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
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
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BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

VOLUME I.
(THIRD SERIES.)



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BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1853.

- ART. I. — 1. *The Glories of Mary. Translated from the Italian of ST. LIGUORI.* New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1852. 12mo. pp. 802.
2. *Jesus the Son of Mary, or the Doctrine of the Catholic Church upon the Incarnation of God the Son, considered in its Bearings upon the Reverence shown by Catholics to his Blessed Mother.* By the Rev. J. B. MORRIS, M. A. London: Toovey. 1851. 2 vols. 8vo.

THE *Glories of Mary*, by St. Alphonso di Liguorio, is a standard work on the subject of which it treats, and too well known and too highly appreciated to require, or to admit, any other notice of it at our hands than the simple announcement of its publication. The works of the saints are to be read and meditated, not criticized, and whoever finds himself unable to relish *The Glories of Mary* must accuse himself, not the author. The edition before us is a new translation of the unabridged work of the Saint, from the Italian, by an estimable lady of New York, like ourselves a convert from Unitarianism, and has been executed at the suggestion, and under the supervision, of the children of St. Alphonsus established in this country. The translator has, we doubt not, found in the performance of her pious labor an ample reward, for Our Lady never fails to obtain rich graces for those who devote themselves to her service.

Jesus the Son of Mary, by the Rev. Mr. Morris, a distinguished convert from Anglicanism, and one of the Pro-

fessors at Prior Park, England, we noticed at length in our Review for July last, chiefly, however, with reference to the doctrinal and other faults which we find in it and the school from which it emanates. But notwithstanding these faults, most of which grow out of certain theories embraced and mental habits contracted by the excellent author and his friends prior to their conversion, and while laboring to *Catholicize* the Anglican Establishment, the work itself is really a valuable contribution to our English Catholic literature. It was not written to bring out the errors we indicated in it, and they might be easily eliminated with advantage to the author's argument. The author seems to us to have written hastily, without taking sufficient time to digest his materials; but his work, after all, is the fullest and most complete treatise on the subject with which we are acquainted. It is an attempt, and for the most part a successful attempt, to determine the place the honor we pay to Mary holds in the general doctrine of the Church on the mystery of the Incarnation, and to show that it is so intimately connected with that mystery, that the denial of its propriety would involve the denial of the Incarnation itself, and therefore of the whole Christian doctrine of grace. This the author accomplishes with a mass of learning and a weight of authority that leave nothing to be desired, and by which we have been alike edified and instructed.

But we have named these works merely as the occasion of some remarks which we wish to offer, in the light of Catholic faith and theology, on the honor which we as Catholics pay to Our Lady, the Most Holy Mother of God and Queen of Heaven, our life, our sweetness, and our hope. We propose to consider the worship of Mary in its foundation, the principles or reasons on which it rests, and to defend the strong expressions used by Catholic writers when speaking of her in connection with our salvation. We do not propose to do this for the special benefit of Protestants, for they are not in a proper state of mind or heart to appreciate what we have to offer; we propose to do it solely for the sake of those of our Catholic friends who are liable to be more or less affected by the objections, cavils, and sneers of the heretical and unbelieving world in the midst of which they are obliged to live.

As Catholics we worship, that is, honor, Mary in com-

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mon with all the saints, and we also offer her a peculiar worship, which we offer to no other saint. We defend this worship in part on the principle on which rests the worship of saints in general, and in part on her peculiar relation, as Mother of God, to the Mystery of the Incarnation. In the *cultus sanctorum*, or worship of the saints, we must distinguish between the honor rendered to the saints, and the Invocation of Saints; for the two things rest on very different principles. We honor the saints, we offer them a religious worship, and we pray to the saints, or invoke their interposition for us.

The principle of the worship of the saints, or of the honor we render them, is that of honoring God in his works, especially in his works of grace, and therefore in his saints, who are his greatest and noblest works. The principle, that God is to be honored in his works, is the most reasonable principle that the human mind can entertain. We do not know from reason alone what is the honor that we are to render to God, but we do know from simple natural reason, that we are to love and honor him supremely, with our whole heart, soul, mind, and strength. But we cannot do this without loving and honoring him in his works. To despise or to refuse to honor the work is to dishonor the workman, and nothing is more natural or more proper, when our hearts are filled with the honor and glory of the workman, than that they should overflow with love and honor to the work. It is a high honor to have been the work of God, for if we rightly consider who and what God is, we must conclude that he can do, or even touch, nothing, without imparting to it, in some sense, an infinite value. Rightly considered, God is no less worthy of honor in his doing than in his being; for since he is, as the theologians say, pure act, his doing and his being, on his side, so to speak, are inseparable. Consequently, he is infinitely adorable in all his works, and whoso despises the meanest of his creatures, even though the veriest clod of senseless earth, despises God, and whoso honors the meanest, because the work of God, honors God himself.

Because the work of God, we say; and this must not be forgotten. The worship of the saints is not the worship of the works of God as abstracted from him, but the worship of God in his works. If we honor the creature for

any other reason than that it is God's creature, we do not honor it as the work of God, but as God, and the honor is idolatrous, and gives to the creature what is due only to the Creator. Here is where our modern transcendentalists, rationalists, socialists, and philanthropists commit their most fatal mistake. They tell us, and tell us truly, that God can be honored in his works, that if we honor God, we shall honor his creatures, and that if we love God, we shall love our brother also; but they add, therefore to honor the works is to honor the workman, and to love man as our brother is in itself to love God. But this conclusion is illogical, for if we do not love and honor the creatures for the reason that they are his creatures, we do not in loving and honoring them love and honor God at all. We love and honor them in place of him, and fall into mere creature-worship, which is idolatry, the crying sin of our times, no less than of the times before our Lord's advent. But to love and honor the works of God, *because* the works of God, for the reason that they are his works, is to love and honor him in them, and is not only not idolatry, but even one of the most effectual preservatives against idolatry, because even in the creature it keeps the mind and heart fixed on the Creator. The principle here is analogous to the principle on which we discharge our duty to God by discharging it to our neighbor. I owe a duty to my neighbor only in God, and I pay it to God, in paying it to my neighbor, if I pay it for God's sake.

Under this point of view, as the work of God, all nature is lovely and worthy of honor, and the true worshipper of God loves to honor it, from the highest to the lowest. To him the crawling worm, the insect of an hour, the mote in the sunbeam, has an untold worth, and becomes an object of tender affection, as we see in the life of many of the saints, especially of St. Francis of Assisium. He who cannot, in a degree at least, sympathize with this seraphic saint in his love of all created things, even the lower orders of creation, has as yet comprehended very little of the mystery of the love of God, and he to whom the saint's love seems ridiculous or unwarranted has as little reason to boast of his progress in true science as in true piety. We have, indeed, no sympathy with our modern nature-worshippers, or our modern cockney poetry, which goes into ecstasy before a daisy or a cowslip; for it

stops short with created nature itself, with nature as independent of God, without regarding it as his handiwork. For this reason our modern poetry is less respectable than the ancient, which peopled the woods, the groves, the rivers and fountains, with Fauns, Dryads, Hamadryads, and Naiads; for even a false conception of the Divinity is still a conception of the Divinity, and is better than none. Ancient poetry sang nature only in its supposed divine relations; the modern severs nature from God, and reflects not that it owes all its truth, beauty, and worth to the fact that it is God's creature. But look upon nature in its relation to the Creator, have always present to the mind that it is his creature, and is hallowed by being the work of his hand, and it at once becomes worthy of the profound reverence and love of every devout heart.

Now, all the arguments which prove that God may and should be honored in his works, prove, *a fortiori*, that he may and should be honored in his works of grace, which are incomparably superior to his works of nature. Of the works of grace, the saints are the greatest. The saint is in reality the greatest and the noblest work of God, and therefore it is especially in his saints that we are to honor God in his works. The saint is a saint only by what he receives from God, and God in crowning him, as St. Augustine teaches us, does but crown his own gifts. What we honor in him is his heroic sanctity, and as this is the work of divine grace, in honoring him we do but honor God in his noblest work. We honor here the gifts of God, and in this we do but imitate, in our feeble manner, God himself, who also honors them, and with a crown of glory, that fadeth not away, eternal in the heavens. What can be more reasonable than for us to honor God in his saints, or more pleasing to him than for us to imitate him in honoring those whom he himself delights to honor? The honor we ~~give~~ give, however high we carry it, redounds to his glory, for it is always *his* works, always *his* gifts, that we honor. How beyond all price do we prize the work or the gift of a much-honored and dearly loved friend! Yet what friend so dear, so intimate, as God? What friend can impart so high a value to his work or to his gift?

These considerations prove beyond all doubt or cavil the reasonableness, in fact the duty, of honoring God in his saints, or of honoring them as his works, and that to

refuse to do so would be to offer an affront, an indignity, to God himself, who deserves all honor both for what he is and for what he does. Therefore the prophet-king breaks forth: "*Laudate Dominum in sanctis ejus; laudate eum in firmamento virtutis ejus.*" "Praise ye the Lord in his saints; praise ye him in the firmament of his power." (Ps. cl. 1.)

The principle, then, on which rests the worship of the saints is solid and unobjectionable. Consequently the worship of Mary as a saint is fully warranted, and there is nothing to be said against it; for certainly Mary was a saint, and the greatest of saints. We see her sanctity in her perfect humility. Who of mortal maidens was ever so highly honored, and yet who so lowly? Never does she once obtrude herself upon our notice; she lives all for God, and breaks her silence only for his glory. In perfect humility is perfect love, and in perfect love is every virtue. Not to honor her as a saint, not to thank God for her spotless virtue, not to call her blessed among women, not to hold her character up for universal love and imitation, would argue on our part hearts cold and depraved, and minds incapable of appreciating true heroic virtue.

The second part of the *cultus sanctorum* is the Invocation of Saints. We honor the saints by invoking them. This rests on a different principle from that of honoring God in his works, namely, that of intercession, which itself rests on the fact that God carries on, so to speak, his works of providence and grace by the agency of ministers. God, of course, could, if it seemed to him good, accomplish the ends of his providence immediately, without the employment of any intermediate agency. Ministers are not necessary to him; he needs no instruments; he can will, and it is done; speak, and it stands fast. He could make the corn to grow without any labor of man to prepare the soil, or to sow the seed. He could confer on us all temporal and spiritual blessings, without our asking for them, for he knows what we need before we ask him, and he is always more ready to give than we are to ask. He could by the direct operation of the Holy Ghost convert the soul, and make us his faithful servants, without the ministry of the Church, or the agency of teachers to instruct, or pastors to rule, feed, and defend us. That is, we see no abstract reason why he could not, if he chose. But he evidently does not so choose. He employs the ministry

of angels, and also of men. This, it is evident from Scripture and tradition, is a part of his plan. In his works of providence, especially in the supernatural order, he admits the faithful, whether angels or men, to a share, employs them on his errands of love and mercy, and permits them to coöperate with him in the work of converting and perfecting souls. He does this, not because he needs them, not because he would impose upon them a task; but because he loves them, and delights to honor them. It is a great honor to be employed by him, and to be permitted to labor in his service. Even to be employed by a temporal prince in the administration of the temporal government is counted a great honor to the one employed; men covet it, and to obtain it shrink from no exertion, and sometimes even from no crime. But the honor of being employed by God, the King of kings and Lord of lords, is infinitely greater than can be that of being employed by the greatest and best of temporal sovereigns. It is a favor which God shows to those who love him, a reward which he confers on them for their love and devotion to him. As he delights to honor them, and to give them, so to speak, a part in his own glory, as the Friend, the Ruler, the Redeemer, and Saviour of men, he permits them to be agents for obtaining and communicating his favors and graces to others. This evidently, from the whole of our religion, is the principle on which he conducts his gracious providence, and we need spend no time in proving it.

Now, this premised, we can understand why intercession may and does have place. God does not need the intercession of any one to placate him, and to render him disposed to confer graces on mankind, for the charity that intercedes comes from him, as its fountain, as its origin and cause; but he requires it for the honor and reward of his saints, so that the intercessor shall be blessed at the same time that is blessed the one for whom he intercedes. It is only on the principle of intercession that prayers for one another are proper, or justifiable, for to pray for another is to make intercession for him. All concede the propriety of praying for one another, and of asking another to pray for us. The priest makes intercession for the people when he prays for them. The Protestant even solicits intercession, when he asks his minister and the congregation to pray for him, for his family, for health, for recovery

from sickness, for the sanctification to him of his sorrows or afflictions, — that he may be protected in his journeying by sea or by land, or that he may be delivered from dangers which threaten, and blessed with seed-time and harvest, rain and sunshine. Every one admits the principle, when ever he says to another, "Pray for me," or, "Let me have an interest in your prayers."

Now, here is the principle of the Invocation of Saints. No one hesitates to ask his friend to pray for him, that is, intercede for him, and the better we esteem such friend, and the more we love him, the more confidently do we beg his prayers. Why shall I ask a weak and fallible mortal, still affected by the infirmities of the flesh, to pray for me, and yet shrink from asking the same thing of a saint in heaven, who sees God face to face? Is it that the saint is less alive? To suppose it were to doubt immortality. The Church teaches us better, in calling the day of the death or departure of a saint his birthday, because it is only then the saint truly begins to live. All before had been, as it were, only a promise of life, upon the reality of which he now enters. It is the blessed privilege of the Christian to have a full assurance of a future life, and to look upon the world after death as more truly real than the present. He has faith, not a simple conjecture, opinion, or persuasion, but faith, which is no less certain than actual personal knowledge. The saints who have thrown off the flesh are to him as near, as dear, as living, as before, and far more so. We do not lose our friends when they die; we gain them, if they die in the Lord. "As I live," saith our Lord, "so shall ye live also." Not for us does the glorious army of saints and martyrs, the bright choir of virgins and purified souls, who honored their Lord in the flesh, exalted the aspirations and hopes of mankind, glorified human nature through divine grace, and consecrated the whole earth, sleep in the cold grave, or lie torpid in some undefined region, waiting the return of a warm spring morning to wake anew into life and activity. They are now living, full of life, a sweet, joyous life, in comparison with which what we call our life is but death.

Is it that the saints have ceased to love us? To suppose it were to deny or to forget the Communion of Saints, that saints on earth and saints in heaven make but one

holy communion, are all members of one body, members of one head, Christ the Lord, and through him members one of another. The glory of the saints when in this world was in this holy communion, in the intercommunion of life between the member and the body, and between the body and the head. They loved their brethren, and knew that they had passed from death to life because they loved them. They lived in and for this communion when here, and were ready at any moment to pour out their life to obtain blessings for it, or to bring new souls within it. Has all this changed with them now? Do they cease to be members of the Church, whom Christ so loved, and whom he hath purchased with his own blood? In being made more like God, in being raised to a participation in a still higher degree of the Divine nature, in being assimilated to their head, because seeing him as he is, — do they become all at once indifferent to those whom he loves, and without interest in the great end of the Incarnation, the highest glory of God? It is impossible. We know better. We know they become like the angels of God, and we know there is joy in heaven among the angels over one sinner doing penance, and therefore that saints do still take an interest in our welfare, and in whatever pertains to our real good.

Is it that they have lost their power, and that, now they are perfected in glory, God will no longer hear their prayers or suffer their intercession? What more absurd! We know that he employs the ministry of angels, and that the intercession of the saint must be more acceptable to him, and more effectual with him, than the intercession of the ungodly, or even the imperfect, and therefore the more holy one is, the more pleasing and effectual must be his intercession. Nor can we suppose that they are incapable of hearing and presenting our petitions. It is not *dead* men we invoke, when we invoke the saints, as rationalistic Protestants pretend, thereby unintentionally revealing their own want of faith in the immortality of the soul, and the reality of the future life. They are living men, shorn of none of their powers by being beatified in heaven. They see God face to face, and they may see all that concerns us, and all that we do, in him, as in a mirror which reflects all. Moreover, beatified spirits are no longer affected by the accidents of space and time

which affect us, and which render our communion with one another and with the eternal world so imperfect. Nothing prevents them from being present to the heart that invokes them, ready to receive our petitions as soon as formed in our own minds and hearts, and to present them to our Lord. They see and hear all in God, by whom they are present to all. We do not see all in God as they do. We see all, indeed, by his uncreated light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world, but much by that light only as reflected to us from sensible things. We see not our guardian angel, yet he as a pure intelligence sees and hears us, and can instantly report all to the company of heaven, or to the saint that we invoke, so that the saint can never be ignorant of the petitions we proffer. In some one or in all of these ways, it is easy to conceive the saint may know what is asked of him. Granting, then, the principle of intercession, as we must, if we ever allow one man to ask the prayers of another, we must concede the propriety of the invocation of saints, and then, evidently, the propriety of invoking Mary, and begging her intercession for us. Hence we find wholly justifiable the worship of Mary as a saint, or that worship which we render her in common with all the saints.

But we worship Mary, not only as St. Mary, in common with all the saints; we render her also a peculiar and a much higher worship. This worship is authorized by her peculiar relation to the Mystery of the Incarnation, therefore to our salvation, and is rendered in honor of that Mystery itself, that is, in honor of God in his human as well as his Divine nature. Those who reject the Incarnation, such as Pelagians, Nestorians, Socinians, or Unitarians, can understand nothing of this worship, and have no lot or part in it; for they can neither worship God in his human nature, nor admit that he really assumed flesh from the flesh of Mary. To them Mary is only an ordinary woman, and holds no peculiar relation to the Mystery of Redemption. She has, in their view, nothing to do with our salvation, and is related to the faithful no otherwise than is any other woman. They assign her no peculiar position or office in the economy of God's gracious providence. They are offended when they hear us call her the Mother of God, and sneer at us when they hear us address her as our own dear Mother. We have nothing here to say to them. The

worship of Mary presupposes the Incarnation, and they who shrink from it show by that fact that they do not really believe in that Mystery, and therefore do not really embrace the Christian religion, and at best make only a hollow profession of it. There is and can be no truer test of one's active, living faith in our holy religion, in the redemption and salvation of sinners through the cross, than a firm attachment to the worship of Mary, or a lively devotion to our Blessed Lady. This is, probably, wherefore devotion to Mary is commonly regarded by the saints as a sign of election.

The peculiar honor we render to Mary, called by our writers *Hyperdulia*, as distinguished from simple *Dulia*, or the worship we pay to all the saints, presupposes the real incarnation of our Lord in her chaste womb, and her real and subsisting maternal relations to God made man. Concede the Incarnation, and the worship follows as a necessary consequence, because then Mary becomes truly the Mother of God. If you concede the Incarnation, you must concede that Mary is the Mother of God; if you deny that she is the Mother of God, you must deny the Incarnation. There is no middle course possible. If Mary is the mother of her son, then the relations between mother and son and all that those relations imply subsist and must for ever subsist between them, and she must be honored as the Mother of God, and therefore of Grace, the grace through which we are redeemed and saved.

In the Incarnation God assumes human nature, becomes man without ceasing to be God, and so assumes human nature that he becomes from the moment of the Incarnation as truly human as he is Divine, — perfect man as well as perfect God. It is not that a perfect man is united to perfect God, but that perfect God becomes himself really perfect man, in such sort that the human nature is as truly the nature of the Divine Person or Word, as is the Divine nature itself. The two natures are united in one person, or the one person is the hypostasis or the one *suppositum* of two distinct natures, one Divine, the other human. The tendency of Protestants, even of those who profess to hold the mystery of the Incarnation, is to regard the union, not as the union of two natures in one person, but as a simple moral union of two persons, one human, the other God, or the union of human nature in

its own human personality with God, which is what Nestorius taught. Hence, Protestants have a tendency to dissolve Christ, and to cherish the spirit of what the Apostle calls Antichrist. But the true doctrine of the Incarnation, which we must admit, if we admit any real incarnation at all, is, that the human and Divine natures are united, without being confounded, in one Divine Person. Person is distinguishable, but not separable, from nature, for no person is conceivable as really existing without a nature; and though human as well as Divine nature is distinguishable from person, yet neither is conceivable as really existing without person or personality. The human nature of Christ is not human nature divested of personality; it is a person as much as is the human nature of Peter or John, but its person is Divine, not human, — the eternal person of the Divine nature of Christ. Hence Christ is two distinct natures in one person, which Divine Person is God, or the second person of the ever-adorable Trinity.

Now God in his human nature is literally and truly the Son of Mary, and she is as much his mother as any woman is the mother of her own son. She is not the mother of a son united to God, of a human son received into union with God, for that were the error of the Adoptionists, and would imply that the human nature of Christ has a human personality, which it has not, and never had. Human nature cannot exist without a personality, and the human nature of Christ, therefore, was not and could not have been generated without his Divine personality. Then that which was conceived in the womb of Mary and born of her was the Divine Person assuming to himself flesh, or the nature of man, therefore God. Hence, in the strictest sense of the word, Mary is the Mother of God, and therefore God is as truly her son as any one is the son of his own mother. Unquestionably, Mary was not the mother of God in his Divine nature, that is, the mother of the Divinity, for in that sense God is eternal, necessary, and self-existent Being, and the Creator of Mary, not her son; but God incarnate is still God, and God having assumed flesh is no less God in his human nature than in his Divine nature. And therefore Mary is none the less the mother of God because his mother only in his human nature, for the human nature of which she is the mother is

the human nature of God. She is not the mother of the Divinity, but she is the mother of God, for since the Incarnation, God the Son is the one person of both Divine nature and human nature, and is as to nature at once God and man. How God can descend to be the person of human nature, or exalt human nature to be truly his own nature, is a mystery which we do not attempt to explain, which transcends every created intelligence, and which none but he himself can fully comprehend. All we know or pretend to know is the fact that he has done so, and thus, although our Creator, has become our brother, flesh of our flesh, that we might be made partakers of his Divine nature, and live for ever in a true society with him.

Now Mary, as the Mother of God, is something more than an ordinary woman, and holds a place in the economy of grace different from that of any other woman, different from and above that of any other creature. She has been honored by the Creator as no other creature has been, for she alone has been selected by him to be his mother. If God has distinguished her from all other women, if he has chosen her to be his mother, shall not we distinguish her from all other women, and honor her as his mother? What higher honor could God confer on a creature than he has conferred on Mary? Shall we not honor whom God himself delights to honor, and like him give her the highest honor that we can give to a creature? We are to love and honor the Son as we love and honor the Father, and we are to love and honor him in his humanity no less than in his Divinity. We cannot dissolve Christ; for "Every spirit that dissolveth Jesus," says the blessed Apostle John, "is not of God; and this is that Antichrist of whom ye have heard that he cometh, and he is now already in the world." (1 John iv. 3.) We cannot dissolve Christ, and worship him in his Divine nature only, and refuse to worship him in his human nature. He is one Christ, not two, one human, the other Divine, — is two for ever distinct natures in one person, to be loved and honored alike in both natures, and therefore in her from whom he took his human nature. We cannot honor him without honoring her, if we try, nor honor her as his mother without honoring him. Such is the intimate relation between the Mother and the Son, that whatever honor we render her as his mother redounds to him, and

whatever honor we render to him as her son — that is, to him as come in the flesh — will overflow and extend to her. The two cannot be separated, for the flesh of the son is of the flesh of the mother, and both have one and the same nature, and impossible is it to honor the nature in the one without honoring it in the other.

If we bear this in mind, we shall find no difficulty in justifying the peculiar worship of Mary, or in vindicating the strongest language which Catholic piety has ever used in addressing her. Mary is the Mother of God; from her the Son of God took his flesh, his human nature. By this fact she becomes intimately connected with the mystery of our redemption and final salvation. We are redeemed only by God, not in his Divine nature, but in that very nature which he took from the womb of Mary. In the present providence of God, man could not be saved and enabled to gain his supernatural end without the Incarnation of the Son, that is to say, man could be redeemed only by God in the flesh, — God in human nature; for as the Divine nature can neither suffer, nor obey, nor merit, it was only in human nature, in the flesh, become really his nature, that God could perform the work of redemption, that he could satisfy for sin, and merit for us the grace of pardon and sanctification. Mary is thus called, and rightly called, “the Mother of Grace,” for she is it inasmuch as she is mother of the Sacred Flesh through which grace has been purchased and is communicated to us.

But God did not become incarnate in the womb of Mary without her free, voluntary consent; and thus she by her own will coöperates in the work of our redemption, and therefore, for another reason, may be called the Mother of Grace and associated with our salvation. Much of what is said of Mary in this respect rests on the fact of this consent. We might reasonably presume, from what we know of the dealings of God with men, that this consent was first obtained; for we cannot well suppose that God would do violence to one he so loved as to choose her to be his mother, or that he would be conceived in her womb against or without her free consent. It is evident, also, from the history given us by St. Luke of the Annunciation, that this consent was asked and obtained. “The angel Gabriel was sent from God into a city of Galilee called Nazareth, to a virgin espoused to a man named Joseph, of the

house of David; and the name of the virgin was Mary. And the angel being come in said to her: Hail, Mary, full of grace! the Lord is with thee: blessed art thou among women. And when she had heard, she was troubled at his saying, and thought within herself what manner of salutation this should be. And the angel said to her, Fear not, Mary; for thou hast found grace with God. Behold thou shalt conceive in thy womb, and shalt bring forth a son; and thou shalt call his name Jesus. He shall be great, and shall be called the Son of the Most High; and the Lord God shall give unto him the throne of David his father; and he shall reign in the house of Jacob for ever, and of his kingdom there shall be no end. And Mary said to the angel, How shall this be done, because I know not man? And the angel answering said to her, The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee; and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee. And therefore also the Holy that shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God. And behold thy cousin Elizabeth, she hath also conceived a son in her old age, and this is the sixth month with her that is called barren; because no word shall be impossible with God. And Mary said, *Behold the handmaid of the Lord: be it done to me according to thy word.* And the angel departed from her." St. Luke i. 26-38.

Here manifestly is consent asked and consent given, and though given, not given till an explanation has been demanded and received. It is plain from the narrative that Mary was not only a virgin, but resolved always to be a virgin, and she gives not her consent until assured by the angel that she can become the mother of the Son of God without prejudice to her virginity. She knows not and will not know man, but when assured that this is not necessary, and referred to the conception of her cousin Elizabeth as an evidence that no word is impossible with God, then, but not till then, does she give her consent. "*Behold the handmaid of the Lord: be it done to me according to thy word.*" There was then a moment when the salvation of the world depended on the consent of Mary. Man could not be redeemed, satisfaction could not be made for sin, and grace obtained, without the Incarnation, and the Incarnation could not take place without the free, voluntary consent of this humble Jewish maiden. While, then, we are lost in admiration of the infinite condescension of

God, that would do such honor to human nature, as in some sort to place himself in dependence on the will of one of our race, to carry into effect his own purpose of infinite love and mercy, we cannot help feeling deep gratitude to Mary for the consent she gave. We call her blessed for the great things He that is mighty has done to her, and we bless her also for her own consent to the work of redemption. She gave to that work all she had; she gave her will; she gave her flesh; she gave her own son to one long passion of thirty-three years, to the agony in the garden, and to the death on the cross. It is true, God had selected her from all eternity to be his mother, and had filled her with grace; but neither the election nor the grace took away her free will, or diminished the merit of her voluntary consent. She could have refused; and deserves she no love and gratitude from us, who have hope only through her flesh assumed by the Son of God, that she did not refuse? Can we say, in view of this fact, that she has no peculiar relation to our redemption, no share in the work of our salvation? To say so would be simply to deny that we are redeemed and saved by God in the flesh, that the flesh or human nature of our Lord performs any office in the work of redemption and salvation. Here is wherefore to refuse to honor Mary as connected with and sharing in that work is to deny that it is in his human nature that God redeems and saves us, which is either to deny redemption and salvation altogether, or to contend that God redeems and saves us in his Divinity, that is, to contend that the Divine nature suffered and died!

Mary is really the Mother of our Lord, for our Lord did in reality, not in appearance merely, come in the flesh. He is true God of God, and true man of the flesh of the Virgin. Then between Mary and Jesus there was and is the real relation of mother and son. This relation is a subsisting relation, and subsists as really in heaven as it did when both were on the earth; and therefore Mary still preserves all her maternal rights in regard to her Son, and he still owes her all filial love, reverence, and obedience. For if he is God, he is also man, and in his humanity has all that pertains to pure and sinless humanity. This would even justify in some measure the expression, — which, however, does not please us, — said to have sometimes been

used, not by the Church, but by some Catholics in their ardent devotion to Mary, "Command thy Son." The Son of God in his humanity, not of course in his Divine nature, nor in any matter which is proper to him only in that nature, was subject to Mary here, and obeyed her; and as the two natures remain in him for ever distinct, two natures in one person, we know no reason for supposing that the relation, and what pertains essentially to it, between the mother and the Son in his human nature, are not precisely, saving that both are now in a glorified state, what they were when on the earth. We are not to suppose the soul loses in the future life the habits of this, and therefore we must suppose that the habits of obedience, love, and reverence of our Lord to his holy Mother here, are still retained. Therefore, that her will, always one with God's will, because moved by the Divine Charity, is still regarded by him as the will of his mother, and has that weight with him that the right will of a mother must always have with a good, pious, and loving son.

This much, at least, is certain, that he loves his mother, loves her as his own mother, and delights to honor her. This is no more than belongs to filial affection. We may then see the reasonableness of what many of our writers say, that Mary is the channel through which our Lord dispenses his graces, and that he dispenses none save through her intercession. This, perhaps, is not precisely of faith, but it is a very general opinion of our doctors. There is no reason why it should not be so, and there are many why we should hold it, aside from the authority of the doctors and the general belief of the faithful. She is the channel through which all grace flows to us, inasmuch as she is the mother of the flesh in which God merited grace for us, redeems, sanctifies, and blesses us with everlasting life. But aside from this, to be made the channel through which God communicates his graces to us, whether the grace of conversion or of perseverance, is a high honor to her. And can we doubt that Jesus, as a loving son, would delight to load with honors that dear mother who had borne him in her womb, and in her arms, and nursed him at her breast? Could he confer on her a higher honor than to make her intercession the condition on which he dispenses grace to us while in the flesh? Can we suppose his love for her would not induce him to do so? Did he not, even

before conceived in her womb, fill her with grace, make her all beautiful? What then, that can be communicated to a creature, will he withhold from her? He will withhold no good thing from them that love him, certainly not then from his own dear mother, who loves him more than any one else. It would be in strict accordance with the plan of God's gracious providence, which includes the ministry of angels, and adopts throughout the principle of intercession as an integral part of it, for our Lord to place Mary first, and to give her the blessed privilege of interceding in all cases, and of always having her intercession effectual. The whole, under this point of view, rests on the love which God bears to his saints, and his delight to honor them. It would seem, if we may so speak, that his love is so great that he exhausts his infinite wisdom in multiplying honors to them. And which of his saints should he so delight to honor as his own immaculate and loving mother?

Mary is also *our* mother, the mother of all the faithful. They who never reflect on the Mystery of the Incarnation, and who have no faith in redemption through the cross, laugh at us when we call Mary our mother. Yet she is our mother, and, to say the least, as truly our mother as was Eve herself. Eutychianism is a heresy. The human nature, hypostatically united to the Divine, remains for ever distinct from the Divine nature, and therefore our Lord remains for ever God and man in one Divine person. By assuming our nature, the Son of God has made himself our brother. We become, through the nature so assumed, of the same nature with God. Hence he is not ashamed to call us brethren. Now of this human nature in Christ, by which we become united to God by nature, Mary is the mother, and as the human as well as the Divine nature is one, she is truly our mother, in so far as we through that nature become united to him. She is not our natural mother in the sense of mother of our personality, but of our nature in God, and in so far as we were raised to brotherhood with Christ her Son, and are made through him one with God.

She is our spiritual mother, for it is only through her flesh assumed by the Son of God that we were redeemed and begotten to the new spiritual life. We cannot too often repeat, that it is the Word made flesh, or God in

the flesh, that redeems and saves or beatifies us. It is always through the incarnate Son that we have access to the Father, or that even the saints in heaven become one with God, and behold him in the beatific vision as he is. The life we as Christians live here is the life that proceeds from God in his humanity, and the life we hope to live hereafter proceeds from him in the same sense. To suppose the saint here or hereafter separated from the flesh which God assumed in the womb of the Virgin, would be to suppose his annihilation as a saint, as much as to suppose our separation from God as Creator would be to suppose the annihilation of our natural existence. Here is the mystery of godliness which was manifest in the flesh. Then, unless we can make it true that Mary is not the mother of our Lord in his human nature, we cannot make it untrue that she is our spiritual mother. So long as spiritual life is dependent on God in his human nature, so long is Mary truly the mother of spiritual life, and so long as she is the mother of that life, so long is she our spiritual mother, and to be honored as such, and honored even more than our natural mother, for the spiritual life is infinitely more than the natural life. Mary is also our spiritual mother, inasmuch as it has been through her intercession that we have been regenerated, and hope to obtain the gift of perseverance.

Mary is called the Queen of Heaven, — of heaven and earth, — Universal Queen. Our Lord is King, for to him has all dominion been given. He is king, not merely as Son of God, in his Divine nature, but he is king in his human nature, as Son of Mary. Her Son is King; then she, as mother of the king, is Queen, the Queen his Mother. As he loves and honors his mother, and must as a good son wish all creatures also to love and honor her, he must have crowned her Queen, and given her a formal title to the love, honor, and obedience due to a queen.

Here are considerations which, if taken in connection with the Mystery of the Incarnation, will fully justify our warm devotion to Mary, and the strongest expressions which in the fervor of our piety we can use. God has honored her and placed her above every other creature, next below himself, and endowed her with all the graces a creature can receive, and exalted her to a rank as near his own as she can hold without ceasing to be creature. She

is pure, spotless, all-beautiful, full of grace, full of sweet love, coöperating in her will in the whole work of redemption, and constantly interceding for sinners, and the perseverance of the regenerate. What more can we say? What other creature can have higher, or any thing like so high, claims upon our love and gratitude? And what can be more pleasing to her Divine Son, than for us to regard ourselves as her clients, and to render her the highest honor in our power? Considering her relation as Mother of our King, the love her Son bears her, the high honor he bestows on her, and the favors he delights constantly to show her, whose intercession can be more powerful, or whom can man invoke with more, or with equal confidence?

The peculiar devotion of Catholics to Mary springs, as all must see, from our faith in the Incarnation. Granting that mystery, all is right and proper, and consequently the fact that we insist on it bears witness to the world that we believe with a firm faith that that mystery is a reality, that Jesus has really come in the flesh, and that by his flesh, or God in the flesh, we are saved. The worship of Mary is one perpetual festival in honor of that sacred mystery, and the prominent part assigned to Mary in all Catholic worship is only a proof of our faith, that all in Christian redemption and salvation turns on the mystery of the Word made flesh. The daily practice of devotion to Mary as the Mother of God, aside from the special graces it obtains for us, keeps alive in our minds and in our hearts this Mystery of Mysteries, and our dependence on it for every good in the spiritual order. We cannot think of Mary without thinking of Jesus; we cannot honor her without honoring him as her Son; for here the honor of the mother is from the son, not the honor of the son from the mother. We do not honor Mary as separated from her son, but as his mother, and for what she is being his mother. Her name brings at once to our mind his name, and the Mystery of the Incarnation, the foundation of all our hope, the source of all our life. We do not connect her with the Mystery of Redemption as efficient cause, for the efficient cause is the infinite charity of the ever-adorable Trinity, but we do connect her with it as a medial cause, as an instrument, and as an instrument freely coöperating, and therefore as not without a moral share in the work and the glory of our salvation. As long

as we worship her, we can never forget the Lord that bought us, who has redeemed us with a price, with the price of his own blood; and indifference to her worship is always a sign of a want of love to him, and of faith in the Incarnation as a reality. None of those who reject her worship understand, or if they understand believe, the doctrine of salvation through the cross. Her worship is the best conceivable preservative of the essential Christian faith, and to neglect it, as we see from the history of Protestantism, is only to fall into unbelief and mere naturalism.

The pretence of those who consider that this worship of the saints, and especially of Mary, is idolatry, does not move us in the least. So far is it from being idolatry, it is a real and sure protection against idolatry. Idolatry consists in worshipping that which is not God in the place of God, or giving to that which is not God the honor due only to God. We are not commanded to honor, that is, to worship, — for, according to the true sense of the word, *to worship* means *to honor*, — none but God. We are commanded to honor the king, magistrates, our parents, and indeed all men. The heathen were idolaters, not simply because they had images, and honored them, but because they either worshipped the images as being themselves God, or as symbols of non-existing or demoniacal powers, that is, as symbolizing either what is not, or what is not God. To honor the saints as God, or as gods having a divinity of their own, though inferior to the Supreme Divinity, would undoubtedly be idolatry. But we do no such thing. We honor or worship God in his saints, as his work, and therefore the honor we give them redounds to him, for they are saints only by his grace. We do not honor Mary as God; we know she is a creature, and that it is only as a creature we can honor her. The very foundation of the honor we give her is the fact that she is a creature. We honor her as the Mother of God, from whose womb he took his flesh, his created nature, and therefore to deny her to be a creature herself would be to deny the very foundation of the honor we render her. The more we honor her, the more, therefore, are we reminded that she is not God, but is, like ourselves, God's creature. We cannot call her our mother, and assert that it is only through the flesh our Lord took from her womb that we come into brotherhood with him, and

are united to him by a common nature, without distinctly asserting her to be a creature like ourselves. To suppose her divine, or any other than a true woman of our own race, would overthrow our whole faith in the Mystery of the Incarnation, and destroy all our hopes of heaven. Truly then may we say, that to honor Mary as the Mother of God is not only not idolatry, but the best possible preservative against idolatry, and as Catholics are the only people who really thus honor her, so are they also the only people in the world who are wholly free from all taint of idolatry.

Protestants call the worship we pay to Our Lady, in which they have no share, Mariolatry, and, in order to justify their alienation from the family of Christ, seek, under pretext of zeal for the honor of God, to brand it as idolatrous. We are neither moved nor surprised by this. They have lost the deep sense of the Christian religion, and really retain no worship to God superior to that which we pay to him in his saints. In regard to external worship, it is not we who worship Mary as God, but they who do not worship God himself as God. The peculiar distinctive external worship of God is the offering of sacrifice; but Protestants have no sacrifice, as they have no priesthood, and no altar, — even their temple is only a meeting-house, or place of assembling together. In rejecting the Sacrifice of the Mass, they have retained nothing more than we offer to Mary and the saints. Consequently they are unable to perceive any distinction between what they regard as the external worship of God; and that which we render to him in his saints, — that is, a worship of prayer and praise. But we have a Sacrifice, and are therefore able to distinguish between the highest honor we render to his saints, and the supreme worship we render to him. Supreme religious worship is sacrifice, and sacrifice we offer to God only, never to any creature.

The Protestant may speak of internal sacrifices, those of a broken heart, and of inward justice, but these are only sacrifices by way of analogy, and what should always accompany the sacrifice proper. If the Protestant tells us he has in the interior homage of contrition and real submission of himself a distinct and peculiar worship of God, we tell him, in return, that then he must not call the worship we render to Mary Mariolatry, because this homage and submission,

in the sense he means, we never offer to her. If he has something in this interior homage that pertains to supreme worship, the worship of *Latria*, he must bear in mind that we do not offer it to the saints, and therefore our worship of them is not idolatry; if he has not something of this sort, then he does not himself offer any worship proper to God, external or internal, and therefore has in no sense any worship to offer to God of a higher order than that which we offer to Mary and the saints. Hence we are not surprised that he should accuse us of Mariolatry.

The simple truth is, that the Protestant rejects the worship of Mary, because he does not believe in the Incarnation, and his calling it Mariolatry is only a proof that he dissolves Jesus, and is Antichrist, and does not believe salvation cometh from God in the flesh, from God whose nature is human nature as well as Divine nature. The honor we render to Mary is in the last analysis the honor we pay to the Sacred Mystery of the Incarnation, and either it is idolatry to worship the human nature of Christ, that is, God in his human nature, or our devotion to Mary is not idolatry. The first, none but a Unitarian dare assert, and therefore none other dare deny the last.

The worship of the saints, we therefore conclude, is the worship of God in his works; the peculiar worship of Mary is the honoring of God in the Mystery of the Incarnation. As God in both is infinitely adorable, the honor we render to the saints or to Mary can never be carried too high, and as it is always distinguishable in kind from that worship which we render to him for what he is in himself, as God our Creator, Redeemer, and Supreme Good, it can never be idolatry, or detract from the honor due to him alone. We love and honor God too little, but we cannot love and honor the saints too much; we are too weak, too cold, and too languid in our love to Jesus, but we cannot be too strong and fervid in our love to Mary, for we can never love and honor her so much as God himself loves and honors her.

Our readers will readily perceive that we have had no intention of exhausting the subject on which we have been remarking. We have only wished to throw out a few suggestions, which, if followed out by those who may have difficulties in regard to it, may lead them to the full conviction that it is not without reason that the Church as-

signs so large a place to the devotion of Mary, and that there is something more than mere accident in the fact, that the greatest saints have always gone the farthest in their love and honor of Our Lady. We have cited few authorities, for our purpose has been, not so much to prove the Catholic doctrine on the subject, as to remove some of the obstacles which persons with a feeble faith may find in the way of accepting it. We have wished simply to present it under its rational aspect, so that the reader might seize the general principles on which it rests. But for our own mind, and that of every true Catholic, the simple fact that the Church authorizes it is enough; and the fact that all the saints in every age of the Church, as far as history gives us any information, have always had a peculiarly tender devotion to Mary, is argument enough to recommend its practice. We are unworthy clients of Mary, and we may fail of beholding her and her Divine Son in heaven, but we have no hope to persevere unto the end but through her intercession for us; and we are sure that we become acceptable to her Son only in proportion as we love and honor her. She is our sweet mother; she is the mother of our life, of our hope, and we pray to her to obtain grace for us that we may be made worthy to be termed her son.

Devotion to Mary has always been practised in the Church, and we find it general and prominent at the very moment when the *disciplina arcani* ceased, and the doctrines and practices of the Church were revealed to the profane as well as to the initiated. It is not a devotion of modern origin or of modern development; for the very church in which assembled the Holy Council of Ephesus, that condemned the blasphemy of Nestorius, and defined Mary to be the Mother of God, was dedicated to God under the patronage of Our Lady. Though we recognize in the Church no developments of new doctrines, we do recognize devotional developments; and it is no objection to a particular devotion, that it does not in its form date from the time of the Apostles. The piety of the faithful takes different directions in different ages and in different countries, and assumes different forms. Thus the worship of the Sacred Heart of Jesus as a special form of devotion is quite recent. Ordinarily a new form of devotion springs up when and where there is a new heresy

or heretical tendency to oppose. The Church is the keeper and the witness, the teacher and the judge, of faith, and faith is the root and foundation of every Christian virtue, because it is only through faith that we are regenerated, or begotten into the life of the Christian order. The Church, as the divinely instituted medium of begetting and promoting that life in the world, necessarily directs her first care to the spread and preservation of the faith, which is the same everywhere and always. But her usual practice, when any particular tendency of the times or of the country threatens the purity of the faith, is to set the faithful to praying against it, by granting them a form of devotion especially fitted to keep alive in their hearts the particular dogma or truth that is threatened. Hence, when Berengarius assailed the Holy Mystery of the Eucharist, and denied the transubstantiation of the sacramental bread and wine into the flesh and blood of our Lord, she not only judicially condemned the heresy, but she instituted the Feast of Corpus Christi, and established processions in honor of the Sacred Host. So, in these latter days, when Gnosticism revives, and the reality of the sacred Humanity of Christ is denied, she authorizes the Devotion to the Sacred Heart. The Holy Ghost is ever present in his Church and in the hearts of the faithful; and now, when the Incarnation is so widely rejected, forgotten, or blasphemed, he seems to move in the faithful and to inspire them with a new and more special devotion to Mary the Mother of God. Hence we account for that general desire now manifest to have the Immaculate Conception of Mary defined to be of faith. The faithful would render her a new honor, that they may have a new protection against the desolating heresy, and also bear a new, and, if possible, a more decided, testimony against it. These are developments of devotional practices, not of faith, and developments whose primary object is the preservation of the faith in its purity, integrity, and life. Even if it were true that the devotion to Mary holds a more prominent place in modern than in ancient devotion, it would not be any argument against it, for the times specially demand it, and it is only by the general prevalence of this devotion that the age can be saved from heresy, idolatry, superstition, and irreligion.

ART. II.—*Histoire des Souverains Pontifes Romains.* Par M. LE CHEVALIER ARTAUD DE MONTOR, Ancien Chargé des Affaires de France à Rome, à Florence, et à Vienne, Membre de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belle-Lettres, etc. Paris. 1847. 8 tomes. 8vo.

WE notice this work again, for although not very profound, or in all respects faultless, it is the best popular history of the Sovereign Pontiffs with which we are acquainted. It is written by a layman for the people, not for theologians, and is, to some extent, an abridgment, rather than a strictly original work; but the author seems to have had access to good materials, and to have availed himself of the best authorities on the subject. He has in the later volumes inserted some valuable documents not generally known, and upon the whole produced for the general reader a valuable as well as a very interesting history of the Sovereign Pontiffs from St. Peter down to Pius the Sixth inclusive, which we should be most happy to see presented to our public in an English dress. It is a work much needed, and would be of great service to our community, especially to our *liberal* Catholics, who wish the Pope to confine himself, as a good *curé*, to his parish church at Rome.

M. Artaud is a sincere Catholic, and for the most part writes as a *Roman* Catholic, not merely as a member of *l'Église Gallicane*. He has lived long enough in Italy and at Rome to get rid of many national prejudices, and to acquire a sincere affection for the successors of St. Peter, and a warm devotion to the Holy See. He writes in an amiable spirit, with great sweetness of temper, and true French urbanity and grace. He evidently aims at strict historical truth, and he takes good care not to sully his pages with the unfounded charges against the Sovereign Pontiffs, so often repeated by the enemies of religion and lovers of the world; although the more serious charges against some of them, which have passed into history and been entertained by grave Catholic historians, he briefly examines, and, for the most part, refutes. His History would please us better, we confess, if it gave us fuller details of the lives of the earlier Popes, and especially of the Popes in the much calumniated tenth century; also if it presented the Pontiffs in

their relations to the Catholic world generally, instead of presenting them exclusively, or almost exclusively, in their relations with France. Under a Catholic point of view, France has always been an important kingdom, but it is not and never has been all Christendom. The author, however, is a Frenchman, writing for Frenchmen, and it is not strange that he should take his own country for his centre, and judge persons and events by their bearing upon its interests.

Still it would be unjust to the excellent author to leave the impression upon our readers, that he is remarkably French in his feelings and attachments. His nationality sometimes, indeed, warps his judgment, and leads him to praise certain French kings and statesmen who deserve any thing but the commendation of Catholics and friends of European civilization; but in general he is candid and just. He takes sides, as he should, with the Popes in the quarrels of the sovereigns of his country with the Holy See, and earnestly protests against pronouncing judgments against men according to their national origin or breeding. He aims to rise above nationalities, and to remember that Rome, not Paris, is the centre of Catholic unity. Certainly he loves his own nation, for which no one can blame him; but he uniformly insists that we have no right to condemn, or to speak slightly of, any people as a whole. For this we thank him. It is too much the fashion with many of us to praise or condemn whole nations and races, and to deny all good or all evil to a people, because French, English, German, or Italian. This is wrong. God has made of one blood all the nations of men, and there is no nation incapable of virtue or of vice, — in which there are not individuals who can degrade themselves below the brute, or through grace rise to true heroic virtue. The Celt can equal the Saxon in good and in bad qualities, and the Saxon in both can equal the Celt. Man is man the world over, and of whatever nation one may have sprung, it is properly no ground of glory or of disparagement. Even these United States may yet have their saints descended from the old Puritan stock. England was once called the Island of Saints, and may be again. Germany has given us Luther and the Reformation, but she has also given us St. Henry, and the author of the *Imitation of Christ*. Poland floods the world with revolutionists and desperadoes, but she did much to de-

fend Christendom against the Turks, and has given her share of saints to the calendar. France has spread false philosophy and incredulity through all civilized nations, but she has also hallowed every continent and the most distant isles of the ocean with the blood of her martyred missionaries of the Cross. She has given her name to a theory which virtually emancipates the temporal order from the law of God, and sanctions political atheism, but she has furnished us the ablest and most successful defenders of the supremacy of the spiritual order, and of the prerogatives of the Holy See. There is good and there is bad in all nations and races, and never should we allow ourselves to commend or condemn any one nation or race indiscriminately.

M. Artaud evidently believes himself an Ultramontane, and is much more Ultramontane than many Italians who declaim lustily against Gallicanism, but he is not precisely a Papist after our own heart. He denies, indeed, the last of the Four Articles, the one which asserts that the doctrinal decisions of the Pope are reformable, unless accepted by the Church; but we can find nowhere in his pages a distinct denial of the first, by far the most objectionable of them all, — the one which denies the Church all temporal authority, and asserts the independence of sovereigns in temporals, and which therefore involves the political atheism now so rife throughout the civilized world. It is true, he defends St. Gregory the Seventh in his conflict with Henry of Germany, and Boniface the Eighth in his struggle for the rights of the Church against Philip le Bel of France, but he does it on principles which the lowest Gallican of the times of Louis the Fourteenth might have accepted, and by no means on the principles asserted by these holy Pontiffs themselves. He professes to follow the popular theory of the excellent and learned M. Gosselin of St. Sulpice, and derives the power exercised by the Popes over temporals in the Middle Ages from the concessions of sovereigns, the consent of the people, the public law of the time, and the maxims then generally received; not from the express grant of power by our Lord to Peter, nor yet from the inherent universal supremacy of the spiritual order. He must, therefore, hold that power to be of human origin, and its possession a mere accident in the history of the Church. This, with many for whom we

- have a profound reverence, is at present a favorite method of defending the power exercised over sovereigns by Popes and Councils in the Middle Ages, — a power always odious to tyrants and demagogues, and which it is gravely asserted is no longer held or claimed by the successors of St. Peter.

Of course we are far from denying the fact of the consent and concessions alleged, or that the claim of the power in question was in accordance with the public law and generally received maxims of the age; nor do we deny that this fact fully justifies, on the principles of modern politics, the use which was made of it by Popes and Councils; yet we confess that the complete and absolute justification of that power seems to us to demand the assumption of a higher ground, and a different line of argument.

According to M. Gosselin, as cited by M. Artaud in his *Life of St. Gregory the Seventh*, "the power exercised over sovereigns by Popes and Councils in the Middle Ages was not a criminal usurpation of the rights of sovereigns by the ecclesiastical authority," because "the Popes and Councils who exercised this power only followed and applied the maxims then very generally received, not only by the people, but by men the most enlightened and virtuous." The fact here alleged is undeniable, but when we adduce it in defence of the exercise of that power, do we not defend the Church as a human rather than as a divine institution? This line of argument would, no doubt, answer our purpose most admirably, if we were defending a human government; but where what we have to defend is not a human government, but a divinely constituted and supernaturally assisted and protected Church, it, even if admissible at all, seems to us altogether unsatisfactory. It is certainly undeniable that the concessions of sovereigns and the consent of the people were obtained on the ground that the Popes held the power by divine right, and that those maxims on which M. Gosselin relies for the justification of the Popes and Councils in exercising it were, that the spiritual order, and therefore the Church as the representative of that order, is supreme, and temporal sovereigns are subjected to it, and to the Pope as its supreme visible chief. Popes and Councils in exercising authority over sovereigns even in temporals were, according to those maxims, only exercising the inherent rights of the Church as the spiritual authority, and conse-

quently sovereigns were bound to obey them, not by human law only, but also by the law of God. Such incontestably is the doctrine of the magnificent Bulls of St. Gregory and Boniface, and of the maxims according to which it is attempted to justify the power exercised over sovereigns by Popes and Councils.

Now these maxims either were true or they were false. If they were false, how will you justify an infallible Church — expressly ordained of God to teach the truth in faith and morals, and to conduct individuals and nations in the way of holiness — in adopting and acting on them? If they were true, how can you deny that the power exercised is of divine origin, or pretend that it is derived from the consent of the people, or the concession of sovereigns?

Moreover, we confess that we are extremely averse to defending things in the history of the Church, which happen just now to be unpopular, on the ground that they were authorized by the maxims of the age, that is, the public opinion of the time. We have yet to learn that public opinion is infallible or obligatory. We are unwilling to receive it as law, and cannot understand how an infallible Church, deriving her knowledge and wisdom from above, can take it for her guide, far less how, in case she adopts and follows an erroneous opinion, she can plead in her justification or excuse, that she “only followed and applied the maxims very generally received, not only by the people, but by men the most enlightened and virtuous.” Have we in the Church nothing superior to human intelligence and virtue? Is the Church dependent upon, and responsible to, public opinion, and therefore in nothing superior to an ordinary Protestant sect? We own we had thought it the office of the Church, not to learn from public opinion, but to instruct and form it, — not to be judged by it, but to judge it, — not to conform to the maxims of the age, but to use all her power to make the age conform to her own maxims. Is this her office? Is she qualified to discharge it? How, then, undertake to justify her in the exercise of a power which you deny to be properly hers, on the ground that she only followed the maxims of the age? or how dare you suppose, in case of a collision between her and public opinion, that she, not public opinion, is in the wrong, and must give way?

The Church, placed in the world to teach and govern it,

must undoubtedly apply her own principles and maxims according to the circumstances, conditions, and wants of particular times and places; but we cannot help believing that it is our duty either to renounce her, and no longer hold her to be God's Church, supernaturally endowed and assisted, or else to maintain that the principles and maxims she adopts and applies are those which she receives from her heavenly Spouse, and not from the age which she is ordained to teach and govern. If she adopts and applies false principles and maxims, or a line of policy not at all times and places just and true in principle, she is, as far as we can see, inexcusable, and it is but a miserable defence to allege that she only "follows and applies the maxims very generally received, not only by the people, but by men the most enlightened and virtuous." Reëstablish the "discipline of the secret," if you can, resort to the *œconomia* or prudent reserve practised by the Fathers, if you will, or if it is possible with the past history of the Church before the public, but do not take up a line of defence that reduces her to the level of human governments, philosophies, and sects. Least of all attempt to justify her on the ground that she only conforms to the maxims of the age, especially in these times, when the tendency is to derive all authority from the multitude, and to declare popular opinion the supreme law.

We have not read M. Gosselin's highly esteemed and learned work on the power of the Sovereign Pontiffs in the Middle Ages, and consequently are unable to speak of his theory as he may himself hold it. What we oppose is not his theory, at least as his, but a theory which we every day encounter, and which is almost everywhere alleged against us, whenever we venture to assert the supremacy of the spiritual order, save as a vague speculation, intended to have no practical application, — a theory apparently adopted as a sort of compromise between Gallicanism and Ultramontanism, yet a compromise in which the concessions are all on the side of the anti-Gallican, and incompatible with the theory of the Church that we have been taught, and with what seems to us to be the natural relation between the two powers, temporal and spiritual. Nothing we may say is intended to have any application to M. Gosselin himself.

It strikes us that the advocates of this popular theory,

which concedes the human, but denies the divine right of the Church over sovereigns, confound two things which are very distinguishable, namely, the origin and ground of the power in question, and the conditions of its practical temporal or civil consequences. As a matter of fact, this power was in accordance with the public law and the generally received maxims of Christendom in the Middle Ages, and had it not been so, its exercise would not and could not have had direct practical effects in the civil order. To its practical efficacy in temporals, the consent of sovereigns and of the people was indispensable. The Church is herself a spiritual kingdom, and her powers are in their origin and nature spiritual, and to be exercised always for a spiritual end. Her exercise of these powers has not *per se* temporal consequences in the temporal order, because she is not herself the temporal power, and has not in herself the material force requisite to give it temporal effect, and cannot, as a fact, obtain it without the consent of the prince, royal, aristocratic, or popular. She might without the maxims and public law of the Middle Ages have performed all the acts she did in regard to temporal sovereigns, and they would have had their spiritual effect, but no temporal or civil effects. In a country like ours, for example, excommunication has only spiritual consequences, because the civil law does not recognize it. The excommunicated person loses none of his civil rights, and stands before the civil law or the state precisely as if no sentence of excommunication had been pronounced against him. Marriage, invalid by the canon law, yet not contrary to the civil law, is invalid here only in the eyes of the Church, and loses none of its civil rights or effects. The excommunication and deposition by the Pope of a sovereign of England would, as the English law now stands, work no civil consequences, because the law of the realm does not recognize such excommunication and deposition, and makes none of the civil rights or prerogatives of the sovereign depend on his being in the communion of the Catholic Church. And this, too, whether the sovereign be a Catholic or a Protestant. Yet were her present gracious Majesty to become reconciled to the Church, she would forfeit her crown, because the civil law incapacitates all but Protestants, of some sort, from wearing it, as before Elizabeth it incapacitated all but Catholics. As a fact, then, the can-

ons of the Church can have civil consequences only on condition that the prince recognizes them as the law of the land. Hence the Church can never secure to her decrees, sentences, or canons their proper civil effects against, or without the consent of, temporal sovereigns. Like consequences would not now generally follow acts like those of the Popes and Councils in the Middle Ages, because now in most states the civil law does not recognize them, and would treat them as *non avenue*. The civil law in our times concedes to the acts of the spiritual authority no civil efficacy, and therefore their direct consequences are all confined to the spiritual order. We grant, then, that, as a matter of fact, the Church is dependent on the consent of the people for the civil consequences of her power over temporal princes, and in this sense and thus far we agree with the advocates of the theory in question.

But not therefore does it follow that the power formerly exercised by Popes and Councils over sovereigns in temporals is derived from the concessions of princes and the consent of the people, from human law, and the generally received maxims of the age. It by no means follows from any thing of this sort, that princes or people have the right before God to prevent the power from having its civil consequences, or that the power itself is not of divine origin, and inherent in the Church as the spiritual authority. A man may, if he chooses to incur eternal damnation, reject or blaspheme the Church, but that does not prove that he has the right to do so. Princes and people may refuse to recognize as law the canons of the Church, and proceed as if no such canons existed; but that does not prove that they can do so without wrong, or without incurring the wrath of Heaven. The Church may, in fact, depend on the will of sovereigns or civil enactments for the civil efficacy of her canons, and yet have a divine right over sovereigns in temporals as well as in spirituals. Because the public law and the maxims generally received by nations have, in this respect, been changed in modern times, we cannot say that they have been rightfully changed, that civilization, freedom, and virtue have profited by the change, or that the Popes have lost, far less abandoned, the power they formerly exercised over temporal affairs. They may not assert the power now, because now it cannot be exercised with its proper temporal consequences; but because they

do not now assert it, we are not to conclude that they do not now possess it, or that they do not hold it by divine right.

We regard this question, as to the relation of the two powers to each other, as of no little practical importance at the present time, and even in our own country; and though we have often discussed it, we must be allowed to discuss it again, and with some thoroughness. There have crept even into the Catholic camp not a few gross errors in regard to it, which are no less dangerous to civil liberty and social order, than hostile to the Church and derogatory to the rights of her Sovereign Pontiff. It is quite the fashion even for Catholic politicians to assert, that, though the Church is supreme in spirituals, the state in temporals is absolutely independent of her authority. "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's. As long as the Church keeps within her own province, and confines herself to spirituals, we respect her, and submit to her authority; in spirituals, we even recognize the authority of the Pope, and allow that in them he may do what he pleases; but he has no authority in temporals, and in them we will do as we please." Such is the popular doctrine of the day, and of not a few who would take it as a gross affront and as downright injustice were we to insinuate that they are but sorry Catholics. Scarcely a Catholic amongst us engaged in politics can open his mouth without uttering this doctrine, and uttering it as if it were an incontestable truth and a maxim of divine wisdom. It has become the commonplace of the whole political world, and is rung out upon us from thrones and the cabinets of ministers, the halls of justice and legislation, and from the hustings and the caucus. Whoso ventures to question it, is stared at as the ghost of some old dreamy monk of the Dark Ages. Let us, then, be allowed to examine it.

The Church is supreme in spirituals, the state in temporals; the two powers are distinct, each independent in its own order. This is the popular doctrine in its least offensive form. It was the doctrine of the Gallican bishops, — or rather of Colbert, the minister of Louis the Fourteenth, — assembled by order of the king in 1682. According to this doctrine, in all that belongs to the temporal order, the temporal authority is supreme, and therefore absolutely independent of the spiritual authority. This is

a bold doctrine, and it requires some nerve in a man who believes in God to defend it. If it is conceded, it must be maintained, that, let the sovereign reign as he will, tyrannize and oppress his subjects in temporals as he may, the spiritual authority has no right to rebuke him, and the Pope, as visible head of the Church, has no power to admonish him, or to subject him to discipline. However his subjects may be ground down to the dust, however they may groan under the weight of his iniquitous exactions, the Church must look on in silence, and never dare open her mouth in their behalf, or in the most modest and timid tones possible remind the tyrant that "the king is not in reigning, but in reigning justly."

Nor is this the worst. The doctrine means, if any thing, that the temporal order is independent of the law of God, and therefore of God himself. It must, if independent of the spiritual authority, be virtually independent of God, even though you should pretend that it is bound to obey his law; for it can in such case be bound to obey that law only as it interprets it for itself, and a law which it is free to interpret for itself is no law at all, — is but its own will, passion, or caprice. To declare the temporal independent of the spiritual, is only, in other words, to declare that God has no dominion over it, no right to legislate for it, or to sit in judgment on it, and therefore that sovereigns in temporals are under no law, accountable to no power above themselves, and free to do whatever they please. Their sovereign will and pleasure is the only rule of right or wrong in temporals. What the prince wills is right, what he forbids is wrong. Here is absolute political atheism. God is voted out of the constitution of the state, and in politics there is no God, unless it be the temporal sovereign himself. Do you not see that, if you hold this, you must take Cæsar for god, as under pagan Rome, and hold right and godlike whatever he does, and that it is permitted you to have no will but his? How, if Cæsar is god, or subject to the divine law only as he interprets it for himself, can you accuse him of tyranny or oppression? What law can you adduce that he is bound to obey? What right have you to denounce the temporal tyranny of a Nero, a Decius, a Maximian, a Diocletian, a Henry the Second, a Louis of Bavaria, a Don Pedro the Cruel, or a Charles le Mauvais? Let the crowned monsters, whom all history holds up to

our execration, ride roughshod as they will over the hearts of their inoffending subjects, what right have you to blame them? They do but exercise the independence you claim for them, and denounce us for denying to them.

But it may be you are democrats, and fancy that you obviate this objection by asserting the sovereignty of the people, and making all power emanate from them, and all rulers and magistrates responsible to them. But you only crown the people instead of one man, put the people in the place of the king. You assert their independence of the Church, and maintain the absolute independence of their will in temporals. Are the people as sovereign bound to conform to the law of God as interpreted by the Church? To say that, would be to abandon your favorite doctrine, and to agree with us. Are they bound to conform to that law only as they interpret it for themselves? Then are they virtually not bound by it at all. Are the people a god? You cannot say it, if you are Christians. Are they infallible? You dare not pretend it, if you respect common sense. Are they impeccable? You know better, if you know any thing. What assurance, then, have you that they will not construe the law of God, even if they acknowledge it, so as to authorize whatever iniquity they for the time being imagine it for their interest to practise? Or that they will not tyrannize in temporals as well and as fatally as kings and Cæsars?

“O, but you blaspheme the people! You are no democrat; you are an absolutist, an aristocrat, a monarchist, and would have kings and nobles, born booted and spurred, to ride us by the grace of God. *A bas les rois! A bas les aristocrats! Vive le peuple!*” Peace, good friends! Do not suppose, because you have lost your senses, that every body else should be sent to the lunatic asylum. Do not fancy that, because your understandings have become darkened, you are enlightened, or that all light is extinguished. If you retain the least glimmering of common sense, you must see that it is precisely against absolutism, that is, the independence of the temporal sovereign, whether king or people, that we are contending. Blaspheme the people! And whom do you blaspheme when you put the people in the place of God, and declare their will the law of God, as you do in your application of the maxim, “The voice of the people is the voice of God”? We love freedom,

perhaps, as much, to say the least, as you do; but do not require us to be stupid enough to suppose that the best way to secure it is to destroy its indispensable conditions. Have you no knowledge of history? Know ye not that the very doctrine which we oppose, and you defend, was originally invented by graceless courtiers to please tyrannical masters, and that it has been by substituting it for what you call the monkish doctrine of the Dark Ages, that kings have emancipated themselves from all law, destroyed the old free constitutions of Europe, and established very nearly throughout all Christendom that Byzantine system of government, or that centralized despotism, against which you direct in vain your Jacobinical and Red Republican revolutions? You, with all your democratic froth and foam, only reproduce in another form the very doctrine that permits kings to play the tyrant at will. Because you make the people God, or at least claim for them the prerogatives of the Church of God, you must not suppose that we make kings and Cæsars the object of our idolatry. We are republican, republican born and republican bred, and we have never yet raised our voice but in behalf of freedom and against tyranny; and against tyranny and the principles of tyranny we will raise it, whether royal or popular. We wish the people free,—free from their own passions, and from yours and mine,—alike free from despots and from demagogues; and we know there is and can be no freedom for them, either in spirituals or temporals, except in so far as they are subjected to the law of God, as interpreted and applied by his Church.

Democracy, understood as the ancients understood it, may be a good government, nay, the best government, when and where it is legitimate, as with us. But even legitimate democracy has a natural tendency, as old Aristotle tells us, to “degenerate into demagogie.” And does so degenerate, “when the lowest of the people, those who have no fortune and less virtue, become the majority, suffer themselves to be seduced by flatterers to despoil and oppress the rest. For the people also are a monarch, not an individual, but a collective monarch. Hence they seek to be themselves a monarchy, and to reign alone, without law, as a despot. They assume the air and manner of tyrants; and like them have their flatterers, who grow rich and powerful, because the people dispose of all, and

they dispose of the people.”* We are no advocates of monarchy; we are firmly attached to the institutions of our country, and we should have something to say against kingly and much in favor of republican government, if the prevalence of Jacobinism, socialism, and communism, so many degrees worse than the worst monarchy possible in a Christian country, did not make it our duty to be silent in both respects. The madness and infidelity of European radicals have made it impossible to say aught against monarchical government, without making war on the Church and on society itself. But whoever knows any thing of democracies knows perfectly well that the people count for much less in them than is commonly pretended. The great body of the people in all countries are honest and well disposed; they sincerely desire just and stable government; but they are necessarily engrossed with their private affairs, and ignorant and inefficient in what regards the public. They must at best rely on the few for information, even where newspapers abound, and they easily fall a prey to demagogues and party leaders, who flatter and deceive them for their own selfish purposes. The will that rules in a democracy is the will of these demagogues and party leaders, who have no honest principle to restrain them, and who can be deterred by no considerations of shame; for they affect always to rule in the name of the people, and are able to shift upon them the responsibility of their acts. It is easy to understand, then, without any disrespect to the great body of the people, that democracies can tyrannize and oppress as effectually, and to as great an extent, as monarchies themselves, and therefore that the assertion of the absolute independence of the temporal power in temporals is no less dangerous to civil liberty where the form of the government is popular, than where it is monarchical. Demagogues and party leaders, to say the least, are no more infallible or impeccable than kings and emperors, and no more safe depositaries of absolute power.

No man, unless a downright atheist, dares, in just so many words, to assert the monstrous proposition, that the temporal order is not subjected to the law of God. God is the Universal Lord, the Sovereign King, and his dominion

* Aristotle apud Rohrbacher, *Hist. Univ. de l'Église Cath.*, Tom. I. p. xii.

extends to all, from the highest to the lowest; for he is the sole creator of all, and from him, and by him, and in him, and for him, are all things, in whom we also live, and move, and have our being. His providence extends over all the works of his hands, and he takes cognizance of all our thoughts, words, and deeds, — our eating and our drinking, our downsitteing and our uprising, our sleeping and our watching, our speaking and our silence; he gives us seed-time and harvest, the early and the latter rains, the heat of summer and the snows of winter; he makes the corn to grow in our valleys, and crowns our hills with flocks and herds; he gives victory or defeat to our armies, setteth up and putteth down kings, rears the infant colony into a mighty people, and overwhelms the empire and makes the populous city desolate; he is the sovereign arbiter of nations as of individuals, in temporals as in spirituals. His law is as universal as his providence, and is the sovereign law in all things, for all in heaven, on the earth, and under the earth.

This universal dominion, extending to temporals no less than to spirituals, which none dare deny to God, or can deny to him, unless they deny his existence, and therefore their own, belongs also to our Lord Jesus Christ, not only as he is the Son of God, but also as he is Son of Man. "All things," he says, "are delivered to me by my Father." (St. Luke x. 22.) "All power is given to me in heaven and in earth." (St. Matt. xxviii. 18.) Here his universal dominion is unequivocally asserted, and asserted of him as Son of Man, because it is said to be *delivered* and *given* to him, which could not be said of him as Son of God, for as Son of God he is God, and always possessed it. That he possesses this dominion as Son of Man was well argued in 1329 by Roger Archbishop elect of Sens, before Philippe de Valois, in behalf of the French bishops and clergy, against Pierre, lord of Cugnières, who had spoken in the name of the French nobility in defence of the doctrine we are opposing.

"For," he says, addressing the king, "Jesus Christ had both powers [temporal and spiritual], not only according to his Divine nature, but also according to his human nature. He is a priest after the order of Melchisedech, and hath written upon his garment, and on his thigh, KING OF KINGS AND LORD OF LORDS. (Rev. xiv. 16.) By his *thigh* and *garment* is understood his humanity united to his Divinity, as is

garment to him who is clothed therewith. He says of himself, 'All power is given to me in heaven and in earth.' The Epistle to the Hebrews says that God, his Father, hath 'constituted him heir of all things,' and the Apostle applies to him the words of the eighth Psalm: 'Thou hast made him a little less than the angels; thou hast crowned him with glory and honor; and hast set him over all the works of thy hands. Thou hast put all things in subjection under his feet; all sheep and oxen, and beasts of the field.' Now in subjecting all things to him, the Apostle concludes, 'God has left nothing not subjected to him.' (Heb. i. 1; ii. 7-9.) Hence it is evident that, in that same nature in which Christ is inferior to the angels, he has dominion over all things. The same conclusion follows from this other text (Phil. ii. 8-10): 'He humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. Wherefore God hath exalted him and given him a name which is above every name, that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those that are in heaven, on earth, and in hell.' Hence according to that nature in which he humbled himself hath God exalted him above all things, since in the name of Jesus every knee must bow. St. Peter asserts the same in the Acts of the Apostles (x. 40-42), where he says, that God has appointed him to be the judge of the living and the dead; for he speaks of him according to that nature in which God raised him up again the third day. All Scripture proclaims the same thing." *

Kings and temporal lords, as such, are confessedly null, and therefore unknown, in the spiritual order, and are in it only private individuals, indistinguishable as to state or dignity from the meanest of their servants. With no propriety, then, could our Lord have on his garment and on his thigh, "King of kings and Lord of lords," if he had not dominion over them in temporals, in that order in which they are kings and lords. St. Paul declares (Col. ii. 10), that he is the "head of all principality and power." And we may conclude with absolute certainty that he has, even according to his human nature, universal dominion; and that only He, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. xv. 27), who put all under him, is not subject to him. It follows, therefore, necessarily, if the dominion of our Lord in the flesh, or as the Messiah, is thus universal, that the *Christian* law, the law of Christ, extends not only to spirituals, but also to temporals, and is the supreme law of both orders. Kings and lords, magistrates and rulers, sovereigns and subjects,

* Rohrbacher, *Hist. Univ. de l'Église Cath.*, Tom. XX. pp. 302, 303.

are under it in all things, alike in things temporal and in things spiritual. Whoso denies this denies not merely the sounder opinion, but the Christian religion itself.

This established, we demand to whom, under God, it belongs to keep, interpret, and declare the law of Christ. Whom hath our Lord constituted the depositary, the guardian, and the judge of his law? Certainly the Holy Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church, and the successor of Peter as visible head or supreme chief of that Church. "All power is given to me in heaven and in earth. Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations; baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you." (St. Matt. xxviii. 18–20.) Here plainly our Lord commits his law to his Church, and gives her pastors authority to teach it to all nations, and to teach them to observe whatsoever it commands. Certain then is it, that the Church has received his law, and is the guardian and judge for all men, of whatever rank, state, or dignity, in all things to which it extends, and therefore that all are bound to receive it from her, and to observe it in all things as she teaches and declares it. It will not do to say here, that she is its guardian and judge in spirituals, and that sovereigns are its guardian and judge in temporals. The commission is to the Church, not to the state, and nowhere can it be found that our Lord has made princes, as such, guardians and judges of his law, even in the temporal order. He only gives them authority to execute it when declared to them. Besides, to keep, teach, and declare the law of Christ, whether in spirituals or temporals, is manifestly a spiritual function, and temporal sovereigns, it is confessed in the very doctrine we oppose, have no spiritual functions.

Here we must be permitted to avail ourselves again of the reasoning of Roger Archbishop elect of Sens, in the conferences held on the subject before Philippe de Valois, in reply, as we have said, to Pierre de Cugnières. After having, in the passage already quoted, established the dominion of our Lord according to his human nature, over both orders, temporal and spiritual, he proceeds:—

"St. Peter, whom our Lord constituted his vicar, had the same power. He condemns judicially Ananias and Saphira for the crimes of larceny and lying. Paul also pronounces sentence against the convicted fornicator. That Christ has willed to give

this judgment to the Church is manifest from his words (St. Matt. xviii. 15–18): ‘If thy brother sin against thee, go and rebuke him between him and thee alone. If he hear thee, thou shalt gain thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may stand. And if he will not hear them, tell it to the Church. And if he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as the heathen and the publican. Amen, I say to you, Whatsoever ye shall bind upon earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever ye shall loose upon earth shall be loosed in heaven.’ Behold how expressly he wills that, wherever there is sin of one against another, if the delinquent corrects not himself, the matter shall be referred to the judgment of the Church, so that the offender, if he will not hear her, may be excommunicated. And the reason he gives is, that ‘whatsoever ye bind or loose upon earth shall be bound or loosed in heaven.’ *Whatsoever, all*, without excepting any thing, any more than the Apostle does, when he says all is subjected to Christ. I prove it, also, from St. Luke (xxii. 38), cited by the lord of Cugnières in his own favor. I will beat him with his own staff. He says, and says truly, that by the two swords are to be understood the two powers, the temporal and the spiritual. But in whose power does Christ will the two swords to be? Certainly in that of Peter and the Apostles, of the Pope and bishops, that is, of the Church. Do you say that Christ blamed Peter for striking with the temporal sword? That is nothing. For, mark, he did not tell him to throw it away, but told him to return it to its scabbard, to keep it in his possession, signifying, that, although this power is in the Church, he wills that under the New Law it should be exercised by the hand of the layman at the order of the priest.

“I prove it also, in the third place, by St. Paul (1 Cor. vi. 1–6), who orders that whoever has a lawsuit should bring it to be judged before the saints. His reasoning is, ‘Know ye not that the saints shall judge this world? If then the world shall be judged by you, are ye unworthy to judge the smallest matters? If therefore ye shall have judgments about the things of this world, set them to judge who are the most despised in the Church.’ It is evident from these testimonies, without mentioning others which I omit, that both powers may be in an ecclesiastical person. If St. Peter and the Apostles made little use of the temporal power, it was in virtue of the principles, ‘All things are lawful to me, but all are not expedient,’ and ‘Every thing in its time.’ Now that all Gaul is subject to the Christian faith, the Church rightly insists on the punishment of crimes and the execution of justice, that men may amend their lives. Our conclusion is therefore founded in divine right.

“I prove it again by natural reason. . . . He appears best fitted to

judge who is nearest to God, the rule of all judgments. Ecclesiastics are nearest to God. Therefore it is fitting that the Church should judge in these matters. Besides, nobody denies that ecclesiastics may take cognizance of the sin in these [temporal] affairs. Moreover, who has the right to judge of the end has the right to judge of that which is ordained to the end, which is the reason of its existence. The body being ordained to the soul and the temporal to the spiritual, the Church therefore has the right to judge of both, according to the axiom, The accessory follows the nature of the principal." *

Such was the Gallicanism of France in 1329; for Roger spoke before the king in council, after consultation with the assembled bishops, by their order, and in their name. Between this and the Gallicanism of the Four Articles there is a difference. In 1329 the French clergy thought more of asserting the rights of the Church than of pleasing the king, and opposed instead of following the maxims of the French lawyers and courtiers. Hence the difference between the Gallicanism of 1329 and the Gallicanism of 1682.

There are two points made by Roger against the nobles, that of themselves alone decide the whole controversy. Nobody, he says, doubts that ecclesiastics may take cognizance of the sin which is found in temporal matters. Nobody can doubt it. Every Catholic who knows his Catechism, or who has ever been to confession, knows that the priest can interrogate him on his temporal conduct, and judge him for sins committed in his temporal no less than in his spiritual relations. It would be a startling novelty for a Catholic to be told by his ghostly father that he need not confess any sins he may have committed in temporal matters, such as lying and cheating in his business transactions, refusing to pay his honest debts, stealing, fornication, adultery, murder, sedition, treason, for these pertain to the temporal order, and the Church has no jurisdiction in temporals. Does not the law of Christ extend to all these matters? Are they not all forbidden by the law of God? Are they not all matters which touch conscience? How, then, withdraw them from the jurisdiction of the Church, and say that she has no authority in temporals? If the Church can take cognizance of the sins of private individuals in the temporal order, she can also take

* Ibid., *ubi supra*, pp. 303, 304.

cognizance of the sins of public persons, of kings and magistrates, in the same order. If she may subject private persons to her discipline for the sins of fornication and adultery, why not sovereigns? Do these sins cease to be sins when committed by kings and Cæsars? If she can impose on private persons the law of having only one wife, can she not do the same for sovereigns, and judge the sovereign as well as the private person who violates it? If she can judge of sedition and treason in the subject, wherefore not also of tyranny and oppression in the prince? Are tyranny and oppression in temporal matters, on the part of princes, less sins against the law of Christ, than sedition and treason on the part of subjects? Is it for the Church to bind the subject to the prince, and not the prince to the subject? Were that just? What king ever protested against the Church's condemning sedition and treason? By what right does the Church condemn these; and not the prince who fails in his duties as prince? Theodosius the Great was a pious and orthodox emperor, but he was liable to fits of anger, in which he committed acts of injustice. In one of these fits he ordered a most cruel massacre of some seven thousand of his subjects in the city of Thessalonica. This was an act in the temporal order, of temporal sovereignty, and therefore an act for which the Church, according to the doctrine we oppose, could not judge him; nay, for which even God himself could not judge him, if the temporal sovereign is independent of the spiritual power in temporals. Yet St. Ambrose, one of the four Latin Doctors of the Church, Archbishop of Milan, thought otherwise, rebuked him severely for his tyranny to his subjects, and made him do public penance for it. Some Christians, provoked by the malignity of the Jews, destroyed a Jewish synagogue. Theodosius commanded them to rebuild it. Here, again, was an act of temporal sovereignty in the temporal order. But St. Ambrose interposed, forbade the Christians to obey the order of the emperor, and informed him that it was not lawful for Christians to build the temples of a false religion, or in which their own religion would be blasphemed.

The other point made by Roger of Sens is equally conclusive, namely, that whoever has the right to judge the end has the right to judge the means. The body is for the soul, the temporal is for the spiritual, and therefore the

Church ; since, therefore, she has the right to judge the soul, she has the right to judge the body ; and since she has the right to judge the spiritual, she has the right to judge the temporal. We cannot too often repeat, that the temporal does not exist for its own sake, and that the end for which it does exist is not in its own order, — is not temporal, but spiritual. It has no end, no purpose, no legitimacy, but as it is subordinated to the law of Christ, and made subservient to the spiritual end of man. The state is inaugurated, the king is crowned and invested with the insignia of command, only for society, and society itself is only for man's spiritual destiny, — his ultimate union with God as his supreme good ; for man has been created solely that he "might know, love, and serve God in this world, and be happy with him for ever in the next." This is his end and only end. The earthly is for the heavenly, the seen for the unseen, the temporal for the eternal, man for God. This is the order of things. The Christian religion is the law according to which, from the beginning of the human race, in all times and places, man fulfils his destiny, or attains to the end for which he has been created and redeemed. No other law has ever been given to man. The Christian religion is, in substance, one, and the same religion from the beginning. It is not a new religion, and is a new law only as to its state, for St. Paul argues to the Galatians, that it was before Moses, and therefore that it was madness to think of being perfected by the Mosaic law without Christ. They who were saved before the coming of Christ were saved by the same faith, the same religion, the same law, by which we are saved ; only they believed in a Messiah to come, and we in a Messiah who has come. Always was the law of Christ in the world, always was it the one law for all men, of whatever state, rank, or dignity, — the only law by which man could render himself acceptable to his Maker and fulfil his destiny. There never has been any other religion properly so called than that of Christ, and that is of all times and places.

The Catholic Church, also, is from the beginning, not an institution of yesterday. It is catholic in time as well as in space. The Church is catholic, we are taught in the Catechism, because "she subsists in all ages, teaches all nations, and maintains all truth." She has subsisted under different modes indeed ; but whether as the patriarchal

religion, as the Synagogue, or as the Roman Catholic communion, she is always one and the same Catholic Church, the immaculate Spouse of the Lamb slain from the foundations of the world, and the joyful Mother of all the faithful. All things are ordered in reference to her. Her Maker is her Husband, and he will own none as his children who have not been carried in her womb and nursed at her breasts. Such is his will, eternal as his own being, and which is without variableness or shadow of turning, immutable and immovable as his own nature. She has been instituted expressly to guide, assist, and conduct us to God. For this end she has been made the depositary of the law of Christ, authorized to keep, to teach, to interpret and apply it, — to teach, feed, rule, and defend all men and nations, in reference to their final and only end. How, then, say she has no authority over temporals? How can she have authority to judge the only end for which temporals exist, or have any right to exist, if she have not the right to judge them, and to approve or condemn them as they do or do not subserve this end. How can she have charge of the end without also having charge of the means, since the means are necessarily subordinated to the end, and controlled by it? As she has charge of the end, that is, of gaining the end, she must have charge of the means, and as the temporal exists only as a means to man's final end, she must, by virtue of the very spiritual authority which she confessedly is, have supreme power over the temporal, and plenary authority to govern it according to the demands or the utility of the end, and therefore in all respects whatever.

But let us not be supposed to insist on a doctrine which we do not. We contend not here for the doctrine, that the state holds from God only through the Church, although we should be loath to deny even that doctrine, since it has high authority in its favor; we stop with the doctrine of Bellarmine and Suarez, that the temporal prince holds his authority from God through the people or the community, and therefore concede, as we have always conceded, that the people, where there is no existing legitimate government, are the medial origin of government. But the people, even on this ground, are not the ultimate source of power, and do not give to civil government its right to govern, for *non est potestas, nisi a Deo*; they are only the medium of its constitution, not the fountain of its rights.

The government when constituted has immediately from God its authority or right to govern, and consequently holds immediately under his law, and for the end that law prescribes. That end, as we have seen, is the Christian end, the ultimate end of man. The government then, whether regal or popular, holds its authority on condition that it exercises all its powers in obedience to the law of Christ for that end, and, of course, forfeits its rights whenever it neglects or violates this condition. The powers of government are a sacred trust, and must be exercised according to the conditions of the trust; to violate these conditions is, then, to forfeit the trust, and to lose the powers it confers. We must say this, unless we accept Oriental despotism, and contend for the inamissibility of power; that is, that the prince, let him do what he pleases, tyrannize and oppress as he may, never loses his right to reign, — a doctrine which cannot be consistently maintained by any Englishman who boasts of his glorious Revolution of 1688, or by any American who on each succeeding Fourth of July reads with patriotic pride the Declaration of Independence by the Congress of 1776.

Now, although we do not say that the Church commissions the state, or imposes the conditions on which it holds its right to govern, yet as it holds under the law of Christ, and on conditions imposed by that law, we do say that she, as the guardian and judge of that law, must have the power to take cognizance of the state, and to judge whether it does or does not conform to the conditions of its trust, and to pronounce sentence accordingly; which sentence ought to have immediate practical execution in the temporal order, and the temporal power that resists it is not only faithless to its trust, but guilty of direct rebellion against God, the only real Sovereign, Fountain of all law, and Source of all rights, in the temporal order as in the spiritual. She must have the right to take cognizance of the fidelity of subjects, since they are bound to obey the legitimate prince for conscience' sake; and therefore of the manner in which princes discharge their duties to their subjects, and to judge and to declare whether they have or have not forfeited their trusts, and lost their right to reign or to command the obedience of their subjects. The deposing power, then, is inherent in her as the spiritual authority, as the guardian and judge of the law under which kings and emperors hold their crowns,

and have the right to reign; for in deposing a sovereign, absolving his subjects from their allegiance, and authorizing them to proceed to the choice of a new sovereign, she does but apply the law of Christ to a particular case, and judicially declare what is already true by that law. She only declares that the forfeiture has occurred, and that subjects are released from their oath of fidelity, who are already released by the law of God.

This power which we claim here for the Church over temporals is not itself precisely a temporal power. We are indeed not at liberty to assert that the Church has no temporal authority, for that she has no temporal authority, direct or indirect, is a condemned proposition, — condemned, if we are not mistaken, by our present Holy Father, in his condemnation of the work on Canon Law by Professor Nuytz of Turin, — and we have seen that she has even direct temporal authority by divine right; but the power we are now asserting, though a power over temporals, is itself, strictly speaking, a spiritual power, held by a spiritual person, and exerted for a spiritual end. The temporal order by its own nature, or by the fact that it exists in the present decree of God only for an end not in its own order, is subjected to the spiritual, and consequently every question that does or can arise in the temporal order is indirectly a spiritual question, and within the jurisdiction of the Church as the spiritual authority, and therefore of the Pope, who, as supreme chief of the Church, possesses that authority in all its plenitude. The Pope, then, even by virtue of his spiritual authority, has the power to judge all temporal questions, if not precisely as temporal, yet as spiritual, — for all temporal questions are to be decided by their relation to the spiritual, — and therefore has the right to pronounce sentence of deposition against any sovereign when required by the good of the spiritual order.

No Christian can or will deny that whatever we do, — whether we sing or pray, eat or drink, wake or sleep, assist at public worship or pursue our own domestic avocations, whether we act in a private or in a public capacity, — we are bound to do it from conscience, and for the glory of God, for whom we are created, and who is our supreme good, as well as the Supreme Good in itself. The Church, as the spiritual power, has jurisdiction in all matters that touch our consciences, the law, the glory

of God, or our supreme good. Then she has jurisdiction over all our lives, and all our acts. Does the law of God prescribe our duty to temporal sovereigns? Does it prescribe the duty of sovereigns to their subjects? We have seen that it does. Can we neglect our duty to sovereigns, or they their duty to us, with a good conscience, or without sin? Of course not. If sovereigns play the tyrant, if they become cruel, oppressive, governing their subjects iniquitously for selfish ends, do they or do they not violate the laws of God, and forfeit their rights? If you are not a base despot or a vile slave, you must say they do. If the Church is the spiritual power, with the right to declare the law of Christ for all men and nations, can any act of the state in contravention of her canons be regarded as a law? The most vulgar common sense answers, that it cannot. Tell us then, even supposing the Church to have only spiritual power, what question can come up between man and man, between sovereign and sovereign, between subject and sovereign, or sovereign and subject, that does not come within the legitimate jurisdiction of the Church, and on which she has not by divine right the power to pronounce a judicial sentence? None? Then the power she exercised over sovereigns in the Middle Ages was not a usurpation, was not derived from the concession of princes or the consent of the people, but was and is hers by divine right; and whoso resists it rebels against the King of kings and Lord of lords. This is the ground on which we defend the power exercised over sovereigns by Popes and Councils in the Middle Ages.

We know this ground is not acceptable to sovereigns, to courtiers, or to demagogues. But is that our fault? Who has made it our duty to please them? Are we not bound to please God, and to adhere to the truth, let it offend whom it may? On this subject permit us to translate some remarks from the Abbé Rohrbacher's *Universal History of the Catholic Church*, which we find very much to our purpose.

“In the seventh book of this History,” says the Abbé, “we have seen the three representatives of ancient wisdom, Confucius, Plato, and Cicero, professing with one voice that God alone is the true sovereign of men; that there is no power that comes not from him; that his reason is the supreme and normal law of all others; that what princes, judges, and peoples decree, that is contrary to this

supreme rule, is in no sense law ; that there was to come a time in which the Holy, the Saint of saints, the Word, the Reason itself of God, would be manifested in a sensible manner, give to all nations the same law, and make of the whole human race one only empire, of which God shall be the sole common Master and the Sovereign Monarch. We have seen, in the nineteenth book, that this ancient doctrine of human wisdom is, as it were, a distant echo of the Divine wisdom ; and, joining one to the other, we may establish the following articles of the Divine government of mankind.

“ARTICLE I. God only is properly sovereign. ART. II. The Son of God made man, Christ, or the Messiah, has been invested by his Father with this sovereign power. ART. III. Among men there is no power or right to command, unless from God and by his Word. ART. IV. The power is from God, but not always the man who exercises it, or the use which is made of it. ART. V. Both the sovereignty and the sovereign, and both the use which is made of it and those on whom it is exercised, are equally subordinated to the law of God. ART. VI. The infallible interpreter of the Divine law is the Catholic Church.

“Hence these consequences : —

“Therefore all that which regards the law of God, conscience, eternal salvation, the whole world, nations and individuals, sovereigns and subjects, are subordinated to the power of the Church and of her chief. Hence, also, in all that which interests conscience, civil legislation is subordinated to the legislation of the Catholic Church. Hence the first axiom laid down by a French prelate, M. de Marca, in his book *De la Concorde du Sacerdoce et de l'Empire*, is, that the constitutions of princes and temporal laws contrary to the canons are absolutely null and void.

“To escape this conclusion, it is necessary either to deny to the Catholic Church the right in the last resort to decide doubts concerning the Divine law, conscience, salvation, or else to say that the temporal power and laws are not a matter which concerns the law of God, salvation, conscience. Say either, and you will arrive at anarchy, that state in which there is no longer either law or human duty ; for if it belongs not to the Catholic Church, undeniably the highest authority on earth, to interpret definitively the Divine law, this right belongs to nobody. He, in fact, who refuses it to the highest authority can accord it to none, — to the prince or the nation no more than to the meanest individual. If in this case the prince and the nation are permitted to deride the Church and her chief, the meanest individual must be permitted to deride the nation and the prince. The Divine law, the only source of duty, will be for man as if it were not. Moreover, if submission to the temporal power and law be not a matter which interests conscience, salvation, it ceases to be a duty to submit to them ; then there is

no longer any right, no longer any society. There is no medium. Either society is absolutely null, or else it is subordinated to the Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church.

“But, as we have seen, this is a hard truth. What king will hear it? It revolted the idolatrous emperors of pagan Rome, they who pretended themselves to be not only emperors, but also sovereign pontiffs and gods. During three centuries they made war on the Eternal and his Christ, in order to repulse the yoke of Christ and his Church. But the Eternal laughed at them, his Christ has broken them and their empire as a potter’s vessel beneath his feet.

“This subordination to the kingdom of God on the earth generally displeased the Greek Emperors of Constantinople. A few submitted to it with sincerity; the greater part either did it only in an astute manner, or openly refused to do it, pretending themselves to be, if not gods, at least sovereign pontiffs. We have seen the Emperor Nicephorus, in order to justify his adulterous marriage, cause to be declared by a conciliabulum of courtier prelates, that the emperor is above the Divine laws. The Greeks of Constantinople were in name and in fact the *Low Empire*, till it disappeared beneath the cimeter of the Mahometans.

“In Germany, Frederic Barbarossa and the emperors of his race and character pretended to be the living and sovereign law, from which emanate all the particular rights of nations and of kings. Consequently they would not have the Divine law interpreted by the Church of God. By their force, their address, and their activity, they counted on prevailing against the Church, and against the Rock on which she is built. They ended by being broken against it, they and all their race. Such are the judgments of God, of which we have been the witnesses.

“In France we have seen a grandson of St. Louis forgetting the lessons and example of his grandfather, above all, the lessons and example of Charlemagne, who called and proved himself a devout defender of the Holy Church and humble coadjutor of the Apostolic See in all things,— we have seen Philip the Fair, walking in the footsteps of the Germans, and the Greeks of the Low Empire, insult the Church in her chief; and we have seen in a few years Philip the Fair disappear, and all his posterity. And France, who, instead of expiating the iniquity of her king, augmented its fatal consequences, we have seen delivered over to the English, and on the point of becoming an English province, when God in his mercy sent a Lorraine virgin [Joan of Arc] who restored France to the French.

“Frederic Barbarossa and Philip the Fair were misled and ruined, among other things, by what are called lawyers, men who study laws, but purely human laws, above all, the laws of pagan Rome, when her Cæsars were at once emperors, sovereign pontiffs, and gods, consequently the supreme and only law. More or less im-

bued with this political idolatry, the lawyers made each prince understand that, instead of being subject to the law of God interpreted by the Church, he was himself the living law and sovereign of all laws. Regarding, therefore, as *non avenues* both the authority of the Catholic Church and the sovereignty of Christ on earth, they revived and justified in principle at once both the most odious tyranny and the most frightful anarchy. For if the law of God, and the Church of Christ that interprets it, are nothing for kings, they are nothing for the people, — are nothing for any body ; and no one has any law but himself.

“ Hence, from the times of these sovereigns we may remark among lawyers and their like a certain *low empire* of intelligences, low both as to ideas and sentiments, seeing only matter, only the individual, only the king, at best only a particular nation, never mankind in their integrity, humanity regenerated in God by Christianity, and advancing in the Church towards a perfect and triumphant humanity in heaven. They see nothing, wish to see nothing, and will not allow others to see any thing of all this. To prevent it, they alter and disguise facts, or falsify them by malicious interpretations. They dissemble the good, they bring up and exaggerate the evil. It might be said that the Low Empire of the Greeks, with its baseness of ideas and sentiments, its chicanery, duplicity, and, above all, its hatred of the Church of Rome, has passed from Constantinople to the West, and become naturalized among the writers of the last three centuries. It is, as it were, an invasion of learned barbarism, which suffers to appear in history only quarrels, wars, and ruins, without any thing that consoles or edifies the heart of the Christian reader. In the assemblage of human ideas, all is confusion, inconsequence, contradiction, incertitude, — a confusion worse than that of Babel. In the confusion of languages one no longer understood his neighbor, but in the confusion of ideas which has perplexed literary Europe for three centuries, men no longer understand themselves. They will not allow that politics are subordinated to the law of God, interpreted by the Church of God ; they insist that politics shall be the law to themselves ; and after having thus indoctrinated kings, queens, and princes, they complain that kings, queens, and princes follow their lessons, and acknowledge, politically, no moral law but their own interest. And what is most strange is, that they even blame the Church for their being no better, — the Church whom kings and princes would not suffer in the Council of Trent to proceed to their reform, as she did to that of the Popes and bishops. They declaim against the theory of Machiavelli, and yet they have themselves no other, and differ from him only in the fact that he knew what he said and what he thought. The sight of this general baseness of the French mind and the incoherence of its ideas moves in us an immense

pity for the men and the writers of that epoch [the sixteenth century?]. When we see a Francis the First and a Henry the Second league with Mahometans against Christians, and with Protestants against Catholics, while they punish heretics in their own dominions, we are tempted to exclaim, O God, forgive them! for they know not what they do, any more than they who counsel them.”*

The doctrine that the political order is subordinated to the law of God interpreted by the Catholic Church, is of course deeply offensive to sovereigns, courtiers, and demagogues; but that, if we rightly consider it, is no argument against its truth, or against its being fearlessly asserted. It is only by bringing both sovereigns and subjects back to it that we can save society from being the prey, on the one hand, of the most odious tyranny, and on the other, of the most fearful anarchy. It is no new doctrine, invented by us. The supremacy of the spiritual order is a dictate of the most vulgar common sense,—a universal conviction of mankind. It is in the nature of things, and was recognized by all Gentile antiquity, however it may have been disregarded in practice. It runs through all the Old Testament, and no one can deny that under the old law, in the Synagogue, the kingly power was subordinated to the sacerdotal. The Church, as containing in herself the whole priesthood, and all the spiritual authority instituted under the primitive law, and as succeeding to the Synagogue and continuing it in all not of a local and temporary nature, necessarily inherits and possesses this supremacy in its plenitude. The very end for which she is instituted and placed in the world, the very nature of her

* Rohrbacher, 2d edition, Tom. XXIV. pp. 611–614. We have introduced this extract, not only for its intrinsic merit, but also for the purpose of giving our readers a specimen of the author's Ultramontanism. The Abbé Rohrbacher's work wants method, is sometimes a little crude and indigested, and is not always consistent with itself; but it is a work of extensive erudition, written from a truly Catholic point of view, with great sincerity, earnestness, and vigor; and may be consulted with full confidence and great advantage on all those points on which our popular histories are the most defective or the least trustworthy. The Abbé is no mean philosopher, a sound theologian, and a hearty Papist. His work cannot be too extensively circulated, or too diligently studied. It is well adapted to the wants of the Catholic world in our own times, and even in our own country, where the laity are to a fearful extent infected with the lowest form of political Gallicanism, and seem to imagine that religion has nothing to do with politics.

office and mission, presuppose it, and authorize us to assert it for her, even in case no express grant of power over the temporal order by our Lord to Peter could be alleged. For every Catholic, at least, the Church is the supreme judge of the limits and extent of her own powers. She can be judged by no one, and this of itself implies her absolute supremacy, and that the temporal order must receive its law, at least its interpretation, from her. So she herself has always asserted, by the mouth of all her holy Doctors, her Councils, and her Sovereign Pontiffs. Through all the long years of what is termed the Martyr Age, during her long and bloody struggle with pagan and idolatrous Rome, she asserted it and wrote it out in the blood of her dearest children, whom she commanded to submit to all manner of tortures, and to death in its most frightful and excruciating forms, sooner than obey Cæsar against Christ. She has no sooner emerged from the Catacombs, and gained a *status* in the world, than she reasserts it, and proclaims in the face of Arian emperors and infidel kings the eternal supremacy of the law of Christ, and her right, as its guardian and judge, to judge all men, of every state, rank, or dignity, and to subject them to her discipline. Whenever the occasion occurred, she asserted her power, not in empty words only, but in deeds, to judge sovereigns, kings, and Cæsars, to bestow or to take away crowns, to depose ungodly rulers, and to absolve their subjects from their oath of allegiance. Under this claimed and generally admitted supremacy of the Church, pagan Rome was conquered, barbarians were subdued, the empires, kingdoms, and states of modern Europe were founded, civil liberty reëstablished and protected, nations converted, wholesome laws enacted, and civilization advanced. The human mind awoke from its sleep, rejoiced in new freedom, and felt itself endowed with an unwonted vigor. Men gloried in a sublime ideal, cherished lofty principles, and glowed with noble and generous sentiments. They adopted in their political conduct the Christian law for their guide, saints for their model, and performed deeds, and attained to an heroic virtue, before which the greatest and best of our times seem mean and paltry. Shall we fear to do honor to our noble Catholic ancestors, or to assert the doctrine to which under God was due their greatness, lest we offend the fastidious ears of unbelieving sovereigns, or

disturb the tranquillity of graceless courtiers and demagogues, who, to gain political advancement, would not hesitate to sell Jesus Christ to be crucified? Out upon such servility! We have not so learned Christ; we are not so lost to all true manliness. If God be for us, nothing can be against us, and he whose soul is knit in the bonds of love to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, may well defy all the wrath of man and all the rage of hell. Dare be freemen in Christ, or wear not his livery.

The Church was doing her work, and civilization was advancing, when one day the German lawyers, courting the favor of a German Kaiser, who would be Pope as well as Kaiser, recalled the old doctrine of the idolatrous emperors of pagan Rome, and assured him that he was the living law, the fountain of all rights and of all honor; that is, that he was emperor, sovereign pontiff, nay, a god, from whom emanated all authority, civil and ecclesiastical, which was therefore held at his sovereign will and pleasure. The Kaiser, inflated with his newly discovered godhood, undertook the management of all affairs in Church and in state, and to make and unmake bishops and sovereign pontiffs at will. What the German lawyers claimed for the German Kaiser, or emperor, the French lawyers, not to be outdone as accomplished courtiers, claimed for their king, the Spanish lawyers for theirs, and the English for theirs. Thus the sovereigns were freed from their subjection to the Church, the supremacy of the temporal order was proclaimed, the Church was declared a civil institution, to be protected and preserved only to preach the submission of the people to the civil tyrant, and to threaten them with eternal damnation if they dared resist his tyranny. And religion grew faint in men's hearts, the light of truth became dim, faith expired, civilization was arrested, and the world seemed abandoned to the violence and misrule of crowned monsters. Faith, piety, liberty, science, intelligence, morality, all that makes life worth possessing, were extinct in the secular world, and the courtiers applauded, and their dupes called it progress, the emancipation of the human mind from spiritual bondage, the glorious instauration of science and virtue! Would you have us reinstate these dupes, and follow the lead of those old German lawyers, who would make kings and emperors believe themselves at once emperors, sovereign pontiffs, and gods,

as claimed to be the old pagan emperors of idolatrous Rome?

This doctrine of the German lawyers, since called Gallicanism, and contained in principle in the first of the four Gallican Articles of 1682, introduced into Western Europe the politics of the Low Empire, or of the Greeks of Constantinople, and destroyed the free constitutions of Mediæval Europe, and established on their ruins the absolutism of the last three centuries, expressed in the famous *L'Etat c'est moi* of Louis the Fourteenth. All the world has revolted against this absolutism, and kings, and especially the Church, are held responsible for it, although the Church always opposed it, and her Sovereign Pontiffs exerted all their power to prevent its introduction and establishment, and it was introduced and established only in defiance of spiritual censures and anathemas. But every body feels, that to make kings absolute, to give them all power, and free them from all law but their own will, is not precisely to found and secure civil freedom, or to provide for the well-being of the temporal order. Hence is renewed the doctrine of the responsibility of kings and rulers, but not now their responsibility to God through the Church. It is now responsibility to the people. The modern demagogue does for the people what the German lawyer did for the German Kaiser. He does not say the people are sovereign under the law of God interpreted by the Church; but he says the people are the living law, the fountain of all rights, and from them emanates all just authority, both civil and ecclesiastical. Therefore he makes the people emperor, sovereign pontiff, god. Hence he actually uses the strange terms people-king, people-pontiff, people-god. Read Pierre Leroux, read Giuseppe Mazzini, and you will find these barbarous epithets, or their equivalents, used in sober earnestness, and the last-mentioned of these worthies is the recognized chief of the whole European democracy, and commands the sympathy of constitutional England and democratic America. The people are crowned and deified in opposition to kings and emperors, but it is still the assertion of the independence, nay, the supremacy, of the temporal order, and the denial of its subordination to the law of God. The people are king, pope, god, and may do what they will, and hence for the despotism of kings we have the despotism of the mass, so-

cial despotism, or rather the despotism of the demagogues who control the people.

But some revolt, again, at this, and will no more submit to king-people than to any other king. They see in the people only a collection of individuals, and will not admit of the whole collectively any more than is true of each individual taken separately. Hence we actually hear individuals, not in a mad-house, not looked upon as out of their senses, but honored and held up as the great lights of their age, claim for each individual what the lawyers claimed for Kaiser, what the demagogue claims for the people *en masse*, and assert, each for himself, I am emperor, sovereign pontiff, and god. It is only the logical consequence of the Protestant doctrine of private judgment, only Protestantism consistently developed. But with this monstrous claim of the individual, no law, no government, no society, nothing but anarchy, is possible. Here is where the movement against the absolutism of kings does and must end. Asserting the independence of the temporal order, it passed on to the absolutism of the mass, and from that it passes on to the absolutism of the individual, the Free Trade of the late William Leggett, and would pass further, only there is no further; sink to a lower deep, only a lower deep there is not.

Would you have us follow in this track, assert people-king, people-pontiff, people-god, or declare each individual emperor, supreme pontiff, god? Would you have us, in order not to incur the censure of our age, or offend the god of our demagogues, so belie our common sense, so stultify ourselves, as to accept such arrant nonsense, or rather such horrid blasphemy, which the fools of the day boast as a proof of the light and progress of this nineteenth century? But we must do it, or reassert the Catholic doctrine of the supremacy of the spiritual order, and maintain that the whole temporal order in all things is subordinated to the law of God as interpreted by the Roman Catholic Church. We cannot assert the premises of the idolaters of kings, the idolaters of the people, or the idolaters of the individual, and deny their conclusions; for their conclusions follow necessarily from their premises. We must deny their premises, and that we cannot do without asserting the supremacy of the Church as guardian and judge of the law of God over both sovereigns and subjects, in temporals no

less than in spirituals. There is no medium, save at the expense of common sense or common honesty.

We are aware of the arguments usually adduced in defence of the antichristian and antisocial doctrine of the independence of the political order, but not one of them has the least conceivable force. Our Lord said, we are told, "My kingdom is not of this world." We should grieve to think it otherwise; but how, from the fact that his kingdom is not of this world, infer that it has no jurisdiction in or over this world? The kingdom of Christ does not derive its authority from this world, and is not founded on the principles or maxims of this world; yet it is set up in this world expressly for the purpose of governing it, of reducing the kingdoms of this world to subjection to the law of God, and making them the kingdoms of God and of his Christ. "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's." Most assuredly; but what things *are* Cæsar's? Who has the authority to answer this question for us as Catholics? Not Cæsar himself, for he is neither infallible nor impeccable, and may claim somewhat more than his own, nay, the things that are God's, which he has very often done, and is in general inclined to do. 'We will give him exactly what the Church bids us give him, not a groat more, though he burn us at the stake, behead and disembowel, or hang and draw and quarter us, for the Church is the highest authority. But may not the Church usurp the rights of Cæsar, and refuse to authorize me to give him his dues? And if she can do such a naughty thing, who is to decide for us whether she does do it or not? Suppose she does, what she usurps may be as safe in her possession as in his. The Church any day is as sovereign as Cæsar, and as safe a depositary of power, and the insolence and encroachments of Churchmen, suppose them to be as great as the most shameless courtier or politician ever pretended, are less intolerable than the insolence and encroachments of Cæsar and his satellites. Any day the mitre is above the crown, and the priest above the demagogue. But after all, we have a tolerable pledge of the good behavior, of the justice and discretion, of the Church, in the fact that she is the Holy Catholic Church, the Church of God, the Kingdom of Christ, the immaculate Spouse of the Lamb, divinely commissioned and supernaturally assisted by the Holy Ghost to teach and

judge the law of God, and to conduct individuals and nations in the way of truth and holiness. We trust her in all that concerns the soul, and it would be a hard case if we could not trust her also in all that concerns the body. At any rate, she is less likely to go astray than Cæsar, and we may safely trust her in preference to him.

But it is a mistake to suppose that our Lord in the text cited is giving a positive command. He gave no decision, but merely answered a captious question put to him by the Jews. Some Jews, seeking to entangle him and get something whereof to accuse him either before the Roman Emperor or before the people, asked him, "Master, is it lawful for us to pay tribute to Cæsar, or not? But he, considering their deceit, said to them, Why tempt ye me? Show me a penny. Whose image and inscription hath it? They, answering, said to him, Cæsar's. And he said to them, Render, therefore, to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's." (St. Luke xx. 22-25.) Here is no decision. It is not our Lord who says the penny is Cæsar's; it is the Jews who say so. He merely says, If, as you say, it is Cæsar's, then render it unto him; for it is the principle of justice to render unto every one his own. But he decides nothing as to this further question, whether any thing really is Cæsar's or not. The text therefore cannot avail those who would adduce it in defence of the political independence of the temporal order. But even if this interpretation be rejected, the text says nothing against the right of the Church to decide what things are Cæsar's and what things are God's.

We are also told that our Lord paid tribute for himself and Peter to Cæsar, and thence is inferred the supremacy of Cæsar in temporals, or the subjection of the Church in temporal matters to the temporal lord. But unhappily for our anti-Papists, or idolaters of the temporal order, the very text relied on condemns them. "They that received the didrachma [tribute money] came to Peter, and said to him, Doth not your master pay the didrachma? He said, Yes; and when he was come into the house Jesus prevented him, saying, What is thy opinion, Simon? Of whom do the kings of the earth take tribute or custom? Of their own children, or of strangers? And he said, Of strangers. Jesus said to him, Then the children are free.

But *that we may not scandalize them*, go thou to the sea and cast in a hook; and that fish which shall first come up, take; and when thou hast opened its mouth, thou shalt find a stater; take that and give it to them for me and thee." (St. Matt. xvii. 23 – 26.) Our Lord here plainly teaches that he and Peter, and therefore the Church, are not subject to tribute, and he paid it only to avoid scandal. The text asserts the absolute freedom of the Church even in temporals, or that even in temporalities she owes nothing to the political authority.

All the arguments that can be adduced amount to nothing, for, if any thing is certain, it is that Christ has instituted his Church to govern all men and nations according to his law, which she alone is competent to interpret and apply. We only ask our readers to bear in mind, that the Church is not herself the civil authority, and that, though she possesses the temporal authority *in radice*, she ordinarily governs the temporal order only through the temporal sovereign. She bears by divine right both swords, but she exercises the temporal sword by the hand of the prince or magistrate. The temporal sovereign holds it subject to her order, to be exercised in her service, under her direction. This is the normal order, and it is only an unmanly fear of offending, or an undue desire to please, secular governments, that has ever led any intelligent Christian to concede the contrary. That the Church has always been able to exercise her rightful supremacy, or that secular governments have in general shown themselves to be her obedient children, we are far from pretending; but we owe it to her and to them to assert her rights and their duties, and perhaps in doing so we may aid in preparing a better future, and do something to enable her to check the reign of political atheism, and to save society, now threatened at once by both despotism and anarchy, from utter dissolution.

We have dwelt at length on this subject, because we wish to show that those noble Popes, who withstood the secular tyrants and deposed them for their crimes against the Church and against their subjects, only exercised their rights and discharged the duties of their office. We meet not a few calling themselves Catholics, who regard the conduct of these Popes towards the secular power as something to be apologized for, or as something to be ex-

cused only by a reference to the false maxims and strange ignorance and barbarism of the times. Even though flaming democrats, if not because flaming democrats, they side with such cruel and debauched tyrants as Henry the Fourth of Germany and Henry the Second of England, and by an unaccountable blindness or perversity insist that the cause of truth, justice, and civil freedom was defended by these crowned monsters against the arrogance, ambition, and rapacity of the Sovereign Pontiffs. It was no such thing. The cause of truth, justice, civil freedom, is, and always has been, the cause of the Church, and these much calumniated Pontiffs have often stood alone in its defence, as at one time St. Thomas of Canterbury stood alone in England against the king in defence of the rights of the Church of God. The first interest of mankind in every age and country is the maintenance of the freedom and independence of the Catholic Church, for it is only through her and in her that mankind are redeemed, and able to form and maintain real society. The sovereign that makes war on the Church, that denies her her freedom and authority, by that act alone forfeits his rights, and deserves to be deposed, alike in the name of God and in the name of mankind; for the true good of man is inseparable from the honor and glory of God in his Church. When, then, we find a Sovereign Pontiff judging, condemning, and deposing a secular prince, releasing his subjects from their obligation to obey him, and authorizing them to choose them another king, we may regret the necessity for such extreme measures on the part of the Pontiff, but we see them only the bold and decided exercise of the legitimate authority of the spiritual power over the temporal; and instead of blushing for the chief of our religion, or joining our voice to swell the clamor against him, we thank him with our whole heart for his fidelity to Christ, and we give him the highest honor that we can give to a true servant of God and benefactor of mankind. It is not the sainted Hildebrand, nor the much-wronged Boniface, that we feel deserves our apology, or our indignation, but Henry of Germany and Philip the Fair of France.

The Popes have been wronged by timid or timeserving Catholics, and it is time that we learn to do them justice, and free their memories from the foul calumnies with which party spirit and sectarian malice have loaded them.

The Pope is our father; and shall we not love him as our father? He is dearer to us than natural father or mother, for he is the Vicar on earth of our God and Saviour in heaven, and shall we not feel every arrow winged at him speed deep in our own hearts? Shall we not glory in his power, which after all is only the power of the Cross? Shall we not sorrow when he is driven into exile by the wicked, and applaud when he strikes down the oppressor, defends suffering innocence, and makes himself the friend of the friendless, the father of the fatherless? O Sovereign Pontiff, Successor of the Prince of the Apostles, Vicar of God on earth, if ever through love of the world, or through fear of the secular power, whether royal or popular in its constitution, I forget to assert thy rights as supreme chief under Christ, my Saviour, of the whole spiritual order, and as such supreme alike in spirituals and in temporals, let my right hand forget her cunning, and my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth!

We yield to none in our loyalty to civil government, and we are loyal to it because we are loyal to the successor of Peter. Religion with us governs politics, and the Pope is lord of Cæsar. Without the Pope, the Church would break into fragments, and dwindle into puny and contemptible Protestant sects; without the Church, religion would become an idle speculation, a maudlin sentiment, or a loathsome superstition, like that which is revived among us by our modern necromancers, or "spiritual rappers"; without religion, the spiritual order disappears, morality no longer exists even in name, and man sinks into a mere animal, wallowing in the mire of sensuality. All history proves it; all reasoning demonstrates it; all study of our own hearts confirms it. Shall we then be so mad as to attempt to circumscribe the power of the Sovereign Pontiff, or not to spurn with loathing and disgust that paltry spirit that would rob him of his glorious prerogatives, and make him a base slave of the mob, or of a Byzantine, a German, or a French Kaiser? There is no liberty without the supremacy of the spiritual order; that supremacy cannot be maintained without the Papacy; and therefore, while others pay their homage to graceless demagogues, or to a Frederic Barbarossa or a Louis the Fourteenth, we will reserve ours for the Roman Pontiff.

ART. III. — *Compendium Theologiæ Moralis, Auctore JO-
ANNE PETRO GURY, S. J., in Collegio Romano, et in
Seminario Valsensi prope Anicium, Professore. Lug-
duni et Parisiis. 1850. 2 tom. 18mo.*

IN the Second Series of our Review, for July last, we inserted an article on Moral Theology, suggested by the work of Father Gury on that science. A lively interest in the subject treated by the author induced us to promise another article, in which we would give a more extended notice of the excellent work, which promise we now proceed to redeem.

We cannot refrain from expressing once more the pleasure we feel at the appearance of Father Gury's book. It is a welcome present to the professor, to the student, and to the director of souls, because it is a text-book, and the very best text-book, we believe, in existence. We do not, of course, regard it as an adequate substitute for the treatises of Moral Theology now in use, either in the schools or in our theological libraries. The train of argument in our last article, in which we insisted with great, although, as we believe, not unnecessary stress, upon the importance to the young priest of a singular reverence for Moral Theology, will acquit us of any intention of recommending the substitution of short treatises for the more or less ponderous tomes of well-known theologians. The medulla, or marrow, is, after all, only marrow,—it is not the whole body; although *medulla* is not the precise word wanted to express the nature of this welcome contribution to theological science. Large volumes of matter can sometimes be compressed within a small space, without losing their peculiar merits. Ponderous tomes may not seldom be so condensed, that a small volume will comprise or suggest their whole substance. Father Gury has done a work of this nature in his chosen science. The professor, in arranging his lecture for the class, the student in preparing his essay, the confessor in looking for a decision, will have frequent opportunities of proving that he has not only done it, but that he has done it successfully. It is so convenient at times to find whole tracts reduced to the compass of a few pregnant sentences! The suggestive character of Father Gury's paragraphs forms one of the chief merits of

his book. The student, who has previously read Liguori, will find, as he reads them, that he has not only a new author, but an author who contrives, in every sentence, to recall to his mind what he has learned from the old masters upon the subject of his immediate study. It is the summit of perfection in a compendium, to reproduce or suggest all that is worth remembering of the old, while presenting substantially a new work. It is, moreover, no small merit in this excellent book, that it is not too large to be carried in the pocket. This good quality will be appreciated by the missionary, who is obliged, while engaged in distant missions, where his books are often needed, to leave his bulky Laymann, La Croix, Bonacina, or Liguori, upon the shelves of his library at home.

Father Gury is very sententious. He gives decisions. He not only presents the state of the question, — which he generally does very clearly, and in marvellously few words, — he not only gives the opinions of others, but he gives also his own. Moral Theology, as we have elsewhere shown, is a science *veri nominis*, — nay, the science of sciences; for it is the science of the Final Cause. It is also, in one of its aspects, an art, *ars artium, regimen animarum*. Yet it may be presented in such a way as to peril its claims upon our consideration, as the first of sciences and the highest of arts. It may be unscientifically and inartistically treated, and sometimes it is so. There are treatises in which the student, after wading through pages of matter, containing opposite opinions concerning the question in hand, not seldom looks in vain for a decision from the author. This is especially true of cases which are really difficult, and which are the most likely to perplex the student. Decisions in obvious cases, of course, are readily obtained. But one gets from Father Gury's book, not the difficulties only, but a clear, straightforward decision, in all cases touching which we have had occasion to consult him.

Yet he does not cut his knots Alexander-wise. He is not an innovator. In all his decisions which we have examined, we have invariably found that the weight of authority is on his side. In his Preface he truly says that his book contains an integral exposition of Moral Theology, but that nothing was further from his mind than the thought of expounding new doctrine. He follows in the

footsteps of old and recognized masters in Moral Theology. His chief guide was the blessed St. Liguori, inasmuch as that great light of moral science had received from the Holy See such commendations as are rarely bestowed upon authors by the Apostolic Chair, and such as make his volumes not only a standard work, but an authoritative exposition of Moral Theology. Of course, the work of St. Liguori, which is somewhat less remarkable for its logic than for the piety, good sense, and patient research manifested in its pages, is of indisputable authority only when taken as a whole. As a whole, it received the approbation of Rome, but this approbation is not to be regarded as giving authority to each and every decision of the illustrious theologian, though it certainly gives to every clear decision of his a presumptive authority, — an extrinsic title to respect by virtue of which no deliberate opinion he gives can be lightly set aside. That some of his decisions were susceptible of modifications, certain considerations will render sufficiently apparent. The structure of society recognized in his book is thoroughly Italian. Human nature is, indeed, everywhere essentially the same, but its accidental differences may sometimes change the state of a question. The morality of human acts is to some extent deduced from the circumstances attending them. Then St. Liguori saw reasons for amending, in subsequent editions of his works, certain decisions given by him at an earlier period of his career as a master in moral science. Moreover, in his positive decisions, he supposes the Council of Trent to be publicly received, and the Canon Law to obtain, — the structure of society, in a word, which frequently enters into his *suppositum*, or forms it, he assumes to be Catholic. Father Gurý, while noticing the works of Neyraguet and Gousset, the former of whom has also given to the theological world a valuable compendium of St. Liguori, says of his own work, that it exhibits the doctrine of the illustrious St. Alphonsus, but in a new form, and in a somewhat different method. Referring to his original intention in preparing it, he says that he meant that its circulation should be confined *domesticos inter parietes*. We have already intimated our belief that it will prove to professors and to students an invaluable book, and we are glad that events, as detailed by Father Gurý in his Preface, caused him to extend its circulation from the confines

of the class-room to the body of missionary priests, to whom, we imagine, it will be as useful as it is to students and professors.

The method adopted by the author is very simple, and therefore very natural. He always begins with a definition, and that not a nominal, but an essential one. Then come the divisions, if any, of the subject. Next, he briefly states his principles. Then follow the questions suggested by the definition, with their appropriate answers. Here the author indicates the diverse solutions, if any, which have been given by different masters, after which he redeems his promise, made in the Preface, of telling his reader what his judgment is upon the disputed point. In all these particulars he is very sententious, and the only limit to his brevity is, as he confesses, the beginning of obscurity. His reader will bear witness that he does not attain that limit. Clearer and more distinct sentences than his are rarely found, — a tolerably good proof that he is a man of singularly clear and distinct ideas. To those who ask for more matter, more citations, and more discussion, he simply answers that his book is valuable chiefly inasmuch as it is a compend. To those who urge that a compend can be, at best, but an imperfect introduction to the study of books of which it professes to be the sum, Father Gury suggests that they should not be unreasonably afraid of the word *Compendium*. He quietly adds, — and here all his readers will sustain him, — that his little book is one which can be understood and studied by itself. I have looked to it, says the illustrious author, that nothing in Moral Theology which is necessary, or singularly useful to a right understanding of the subject, should be omitted. We refer the reader to Father Gury's Preface for a modest, but remarkably forcible statement of the peculiarities of his book, and we must not forget to tell the Latin scholar that he would do well to take some notice of Father Gury's style. His Preface is a specimen of good writing. What is of greater consequence, he redeems his promises in the body of his work. We have spoken of it as a book which, like all good compends, is singularly useful to the professor, to the scholar, and to the missionary priest, inasmuch as it presents to a brief, but scientific glance, the results of profound and long investigations, on the part of many masters, in the science of Moral Theology. Yet we cannot deny that it

may stand alone, and supply the place of other works, — a thing which we would venture to say of no other book, that of St. Liguori excepted, of course. The theologian who can carry Gury's doctrine in his head as easily as he can carry the book in his pocket, will be no unskilled director of souls.

We propose to refer more particularly to some of the points treated by Father Gury which have arrested our attention, as worthy of close study in these unhappy times. Take, as an example, his definition of FAITH.

As a virtue, faith is an infused supernatural habit, inclining the understanding to a firm assent to all truths revealed by God, and proposed by the Church, which assent is based upon the authority of God revealing those truths. (Vol. I. p. 126.) A little reflection upon the terms of this definition will make some good persons, who are inclined to place much reliance upon religious controversy as an agent for winning souls to the Church, wonder less at the trifling results which attend so many of their well-meant efforts. In truth, few heretics or infidels are converted through the instrumentality of controversial exercises. Christian antiquity does not favor them, as means of salvation. Some, when they observe that the Fathers often opposed heretics in the controversial arena, misapprehend the import of that fact. Without excluding a desire for the conversion of their opponents, the Fathers did not, primarily, direct their labors to that end. They sought to guard the sheep, and to drive away the wolves. In fact, the conversion of the wolves — the heretics — was not a common event, and, when it did happen, the neophytes were closely looked after, and the greatest caution was observed in restoring them to the communion of the Church, — to say nothing of their being set apart to teach, and to administer the Sacraments. The rarity of conversions among heretics who have, at different times, figured as controversialists, is not at all wonderful, when we reflect that merely human, and sometimes positively sinful motives, urged them to dispute, and accompanied their controversial efforts. Human motives *plus* sin are not likely to generate faith, even if no other obstacles were in the way. But this faith, which the Catholic disputant is so desirous of witnessing in his adversary, is a supernatural habit, therefore not the product of natural reason. It is based upon the authority of God revealing,

and of the Church proposing truth, therefore it cannot stand upon human authority or reason. It is infused into the soul by God, — not found by chance, or by study, or in consequence of a controversial display. Such a display naturally tends to make the heretic more obstinate, for it is not unfavorable to the growth of vanity and pride, and human passions are obstacles to the reception of the gift of faith. Moreover, a firm assent to revealed truth is necessary in order that faith may live. Assent involves a motion of the will. Now we have a hundred proverbs signifying that it is of no use to convince the intellect if the will remains inactive or stubborn. Not only do men see the right, approve it, yet refuse to follow it, but they also see the true, yet refuse to recognize it as the true, — refuse to embrace it, to assent to it. These and similar considerations serve to prove that Catholics might as well abstain, as a general rule, from religious disputes, seeing that our adversaries commonly suspect, or know well enough, sometimes too well, that they should be Catholics, and need a hearty prayer more than an argument, be it ever so learned. The same considerations serve to cause a preference for moral homilies over controversial sermons. These enable the preacher to review his theology, certainly. Yet it is a question whether their frequent introduction, particularly in the morning, when Mass is said, does the good hoped for by the preacher. We do not wish to be understood as desiring to say any thing in disparagement of controversial efforts; — they are excellent in their place, but sometimes they are out of place.

Touching the necessity of faith, our author is very brief, and his tone is quite decided. Heresy is a sin opposed to faith. It is not a weakness, amiable or otherwise, — it is a sin, like theft, murder, or lust. It is defined to be "obstinate error in a baptized person concerning truth as proposed by the Church." The error must be wilful, obstinate; for a man may err, as St. Augustine says, and yet not be a heretic. Mistakes are pardonable, — wilful persistence in error not so. The Christian who errs is at all times ready to submit to authority; the heretic sets up his own judgment as a tribunal above all others. The error, to be heresy, must be in a baptized person. Otherwise it is infidelity, — another sin opposed to faith, and which is the *want* of faith in an unbaptized person. It is not a negative,

but a privative defect, inferring the absence of a quality or habit in one who should have it. Blindness in a man is such a defect, for man should see; and if he does not, he is not a perfect man. Infidelity is blindness of the soul. Heresy is obliquity of spiritual vision, and, in one important respect, it is equivalent to infidelity; for obliquity of vision imports a turning away of the eye from the object. Heresy partially, infidelity wholly, turns away the soul from the Author of Grace. In the end, both arrive at the same result, which is darkness everlasting. He who turns aside from the narrow way of which Christ spake, fails to reach the City of God no less than he who travels in an opposite direction. He who sinks within sight of the shore drowns as well as he who sinks in the middle of the ocean.

Heresy once abounded in this country, infidelity now abounds. Protestants are becoming an unbaptized people, and therefore infidels. It is worth while to remember this fact, for reasons which we will note in another place. Heresy is a mortal sin, and this, as Gury defines it, is a grave transgression of the Divine law, which deprives the soul of the friendship of God, and imports eternal damnation. In a well-regulated, that is, in a Christian society, heresy is regarded with the horror and detestation which it deserves. St. John, the beloved disciple, the apostle of charity, testifies strongly to this point, and the Church, following the commandment of Christ, and the earnest exhortation of the Apostles, has never ceased to repeat the inspired words which anathematize the heretic, though he present himself as an angel of light. Faith, the virtue opposed to heresy, is so necessary, that, to use our author's terse language, the internal exercise or act of faith is necessary to all adults, and so necessary, that it is a means without which there is no justification. There is not, because, as Gury remarks in the same article, the want of faith takes away the capacity of justification. It is scarcely necessary to remark, that the plea of invincible ignorance, even if it excuse heresy in the abstract, fails to justify it in individual cases, simply because the first well-authenticated case of invincible ignorance as to the necessity of faith remains to be discovered. It never exists, says Gury, where the obligation of further inquiry is even in a confused and general way apprehended. The law which requires faith is sufficiently promulgated. Promulgation is the publication of the law made by legiti-

mate authority, in order that all subjects may know the law and be bound by it. It would be absurd to argue that such publication has not taken place. And it is worthy of remark, that Protestants never plead invincible ignorance as an excuse for refusing to believe. On the contrary, we commonly find that they profess to know more about the Church than we know ourselves. They write, speak, and pass judgment concerning it, with an amazing readiness. The most ignorant old woman in the remotest town is quite ready to assign fifty reasons why she will not become a Catholic. Her Catholic neighbors are regarded with suspicion, pity, or dislike. Her servants, if she have any, undergo a sort of continual martyrdom for the faith which is in them. Any member of her family, who may be blessed by God with the grace of conversion, is subjected to a persecution which is not seldom brutal. Now all this proves that the claims of the Church have been presented to the minds of even the most ignorant, at least in a general way, and that invincible ignorance is not the malady to be cured. The feelings which these people experience towards the Church are so peculiar, that, if they had reference to any other subject than the necessity of faith, they would investigate it thoroughly. Yet they are by no means at ease concerning the Church. Satan, who tempted them to reject her, tempts them to hate her. The feelings with which even the most ignorant villagers regard the Church afford matter for an interesting inquiry. Catholics never injured them, and yet they feel impelled, by a power which they do not always recognize as infernal, to persecute unoffending Catholics in political, civil, social, and domestic life. Instances in abundance will readily occur to the reader. Why they have this feeling, and why they indulge it freely, are questions which they cannot satisfactorily answer, even to themselves. And intelligent heretics share the feeling, — their good-breeding only prevents them from expressing it broadly and uncivilly. It is manifested with sufficient clearness in their actions. We are confident that it can be detected in every heretic living, although not in the same degree. In some persons, owing to peculiar circumstances, it is not manifested, or even sensibly experienced, very often. Sometimes it is evident in a quiet, civil, but obstinate closing of the ear against the voice of the Church. Occasionally it takes the form of philosophy, —

patronizingly acknowledges the past labors of the Church, and civilly sneers at her present pretensions. And sometimes it assumes a most ridiculous tone,—talks about branch Catholicism,—says that, if the Roman Church be a mother, she must certainly have sons or daughters,—that, as like begets like, a church must beget churches, and bitterly complains of the Church because she will not acknowledge dead and severed branches as a part of her own living and august body. Try to find invincible ignorance in an individual, and it will flee from you. It is utterly incompatible with the feelings with which heretics, from the highest to the lowest, regard the Church. Their bearing, in the presence of a priest, affords a very curious proof of the fact. They may hate, despise, or neglect their own ministers, but the feeling with which they look upon a priest transcends all species and genera. It is an odd synthesis of attraction and repulsion,—of fear and of hatred. They may regard their own ministers as hirelings,—they never believe the priest to be such. Whatever they may say, they feel that the priest was sent by One having authority to send: If invincible ignorance really darken a heretic, it is such a strange thing, that, as St. Thomas says, the ordinary course of Providence is suspended in its regard, and it is removed by the ministry of an angel. But let no one who has rejected the Sacraments as dispensed by the ordinary minister,—the priest,—expect them at the hands of the extraordinary minister,—an angel. We never heard or read of an administration after the extraordinary manner. It may have taken place,—who knows?—the age of miracles has not passed, and will not pass while the Church and the world coexist. But such an event brings no comfort to heretics. In the first place, it proves that invincible ignorance in life and in death never existed. It proves that the invincibly ignorant cannot enter heaven. It proves that the excuse cannot serve many persons, inasmuch as a miracle is required to remove the evil, granting that it really exists, and miracles, though not unknown, are not of ordinary occurrence. As we remarked but now, Protestants commonly refuse to avail themselves of the plea. The only persons who urge it are Catholics of a stamp unknown in Apostolic times, or in ages of faith. It would be well for them to wait until the parties most interested offer the excuse, and to remember that, when they themselves urge

it in behalf of Protestants, they insult the unhappy heretics instead of complimenting them, for they assert that a Protestant, who persists, to all appearance, unto the end, cannot escape eternal damnation unless by a miracle which God was never known to perform. Were we a Protestant, as by the mercy of God we are not, we should not feel any gratitude whatever for apologies of this sort. It is better, far better, and infinitely more charitable, to tell the truth. Christ said, He who believeth not shall be damned. The Church says, He who believeth not will be damned. Why should Catholics be ashamed or afraid to repeat the words spoken by Christ and by his Church? They know well that Christ established one Church, and only one, and that to this Church he confided the ordinary means of escaping eternal damnation. They know well that "he who has not the Church as his Mother has not God as his Father." They know well that, when they adopt such language, they are governed by the mean canons of human respect. They know that Christ held no such language, and that the Church put quite other words into their mouths. Charity bids a man lose the whole world to gain his own soul. There are several ways, as the Catechism teaches, whereby one may become an accessory to the commission of sin by others. It may be done by silence, by consent, and by flattery. It is a fearful thing to become an accessory to a mortal sin, as heresy assuredly is. It is to be feared that some unthinking Catholics have made the descent into hell easy to many, by most uncharitable silence, consent, or flattery. Let them analyze the motives which have made them prefer the feelings of a Protestant to his eternal salvation, and they will invariably find that the feelings were worldly. They will find that no principle, but mere sentiment, dictated their words. They will find that by silence, consent, or flattery they have helped the unhappy heretic to lose the whole world while endeavoring to gain it, and to lose his own soul therewith. We fear that from the depths many souls cry to Heaven against these uncharitable Catholics for vengeance.

We believe, however, that most Protestants, while they appear to listen complacently to language of this sort from Catholics, despise the speakers, who, by denying One Church, utter heresy, and, so far as in them lies, degrade the Church to the condition of a sect. Protestants are tol-

erably well aware, that out of the Church there is no salvation. They know that Christ said it, and that the Church teaches it. They know that the Church has always acted upon the supposition of the absolute truth of that doctrine, and that in this way only certain events in her life can be explained. They know that, while Protestantism is anarchy, the Church is a body which is governed by inflexible laws, and that law informs every action of Catholic life. The most ignorant of them know this in a confused way, for they witness daily most unequivocal evidences of the fact. In political, civil, and social life they see Catholics conducting themselves in a manner quite foreign to Protestant ideas, and they observe that Catholic action, even in minute affairs, appears to be governed by law. They simply misapprehend the cause of this phenomenon, and they say that it is owing, not to the grace of Christ, not to the Sacraments, but to the priests; thereby mistaking the agent for the cause, the minister for the grace ministered, the channel for the stream. They know enough, however, to be fully aware that Catholics who tell them that they can be saved outside the Church do not enunciate Catholic doctrine, and that they talk of opening heaven with a key which Christ has not given. We counsel them to buy a sixpenny Catechism, mark the passages relating to the absolute necessity of faith, and, when they chance to hear Catholics flattering their Protestant errors, to read the aforesaid passages, and ask for an explanation that will not quite destroy their meaning. One trial will be enough.

We have dwelt upon these citations from Father Gury, because the doctrine set forth in them is peculiarly applicable to our age and country. We Catholics live in a community which was Protestant, and which is rapidly becoming infidel. We do not use the term *infidel* in its popular acceptation, but to signify the unbaptized. We cannot live an isolated life, as Shakers, neither can we form a semi-isolated community, like the Jews. It is decreed that the Christian shall be in the world and not of it. Catholics have political, civil, and social duties that must be discharged. If they be magistrates, they must administer their trust faithfully, and as before God. If they be subjects, they must be obedient and loyal. They must be good masters or servants, good employers or workmen, good merchants, buyers or sellers, good friends and neigh-

bors. Yet they live in a world totally distinct from that of the Gentiles. The principles, language, and habits of the two worlds are essentially different. The particular difference which enters into our present argument is, that in the Gentile world human acts have for their law the human will, and that world, therefore, is naturally wicked, and in a state of anarchy, while in the Catholic world every human act has a law, made by divine authority. The Gentile world is a world of passion, the Catholic world is a world of law. The difficulty, then, is for a Catholic to live in the world without being of it. He has the same nature with the Gentiles; baptism did not destroy in him concupiscence; it was left that he might fight the good fight. The Sacraments furnish a plain, practical solution of this difficulty. Protestants know nothing of this solution, and they confidently expect that the third generation of Catholics in America will become practically, if not wholly, Gentiles. Mixed marriages, mixed education, democratic institutions, and self-interest, will do the work, as Protestant Americans suppose. In their calculations they make no account of the Sacraments, and yet these cross their path at every step. The Sacraments will always guard a goodly portion of Catholics from Gentile influences, and they will ever and anon very quietly reclaim a strayed Catholic, upon whom the Protestants had counted even as one of themselves. Yet it is true that Catholics are in danger, and that some of them fall into the Gentile world, — become *of* that world. The Gentile expectation is not wholly vain, for the nature of the Catholic, as well as of the Protestant, is naturally inclined to evil. His nature is turned to God by grace. The ordinary channels of grace are the Sacraments. Let the Catholic neglect these, and he becomes a man of the world. And many do neglect them. The four Protestant engines just mentioned bring ruin to many souls.

Self-interest and servile fear are certainly motives of action more powerful than honest. The Catholic, like the Gentile, like all other men, has physical and mental wants which are to be satisfied. Like others, he may enjoy the comforts and luxuries of life. He, too, may possess wealth, and be crowned with honors. In the pursuit or enjoyment of these things, he may be tempted to imitate the Gentile, who makes them his end, instead of means for

the attainment of the true end of man. It is to be feared that there are not wanting Catholics who sell their birth-right for a mess of pottage. Some crave the honors and emoluments of office, others seek riches, others ask for only their daily bread. The men who can aid them in the attainment of office, money, or bread are frequently Protestants. It sometimes happens that the price to be paid by the Catholic for the patronage or aid of Protestants is apostasy. Sometimes it is the violation of the commandments of the Church, and an occasional appearance at heretical places of worship. It is not seldom a display of *Catholicism*, or of liberality, as it is called, in religious concerns, which consists in neglect of the Sacraments, in railing at the temporal power of the Pope, and at bishops and priests, and in preferring to believe that heaven is open to moral men, no matter what their religion may be. The men who say and do these things seldom fail to manifest much contempt for "low, ignorant Catholics," and to be very assiduous in their respect to the respectable, which, in their language, means the middle classes, of the Protestant community. Their Protestant tempters are perfectly willing that they remain in the profession of the "Catholic tenets," provided they abandon Catholic practice. Now and then, as we have said, the Protestant is astonished, and very disagreeably, at the sight of a sudden, and to him quite unaccountable, reconciliation of his intended victim to Catholicity. A retreat or a confession did the work; but Protestants have long since forgotten the meaning of these things. It not unfrequently happens that the unhappy apostate apparently obtains the worldly good for which his soul yearned. He gets his wife, his money, or his office. He finds that he is not overtaken with instant vengeance, and he slowly learns to become indifferent to his sin. He not unfrequently presents to others the temptation to which he yielded. "Friend Patrick," he says, "observe! I respect the Catholic Church as much as ever I did, but I have learned to despise the arts of its priests, and their bigoted, exclusive spirit. You know Deacon Smith, who has provided your poor family with the necessaries of life during the winter, and Mr. Jones, who goes about doing good. Will you believe that their church is a false church, or that they will be eternally damned? Moreover, Patrick, observe! If I had continued

to be a narrow-minded Papist, I should not have grown rich. Catholic society is low, and if you wish to become as prosperous as I am, follow my example. Men will not buy your goods, or give you their daughters, while you remain in that low society, and continue to be a slave to the priests. You can believe the Catholic dogmas as firmly as ever, but that will not hinder you from laughing at them occasionally, in the presence of influential Protestants, or from being seen, now and then, at Protestant meetings."

Twenty, thirty, or forty years are, in the sight of God, like a thousand years, or like an instant. Sinners are frequently deceived by the lapse of time which often ensues between the commission of sin and its retribution. Sometimes God, in his wrath, permits the wicked man to go down into hell without having been reminded, by a visible judgment, that the sword hanging over his head was suspended by a single hair. But in this sin of apostasy, and also in the lesser, but still very scandalous, crime of disobeying the commandments of the Church, of sneering at Catholic practices, and of avoiding the fellowship of Catholics, in order to gratify the passion of lust, avarice, or pride, it is a common remark that the punishment is generally visible also. Cases in point are within the memory of most Catholics. And the higher degree of worldly prosperity these wretched beings attained, the more ruinous, loud, and disgraceful was their fall, that the world might know that iniquity never triumphs to the end.

There are not wanting Catholics who would never deny their religion, but who are ashamed of it notwithstanding. It is the religion of the poor; it is not fashionable; its members form a minority of the inhabitants; the prejudices of Protestants are so deeply rooted and so active, that Catholics are persecuted in every walk of life. Now every Catholic knows well that all these prejudices are based upon falsehood. He knows that all enemies of the Church should be Catholics, and would be if they were sufficiently humble to prefer the authority of Christ to their own private judgment. He knows that, as only the Church can guide man to the other world, so only she can teach him how to live in this. Hence, two modes of action are suggested with reference to Catholic bearing in Protestant society. The first is the defensive, apologetic mode. Through the mercy of God, Catholics are less familiar

with it now than they were years ago. The Church is in possession. No Protestant has a right to attack it. When he does, his action is dictated partly by fear, partly by policy. His own ground is untenable, — his own house is tottering; he knows it, and he knows that, when he is forced to stand on the defensive, he must be silent, or fly, or submit. Some Catholics, who do not clearly see this, — although they might if they would but open their eyes and pluck up a little courage, — pursue the defensive course. If they would stop here, less scandal had been given. But, in defending Catholicity, they not seldom made it *Catholicism*, — a term which some of the recent converts from Puseyism prefer to employ. Their preference of the term is not wholly insignificant. The Church, were she what some of her children represent her to be, might properly rank as an “*ism*.” To return to our timid Catholics, — they seem, at times, to be ashamed of their religion. They wish it to be respectable and plausible in the eyes of heretics, forgetting that the Church can be so only when she appears as herself, and that she owes no thanks to those who strip her of her venerable garments, with which Christ clothed her, and present her arrayed according to the tastes of the age. It is a vain effort, for, after all their precautions, the air and gait prove her a being not of this world. These pliant souls lay great stress upon magnificent churches, fashionable preachers, full ceremonies, and fine music, things which certainly belong to Catholicity, but not in their sense. They do not like to hear of hell, or of any of the four last things to be remembered, heaven excepted; and this place, according to them, has a second and tolerably wide gate, through which our “Protestant brethren” may enter, on the plea of invincible ignorance. That is to say, heretics wilfully choose the road to hell, but find themselves, by some mistake, at the gate of heaven, wherefore they must be admitted. The soft-hearted persons of whom we speak do not, of course, tolerate the use of the word *heretic*, and the doctrine revealed by Christ, and taught by the Church, that he who believeth not shall be damned, is explained by them to mean, that he who believeth not can be saved. All the doctrines of the Church which are supposed to be objectionable to Protestants are either never mentioned, or explained away. Great stress is laid upon those doctrines which are supposed to be like Protestant

tenets. Sometimes, particularly in what is called good society, an inquiring and sentimental Protestant lady finds, to her no small astonishment, that she has been a Catholic for years; and that only the outward signs of Catholicity, such as attendance upon the Sacraments and at Mass, and a few other observances, are necessary to bring her within the fold. Coupled with this lubrication of what may here be fairly termed celestial machinery, one finds an excessive tenderness for Protestant prejudices, — a liberal acknowledgment of the inconveniences of the “Catholic system,” — an exceeding candor in admitting the force of many Protestant objections, and in blaming the conduct of Popes, bishops, and priests, — an extreme unwillingness to attack Protestantism, and a perfect willingness to accept, in behalf of the Church, the base and contemptuous toleration of her enemies.

Protestants, however, are seldom deceived by any of these devices. Otherwise, the plea of invincible ignorance might be put forward in their behalf. But they know well enough, that the difference between Catholicism and Catholicity is total and eternal. The most ignorant among them are aware of this, although their ideas concerning it may be confused and obscure. They know that it is Catholic doctrine, that out of the Church there is no salvation, and no amount of reasoning or of concession will convince them that the Church will consent, by any possibility, to be ranked with sects. Hence they regard all those who endeavor to hide their Catholicity with suspicion or contempt. For the apostate they have no regard whatever, inasmuch as he seldom, if ever, fails to show, by his conduct, that his apostasy was caused by base motives. They hold what are called “liberal Catholics” in utter contempt also, and if they ever profess any regard for them or for formal apostates, it is only for a season, in order to use them as vile tools in their opposition to the Church. They know well that the Church does not tolerate this “liberalism,” — that she anathematizes it, — and that these “liberals” are taught by her to confess their faith, whole and entire, not only at the loss of their worldly goods, but even at the peril of their life. Neither can Protestants feel much respect for those Catholics who deny certain articles of Catholic faith, or conceal them, or explain them away for the purpose of converting Protestants,

or, at least, of securing their good-will. The Protestant may always silence them with this dilemma: "Either you explain the doctrines of your Church correctly, or you do not. If you do, it is not what I supposed it to be, — it does not prefer such lofty claims, — it is a mere sect, and I need not join it to secure heaven. If you do not, I will suspend my judgment until I can meet another Catholic who will not be afraid or ashamed to tell me precisely what his religion is."

Both natural and supernatural causes are at work to make Catholics in America more numerous and powerful. They may, and do, attain a standing in political, civil, and social life. This result, as it becomes more apparent, will abate the anxiety of those who wish to see the Church respectable in a worldly point of view. One obstacle, upon which our enemies relied, will be removed. They hoped to prevent conversion among the higher classes, by representing the Church as a receptacle for men too poor and ignorant to go elsewhere. Every visit of a Protestant to Europe tends to dispel that notion. Nay, in Catholic countries, the tables are effectually turned. Protestantism appears mean and vulgar, as it is, and hence Protestants in Catholic countries, if they be not "professors," — a class of persons rapidly growing small, — are ashamed of their Protestantism, and some of them, at times, almost fancy that they are *quasi* Catholics. But there are other "institutions" in America upon which our enemies rely as means for checking what they are pleased to term the "growth of Popery." Of one of these, and the chief, we have spoken. It is the necessity, under which a Catholic labors, of living with Protestants, of hearing their language, and of witnessing their example. He must be in the world, and yet not of it. Much, if not all, that he sees and hears among his generally unbaptized companions, is calculated to estrange him from his Church, and to make of him an infidel, — a result quite acceptable to our Protestant enemies, who care not if a man become a demon, provided he be seduced from the Church. The Sacraments, assiduously attended, are the obvious remedy for all Catholics so tempted. Yearly and semiannual communions do not suffice in our times. The other means upon which our enemies rely are mixed marriages, democratic institutions, and godless schools.

Marriages, when between Catholics and infidels, that is, unbaptized persons, are annulled, and when between Catholics and heretics are forbidden, by ecclesiastical law. Mixed marriages are not intrinsically evil, and the law forbidding them does not bind *semper et pro semper*. Father Gury, however, (Vol. II. p. 374,) regards the conditions without which such marriages are inadmissible as founded upon the natural law. The principal conditions are, that the Catholic party shall be in no danger of apostasy, and that the children, without exception, shall be baptized and educated in the Catholic faith. In this country, as we have already remarked, Protestants are rapidly becoming an unbaptized people, and consequently infidels. Hence, in mixed marriages, most of the dispensations are obtained for disparity of religion in a strict sense. Believers are yoked with unbelievers. The danger of perversion, to the Catholic party, or to the offspring, is as great as when the Protestant party is baptized; for infidels, in these times, hold the Church in deeper hatred than even those Protestants sometimes oddly called church-members. Father Gury, in a very few words, declares his judgment concerning these mixed marriages. Following Benedict XIV. he calls them *detestable*. Benedict, in his decree *super Matrimonii Hæreticorum*, declares it to be a most doleful thing, that there should be found Catholics so shamefully carried away by *insane lust* that they will not abstain from these *detestable* marriages, which Holy Church has *always* condemned and forbidden (*perpetuo damnavit atque interdixit*). The Pontiff goes on to praise, in the highest terms, the zeal of those bishops who deter Catholics, by the enactment and execution of severe laws, from uniting themselves with heretics by this *sacrilegious* bond. And he admonishes all persons having the care of souls to see to it, by opposing all honest obstacles, that Catholics do not enter upon these marriages, which bring peril of damnation to the soul (*in PROPRIAM animarum perniciem*). This decree was directed to the bishops of Belgium, but it forms a part of canon law.

These are strong expressions, but no stronger than those which the Church has employed in every age. St. Paul had said, "Bear not the yoke with unbelievers. For what fellowship hath justice with iniquity? Or what communion is there between light and darkness? But what

agreement is there of CHRIST with Belial? or what portion hath the believer with the unbeliever?" "*This is a prohibition of intimate alliances with unbelievers, and especially of intermarriage.*" — KENRICK, in *Epist. II. ad Cor.*, Cap. vi. ver. 14, 15.

We fear that some Catholics are half disposed to consider marriage with unbelievers as the rule, and not as an exception barely tolerated by the Church, unblessed, and tolerated with fear and trembling, seeing that such marriages are too frequently the result of *insane lust*, or of some equally vile passion. It is true that persons afflicted with this disease are in the habit of quoting 1 Cor. vii. 14: "For the unbelieving husband is sanctified by the believing wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified by the believing husband, otherwise your children should be unclean, but now they are holy." "*The children were lawful. He calls them holy, that is, not unclean.*" — KENRICK, in *loc. cit.* It is probable that they were called holy for another reason. It was understood that the conclusion, the offspring, contrary to the logical rule, should follow the better part, the Christian parent, and thus become baptized, holy. It is certain, that, in some mixed marriages, the unbelieving party is converted to God. But it is as certain, that, in a majority of cases, children born of mixed marriages come into the world, live in it, or go out of it, with all the signs of reprobation. So far as our experience extends, the Catholic party and the children are saved, if they be saved, so as by FIRE. We have yet to see or hear of a mixed marriage which turned out well. Sometimes temporal, and, humanly speaking, most unaccountable misfortunes, befell the family. More rarely, the Catholic party would apostatize. Very frequently the same party would grow remiss in the discharge of Catholic duties, — an almost inevitable result, inasmuch as "evil communications corrupt good manners," and no communication is more evil than that between an unbeliever yoked with a Christian, because it may be close, confidential, and uninterrupted. Few Catholics, who have intermarried with Protestants, can say that they have gone forward in the way of salvation. Many have sensibly receded from their first fervor. The most common result of mixed marriages is the perdition of the children. If the father be an unbeliever, his authority — if the mother, her slow, but sure influence — militates against the life of the

child. Sometimes the infant is not baptized. More commonly, the children are suffered to acquire a dislike, which some demon seems to foster in them, of Catholic habits, and they are accustomed to prefer mere Protestant society. They are too commonly reared in such a pagan way, that they hold the Catechism and the Sacraments as of little account,—things well enough for the vulgar, but scarcely necessary for them. If a child, under these circumstances, be sent to a mixed college or school, his ruin is complete, a miracle apart. Indeed, punishment, always visible to the eye of faith, frequently to the common observer seems to be meted out to this sin, even in the present life. Why should it be otherwise? In a great majority of cases, the conditions without which mixed marriages are utterly damnable are not observed. There is danger of seduction to the Catholic party, or to the children. This danger, everywhere possible, becomes in our country probable, in consequence of the comparative liberty *claimed* and exercised by American children, their early emancipation from parental control, and the pagan nature of the society into which the providence of God has thrown Catholics in the nineteenth century. Yea, why should it be otherwise? Mixed marriages are not blessed by the Church. Is there a medium between a blessing and a curse? There are no prayers, no sacred rites, and the priest is not permitted to assume the signs of his office as minister of the Sacrament. He stands sadly by, an involuntary witness of an act barely tolerated by the Church. It is one of the most dreary events of his ministry. He, the dispenser of the mysteries of God, knows well that the exhibition of human passion before him too commonly ends in the ruin of all concerned. He does not assist as a minister of God, for matrimony is a Sacrament of the New Law bringing grace to sanctify the legitimate union of man with woman, and to enable them to receive and to rear their offspring in piety and holiness. These things may be done in mixed marriages, and so may the dead arise.

Our enemies rely upon godless schools,—state education,—as a means of checking the progress of Catholicity. We must admit that they have laid their plans with infernal skill. The result will not equal their anticipations, however. The attention of the Catholic world has been directed to this subject by those whom God hath sent to

rule over us, and a struggle, which will end in a victory for the Church, has begun between Catholicity and the State, to see who shall have the child. We translate a few paragraphs, in which Father Gury, as usual, pithily states the Catholic doctrine.

“Parents are especially bound to procure for their children sound spiritual education. Man hath a most noble and rational soul, created after God’s image, and for God, his final and supernatural end. Hence parents are strictly bound to instruct and educate their children for God, their last and only end. Hence matrimony was made a Sacrament, that the children might be born again to Christ, and become worthy of eternal life. For what saith the Apostle? ‘If any one have not care of his own, and especially those of his household, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel.’ Parents are bound, either by themselves or by good masters, to rear their children in good discipline, in the observance of the commandments, in faith, and in all things necessary to salvation. They are strictly bound to procure for them masters distinguished for learning and piety, and to see to it that they be not corrupted by bad companions, discourses, and books. Parents are guilty of deadly sin, at least generally, who send their children to heretical schools, or who suffer them, for the sake of worldly learning, to sit under an heretical, impious, or immoral teacher.”

We refer the reader to the chapter on prohibited books, Vol. II. n. 754. In the first volume, n. 226, we find the following sentences: —

“It is *never* lawful to print or publish books containing matter against faith and morals, not even when they contain some good matter. Printers should, in all doubtful cases, consult learned persons, particularly their ecclesiastical superiors. Such books cannot be indiscriminately sold, let, leased, or given away. Obscene books are to be destroyed whenever they chance to fall into Christian hands. They are not legitimate property, and no man can honestly own or claim them. Like noxious creatures, they should be wholly extirpated.”

Among the worst books in circulation are some which were written or compiled for the use of school-children, or for what is humorously called scientific reading. The inanity of many school-books, their multiplicity, and the atheistical character of some of them, are evils which are beginning to arrest the attention of even the Protestant community. Little heed is given to the character of the teachers,

and not much to their qualifications. Normal Schools are established for them, with what success may be gathered from the fact, that there are not wanting among them persons who do not know how to spell. What is called Christianity is no recommendation to them ; Catholicity is, avowedly, a disqualification for which no degree of scholarship can atone. The consequence is, that the generation now educated by the state will become, not only pagans, but ignorant pagans. The chief aim of those who have the care of youth seems to be to erect palaces for school-houses, to multiply books and ornamental branches of study. Solidity is so generally sacrificed to show, that our school system reminds one of a thing which should be the head of a man, but which turns out to be an empty head, that is worthless except as a hairdresser's sign. Wait a little, and all Protestants who profess to believe in the necessity of religion, and all parents who care for more than the bodies of their children, will become convinced of the rottenness of our system of state education, and they will join us in praying for its restoration to its proper place, as a handmaid of religion. It has played the vagabond long enough.

The peculiar institutions of this country are frequently spoken of by our enemies as efficient means for the perversion of Catholics. When they are urged to describe the peculiar institutions upon which they depend for this result, it is usually found that their ideas are indistinct and obscure. State education is one of the first to be mentioned. This institution is rapidly committing suicide, and, if it is inimical to religion, as it certainly is, it cannot destroy Catholicity without burying all religion beneath its ruins. It will not destroy Catholicity, however. The Church has witnessed the downfall of too many "institutions" planned for her ruin, to fear this empty head with glossy curls. True it has ruined souls, but it will not live to do as much evil to future generations as it has to the present and past. The Church has struck it with her anathema, and she calmly awaits the certain result. Our enemies are already beginning to find, that not Catholicity, but Protestantism, so far as it professes to be a religion, is menaced by common schools with imminent ruin. The Protestant formula includes paganism. State education serves admirably to bring that element into a state of portentous activity.

Upon questioning our enemies more closely, mixed marriages turn out to be an institution designed for our extirpation. The inevitable association of Catholics with Protestants in most walks of life, and the contagion of Protestant example, is another institution calculated to undo us. We have already spoken of these. Protestant ideas are naturally obscure and confused in all things which require logical treatment, and which do not concern money, but a patient application of the Socratical method — that of asking questions — gradually brings their notions into objective clearness and distinctness. Another of the hostile “institutions” is the comparative ease with which men may change their original condition, rise above it, and attain to wealth and respectability. Poverty is one of the five mortal sins, according to Protestantism. The other four are chastity, faith, obedience, and humility. Humility, *radicitus*, includes the other four, as it supplies their formulæ. It is remarkable, speaking of the identity of Protestantism with paganism, that humility, according to the ancient Romans, was a *vice*. The exaltation of *self*, so essential to paganism, is recognized by Protestantism as a virtue, and it is accordingly recommended and celebrated in Protestant pulpits. The promise of Satan, who said to our parents, *Ye shall be as gods*, is faithfully repeated weekly to Protestant audiences. The boast of Satan, — *I will fix my throne above the stars; I will be like unto the Most High*, — is, curiously enough, distinctly traceable in most Protestant speculations concerning the destiny of our country, prepared for pulpits, public meetings, reviews, magazines, and newspapers. Whoever takes the trouble to read a common newspaper article recommending annexation and foreign intervention, will find it clearly reducible to the Satanic formula, word for word.

It is very true that our country is vast, — that its resources are more than sufficient to supply the wants of its inhabitants, and that the industrious Catholic emigrant can become wealthy, can hold offices of trust and of profit, and can see his sons sitting in the highest places of the land. It cannot be denied that the poor Catholic, who sees others attain worldly prosperity, and knows that he, too, may change his condition, is liable to severe temptation. But see what hellish inducements are offered to him by the enemies of the Church, that he may renounce her. It re-

peats the language of Satan to our Lord, and, pointing to the good things of this world, says to the poor Catholic, "All these will I give thee, if, falling down, thou wilt adore me!" "Blessed are the rich," says Protestantism, "for of such is the kingdom." That there are Catholics who neglect the interests of their souls in the rush for worldly goods is unhappily true, but it is true in every age and country. The peculiar facilities for growing rich without becoming dishonest, are an "institution" which is swiftly disappearing in America,—a fact of which the Catholic discoverers of the country, were they living, would not be likely to complain. Complaints, or rather reproaches, both frequent and serious, are made by Protestants, that Catholics do not grow rich suddenly. We answer,—1. That voluntary poverty is an evangelical counsel, and there are, happily, Catholics left who are willing to follow Christ, his Apostles, and an army of saints, to heaven through this road. 2. Considering only those persons in America who have honestly risen to wealth or to distinction, we believe that, regard being had to relative numbers, as many Catholics as Protestants will be found to excel. The Church does not forbid the acquisition of wealth or of honors, but their unjust possession, or an inordinate thirst for them. 3. Catholics, providentially, remember the first chapter of the Catechism better than most others. It contains the following questions and answers. "Which must we take the most care of, the body or the soul? Of the soul. Why so? Because 'What doth it profit a man, if he gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?'" The maxim that all is fair in business transactions,—the saying, *Caveat emptor*,—is recognized by Protestantism as law. The Catholic is taught that perjury, lying, and fraud are sins. He is taught that wealth or honors, unjustly acquired, may drag his soul to hell. He knows that, whether he may have injured his neighbor in his reputation or in his goods, he must make whatever restitution may be in his power. *Non dimittitur peccatum, nisi restitatur ablatum*, is a maxim of moral theology which forms one of the chief rules of Catholic life. Some Catholics may neglect it, but they were not taught to do so. Most Catholics, we trust, endeavor to heed it. The comparative poverty of many is a proof that it is not forgotten. A strange "institution" that, which reproaches Catholicity in that it teaches the necessity of being honest!

But our limits do not permit us to proceed further at present. We shall resume and continue this subject hereafter.

ART. IV. — *The Life of Henry the Eighth, and History of the Schism of England. Translated from the French of M. AUDIN. By E. G. K. BROWNE. New York: Duni-
gan & Brother. 1852. 8vo. pp. 441.*

SINCE their utter defeat in the seventeenth century by the great Bossuet, Protestants have hardly made any serious attempts to defend Protestantism as a religion, and they seem now very generally prepared to abandon its defence, save as a political and social order. If we may judge from their words and actions, their discourses and their writings, the great majority of them not only hold Protestantism as a form of Christian doctrine and worship to be indefensible, but are disposed to reject all theological doctrines, articles, dogmas, or propositions of faith as addressed to the understanding, and to resolve Christianity itself into a vague and indeterminate sentiment, common to all men, — a universal fact in the natural history of man, coalescing alike with any or all forms of faith and worship, and as acceptable to God when coalescing with one form as with another. They who pass for the more enlightened among them say with Pope, or rather Bolingbroke, whom Pope versified, —

“For modes of faith let graceless zealots fight,
His can't be wrong whose life is in the right.”

They quietly assume that faith has no relation to life, and that one's life can be right in any form of faith, or in none; thus entirely losing sight of Christianity as a supernatural life into which no one can be born without faith, or advance without faith perfected by charity.

We say only what the facts in the case warrant, when we say that Protestants everywhere virtually concede that ours is truly the Church of God, if it be a fact that our Lord founded any Church, or visible organization with authority to keep, witness, teach, declare, and apply his law, and out of which there is no salvation; and that Catholicity is un-

questionably the true and only form of Christianity, if Christianity be any thing more than a collection of moral precepts and curious philosophical speculations, or a general principle of political and social amelioration, to be developed and applied according to the special wants, tastes, and convictions of the people in each successive stage in the progress of mankind through the ages. Grant Christianity as a supernatural law, as a positive religion, as a fixed and determinate form of faith and worship, and they will none of them hesitate in their hearts, hardly in their words, to pronounce it and Catholicity one and the same thing. They oppose Catholicity in reality, not because it is not, but because it is religion, and insist upon Protestantism, not because it is, but because it is not religion, or because, while it has the name and appearance of religion, it is in reality as good as none,—imposes no restraint on their reason or will, their fancy or their passions, emancipates them from all religion as law, and leaves them free to be of any religion, except the Catholic, or of none at all, as they please.

Hence Protestants even attempt to defend their system, if system it can be called, only on secular grounds, and as lying wholly in the secular order. They urge in its defence against us, that it is more favorable than Catholicity to the independence of temporal sovereigns, to thrift, to trade and manufactures, to social progress, to mental activity, and to civil and religious freedom, that is, to the freedom of the temporal order from the restraints of religion. Save for the sake of appearances, or as the effect of old Catholic habits not yet lost, they oppose Catholicity and defend Protestantism only by secular reasons. No doubt they still adhere as tenaciously as ever to their Protestant movement, and boast of their “glorious Reformation”; yet certainly not because they regard it as the only true way, or even as *a* way, of salvation in the world to come,—certainly not because they regard it as best meeting the religious wants of the soul, and the best fitted to strengthen and console one on his death-bed; but because, in their judgment, it imposes the least restraint on reason and will, is the best thing for man as an inhabitant of this world and devoted to its transitory goods, and the most convenient for those who would live a free and easy life here without any grave reproaches of conscience,—because it relieves them

from the necessity of submitting their understandings to a law, and from the performance of good works, and leaves them to indulge their own carnal nature, and to follow unabashed their own corrupt passions and inclinations. This is the solemn fact, and in vain will they attempt to deny or disguise it.

This should not surprise us, for Protestantism never was a religion at all. No matter what may be the self-complacency of Protestants, the lofty airs they assume, the great, swelling words they use, or the grave tones in which they speak of their pure, unadulterated evangelical religion, the fact is, Protestantism, considered in itself, is not and never was a religion, true or false, never had a single religious element, never was sought and has never been upheld from any strictly religious motives. Men may have combined some fragments of religious truth with it; they may have retained in spite of it some religious observances, but never were they moved to embrace it, or to contend for it, by any considerations of religion. With the dissolute among the clergy and religious it was embraced because it emancipated them from the discipline of their superiors, freed them from their vows of chastity, and permitted them to marry; with kings, princes, and nobles, because it freed them from subjection to the Church, especially the Pope, enabled them to reign without any restraint on their will from the spiritual authority, and gave them the rich spoils of the churches and the monasteries; with the laity generally, because it emancipated them from the clergy, and gave them the power to select, teach, commission, and govern their pastors and teachers; and with all, because it freed them from the good works and almsdeeds, the fasts, penances, and mortifications, insisted on by the Catholic Church. Its chief and in reality its only charm for those who embraced it was, that it asserted the dominion of the flesh over the spirit, and of the temporal over the eternal. It had its root in man's fallen nature; it was engendered by that spirit which everywhere and at all times works in the children of disobedience, and was fostered and sustained by ungodly civil rulers, who wished to reign supreme over God and his Christ. The impious emperors of Germany, and faithless kings of France, who in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries made war on the rights of the Church, and sought to make the Pope their slave, their tool for op-

pressing their subjects, prepared the way for it, and it is only the development and generalization of that doctrine of the independence of the temporal order, which is even yet held by many Catholic politicians, courtiers, and demagogues under the name of *Gallicanism*, which is far older than Bossuet and Louis the Fourteenth, and the fatal consequences of which they are far from foreseeing.

Assuredly Protestants do not avow this in just so many words; assuredly they have a theory that their movement originated in a sincere and ardent attachment to Christian truth, and an earnest desire for religious reformation. To hear some of them talk, when in a romantic mood, one would be led to think that they really believe that the brutal tyrants steeped in crime and lust, the apostate monks, and renegade priests, who effected their so-called Reformation in the sixteenth century, were firm believers, the meekest and gentlest of men, peaceable and holy men, filled with the milk of human kindness, and animated with an ardent love of God, inoffensive in their lives, free from all turbulent passions, laboring only to preach the pure word of God, or the pure doctrines and morals of the Gospel, to win sinners back to their duty, and to induce all to love God supremely, and each his neighbor as himself. How beautiful! What a pity that it is all fancy, romance, formed of such stuff as dreams are made of, with not the least conceivable approach to reality!

Protestantism, save in name and outward form, did not originate in the sixteenth century. We find the first traces of it in Christendom, as far back as the time of the Arians, in the Byzantine court, with the eunuchs, courtiers, and flatterers of the emperors of the Low Empire, persuading them to usurp the pontifical power, and to make themselves supreme alike in temporals and in spirituals. It is of pagan origin, and displayed itself in all its glory under those pagan emperors who claimed to be at once emperors, sovereign pontiffs, and gods. It was revived in the Byzantine court as a reminiscence of the pagan empire, and maintained for the purposes of that centralized despotism which disgraced and finally ruined the Low Empire of the Greeks of Constantinople.

In its essence, it is the substitution of the temporal for the spiritual, and man for God; in its original form, it was the union of the temporal and spiritual sovereignties in the

hands of the temporal prince, that is, the conversion of the spiritual into a temporal authority. From Constantinople it passed into Western Europe, first under the German emperors, then under the kings of England, France, and Spain. Henry the Fourth, king of the Germans, whom St. Gregory the Seventh excommunicated and deposed, Frederic Barbarossa, Louis of Bavaria, Henry Plantagenet and Edward the Third of England, Philip the Fair of France, and Peter of Aragon, were at least incipient Protestants, as is evident from the sympathy they call forth in every Protestant breast, and the fact that Protestantism honors their memory as its early sons and saints, and denounces as monsters of insolence and rapacious ambition the Popes, their contemporaries, who sought to curb their licentiousness and to repress their brutal tyranny. Yet neither in the East nor the West was Protestantism in principle asserted or defended from religious motives, or for religious reasons. The Byzantine emperors had no reference to the interests of religion; they sought only to enlarge their own power, and to make religion their tool for enslaving their subjects. It was not religion that moved the Emperors of the West, the kings of England, France, and Spain, to resist the Sovereign Pontiffs, and to seek to rob the Church of her rights and her possessions. They did not seek to extend the empire of religion, and to bring all into subjection to the law of God; on the contrary, their precise, and to some extent even avowed object, was to restrict the province of religion, to enlarge that of the state, and to bring religion itself into subjection to the prince as an instrument of temporal tyranny. In the very nature of the case, even without supposing the truth of the Catholic Church, if that were possible, their movement was irreligious; for it was against what they held to be religion, and avowedly in favor of the supremacy of the temporal order, which is the denial of religion, and in principle the assertion of atheism. Under any supposition possible, the whole movement was purely in behalf of the secular order for its own sake, and such a movement, we need not say, is not and cannot be called a religious movement. The best thing you can say of it is, that it is a purely secular movement, and the truest thing is, that it is a diabolical movement, instigated by the Devil in his ceaseless warfare against the Eternal.

The history of the introduction and establishment of Protestantism, in the sixteenth century, in what are now the Protestant nations of Europe, fully confirms the assertion that Protestantism has no religious character, properly so called. The contrast between its introduction and establishment in Catholic Europe, and the introduction and establishment of Christianity in the Roman Empire and the pagan world, is a most striking proof of it. Christianity went forth poor, without staff or scrip in her hand; Protestantism stepped at once into the rich possessions of the Catholic churches and monasteries, and found itself provided with temples, schools, colleges, universities, hospitals, founded and endowed by Catholic piety and charity; Christianity had to make its way, not only against the old religion, but also against the corrupt nature of man, and the whole force of the temporal authority; Protestantism in every country where it gained a footing had the temporal authority and the corrupt nature of man on its side, as its unwavering supporters; Christianity had to encounter physical force, plunder, and murder; Protestantism wielded physical force, plundered, and murdered. The Christians suffered persecution from the old religion, whether Jewish or pagan; the Protestants persecuted the Catholic religion. The Christians demanded of the state the freedom of the Christian religion; the Protestants demanded the civil establishment of Protestantism, and the suppression, under the pains and penalties of high treason, of Catholicity. The Apostles in propagating Christianity became martyrs themselves; the Reformers in propagating Protestantism made martyrs of others. The Apostles and their associates gained the world to Christ by their preaching and their virtues; the Reformers gained the nations they did gain to the Reformation by the sword, fines, confiscations, imprisonments, exile, death,—by their tyranny, persecution, vices, and crimes. What can better prove that Protestantism is not Christianity, is not religion, is purely an affair of the flesh, excited and strengthened by hell, and led on by ungodly rulers, bent on destroying Christianity, and reigning supreme over God and his Christ?

Of course we do not mean to be understood that Protestantism was actually concocted by civil rulers, or that the primary motive of its invention was to favor the tem-

poral sovereign. After Satan, its authors were lawyers, courtiers, demagogues, dissolute priests, and apostate monks, and their motive was emancipation from the restraints of Catholicity, and the promotion of their own temporal interests and pleasures, their ambition, their cupidity, or their lusts. This end could not be gained without breaking the power of the Church, and treating her as *non avenue* in all the affairs of this world, — a thing then not possible without the aid and the supremacy of the temporal power. But what we do really mean to assert is, that Protestantism made its way in the world only under the protection of temporal princes, by violence against Catholicity and Catholics, and that wherever it gained an establishment it gained it by the sword, civil or military. Luther was protected in his movement against the Church by the Elector of Saxony and the Landgrave of Hesse, and indirectly even by Maximilian the First, and his grandson, Charles the Fifth, Emperors of Germany, who wished to make use of him to force the Pope to yield to the iniquitous demands they might have occasion to make. His cause triumphed only in those states whose princes supported it with their policy, their arms, and their penal enactments against Catholics. The reform in Switzerland gained an establishment only by first getting a control of the temporal government, and then using it to suppress by force the old religion, to imprison, banish, or massacre its adherents. In England it was introduced and forced upon a reluctant people by the arts and tyranny of the king or queen and Parliament, and it was the same in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. All this is notorious, and may easily be collected from Protestant historians themselves, by any one who knows how to read.

No doubt Catholics sometimes fought and fought hard against Protestants, for there cannot well be war where there is only one party; but they did so only in self-defence. They were not, and from the nature of the case could not be, the aggressors. They were in legal possession, and had been for ages before the Reformers were born, and could have no occasion to make war on Protestants, if Protestants made none on them. The Protestants were necessarily the first aggressors, and therefore responsible for all the errors and bloodshed which have followed. They were needy adventurers, intruders, who had and could have

nothing save as they unjustly and illegally dispossessed Catholics. They could gain a footing in the world only by displacing those already in legal and rightful possession, by robbing Catholics and plundering the Church. No other way was open to them; and this way they took. They began by assailing Catholics in their faith, which had also been their own, in which they had been reared, to which they were indebted for their science and learning, their culture and civilization, and which they had vowed and sworn to hold and to uphold even to death. They assailed it with falsehood and ridicule, even while professing to hold it, and to acknowledge the authority of the Church; and as soon as they became powerful enough in any particular place, they appropriated the Catholic churches to their own use, suppressed by violence the Catholic service, and installed a profane service of their own concocting. They usurped the churches and monasteries, appropriated their revenues, forced the recognition of their innovations, proscribed the Catholic faith and worship, insulted, mobbed, plundered, imprisoned, exiled, or massacred those who would not curse their spiritual Mother, and forsake the God of their fathers. What more serious aggression could be offered? What less strange than that such frightful sacrilege, such brutal tyranny, such wholesale robbery and violence, should provoke resistance and drive Catholics to arms in defence of their faith, their Church, their liberties, their possessions, their lives, and all that makes life worth possessing? Who can blame them? Who blames the traveller for resisting, even to death, the highwayman, who, with pistol in hand, bids him "stand and deliver"?

Certainly we do not pretend that Protestantism in the sixteenth century was all included in the assertion of the supremacy of the civil power, or the authority of princes over the Church. To do so would be to take a very narrow and one-sided view of what by way of courtesy we call the Reformation. The Reformers certainly preached many heresies in opposition to Catholic doctrines, besides that of the independence of sovereigns, and the principal controversies of the time turned on these. But none of these heresies were new; they were all old, and had all been refuted by Catholic doctors and condemned by the Church. The only novelty Protestantism could boast was that of reproducing and combining in one general heresy all the

particular heresies which had hitherto appeared and been anathematized separately. But however much these heresies were insisted on by the Reformers, they were not insisted on for their own sake, and were contended for at all only inasmuch as they tended to abase the spiritual and to exalt the temporal order, — to enslave the spirit and give dominion to the flesh. There is not a single one of the so-called Protestant doctrines, in so far as it differs from the Catholic doctrine on the same subject, that does not depress the moral and religious order, diminish the authority of the spirit, supersede the necessity of good works, and enlarge the freedom and dominion of man's carnal nature. Such is undeniably the case with the doctrine of justification by faith alone, the inamissibility of grace, the serf-will preached by Luther, and the priesthood or pontificate expressly claimed for each individual Christian by all the Reformers. Such, too, was the rejection of the Sacraments, the denial of the merit of good works and almsdeeds, penance, fasts, and mortifications. The heresies were not valued for themselves, but for the end they favored; and whoever examines them will find that the end they favor is in all cases the emancipation of the temporal order and the subjection of the spirit to the flesh, the soul to the body. It was this end, though probably not always — and with the mass perhaps seldom, if ever — clearly apprehended, yet in some manner apprehended, that lent the Reformation its peculiar charm, and created that wild and frantic enthusiasm in its favor, which marked the great body of its promoters and adherents, and which for a time, like that of the Saracens, swept every thing before it.

No man can doubt this now, however it might have been doubted in the beginning. The Reformation, in so far as it has had free scope, has been true to itself, and its variations have only served to place its real and essential character in a clearer light. Its history is its best commentary. In no instance has it deserted itself. Yet it has, at one time or another, abandoned all its special doctrines. The Confession of Augsburg, drawn up by its authors, and approved by Luther, abandons not a few of the doctrines which Luther began by calling the Church the whore of Babylon and the Pope Antichrist for not holding, and in Melancthon's apology for that Confession, the Reform, on most doctrinal points, is made to speak almost like a Chris-

tian. Refute any Protestant doctrine, save the denial of submission to authority, and you affect no one's Protestantism. The Protestant may abandon the doctrine refuted as indefensible, and strike it from the list of genuine Protestant doctrines; but he is no less, in fact he is even more, of a Protestant than before. Protestants have given up, one after another, all the points principally discussed in the outset between them and Catholics, but they are just as well satisfied with their Protestantism as ever they were, and as ready to proclaim the transcendent merits of their glorious Reformation. All this proves that the peculiarly Protestant doctrines, the theological doctrines, the special heresies, at first promulgated and insisted on, were mere accidents in the movement, and by no means essential elements of Protestantism. Protestants did not break from the Church for the sake of liberty to hold and preach their heresies, but they held and preached their heresies as the means of enabling them to break from the Church; or to crush the Church that they might revel in freedom from all spiritual authority, and live as they listed, without any one to call them to an account.

The supremacy of the civil government, or the union of the royal and pontifical authorities in the person of the king or temporal prince, was a necessary consequence of the Reformation in the sixteenth century, as the necessary consequence of a similar reformation now would be to unite the political and pontifical authorities in the hands of the people, or rather of the demagogues who control the people. Kings in the sixteenth century were strong, and could turn any weakening of the spiritual power to the strengthening of their own; the people are now strong, and can appropriate to themselves whatever you may succeed in wresting from Peter. The reform operates now in favor of democracy, so far as democracy seeks to render itself absolute; but it will operate in favor of the "Higher Law" gentry, and help on individualism, just in proportion as individuals rebel against the despotism of the mass. As we say by its aid, "People-king" and "People-pontiff" to-day, we shall say by its aid to-morrow, each for himself, "I am king, I am supreme pontiff." "I am my own king, my own priest, my own pope, my own church," we have heard men say in sober earnest, and men too who pass for intelligent, and even great men. The essence of Protes-

tantism is the absolute independence and supremacy of the temporal as opposed to the spiritual; and it is the same in principle, whether it manifest itself in the form of despotism or anarchy, of the despotism of the king or the people, of slavery or licentiousness. But without the aid of the secular authorities desirous of emancipating themselves from the authority of the Church, and appropriating to their own use the wealth of her churches and monasteries, it is as certain as any historical fact of the kind can be, that the Reformation never would have been attempted, and never could have succeeded if it had been.

We think, and we never cease to repeat it, that too much has been made of Protestantism under the theological point of view, and too much importance has been attached to the refutation of its attempted doctrinal statements. It was not at first easy to see that Protestants had not some kind of attachment to the particular theological doctrines which they from time to time professed, and it was not unnatural to suppose that they made war on the Church because she anathematized their heresies, and would not permit them to hold them in her communion; but it is clear from the historical developments of Protestantism, that the Reformers did not oppose the Church because she opposed their Evangelism, but that they adopted their Evangelism for the sake of opposing the Church. They cared not a pin for their Evangelism any further than it furnished them arms against the Church, especially against the Pope. The destruction of the Papacy and of all spiritual authority was the primary motive of their movement, and any thing that would contribute to this end was welcome, was seized hold of with avidity, and wielded with Satanic energy. They did not ask what doctrines were true, but what doctrines would best serve their purpose in the particular circumstances in which they found themselves, which would least revolt the people, and which Catholics would find the most difficulty in refuting to the popular apprehension; — what doctrines would be most likely to command the sympathies of the people, and whose denial could be most easily construed into a denial of what the people had always believed to be essentially Christian. Hence they insisted strenuously on justification by faith alone; and when the Catholics maintained that faith without works is dead, and

cannot justify, they set up the cry, that the Pope and Cardinals denied the necessity of faith, and taught that we are justified by our works without the grace of Christ. Hence, too, they insisted on the Bible as the rule of faith, and when the Catholics replied, that the Bible, to be the rule of faith, must be taken as interpreted by the Church, by the Fathers, by Popes and Councils, they cried out to the people: "See the arrogance of the Pope and Cardinals! They set themselves above the Bible, and deny the authority of the Word of God!" Then they quoted Scripture, as Satan did to our Lord in the wilderness, and poured forth streams of burning eloquence in praise of the Holy Scriptures. But all was for the one purpose of demolishing the Church; and to effect that purpose we have seen them in later times ready to shift their doctrines and set up contradictory cries; thus proving that their whole Evangelism was adopted merely as a means to an end, and in no sense as the end itself. It is all, except with a few old women of either sex, now abandoned, and now the cry is, Social progress! The rights of man! Civil and religious freedom! Earthly felicity!

In Great Britain Catholicity must be put down because it encroaches on the prerogatives of the crown, and is incompatible with the civil and religious freedom of — her Majesty as the depositary of the royal and pontifical authorities, and of the laity to rule the clergy; in these United States it must be put down, or at least opposed, because incompatible with our political institutions, with democratic freedom, and because its progress would destroy our free republic and bring us into hopeless civil and religious bondage to a foreign potentate. What does all this prove, but that specific Protestant heresies are of minor importance even with Protestants, and that the real object of their hostility is the Church herself, as claiming authority from God to keep, interpret, and apply his law; and that they seek to destroy her, because she asserts and maintains, where free, the supremacy in all things of the spiritual order, or the rightful dominion of God and his Christ? "Why have the Gentiles raged, and the people devised vain things? The kings of the earth stood up, and the princes met together, against the Lord, and against his Christ, [saying,] Let us break their bands asunder; and let us cast away their yoke from us." (Ps. ii. 1 – 3.) This is the secret of the

whole movement, and say what you will, the whole of Protestantism is here condensed in the inspired words of the Monarch-prophet: "The kings of the earth stood up, and the princes met together, against the Lord, and against his Christ: Let us break their bands asunder; and let us cast away their yoke from us." They would not bear the yoke of Christ and learn of him, although his yoke is sweet and his burden is light. (St. Matt. xi. 29, 30.)

A glance at the men and the means by which the Reformation was introduced into what are now the Protestant nations of Europe will fully confirm all this. Of the men little need be said. They were all either renegade priests and apostate monks, or princes notorious for their vices, their crimes, and their brutal tyranny. There is not one of the prominent leaders of the Reformation in whom you can discover a single redeeming moral feature. Luther, Melancthon, Zwingle, Farel, Calvin, Beza, Cranmer, as well as the princes who protected them and supported their cause by their arms and their policy, were men who exhibited in their lives, at least from the moment of their revolt against the Church, not a single Christian, and scarcely a single heathen virtue. Those princes were all perjurers; they were all guilty of sacrilege and robbery; some of them were gross gluttons and drunkards, wallowing in the mire of sensuality; and all of them were brutal tyrants, and both as men and princes the successful rivals of the worst emperors in the worst days of pagan Rome. Not Nero, Decius, Diocletian, Maximian, Galerius, and Maximin were more cruel persecutors, or persecutors on a larger scale, than not a few of them. John the Elector of Saxony was one of these princes. He was the greatest glutton of his age, and was obliged to support his protuberant belly, stuffed with wine and viands from early morning, by means of an iron hoop. We may well understand his infatuation for a Reformation that abolished Lent, fasts, and abstinence on Fridays and Saturdays. His cupboard was more richly garnished than any other in Germany with vases of all sorts, stolen from the refectories of the monks and the sacristies of the churches. His son Frederic exhausted his time and health at the table, or in the chase, and, like him, devoted to wine and good cheer, scarcely knew his Catechism. The Landgrave, Philip of Hesse, was proverbial for his lewdness. A shameless adul-

terer, who, to resist the assaults of the flesh, after a while demanded and obtained from Luther and his associate Reformers permission to sleep with two wives. Wolfgang of Anhalt was so grossly ignorant, it is said, that he had never been able to make the sign of the cross, and Ernest and Francis of Lunenburg, though they would not suffer their servants to pillage the churches, took care to rob them with their own hands.* These were the best of the lot, against whom we have the least to say. The Protestant princes of Germany generally, while their private characters were as corrupt as need be, were obliged to observe some measure in their public conduct, through the influence of the Emperor and the faithful princes of the empire. The character of Henry and Elizabeth of England is well known, and needs not to be dwelt upon. Our friend Paul Peppergrass, Esq., save that he is too favorable to the Queen regnant, has done enough for the latter in his *Spaewife, or the Queen's Secret*; and M. Audin, with all his admiration for the former, and depreciation of Clement the Seventh, has furnished evidence sufficient that he had no loyalty, that he was a brutal tyrant, and the slave of his lusts. Christiern and Frederic of Denmark, Gustavus Wasa of Sweden, both as individuals and as sovereigns, fall far below the common heathen standard; and no Protestant, acquainted with their history, can have the effrontery to claim for them, even in his eyes, any other merit than their unprovoked and brutal hostility to the Church of Rome, and their successful defence of Protestantism.

Christiern, or Christian the Second, in 1519, succeeded his father, John the Second, king of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, by the Union of Calmar united under one crown, since 1397. He was crowned the following year by the Archbishop of Lunden, and took a solemn oath to maintain the Catholic faith, and the privileges of the clergy and nobility, privileges which very much restricted the royal power. The Estates also made him promise that he would do nothing, during his life, to procure the throne, which was elective, not hereditary, for any one of his children, or for any other person. He was of an ambitious, despotic, cruel, and perfidious nature. He removed the grantees from the administration of the kingdom, and commit-

* Audin, *Hist. de Vie de Luth.*, Tom. II. p. 402.

ted the management of affairs only to persons of low birth and mean condition. His principal counsellor was a Netherlandish woman, whose daughter was his concubine. He was devoted to the Pope and the Roman Church, indeed, but only inasmuch as he could turn his devotion to his own interest. He permitted, in 1517, the Papal Nuncio, Arcimbold, to preach the indulgences in the kingdoms of the North, but only in return for a present of eleven hundred florins; and as the Nuncio did not satisfy him with regard to certain political intrigues in Sweden, he took from him the following year a much larger sum collected for the Basilica of St. Peter.

Sweden was then divided into two parties, the one having at its head Gustavus Trolle, Archbishop of Upsal, and *ex officio* President of the Senate, and supporting Christiern; the other, having for its chief Sture, Administrator of the kingdom, demanded a national king, contrary to the Union of Calmar. This last party deposed the Archbishop, razed his castle, and imprisoned him in a monastery, — an illegal proceeding certainly, but which, it is said, was approved by the Nuncio, who engaged the Archbishop to submit to it. But in 1518, Christiern arrived before Stockholm. Being repulsed by Sture, he had recourse to artifice, and proposed an interview with the Administrator in the city, and obtained six hostages selected from the first families. These hostages, among whom was Gustavus Wasa, having come on board the Danish fleet, were treated by the perfidious monarch as prisoners, who departed with them for Denmark. In 1520 he returned to Sweden with an army; the Swedes were defeated, and Sture mortally wounded. The Archbishop of Upsal presided over the Swedish Estates, and proposed the recognition of Christiern, which was done. A general amnesty was proclaimed. Stockholm, whither had retired Sture's widow, resisted for some little time. Christiern himself came with his fleet, and anchored before it. Almost all the clergy, and a portion of the nobility, went on board to render him their homage. The city at length consented to receive him. He made his entry into the city, September 7; promised to preserve to Sweden her liberties, to give the widow of the Administrator an establishment in Finland, and to forget the past. He deferred his coronation to November 2, convoked the Estates for that day, and departed for Denmark.

On his return to Sweden, near the end of October, he demanded of the bishops and senators an act recognizing him as hereditary monarch, and caused himself to be crowned by the Archbishop of Upsal two days after. There were on this occasion feasts and rejoicings, in which he showed himself attractive and affable, but only the better to conceal his wicked designs. Under pretext of executing the Bull of the Pope against those who had deposed the Archbishop, but in reality to pluck down the best heads in the kingdom, and to inaugurate his despotism by their blood, he caused them, in spite of the amnesty, to be dragged before a judicial commission, and, according to some historians, without even waiting for any sentence, sent the executioners to announce to them their last hour, refused them the consolation of confessing to a priest, and had them executed publicly, — senators, lords, and bishops, in one and the same day, to the number of eighty or ninety. Not content with the murder of so many noble personages, he abandoned the inhabitants of Stockholm, without distinction of age or sex, to the fury of his troops. As a tiger, when he has once tasted blood, Christiern seemed insatiable. In his return from Sweden to Denmark he caused scaffolds to be erected in all the towns through which he passed, especially in Wadsten, the land of St. Bridget. In the monastery of Nidäl, though he had been received there with great honors, he caused the abbot and the monks to be seized, on coming out from Mass, and cast into the river, with their hands tied behind their backs. The abbot, having broken from the cords, attempted to save himself by swimming, when the tyrant caused his head to be smashed with the blow of a lance.

With such instincts, we shall not be surprised to find that this Nero of the North had a natural sympathy with the god and the religion of Luther, — a tyrant-god, who punishes us not only for the evil we cannot help doing, but even for the good we do, and do the best we can, — a god without faith, who breaks his word, and abandons his Church, after having promised to be with it all days to the consummation of the world; — a religion which makes man a machine, good works so many crimes, and crimes so many good works, — which gives in principle every man himself for his only law, but in fact to all for their only rule artifice and force, otherwise tyranny. Thus, in 1520,

he himself demanded a Lutheran preacher, and assigned him a church in Copenhagen, whence he might retail his new Gospel. The following year he prohibited the University of his capital from condemning the works of Luther. The archbishopric of Sweden possessed in property the island of Bornholm; he claimed it for the crown, and the Archbishop resigned in order to withdraw himself from embarrassment. As the Canons refused to accede to the good pleasure of the king, he sent them to prison, and took possession of the island in 1521. He nominated his old barber and favorite, Schlaghoek, Archbishop of that metropolis, then, in the following year, 1522, caused him to be hung and burnt for having counselled the massacre of the bishops and lords at Stockholm. In his code of laws he prohibited every bishop, priest, or monk from acquiring any property, unless he was married. He also prohibited all ecclesiastics from appealing to Rome, or having their causes judged in the Roman courts, and he ordained that all ecclesiastical causes should be terminated within the kingdom before a tribunal instituted by himself.*

Christiern, though always professing himself to be a Catholic, as enabling him to work more effectually for the destruction of the faith and the liberties of his subjects, was succeeded in 1523, in the Danish throne, by his paternal uncle, Frederic, Duke of Sleswig and Holstein. He on his coronation also, though a Lutheran in his heart, swore to maintain the Catholic faith and the rights of the bishops. Dissimulation was necessary to prepare his people for apostasy. But in 1526 he took under his protection a Lutheran preacher, an apostate monk, and named him his chaplain. In 1527, in the Diet of Odensee, he announced that he should not keep his oath, for Luther had discovered many abuses in the ancient religion of Denmark, Sweden, and the Christian world; consequently it was his royal will that the two religions, the new of Luther and the old of St. Anscarius, should be placed on a footing of equality, till the convocation of a General Council. But he did not stop there. In spite of the opposition of the bishops and a part of the nobility, the king made the Diet resolve, — 1. that the bishops shall no longer seek confirmation of

* Schroeck. *Hist. de la Réformation*, Tom. II. p. 67; and Rohrbacher, *Hist. Univ. de l'Église Cath.*, Tom. XXIII. pp. 292 – 295.

the Pope, but henceforth of the king; 2. that the clergy, the churches, and the monasteries shall preserve their actual goods, till dispossessed by the laws of the country; and 3. that ecclesiastics and monks be permitted to marry.* Thus this Protestant king did not blush to break the oath of his election, to rob his people of the faith of their fathers, the Church of her goods, the Pope of his primacy, the bishops of their divine mission, so as to make of them and other ecclesiastics mere civil functionaries, *employés* of the police, consoling themselves for their apostasy and degradation, in the arms of a wife who was not and could not be theirs. Christiern the Third finished the apostasy of Denmark by violence, in 1533. He cast the bishops into prison, and liberated them and restored their goods only on condition that they renounced the goods of the Church, and desisted from all opposition to the Protestant innovations. These kings purchased the consent of the nobles by giving them a large share of the plunder of the goods which Catholic faith and piety had dedicated to God. Similar measures forced Norway into apostasy in 1537, and Iceland in 1551.

The Reformation was introduced into Sweden very much in the same way. Gustavus Ericson, or Wasa, whose father fell in the massacre of Stockholm in 1520, escaped, in 1519, from the Danish prison in which he was detained. During his sojourn at Lubeck he imbibed a taste for the religious revolution of Luther, and kept up a secret correspondence with an apostate monk. Having, under various disguises, entered Sweden, and being sustained by the peasants of Dalecarlia, who were zealous Catholics, he beat in several encounters the Danes who occupied the kingdom, was chosen Administrator in 1521, and King in 1523. The Swedish kings were elective; and they possessed only limited powers and very moderate domains. The nation was jealous of its liberty, and would not suffer its kings to be too powerful. Gustavus availed himself of the present occasion to change this state of things. Lutheranism seemed to him an admirable means to enrich himself with the goods of the churches and monasteries, to confiscate the liberties of his subjects, and to subject conscience itself by breaking the spiritual indepen-

* Schroeck. *apud* Rohrbacher, *ubi supra*, pp. 295, 296.

dence of the bishops, and making himself Pope, and imposing himself and his future descendants on Sweden as hereditary kings and popes. What Gustavus could comprehend, he could ably execute. Three priests returned into Sweden preaching the heresies of Luther; he favored them, seconded them in every way, only recommending them to act with prudence, so as not to divulge his secret and stir up public opinion against him; for the mass of the nation were as yet sincerely attached to the religion of their fathers. Of these three sectaries, he appointed one Professor of Theology in the University of Upsal, the second preacher in the great church of Stockholm, the third Chancellor of the kingdom. He deposed the Bishop of Westeras, and Canute, Archbishop of Upsal, under the pretext that they were engaged in a conspiracy, and for the latter substituted John Magnus, or Store, who, however, persevered in the Catholic religion, as did also his brother Olaüs Magnus, Archdeacon of the Cathedral of Strengnes. Among the Dominicans charged with the Inquisition in Sweden there was a prior who was secretly a Lutheran; Gustavus gave him a commission to visit all the monasteries to sow in them the seeds of the Reformation. The strongest opposition he found was among the religious of his own order. Gustavus threatened to expel them from the country, and forthwith deprived them of their power as Inquisitors. In 1525, Olaüs Petri, a priest, one of the three sectarians, whom he had established as preacher at Stockholm, was publicly married, and Gustavus, far from being displeased, was himself present at the nuptials; this scandal was immediately imitated by many monks and nuns. Gustavus seized the monastery of Gripsholm, and expelled the religious. The people showed signs of discontent, but to seduce and enslave them, it was necessary to destroy the power of the bishops, and the best way to do this was to disunite or separate them, and promise their spoils to the nobles. The Archbishop of Upsal was primate of the kingdom and legate of the Pope. Gustavus sent him into Poland, ostensibly to negotiate his marriage with the princess royal, but in reality to deprive the clergy of Sweden of their head and centre. Having thus deprived the Catholic clergy of their chief, he proceeded to strike them a severe blow. The two deposed prelates, Canute, Archbishop of Upsal, and Sunanveder, Bishop of Westeras, had sought refuge in

Norway; Gustavus contrived to draw them back into Sweden, accused them of sedition, and put them to death in 1527.*

After going through the farce of resigning and reaccepting the crown, Gustavus proceeded with a bolder step, and made the Estates resolve that the revenues of the crown should be augmented by the goods of the bishops, churches, and monasteries, and that the bishops should have for their support what it pleased the king to give them, who would have full power to govern the churches and monasteries; that the nobles should have also the right to resume the goods given, sold, or pledged by their ancestors; that no one should be permitted to say that the king wished to introduce a false religion; on the contrary, all the inhabitants of Sweden must hold in the highest esteem the pure word of God as taught by the Evangelical preachers.† Thus the Estates of Sweden denied the faith of their fathers, embraced the new heresies, and declared their king infallible, on condition that the nobles pillaged, robbed, the churches and monasteries with him. Cicero said, indeed, that "unjust decrees no more deserve to be called laws, than the plots of thieves."‡ Plato, in his *Minos*, holds the same language. But they were pagans.

Over thirty monasteries were suppressed in Sweden, and plundered by the king and nobles. One of the first three sectaries was Lawrence Petri. In 1521, Gustavus caused him to be elected Archbishop of Upsal, which see was not vacant; and as the intruder was unwillingly received by the chapter, he gave him a guard of fifty men, and substituted Lutherans for the faithful canons. However, the three sectaries, the two brothers Petri and the Chancellor Anderson, were not sufficiently submissive to the caprice of the monarch, and incurred his disgrace. In 1540, he compelled Lawrence Petri to preside over a commission that condemned Olaüs Petri and the Chancellor to death. The same year the king-pope succeeded in causing the Swedish royalty and papacy to be declared hereditary in his family. Thus a nation, hitherto Catholic and free, lost at once its faith and its liberty, by the artifice and violence of an able usurper. Modern philosophy calls this usurper by the title

* Schroeck., Tom. II. p. 36.

† Ibid., Tom. II. p. 42.

‡ Cicero *de Legibus*, Lib. II. n. 5.

of Great, which shows what both the title and modern philosophy are worth.*

These scraps of history, which we translate from the Abbé Rohrbacher's excellent History of the Church, will show by what sort of men, and by what means, the Reformation was introduced into the Scandinavian kingdoms. It was introduced by civil tyrants, who established it by artifice and force, and suppressed the Catholic religion by violence, plunder, and civil enactments. In a similar manner, by similar agencies, was Protestantism introduced and established in every country in which it became or is even now dominant. Not only was Protestantism introduced by the arts, the violence, and the brutal tyranny of the civil rulers, who espoused it, but it has maintained itself only by the aid of the civil power, which ordained it to be received, and suppressed the Catholic worship by the most severe system of civil pains and penalties. Till quite recently, it was not lawful to exercise the Catholic worship, or for a Catholic even to live in any one of the three Scandinavian kingdoms; and even now it is not lawful for a Dane, a Swede, or a Norwegian, to abandon the state establishment, and become reconciled to the Church. No Catholic has, or can have, any civil rights in those kingdoms, and for a Lutheran to become a Catholic is confiscation of goods and perpetual banishment from the kingdom. We are aware of no Protestant state on the Continent of Europe in which it is not against the civil law either to reconcile a member of the state religion, or for him to become reconciled, to the Church. If there be any exception to this remark, it is of a very recent date. In several of the German Protestant states, Catholics are, indeed, not punished simply for being Catholics, and the Catholic worship is tolerated for the Catholic portion of the population; but we know of none in which Protestants have the legal right to become Catholics. The Prussian government recently complained of the Catholic missionaries for receiving converts from Protestantism to Catholicity.

The sketch we have given of the introduction and establishment of Protestantism in Denmark and Sweden is substantially the history of its introduction and establishment in England. It was first introduced by the king and

* Rohrbacher, Tom. XXIII. pp. 296 – 300.

Parliament. Henry the Eighth was an artful as well as a despotic prince. With the mass of the Lutheran heresies he had no sympathy; he had profited by his early theological studies too much not to reject them with contempt; but he was from his coronation opposed to the Papacy, except as vested in himself. This is evident from the alterations he made in his coronation oath, the day after he had taken it. For a time, however, he lived on good terms with the Pope, and even sustained his cause against France and the Emperor Maximilian the First; but partly because he found it for his interest to do so, and partly, no doubt, through the influence of Cardinal Wolsey, not indeed one of the best, but one of the greatest, men England ever produced. As soon as the Cardinal fell, Henry broke through all restraints, and gave free scope to his own brutal and despotic nature. It is a great mistake to suppose that the divorce case was the cause of Henry's schism. It was only its occasion; and there can be no doubt that he would have broken with Rome on occasion of the least contradiction from the Pope. He only waited a pretext for declaring the independence of the crown, and for usurping the spiritual authority. The refusal of the divorce gave him this pretext. In executing his purpose, he proceeded with art as well as tyranny. He did not shock his people by at once proclaiming the new heresies and suppressing the old Catholic faith and worship. He maintained the general Catholic faith, the Sacraments, and the Mass, and hung or burnt those who taught any thing against them. He levelled his blows at the Papacy, and labored only to throw off the power of the Pope, in order to claim it for the nation, that is, for himself. He flattered and won over all his bishops, already his creatures, save the Bishop of Rochester, Cardinal Fisher, by releasing them from their dependence on Rome, and gained the nobles by distributing among them the spoils of the rich abbeys and monasteries. He worked upon the fears of the clergy through the terrible writ of *præmunire*, and by bribery, cajoling, force, and the axe of the executioner, he broke their power. Having broken his kingdom from Catholic unity, and made the king pope as well as king, he prepared the way for Somerset, the Protector during the reign of the boy Edward, to introduce Protestantism, and to suppress the Catholic worship.

The English people, deprived of faithful shepherds, and shaken in their faith, were still attached at heart to the religion of their fathers; but the short reign of Mary, the best sovereign England has had since Edward the Confessor, and one whom we, as of English descent, delight to honor, did not suffice to consolidate the reaction, and place the Papal supremacy on a firm footing in the kingdom. Mary's unfortunate marriage with Philip of Spain, added to the hatred of the Pope that of the Spaniard; while her still more unfortunate consent to Philip's declaration of war against the Sovereign Pontiff, interrupted the blessing of God on her exertions to restore permanently the Catholic religion. The cause of Catholicity became allied in the popular mind with that of Spanish dominion, and a new and more legitimate national feeling was thus aroused against the old religion, and in favor of the Reformation. Yet Elizabeth, who succeeded Mary, and consummated the apostasy of England, ascended the throne as a Catholic, professed herself a Catholic, and swore to maintain the Catholic religion. Had she avowed herself a Protestant, she never could have been crowned. She and her counsellors all dissembled their Protestantism till they had obtained the power, and then only little by little threw off the mask. She first severs her kingdom from communion with Rome, and thus knocks out the keystone of the English hierarchy; she then expels all the faithful bishops from their sees, and intrudes creatures of her own; then abolishes the Mass, establishes a new service, prepared from the old, and commands all her liege subjects to assist at the new-fangled worship, under the most severe pains and penalties. Thus, whether we speak of Henry, Edward, or Elizabeth, the reform was introduced into England and established by the temporal authorities, by perjury, fraud, sacrilege, robbery, and brutal tyranny,—all for the purpose, not of promoting religion, but of freeing the government from religion, and uniting in the crown the royal and pontifical authorities. It has also been maintained in the land of our ancestors by the most shameful penal laws that ever disgraced the code of any nation, civilized or barbarous, and by the most cruel and unremitted persecution of Catholics. The penal laws were to some extent repealed in 1829, but the first step to their revival has been taken in the recent Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, and the

spirit of persecution is revived with almost its old ferocity. The late trial of the Very Rev. Dr. Newman, for an alleged libel on the renegade Achilli, has proved that no Catholic can in any case that touches Protestant prejudice hope for justice from an English court and jury.

If from England we turn to Zurich, Berne, and Geneva, pass to the Dutch Netherlands, or cross over into Scotland, we have, in principle, only the same sickening story to repeat. Everywhere the reform is the work of perjury, fraud, sacrilege, robbery, imprisonment, exile, and massacre. In France and Ireland all these were attempted, but happily in vain, and both kingdoms have remained substantially Catholic. Now are we to be told, "in the middle of the nineteenth century," that the motive which inspired the actors in the tragedy, and induced the employment of these base and criminal means, was a religious motive? Are we to be so mocked? Are our understandings to be so insulted? No. The men who adhere to Protestantism, if they ever investigate their own motives, know perfectly well that they adhere to it only because it emancipates them from all religion, by subjecting religion now to the state and now to the individual judgment or caprice.

This is the only solution of the problem. The Reformation in principle was not an attempt, though a mistaken or an unlawful attempt, to get a purer and better religion than the Catholic; it was simply a rebellion against God, prompted by the flesh, incited by the Devil. It was born of hell, and hence it is that we seldom affect or disturb it by refuting its heresies. Hence the reason why we everywhere and at all times object to treating it as a form, though a false form, of Christian doctrine and worship, and insist that it shall be treated solely as a sin. Protestants in defending themselves only on political and social or secular grounds concede that they have no religion to defend, and that it is not as a religion they adhere to the Reformation. We must oppose Protestantism, not as a false theology, but as a revolt of the flesh against God, — as the mad attempt of men to set themselves up above their Maker, and to live as they list.

No doubt many Catholics will think this too severe, but it is because we apprehend that there are some who will so think that we say it. We wish our friends to be fully

aware of the enormity of Protestantism. We are not wholly ignorant of the infinite tenderness of the Gospel, and we can admire, as well as others, the beauty of Christian charity. We know, too, that many, very many, Protestants are amiable in their social relations, are faithful to their engagements, and honest in their dealings, and so far very superior to their Protestantism itself; but not therefore are we to confound their purely human or Gentile virtues with the supernatural virtues of the true Christian. We know what allowances also to make for ignorance and for prejudices early instilled in the minds of Protestants; but we are speaking to Catholics, who are always in danger of thinking too favorably of those who are involved in the Protestant rebellion against God. We have no wish to be severe; we speak not in wrath; we would willingly lay down our life to bring Protestants into the Church of God; but we believe it true kindness, true charity, to strip off the mask from Protestantism, to expose its real features, and to compel it to bear its own appropriate name, so that all the world may see that there is no medium between Catholicity and no religion, any more than there is between virtue and vice, truth and falsehood, Christ and the Devil. If this offends, then let it offend; if it do not offend God, we shall remain at our ease.

ART. V. — *The London Quarterly Review.* Art. VIII.
Parliamentary Prospects. October, 1852.

As far as we can judge, at this distance and with our very limited information, England is rapidly verifying the old saying, *Quem Deus vult perdere, prius dementat*. She received from God, with the Catholic religion, a most excellent political and civil constitution; but she seems to be resolved on doing her best to destroy it. The so-called Reformation in the sixteenth century, which followed close upon the destruction of the old nobility in the wars of the Roses, by uniting in the king both the temporal and spiritual sovereignty, disturbed the proper balance of the estates of the kingdom, and made once free and merry England, under the Tudors and the Stuarts, virtually an absolute

monarchy; the rebellion in the seventeenth century, which beheaded Charles the First, and the revolution which placed Dutch William on the throne, and more lately the Elector of Hanover, unduly depressed the authority of the crown, threw too much power into the hands of the aristocracy, and converted the government into an oligarchy; the Reform Bill of 1832, and kindred measures which have since followed, have in turn broken the power of the aristocracy, given predominance to the Commons, and subjected the government to the fluctuating interests and passions of the business population. A further change, which shall clear away both monarchy and aristocracy, and favor the British empire with a Jacobinical reign of terror, would seem to be only a question of time.

The Reform Bill established the supremacy of the Commons, and introduced the elementary principle of Democracy; the Free Trade policy, which Sir Robert Peel found himself unable to resist, places the nation under the control of the trading and manufacturing classes, to the serious detriment of the agricultural interests, and to the ruin or emigration of the rural population. To remedy the evils which necessarily follow, new political reforms are demanded, and these, if obtained, will demand others still, and thus on to the end of the chapter, because each new political reform will only aggravate the evil it was intended to cure. English statesmen have been applauded, and have applauded themselves, for the wisdom with which, during the convulsions of Continental Europe, they have staved off revolution and civil war by well-timed concessions to popular demands; but concession to popular demands is a mere temporizing policy, and a temporizing policy seldom fails in the end to be ruinous to every government that adopts it. It deprives it of the moral strength which is derived from fixed and determinate principles, and reduces it to a mere creature of expediency. A struggle immediately commences between it and its subjects, — they to get all they can, and it to concede as little as possible, — in which they are sure to come off victorious at last. The fact that the government yields at all, is a concession that it holds its power rather by sufferance than right, and gives an air of justice to the popular demands against it.

The effects of the past policy of the British government

may be seen in the uncertain movements of the present nominally conservative ministry. It is a ministry without any mind of its own. It lacks morality, it lacks principle, and seems to have no other plan of government than to keep itself in place. It has no high and commanding policy, no comprehensive or far-seeing statesmanship; and, in fact, does not rise above the lowest forms of mere temporary expediency. It sinks to the common Whig level, and even below it, and stands on a par with our own Whig party, who seem long since to have abandoned all principle in order to be able to triumph over their Democratic opponents. It seems prepared to accept, with hardly a wry face, the Free Trade policy of Sir Robert Peel, which its members, when out of power, denounced as ruinous to the country. Whether the ministry could do otherwise and retain its place, may be a question; but they ought to be aware, that the adoption of that policy commits the government to a series of measures which cannot fail to subvert the British constitution, and they should leave to others the sad privilege of consummating the revolution. If they accept that policy, they must go further, grant a new Reform Bill involving the principle of universal suffrage, and change the Commons from an estate to the people, or give way to the accession to power of Messrs. Cobden, Bright, & Co.; and in either case they can only prepare the way for a democratic revolution, and consequent anarchy and military despotism.

The ministry seem to us to be hastening on this deplorable result, — deplorable for England, and of no advantage to us, — by their madness in renewing the old Protestant persecution of Catholics. Henry and his daughter Elizabeth, unhappily for their own country and the world, made England a Protestant state. The most shameful and barbarous persecution of Catholics preserved her as such down to 1829, when the Catholic Relief Bill, reluctantly conceded by Wellington and Peel, in order to avoid the horrors of a threatened civil war, changed her in principle from an exclusively Protestant state to a state professing no religion in particular, and leaving its subjects free to be of any religion they choose, providing it be nominally Christian. Great Britain then threw open the Imperial Parliament to Catholics, as she had already done to Dissenters, and recognized them as subjects and free citizens of the em-

pire. In so doing, she made her Protestant Church a monstrous anomaly in her constitution, and really committed herself to its annihilation as a state religion. A party resolutely opposed to it, strong enough in spite of its influence to recover their liberties as electors and senators, could have no disposition to sustain it, and could hardly prove unable, in the long run, to withdraw from it the support of the state. *C'est le premier pas qui coûte.* They could more easily, after having gained admission into Parliament, go further, and overthrow the Establishment, than they could gain that admission itself. They could not be expected to stop with that achievement. Logical consistency, if nothing else, would require them to go further, and eliminate the anomaly from the constitution. The necessity of logical consistency might not, indeed, be strongly felt by the adherents of the Establishment, who generally contrive to dispense with logic, and to utter much solemn cant about *via media*, or the middle way between truth and falsehood; but the party opposed, and whom this solemn cant only insults and disgusts, could not be stayed by so feeble a barrier. They must have consistency; either the consistency of dissent with the non-conformist, or the consistency of truth with the Catholic. In opening her Parliament to Dissenters, and in signing the Catholic Relief Bill, Great Britain, whether she intended it or not, gave the death-blow to the Anglican Establishment. She committed herself to what was for her a new policy, and from which she cannot henceforth retreat without shame and ruin. The Anglican Establishment, or *Church* of England, it is well known, is a creature of the state. It was made by the crown and Parliament; and now that the crown counts for little, and the royal prerogative yields to the majority of the House of Commons, it is idle to suppose that a Parliament in which Catholics and Dissenters have seats will not, sooner or later, exert its power to unmake it, especially since it is no longer in harmony with the other parts of the constitution.

The late ministry, probably for the purpose of breaking up the Tenant League that was forming in Ireland and boding no good to Irish landlords, made a show, in its Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, of reëstablishing Protestantism, and governing as if the state were still a Protestant state. Its success threw it from place, and secured it the con-

tempt of the Christian world. The Derby ministry, seeing the embarrassment the English and Irish Catholics might cause them in carrying out such policy as they have, seem to be in earnest to restore deposed Protestantism, and to administer the government as if the Catholic Relief Bill had never been granted. This we regard as a proof of its madness. It is too late to threaten the disfranchisement of Catholics, or to hope any thing for the state from the persecution of the Church. Statutes may be passed against Catholics of the most oppressive nature, the old penal codes of England and Ireland may be revived in all their Satanic rigor, but all in vain. England can never become again an exclusively Protestant state. The Catholic element in both England and Ireland is stronger than it was in 1829, when it was strong enough to force Wellington and Peel to concede Emancipation, and graver consequences would follow the repeal of the Catholic Relief Bill than were apprehended from a refusal to grant it. Neither English nor Irish Catholics are now the timid and depressed body they were then; they have a firmer and a bolder spirit, a higher and a more thoroughly Catholic tone; and are, in England at least, more numerous and better organized. They are cheered now with visible tokens of God's grace. The Lord seems to have withdrawn the rod of chastisement for the present, and to permit his countenance once more to shine upon them. In the light of his countenance they rejoice and are strengthened. The day of their deliverance, and of his vengeance on their oppressors, is apparently nigh at hand. Persecution cannot now break their spirit; it will serve only to give them fresh courage and zeal, and to add daily to their numbers and influence; for the present seems to be one of those seasons when in the Divine providence judgments are not delayed, and punishment follows close on the heels of the offence. This may be seen in the results of the late Red Republican revolutions. They were got up and directed primarily against the Church, the only solid basis of society, and they swept as a tornado over more than half of Europe. They have all failed, and their only notable result has been that of breaking the bonds with which infidel governments and paganized statesmen had bound the Church, and giving her a freedom and independence of action she has hardly enjoyed before since the breaking

out of the Protestant Reformation. Even the republic of France, with General Cavaignac at its head, found itself obliged to send its troops to restore the Holy Father, compelled by the very party that made that republic to fly from Rome.

It seems to us that the time for reviving the old persecution of Catholics is exceedingly ill chosen. Such persecution will naturally force Catholics to seek the means of self-defence. The Ecclesiastical Titles Bill has destroyed their confidence in the Whigs, who can never again count on their support as a body. They never had much confidence in the Tories, and will certainly have less if the Tory ministry continues to persecute them. They will be driven, then, to unite with such as are opposed to both the Whigs and the Tories, and therefore with the Manchester politicians; that is, with a republican party. If you turn both crown and aristocracy against them, they will, however reluctantly, combine their force with the party from whom crown and aristocracy have nothing to hope, but much to fear. The accession to power of the Manchester school, commanding as it does the sympathies of both the people and government of this country, would be virtually the accession of democracy; and Great Britain cannot become a democracy without descending from her present proud eminence to the rank of a third or fourth rate European power. Catholics are loyal and patriotic, and would not join with the party whose views are so hostile to the temporal interests of their country, without a severe struggle; but they do and must place their religion before their politics, and they know perfectly well that the prince who persecutes their Church forfeits his right to their allegiance. Our obligation to obey the temporal ruler is restricted to obedience in those things which are not repugnant to the law of God, as interpreted by the Catholic Church. When the prince commands that which is contrary to that law, so interpreted, we are released from the obligation of obedience; for we must obey God rather than man. How, then, count on the support of Catholics for a government that persecutes them? or not expect them to oppose such government by all means in their power, not in themselves unjust? If the temporal interests of their country suffer by the course they adopt, let it be so. The Church of God is more to them than country, and they can never

hesitate to sacrifice the interests of the latter rather than the rights of the former, when you place them in a position in which they must sacrifice one or the other. You have no right to seek the temporal interests of the state at the expense of the interests of religion. If you do not, you will find Catholics among your most loyal and patriotic subjects ; if you do, you must expect them to oppose you. You have no right to complain of them, for you, not they, are the party in the wrong. It seems to us, then, a very mad policy, in a professedly conservative British ministry, to force the Catholics of the empire into a union with radicals or democrats as the only means of securing the freedom of conscience.

Great Britain is, at the present moment, not only threatened with a democratic revolution, but also with a formidable foreign invasion. We have no doubt that Napoleon the Third wishes for peace, and will seek it, if by it he can effect his purposes ; but we cannot suppose him afraid of war, placed, as he just has been, at the head of an empire whose chief recollections are of military glory. He not unlikely wishes to repair the defeat of Waterloo, and we cannot presume him unwilling to return at London the visit paid by the British troops to Paris in 1815. He appears to be preparing to return that visit, and the attempt to do so we can well believe would not be at all distasteful to the French army, or to the French people. Appearances certainly indicate that at no distant day the haughty island queen will be visited by a French army, and that she will have to fight, — not to annex new kingdoms to her Indian empire, not merely to save her distant colonies in Africa or America, but in defence of her own fireside, — against an enemy her equal in bravery, her superior in military science, and urged on by the enthusiasm of a new dynasty, the memories and rivalries, the victories and defeats, of seven hundred years. England's insular position has saved her from being the theatre of the principal foreign wars in which she has been engaged ; but we recollect no instance in her history, from Julius Cæsar down to William Prince of Orange, in which she has been invaded without being obliged to succumb to the invader. If the new French Emperor should effect a landing on her shores, as it is thought he may without serious difficulty, she will find it no child's play to prevent it from becoming another

Norman Conquest. She is strong, we grant, but she is also weak; strong abroad, in a war carried on at a distance, but weak at home, for her possessions are so scattered over the world, and require for their preservation such a dispersion of her forces, that she cannot concentrate her strength there in defence of herself. All commercial and manufacturing nations, however strong they may be abroad, when they can subsidize other powers, are always weak when attacked in their own centre.

In this no improbable struggle where is England to find friends and allies? Not with us, certainly, though allied to her by blood and language; for the great body of our people would far more willingly fight against than for her, and are only waiting a fair opportunity of measuring their strength with hers. Moreover, we have certain designs on Central America which she is the only power likely to thwart. She is also our most formidable rival in the markets of the world, and we shall be quite willing to find ourselves able to supplant her. We have now no Secretary of State disposed to form an "Anglo-Saxon Alliance," and are not likely to have one again for some time to come. Our cotton, and California gold mines, render us in the main independent of her money power, and able to withstand the shock of a conflict with her. She can find no friends or allies on the Continent, if Napoleon takes ordinary care not to excite the apprehensions of his neighbors, and abandons the old French policy, so long and so fatally pursued, of humbling Austria. She has by her pride, her arrogance, her intermeddling with the affairs of her neighbors, her support of revolutionists, and her readiness to stir up rebellions in all the Continental states, alienated from her all these states, unless perchance Sardinia; and there is not one of them that would not willingly see her fall, and utterly ruined, providing that it could be done without rendering France too formidable. If the new French Emperor takes the pains to give ample security on this head, he may count, in a war with Great Britain, on the sympathy of very nearly the whole world.

We do not say that Great Britain, in such a contest as we suppose, would be beaten, but we do say, that to sustain herself she would need the cordial and loyal support of her subjects. The Catholics constitute about one third of the population of the United Kingdom. Can she afford, in the pres-

ent juncture of affairs, to alienate the affections of so large a portion of her population? Can she dispense with their aid? Or can she, if she disfranchises and persecutes them for conscience' sake, count on their support? Will Catholic Ireland, whom she hardly keeps tranquil by one half of her regular army at home, consent to shed her blood in defence of her tyrant and persecutor? Ireland is indeed somewhat apt to disappoint the calculations of her friends, and by her internal divisions, or by often deceived hopes of conciliating a hostile government, to secure the triumph of her aggressors; but we can hardly believe that she will support in peace or war any ministry mad enough to attempt to deprive her of her religious freedom. The Church is all that she has left of her ancient national greatness, and it is only in the independence of her Church that she retains any vestige of her former national independence. Destroy the independence of her Church, by subjecting it to the state, or even to the Catholic hierarchy of England, and you extinguish the last spark of her national life, annihilate the Irish as a distinct people, and absorb them in the Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman population of the empire. That conquest, which you have been trying in vain for seven hundred years to complete, would then be consummated. Ireland lives only in the freedom and independence of her Church of all authority save that of the Holy See. Her faith and piety, her strong national feeling, and her deep sense of wrong and insult, of unheard of oppression, and unrelenting persecution continued for centuries, with all the malice, the cruelty, and cunning of hell, — as well as all her old Celtic memories, associations, and affections, — must indispose her to support a government that makes war on her Church, and the most that you can hope the influence of her clergy will be able to effect will be to restrain her from acts of open hostility. There are, also, the Irish settled in England, to the number, it has been said, though we can hardly believe it, of three hundred thousand men able to bear arms. Can a ministry hostile to their religion, and determined to deprive them of the rights of conscience, count on their support, or even their neutrality? Will they shed their blood for the power that is gorged with the spoils of their Church, that oppresses the land of their fathers, and deprives them of their dearest rights?

Great Britain is the main stay of the enemies of God and his Christ; she is drunk with the blood of martyrs; and in the approaching contest the prayers of two hundred millions of Catholics throughout the world will daily and hourly ascend for her defeat. Of English descent, a warm admirer of many traits in the character of Englishmen, speaking the English language for our mother tongue, and nurtured from early childhood in English literature, we have personally no hostility to England, and certainly should regret to see her become a French province; but we cannot deny that we should not grieve to see her humbled, for till she is humbled we cannot hope to see her return to the bosom of Catholic Unity. She is and has been the bulwark of the Protestant rebellion against the Church, and of all the nations that broke the unity of faith and discipline in the sixteenth century she has been the most cruel and barbarous in her treatment of Catholics. How, then, should we grieve to see her weeping in sackcloth and ashes her apostasy and cruelty to the people of God! Sorry are we that she needs punishment, but since need it she does, we cannot be sorry to see it inflicted, and warmer sympathy than ours she need expect from no Catholic heart. These prayers of Catholics she may, indeed, make light of, but they will not ascend in vain. They will be heard in heaven. Not nations any more than individuals can always go on sinning with impunity. They must at length fill up the measure of their iniquity, and when they have done it, vengeance is sure to overtake them, and they fall, to rise no more for ever.

Considering, therefore, the present temper and strength of the Catholics of the United Kingdom; considering that the country is threatened with a democratic revolution on the one hand, and with formidable foreign invasion on the other, we cannot but wonder at what seems to us the folly and madness, even in a political point of view, of the British ministry, in attempting to reëstablish effete Protestantism, and to revive the old policy of penal enactments against the faithful members of the Catholic Church. We can account for such folly and madness only on the ground that the term of indulgence granted to this haughty island power has wellnigh expired, and that the day of her exemplary chastisement is at hand. To us the statesmen of England seem struck with a preternatural blindness.

The London Quarterly Review for last October, in its article on *Parliamentary Prospects*, shows even more alarm than virulence. It appears to be fully conscious of the critical state of the ministry, if not of the empire. It sees very clearly the embarrassment the Catholics of England, and especially of Ireland, may produce by their determination, partially carried into effect in the recent elections, to use their political power as electors and senators to force the government to repeal the acts repugnant to their religious freedom, and it seeks to arrest their action, well knowing their scrupulous fidelity to their oaths and engagements, by pretending that in so using their power they are violating the declarations and oaths on the strength of which the Catholic Relief Bill was granted. It assumes that their determination is an act of aggression on the Protestant constitution and the Church as by law established, which they had sworn not to disturb, and makes out what appears at first sight rather an awkward case against them. But who cannot make out a strong case when he is free to invent premises to suit a foregone conclusion?

It is not our province to criticize the declarations and oaths cited by the reviewer. We presume them to be such as a Catholic can take without heresy or schism, otherwise they would have been condemned by authority; but we say for ourselves, personally, that we would be hung, drawn, and quartered before we would subscribe to them. Our Catholic friends, no doubt, deemed them not only allowable, but also prudent; and they may have judged wisely. We, however, are no friend to liberal concessions of what is not our own, and we regard it always as highly imprudent even to appear to restrict the power or province of the Papacy in favor of the secular government. The arguments of our London contemporary only confirm us in this opinion. When hard pressed, men naturally concede every thing that they can in conscience, and if we cannot approve, we can at least excuse them; but the concessions they make seldom fail in the long run to return to their serious embarrassment. They narrow the ground we stand on, and if they leave us less to defend, they leave us less with which to defend it. When the question is an open one, we always prefer the higher and more comprehensive view as the more politic. It is sure to prove so in the end, whatever it may be for the moment.

We have an invincible love for freedom, for that freedom which none but a Catholic can enjoy, or even understand; and we can never consent to give up one iota of it to Cæsar, let him storm and threaten as he may. His storming and threatening never frighten us, for we know that he has no power to harm us. He may bind or torture our body; he may hang, behead, burn, or cast it to the wild beasts to be torn and devoured; but that is no injury to us. It is rather a benefit, nay, the greatest possible favor to us, if we remain steadfast in the faith and charity of the Gospel. So we always make it a point to defend even to the last the most distant outworks of the Church, sure that we have yielded too much if we have permitted the enemy to attack us in the citadel, although we know that to be impregnable.

The tendency of English Catholics, as well before as at the period of the so-called Reformation, was to regard the Pope as an Italian potentate, rather than as their own chief, and to restrict, as much as possible without falling into absolute heresy or schism, the Papal authority in favor of the temporal sovereign. Indeed, what is termed Gallicanism might with far more propriety be called Anglicanism, for France borrowed it from England, as she subsequently borrowed from her her deism, incredulity, and sensist or sensualistic philosophy. This tendency prepared the way for Protestantism in England, as it did subsequently for infidelity and Jacobinism in France. The English Catholics cherished it, after the Reformation, not only as in accordance with their national traditions, but as likely to render them less offensive to a Protestant government. Protestantism, as we have shown in the foregoing article, is simply the assertion of the supremacy of the temporal over the spiritual; consequently, Catholicity, which asserts the precise contrary, must be regarded by the Protestant sovereign as high treason. It necessarily denies the royal supremacy, and Catholics in England, for a long series of years, were charged with treason, arrested, and executed as traitors, simply because they were Catholics. It is not strange, then, that English Catholics should have sought to stay the hand of persecution by professions of loyalty, by disclaiming as far as they could their obligation to obey the Sovereign Pontiff, and asserting in very strong terms their subjection to the temporal prince. They

seem to have imagined, that all that was needed to put a stop to the persecution they suffered was to prove that they could, as Catholics, be loyal subjects of a non-Catholic sovereign; and they went so far in the way of proving this as to support their prince against their spiritual Father, as, for instance, under St. Pius the Fifth and Sixtus Quintus. Hence we find, even down to the period of Catholic emancipation, English Catholics generally asserted the independence of temporal sovereigns; and in the spirit of a miserable Gallicanism, which, as we have elsewhere shown, conceals the germs of political atheism, they drew up or accepted the declaration and oaths cited by the *Quarterly Review* as the condition on which the Catholic Relief Bill was conceded.

But the concessions of the English Catholics to the temporal prince did not save them from persecution; they were still fined, imprisoned, exiled, outlawed, beheaded, or hung, drawn, and quartered, and their concessions seem to have served no other purpose than to deprive them of the merit of confessors and martyrs. They were left with such a weak and sickly Catholicity as could not sustain them, and persecution, instead of strengthening them, as in the primitive ages, wellnigh exterminated them. The Church is built on Peter, and those who love not Peter always wilt away before persecution. Latterly, English and Irish Catholics—for even Irish Catholics, after the establishment of Maynooth College, became infected with the same spirit—appear to have discovered this, and a striking change has come over them, which gives them fresh life and vigor. There are propositions in the illustrious Dr. Doyle's evidence before Parliament, which few Catholics in England or Ireland to-day would accept without important modifications. English and Irish Catholics have turned with renewed affection to Rome, and have drawn closer the bands which bind them to the chair of Peter. The Pope is not for them now a foreign potentate; he is their chief, their loving Father, to whom they wish to comport themselves as dutiful, submissive, and loving children. Hence their recent prosperity, and the great accession which has been made to their strength. The curse of leanness with which the English Catholics seem for so many ages to have been struck for their distrust of the Papacy, their coldness to Peter, and their servility to the temporal

power, seems to have been at length revoked, and we know no country in which Catholicity is more healthy, vigorous, or flourishing, than the noble old land of our forefathers. The secret of this change is, we firmly believe, in the fact that British Catholics are becoming hearty, uncompromising Papists. Hence the alarm of Protestants.

The Protestant ascendancy, after the extinction of the house of Stuart, and of all pretenders to the crown to the prejudice of the present reigning family, came to the conclusion, that it had no longer any plausible pretext for maintaining the disabilities of Catholics, as it could have no fears of such Catholics as were content to subscribe to the Four Articles accepted by the French clergy in 1682. Protestants know perfectly well that Catholics of that stamp are quite harmless to them, that they make few converts, have no dangerous zeal, and will seldom, in case of conflict, hesitate to support the temporal authority against the spiritual. They may think them very silly, from a mere point of honor, to adhere to an old and proscribed religion, wholly incompatible with the light and spirit of the modern world; but upon the whole they think them, though a fantastic, a very good sort of people, not much inferior to Protestants themselves, at least not at all more dangerous to the state. But their feelings are very different towards the bold, energetic, and uncompromising Papist, who asserts, without any reticence or circumlocution, that the spiritual order is supreme in all things, and that princes as well as subjects are bound to obey the law of God, and, if Catholics, are bound to obey that law as interpreted by the Roman Catholic Church, especially as interpreted by the Pope, her supreme pastor. Catholics of this stamp they respect, indeed, but dread, because they are evidently in earnest, and present Catholicity in the sense in which it is the precise contradictory of the essential principle of Protestantism.

The pretence of the Reviewer, that Catholics have violated the conditions on which emancipation was conceded, is unfounded. It is a mere pretext. The real thing that he wishes to oppose is this free, fearless, hearty, and vigorous Catholicity; for he knows that this is a Catholicity that does and will march from victory to victory, and that wherever it plants its foot Protestantism must disappear. The real aim of the *Quarterly* is to weaken the power of Catholics, by

sowing divisions in their ranks, and frightening them out of this high-toned Papal Catholicity. What it means to tell us is, that it was the low-toned Gallicanism which the Relief Bill emancipated, not the high and uncompromising Ultramontaniam in which English and Irish Catholics now glory, and therefore that in exchanging the former for the latter they have broken their engagements. He will not succeed. There are, no doubt, in England and Ireland, as well as in this country, some timid Catholics who retain their old prejudices, and who would feel themselves insulted if called Papists. These may think such Catholics as Cardinal Wiseman and the Archbishop of Dublin, with their true Roman spirit, are pushing matters too fast and too far; but though at times seemingly half prepared to give up Peter for Cæsar, they are after all Catholics, and will follow those whom they would never have the pluck to lead. They may grumble a little, but they will remain united with their brethren. As for frightening the others back into the Catholicity of the Gallican school, that is simply out of the question. They love, as well as obey, Rome. They know she is the centre of unity, and that the closer their union with her, and the deeper and more unreserved their submission to the Holy Father, the fresher, the more vigorous, and the more inexhaustible their Catholic life. They are and will be *Roman* Catholics. Both the English and Irish hierarchies are strongly attached to Rome, and will remain so, both from principle and affection; and all the more firmly attached, the more violent the persecution they have to suffer from the ministry. The pastors will follow Peter, and the flocks their pastors. There are not many Norfolks, Beaumonts, and Ansteys, thank God, remaining in the British Isles, and the few there may be are of no account, for they can find sympathy only in the ranks of Anglicans, where, after all, they are despised.

This change, on which we congratulate our Transatlantic brethren, does not in the least violate the conditions on which the Catholic Relief Bill was granted, for it must be presumed to have been a contingency foreseen and accepted by the government. The government may have hoped, and even believed, that English and Irish Catholics would, as a matter of fact, remain Gallican, but it knew that neither it nor any declarations of English or Irish

bishops could bind them to remain so, because it knew that the ultimate authority in the case is Rome, not the national bishops, and that no declarations of the latter could bind, against the approbation, or even permission, of the Roman Pontiff. Ultramontanism, as it is called, if not precisely of faith, is yet, as all the world knows, not only permitted, but favored by Rome, as the very name implies, and no Catholic can be forbidden to hold it, or censured for insisting on it. The government could not, therefore, grant Catholic emancipation without conceding to every Catholic the right to hold and insist on it if he chose. The whole question is a domestic question, with which those outside have nothing to do. To them Ultramontanes and Gallicans are alike Catholics, and Catholic relief necessarily implies the relief of the one class as much as of the other. The attempt of the *Quarterly* to prove that Catholics have violated the conditions on which the Relief Bill was granted, because they do not in all respects coincide with the views set forth in certain declarations made at the time the question was under discussion, fails, because those declarations were not put forth by the highest Catholic authority, and because, if they were put forth by any authority, it was by an authority which the government knew was subordinate to another, which might at any moment reverse its decisions.

But passing over this, we meet the *London Quarterly Review* on its own ground. Even supposing the Catholics of England and Ireland are not acting now in accordance with the conditions on which the Relief Bill was granted, they cannot be censured. Suppose they are using the political power accorded them by that bill to disturb the Protestant Establishment, the government has not a word to say against them; because, since that Establishment is only a creature of the civil government, they are only exercising their rights as freemen and British subjects in disturbing it, and because the government has been the first to violate its engagements towards them. The conditions on which the Relief Bill was granted contained reciprocal engagements, and bound the government to Catholics, as well as Catholics to the government. It promised them the free profession and exercise of their religion, and they in turn promised it, by oath if you will, in consideration of this freedom, to use no political power which they might

acquire by emancipation to disturb either the Protestant settlement or the Protestant Establishment. We need not tell the Reviewer, that the breach of a contract by the one party releases the other; for he assumes it throughout his argument, and on the strength of it seeks to justify the government in reënacting the civil disabilities of Catholics. Now the government has been the first to break its faith, and in its Ecclesiastical Titles Bill it has violated its promise of freedom to Catholics; for that act is incompatible with the free exercise of their religion. The act of Catholics which called forth that bill was no violation of their engagements, declarations, or oaths; for it was authorized by the act of 1829, which granted them religious freedom, and it was in contravention of no law of the realm, as is evident from the fact, that it was necessary to pass a new law to meet the case. The government, having by this act broken the compact, by its own act released Catholics from their obligation to keep it, and threw them back on their rights as freemen and British subjects, and left them necessarily the same right to use their political power against the Establishment, that others have to use theirs in its favor. No party can stand on its own wrong. The wrong of the government released the Catholics from all their special obligations, and however they may use their power against the Establishment, it cannot complain.

The truth of the case, however, is, that Catholics are not doing what they are accused of doing, or any thing really incompatible with their declarations and oaths. The government in the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill has declared the profession and exercise of their religion illegal in the United Kingdom, and they have merely combined, in their own defence, to use what political power they have, in a legal way, to get that bill repealed, and the freedom of their religion acknowledged. That is, they seek by legal means to defend and secure the freedom understood to be conceded by the Relief Bill of 1829. This is the simple fact in the case, and we should like to know what there is in this which conflicts with any engagement they have entered into. No Catholic in the realm dreams of disturbing the Protestant settlement, or disputing the right of the present reigning family to the crown; and no one, as far as we have seen, proposes by any political or legislative action to destroy the Anglican Church, if church it can be

called. The oath taken by Catholic electors and senators binds them to be loyal subjects of the Queen, but it does not bind them to use their political power to uphold the Church Establishment, or forbid them to withdraw from it the patronage of the state. Catholics as members of Parliament have the same rights as any other members have; they sit there on terms of perfect equality with the rest, and nobody can pretend that it is not competent for Parliament, if it sees fit, to withdraw all support from the Establishment, and sever all connection between it and the state. There is a difference between not using a power to disturb, and using it to sustain, the Anglican Church. To the former a Catholic might, perhaps, under peculiar circumstances, lawfully pledge himself; to the latter he could not, for he can never pledge himself to sustain a false church without forswearing his own.

In any light, therefore, that we choose to consider it, the complaints brought against English or Irish Catholics are unfounded, and they are made only for the purpose of diverting attention from the just complaints which Catholics themselves make. The *Quarterly* only renews the old Protestant trick, that of wronging Catholics, and then pretending that it is Catholics who have wronged Protestants; of provoking Catholics by gross injustice to acts of self-defence, and then turning round and accusing them of breaking the peace. The trick has been repeated too often, and has become rather stale. As far as we can see, our English and Irish brethren are only using their political power in their own defence, and we are right thankful that they have the spirit and the energy to do it. They and we are one body; their lot is our lot, and their victory or defeat is victory or defeat for us. One of the members cannot suffer but the whole body suffers with it. They have their "Irish Brigade" in Parliament, and we trust it will lack neither courage nor firmness, neither ardor nor unanimity, and that it will steadily and unitedly oppose every ministry that refuses to repeal the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, and to guaranty to Catholics full and unrestricted freedom to profess and practise their religion, in all fidelity and submission to their spiritual chief. We expect this from the "Irish Brigade," for their sakes and our own. This much they owe to the Catholics of Great Britain and Ireland and of the world. We hope they will make the Catholic question their first object, to be postponed or sub-

ordinated to no other, for the rights and interests of the Church, though politicians are apt to forget it, are paramount to all others, and in securing them all others are virtually secured. These secured, it will be easy to carry such measures of temporal relief as may be necessary; for the merit of securing these will secure the blessing of God, and his assistance. The children of this world are wiser in their day and generation than the children of light; but this need not discourage us, for the folly of the children of light is wiser than the wisdom of the world. God has a voice in human affairs, and takes care that it shall always be seen that his cause does not stand in human wisdom or in human virtue. Whoever would wish to prosper in that cause must rely on him, and not on himself. Prayer is better than numbers or strength. We presume our friends of the "Brigade" know this, and therefore we count on their success.

The prospect for England is not bright, but what is to be her fate we know not. We owe her no personal enmity, and we wish her well. But she has sinned greatly, and has a long account to settle. There are many in heaven and on earth that cry out, "How long, O Lord, how long?" Her ages of misrule in Ireland, and the multiplied wrongs which she has inflicted upon the warm-hearted Irish people, her long-continued persecution of Catholics, and the blood of the saints red yet on her hand, all are registered against her, and demand vengeance, and, if there be justice in heaven, will obtain it. She did a noble deed in receiving and cherishing the exiled French clergy, and in reward she has had the offer of returning to the bosom of Catholic unity. Many of her choicest children have heard the offer, and have returned. The Catholic world is praying for her conversion. If she listens to the offer, and returns to her old faith, once her glory, and to which she is indebted for all that is noble or useful in her institutions, she may hope for pardon; but if she remains obstinate and deaf, if she continues to be puffed up with pride, trusting in her own wisdom and strength, in the multitude of her ships, her merchandise, and her riches, let her reflect on the fate of Tyre, the haughty Island Queen of antiquity, or at least of the once brilliant Spouse of the Adriatic, now the humble slave of the Austrian Kaiser.

ART. VI. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *Revue Contemporaine*. Paris. 1852. 8vo. Nos. I. — XIII.

THIS is a new French semimonthly periodical, commenced last April, and devoted to philosophy, history, the sciences, literature, poetry, romances, travels, criticism, archæology, the fine arts, and indeed to all subjects, except religion and contemporary politics. Its professed design is to wipe out from French literature the reproach of unbelief and immorality, and to correct the many popular errors in regard to history to which that literature has given currency. It has a long list of contributors, and is published with the concurrence of the principal names among the literary men of France. The numbers already issued contain two or three interesting romances, and several valuable articles on French history, especially on the reigns of Philip Augustus and St. Louis. But upon the whole, the work has disappointed us. Its Christianity is a very vague and indeterminate affair, a Christianity without Christ or the Church, — and its morality consists chiefly in fine phrases and pretty sentiments. It has some passable criticisms on art, but it lacks earnestness and strength, and shows no signs of vigorous growth or robust health. A single page of such writers as Rohrbacher, Montalembert, Georges de la Tour, Donoso-Cortez, and even Louis Veuillot, is worth whole cart-loads of such namby-pambyism as is dealt out to us twice a month in the *Revue Contemporaine*.

We of course are ready to welcome any thing coming to us from France that even aims to counteract the evil tendency of the greater part of popular French literature, but we are far from believing that the men who write for this new periodical are the men to roll back the tide of French unbelief and immorality. The men who are to do that very necessary work must be men in earnest, men of nerve, men of prayer, men who fear God, but fear no one else, — men with hearts on fire, from which they speak words that burn, and who care not a pin's head whether they acquire or do not acquire the reputation of finished writers, if they but accomplish the noble and generous purpose to which they devote their lives. When the house is on fire, the roof is tumbling in, and we wish to alarm the sleeping inmates, it is no time to modulate our voice to the etiquette of the presence-chamber or the drawing-room. If your purpose is to weaken the authority of Church and State, to overturn altar and throne, to corrupt manners, promote licentiousness in thought and deed, break up society and introduce a universal Saturnalia, your best method is the charming romance, the pretty love-story, the graceful sonnet, the witty epigram, that will be cited by beautiful lips in fashionable saloons; for the first step towards such a Satanic result is to banish thoughts for phrases, principles for fine sentiments, and to render the people light and frivolous; but if your work is to restore a corrupt society, to recall an unbelieving and licentious people to faith in Christ, to purity of manners, and the practice of the Christian virtues, we exhort you to adopt a far different method, and to employ far other instruments.

The periodical before us is not rightly named. It is not at all *contemporary* in its thought. The contemporary thought of France is, either decidedly Catholic, — and Catholic in the sense of the age of Charlemagne and that of the first Crusade, — or decidedly Socialistic, defying God and openly deifying man. All *living* Frenchmen of the present, follow either

the Catholic spirit, the spirit of God, or the directly opposite spirit, the Socialistic spirit, the spirit of the Devil, and are represented either by a Montalembert or a Proudhon. The *via-media* men, or the *juste-milieu* party, however numerous, belong to the past, and should consider themselves as having died with the dynasty of July. The Respectables, who wish to serve God without breaking with the Devil, or the Devil without breaking with God, have in France, as elsewhere, no contemporary vocation, and serve only as an obstacle, now to the Catholic and now to the Socialist. If they wish to be counted, they must take sides. If God is God, then serve him; if Baal be God, then in Baal's name serve Baal, and take him for your paymaster. This is no time to halt half way.

The struggle in France, if we understand it, is, as everywhere else, between Catholicity, in its genuine Roman sense, the Catholicity of the Dark Ages if you will, which asserts the supremacy of the spiritual order, and the obligation of both sovereigns and subjects to obey in all things the law of God as interpreted by the Roman Catholic Church; and Socialism, or Red-Republicanism, which asserts the supremacy of the secular order, the subjection of the soul to the body, will to appetite, reason to the passions, and makes terrestrial felicity the final end of man. Here are the two parties, each with its principles well defined; each fully aware of its own meaning; each with a distinct and determinate object before it; and each devoted to its object, heart and soul. The war is between these two parties. These are the combatants, and one or the other of these must win or lose the victory. Your old-fashioned Gallicans and your modern Moderate Republicans are mere followers of the camp, swelling the numbers on either side, but encumbering its movements without adding any thing to its effective strength. Some fifteen months ago, all appearances were that victory for a time would be carried by the Socialists, and European society and civilization fall back into barbarism. We saw little in prospect but civil war, confusion, and anarchy, in all the Continental states. But the Holy Father proclaimed a Jubilee, and set all the faithful to praying for peace, concord, and the preservation of society, and almost immediately the face of things began to change. Louis Napoleon, by his famous *coup d'état*, seized the reins of government in France, employed it against the enemies of order, and turned for the time the scale against them, much to the joy of all good men throughout the world. For the present the Socialists are defeated, and there is gained through the mercy of God a respite, which may be improved to reestablish society and social order on a solid and permanent basis.

But although a powerful reaction is going on in Europe against the Socialists, it would be worse than idle to suppose that Socialism is extinct in France, or in any European state, or that all danger to be apprehended from the revolutionary party has passed over. Socialism still exists in France and throughout Europe; it has been defeated for the moment, perhaps disheartened, but not annihilated. Almighty God has heard the prayers of the faithful, and has granted to the nations an opportunity to recruit their strength, to collect their forces, and to provide for the future security of society and civilization. If the existing governments improve this opportunity wisely, and place themselves in normal relations with the Church of God, the reaction against Socialism will prove to be permanent, and the victory recently won to be decisive. But society and civilization are not for their own sakes; they are for the Spiritual and the Eternal, and therefore are in their very nature subordinated to the Church, — the

only true society, the only real civilization. They depend on the Church, and can be promoted or secured only in proportion as she is free and independent, and cheerfully submitted to by sovereigns and subjects as the sole guardian and interpreter of the law of God in all things. If the European sovereigns forget this fact, if they fail to recognize that the mission of the Christian prince is to be the armed defender of the Church against all external enemies, and seek to use the respite granted them only to render their power absolute, to establish despotism as the remedy against anarchy, they will find that Socialism is not dead, and that at such a moment as they think not it will break out anew with resistless fury; for there is too much life, too much vigor, in the people of every European, at least of every Catholic state, to suffer them to sink down quietly under an Oriental despotism.

There are two things against which, as a Catholic, we declare eternal hostility; namely, the despot and the mob, despotism and anarchy. The first exists wherever there are no restrictions on the power of the prince, and he is regarded as the sovereign lord and proprietor of his subjects; the second, where there is no authority which any one feels bound in conscience to obey. Written constitutions, parliamentary bodies, all the contrivances of human wit and wisdom to restrict the power of the ruler, or to bind the subject to obedience, are of themselves insufficient to maintain authority against anarchy, or liberty against despotism. The legitimate authority of the prince, and the just liberty of the subject, wrangle as you will, are practicable only under the supremacy of a divinely instituted and supernaturally assisted and protected Church. To enslave this Church, or not to recognize her authority and secure her freedom and independence of action, is at once to destroy the authority of the prince and the liberty of the subject, or to convert authority into despotism and liberty into license. We have had for years to insist on this great truth in favor of authority against the people in rebellion; we hope we shall not now have to insist on it against rulers seeking to reign as despots.

The great purely human instrument that God appears to have used in staying for a time the torrent of Socialism, and in rendering the reëstablishment of order in Europe possible, is Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, now his Imperial Highness Napoleon the Third, and perhaps, for the moment, the most important secular sovereign in the world. As President and Prince-President of the French Republic, he has been the instrument of much good, and the French people, in gratitude for the essential services that he has rendered to the cause of social order, have permitted him, as it appears, to reëstablish the Empire and to assume the imperial crown. They seem to have believed that only by so doing could they repress Socialism, and maintain fixed and permanent government. Whether they have done wisely or not, time alone can determine. Napoleon the Third is an extraordinary man, and has thus far proved himself the enemy of the Socialists, and not hostile to religion. We see not well what, after the *coup d'état* of December, 1851, France could do, but to place him on the throne of his uncle. Certainly we do not regret the Bourbons of either branch. Their day is over. They forgot their mission as Christian princes, placed France before the Church, and themselves before France, and France has rejected them. We regret not the late Republic, for we never believed it would stand, although, we confess, we wished it to have a fair trial, and should have been better pleased to see its constitution amended than abolished. But the revival of the Empire brings with it

fears as well as hopes. Napoleon the First was a great man, a great conqueror, but he was not a Charlemagne. He restored the Catholic worship in France, and in concert with Pius the Seventh he put an end to the schism of the French Church; he arrested the revolutionary madness, restored social order, and saved French society from utter annihilation. So far he did nobly, and deserved and received the thanks of the whole Catholic world. But this he did as First Consul, not as Emperor. As Emperor we are aware of nothing he did that deserves the gratitude or the memory of mankind. God gave him the mission, in concert with the successor of Peter, to reconstruct Christian Europe, but he proved unfaithful to it. He ruled as a despot, not as a Christian prince. The respect he paid to religion was the respect of a politician, not of an humble and devout son of the Church; and he evidently served it not for its own sake, but only for the purpose of making it a tool for the establishment of his power. He adopted in Church and State the policy of the degenerate Greeks of the Low Empire, from whom, it is said, he was descended, and followed the example of Frederic Barbarossa, Philip the Fair, Henry Plantagenet, and Louis the Fourteenth, instead of that of Charles Martel, Pepin, Charlemagne, and St. Louis. He sought to make the reigning Pontiff the accomplice of his despotism, and failing in this, he stripped him of his states, and dragged him from prison to prison, till indignant Europe rose as one man to liberate him, and send his persecutor to die a prisoner on the barren rock of St. Helena. He was false to his mission, and God rejected him, and overthrew his empire.

God permitted the Bourbons to return, and gave them an opportunity to retrieve their former faults. They only proved that they had forgotten nothing and had learned nothing in adversity, and he again rejected them. He now offers to the nephew of the rejected Emperor, under the direction of the Sovereign Pontiff, the mission of reconstructing Christian Europe, shaken by a century of infidelity and sixty years of revolution. Will the nephew be faithful to his mission? Will he tread in the footsteps of Charlemagne, or in those of his uncle? If the former, we have every thing to hope; if the latter, *he* has every thing to fear. Which he will do, perhaps, it were not difficult to guess; but it is best to leave him to develop his own policy, for whatever fears for the freedom and independence of the Church, and the cause of civil liberty in France, may be entertained, no good can be effected by expressing them. We wish, indeed, that our Catholic friends in France, before consenting to inaugurate him as Napoleon the Third, had taken the precaution to obtain a further guaranty than his simple will against civil despotism; and we think it the part of prudence for Catholics everywhere to let it be clearly understood, that they do not identify the cause of Catholicity with any king or Cæsar, and that they hold themselves free to commend the new French Emperor so far as he serves the cause of religion and society, and to disown him so far as he may prove hostile to them. Catholicity cannot sustain the despot any more than it can sustain the mob. If Napoleon turns despot, as we pray God he may not, there will before many years be a new Socialist outbreak in Europe, and perhaps it is not too soon for us to prepare for resisting a new "*liberal*" reaction.

2. *The Holy Bible, translated from the Latin Vulgate. Diligently compared with the Hebrew, Greek, and other Editions in divers Languages. The Old Testament, first published by the English College at Douay, A. D. 1609. The New Testament, first published by the English College at Rheims, A. D. 1582. With useful Notes, Critical, Historical, Controversial, and Explanatory, selected from the most Eminent Commentators and the most Able and Judicious Critics.* By the REV. GEO. LEO HAYDOCK. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1852. 4to. Nos. 1-7.

THIS is a reprint of the so-called Douay Bible, with Haydock's Notes unabridged. It is in imperial quarto, and for paper and letter-press surpasses by far any edition of the Holy Scriptures hitherto published in this country. The publishers appear to have spared no expense in rendering it worthy of general patronage, and they certainly deserve, as we have no doubt they will receive, the most generous support, in their very heavy undertaking, of the Catholic community. It is furnished, considering the quality of the paper, the beauty of its typography, and the excellence of its illustrations, at a remarkably low price, and ought to be in the possession of every Catholic family. A great merit of this edition is, that it contains Haydock's Notes without abridgment, which can be said of no other edition now in course of publication. These Notes have been selected with great judgment from the best commentators and critics, and are of great value for understanding the Sacred Text. The edition is published with the approbation of the Most Reverend the Archbishop of New York, which is ample guaranty to the faithful for its genuineness and fidelity. We wish the publishers ample success.

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3. *Institutiones Philosophiæ Theoreticæ in Usus Prælectionum.* Auctore FRANC. ROTHENFLUE, S. J. Editio altera. Lyons and Paris. 1841. 3 tomes. 12mo.

THIS work has been placed in our hands, with a request that we would express our opinion of its merits. We have as yet only partially examined it, but as far as we have examined it, we have been very much pleased with it. Father Rothenflue is a German Swiss, and has something of the German forms of thought and expression, which are not precisely to our taste, but he is in the main an ontologist as distinguished from modern psychologists. We know no writer who has treated better or more satisfactorily the knotty questions of Possibilities, the Origin of Ideas, and Space and Time, on which his views seem to us to be as sound as they are clearly and vigorously expressed. As a text-book in metaphysics, strictly so called, it is the best we are acquainted with, and we are glad to see it introduced into our colleges.

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4. *Filosofia Fundamental.* Por D. JAIME BALMES, Presbítero. Barcelona. 1844. 4 tomos. 8vo.

THIS is a work on the foundations or fundamental principles of philosophy, by the celebrated James Balmes, so well and so favorably known by his work on European Civilization. Without being prepared to indorse

every view it may present, we think it the most important contribution that has recently been made in any country to philosophical literature. The author has studied his subject, and shows an extraordinary familiarity with the systems and speculations of all times, especially with the schoolmen of the Middle Ages, and the authors of modern Germany. To a very considerable extent, his work may be regarded as a masterly refutation of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling. It is directed against the modern, sceptical, sensist, and transcendental schools. Its style is clear, precise, and dignified, and compares favorably in Spanish with the Italian style of the able but unhappy Abbate Gioberti, who has so recently been summoned, as it would seem without a note of warning, to meet his Judge. Unlike Gioberti, the Abbate Balmes writes with great modesty and sweetness, and where he feels himself unable to solve a difficulty, he frankly and honestly says so. His great masters are St. Thomas and Suarez, and we may therefore be sure that he is no mere psychologist. On several points of considerable importance his views differ from those which we ourselves entertain, although more in appearance than in reality, we are inclined to believe; but there is no work on the subject that we can more cordially commend, or which we should be more glad to see circulated and studied. It is well fitted to correct the philosophical errors of our times, and if it errs at all, it errs through modesty, not rashness. We have been so delighted and instructed by the perusal of the work, that we have recommended it to a dear friend, who has some taste for philosophical pursuits, to translate it into our own language, and bring out an American edition of it. We shall take another occasion to present our readers with an analysis of the work, and a statement of its principal merits. An edition of the work translated into French, we believe, has already been published, though we have not seen it.

5. *The Forest*. By J. V. HUNTINGTON, Author of "*Alban*" and "*Lady Alice*." New York: Redfield. 1852. 12mo. pp. 384.

THIS is properly a sequel to *Alban*, a work published over a year ago, and which made some noise, and called forth some censures upon the author from several of our Catholic papers. The author was formerly an Episcopalian minister, and is now a pious and devout member of the Church. Whatever may be thought of his books, he is himself, we are sure, a most estimable and pure-minded man. The passages objected to in *Alban*, we are confident, sprung from no pruriency of the fancy, but from the author's theory of art, which seems to have been learned chiefly in the studio of the painter or the sculptor. He has apparently written in accordance with his theory, which he has not in all cases applied precisely as intended. The author's theory of taste is not ours, and he presents as the principal what we would at most only tolerate as accessory. We never tolerate description, whether of external nature or of the human person, for mere description's sake. We allow no more description than is necessary to explain the position of the actors, or to assist the action of the piece. We think it repugnant to the laws of true art for a writer, every time he has occasion to introduce a woman, to stop and give us a full length portrait of her, the color of her hair, the form of her eyebrows, the cast of her features, the pouting or not pouting of

her lips, the shape of her bust, the size of her waist, with remarks on the flexibility of her limbs, and the working of her toes Dr. Huntington seems to have thought differently, and hence the passages which have given offence. His great strength lies in description, in which he excels, not in the conduct of a story or the development of character. In his volumes we find much that is absurd, much that is silly, and a great deal that wants *vraisemblance*; but, after all, the most fastidious critic must allow him a very high order of ability, and passages and scenes of rare beauty and interest. Let his works be read in the spirit and from the point of view of the author, and no one will hesitate to award him a very high degree of merit. If we are to have works of fiction, he is, perhaps, as well fitted to produce them as any author we have. The work before us has the merits and the defects of *Alban*, but upon the whole we give it a kindly welcome.

* * We commence with this number the Third Series of our Review. We do this because we can no longer supply complete sets of the previous volumes, and because new subscribers may like to have their volumes count from Volume I. We make no change save in numbering the volumes. Arrangements have been made with Charles Dolman, Esq., of London, for bringing out an English edition of the work for England and Ireland. Our subscribers on the Continent will be supplied, hereafter, with the London edition. We wish again to thank the Catholic public for their steady support and their flattering approbation of our humble but well meant labors. We have now going on nine years conducted this journal as a Catholic review, and done so almost single-handed. We have spoken freely, frankly, boldly, we would hope not rashly, on all topics that have come up; and our aim has been to encourage a free, bold, and manly tone in our Catholic literature, to make Catholics feel that they are at home in this country, and need but courage in avowing and fidelity in practising their religion to make the country Catholic. That we have sometimes erred in judgment as to the proper topic to be treated, as well as in the manner of treating the topic selected, is very probable; that we have disturbed many prejudices, trodden on a good many corns, and vexed not a few good souls, who would never have Catholicity speak above her breath or in any but apologetic tones, is very likely; but we have aimed well, and done the best we could. The character of our Review is now well established, and such as it has been it will continue to be. We could easily make it more popular, and double our list of subscribers; but we have a conscience, and we can do nothing for the sake of popularity or for the gaining of friends. Our Review is devoted to the cause of Catholic truth and morals, and we seek to please God, not man. We would sooner beg, sooner starve, than shape a single sentence to win the applause of the multitude, although that applause is as sweet in our ears as in those of any other man. As long as we can secure the approbation, and lose not the confidence, of the pastors of the Church, we are content. The past is the only guaranty we can give of the future.

BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

APRIL, 1853.

- ART. I. — 1. *De Auctoritate Romani Pontificis in Conciliis Generalibus. Opus Posthumum* R. P. ALPH. MUZZARELLI, S. J. Gandavi. 8vo. 2 tomi.
2. *The Primacy of the Apostolic See vindicated.* By FRANCIS P. KENRICK, Bishop of Philadelphia (now Archbishop of Baltimore). 3d Edition. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1848. 8vo. pp. 527.
3. *Des Intérêts Catholiques au XIX^e Siècle.* Par LE COMTE DE MONTALEMBERT, l'un des Quarante de l'Académie Française. Paris: Lecoffre & Co. 1852. 8vo. pp. 205.

IN our Review for January last we proved the supremacy of the spiritual order over the temporal, and the divine right of the authority exercised in the Middle Ages by Popes and Councils over temporal sovereigns; we resume the general subject of the supremacy of the spiritual order in our present number, and we may continue it in several numbers to come; for, as we view it, all the great controversies of the age — in fact, of every age — turn on the relations of the temporal to the spiritual, and the provisions which Almighty God has made for the practical maintenance of the spiritual order on earth. Protestantism, as we have heretofore abundantly shown, does not, when considered in its essential character, present a rival religion to the Catholic; for whatever of religion Protestants may in reality possess, is derived from Catholicity, and can find its unity and integrity only in the Catholic Church. In its essential elements, Protestantism simply opposes, in one form or other, the su-

premacY of the temporal order to the supremacy of the spiritual, which the Church always asserts and does her best to maintain. Ordinarily, Protestants are not, we cheerfully grant, fully aware of this, and in practice seldom attempt to go so far. They commonly attempt a sort of compromise between heaven and earth, in which a certain degree of superiority is claimed for each order. They retain too much of Catholic tradition and good sense, to say, in just so many words, that the temporal order is supreme; but they are afraid to assert the absolute supremacy of the spiritual, lest they belie their Protestantism, and find themselves forced by an invincible logic to return to the Church from which they originally separated, and against which they continue to protest. They seek, therefore, to effect a compromise between the two orders, or, as some of them express it, between faith and reason, authority and private judgment, religion and politics; that is, between Christianity and heathenism, grace and nature, heaven and earth, God and man, eternity and time. But since such compromise is, in the nature of things, impossible, since no man, in the words of our Lord, "can serve two masters, for either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will hold to the one and despise the other," the compromise turns out in the end to be the total sacrifice of the spiritual, and the real assertion of the supremacy of the temporal. Hence, in our last Review, we defined Protestantism to be the assertion of the supremacy of the temporal order, therefore not a religion; and though Protestants may not generally in their words go thus far, yet the great body of them when hard pressed will not shrink from it,—will hold to the temporal and despise the spiritual, and choose rather to follow their Protestant movement into open apostasy, than to return to Catholicity.

In all the controversies which arise between the Church and the state, or between the Church and any class of her enemies, it is always a question between the two orders, and the point to be determined is always, Which is supreme? "Ye cannot serve God and Mammon." Ye cannot assert that one order is supreme in some things, and the other supreme in other things, as those who contend for the total separation of the two orders foolishly maintain, because the two orders, though distinguishable, are not in reality separable, and because this would leave no author

ity to decide in what things the temporal is supreme, or in what the spiritual. If you make each the judge of its own powers, of the extent and limits of its own authority, you bring the two orders into perpetual conflict, place them in a state of perpetual hostility, with no possible means of establishing peace between them; you declare the claims of each, however they may conflict with those of the other, just and legitimate, and as the authority of each in determining its own powers is, on this hypothesis, equal, you must maintain that the same claim is both just and unjust at the same time, which we need not say is a palpable absurdity. To escape this inconvenience, you must give the power to determine the province of each order either to the temporal or to the spiritual. If you give it to the spiritual, you declare the spiritual supreme; if to the temporal, you make the temporal supreme. One or the other of these two you must do, whether you will it or not. Then you must either subject the spiritual to the temporal, or the temporal to the spiritual. As Protestants do not and will not do the former, they must be regarded, inasmuch as they are Protestants, as always doing the latter.

As the state confessedly lies in the temporal order, and the Church in the spiritual order, it is clear that every controversy between the Church and the state is a controversy between the spiritual and the temporal. And since the Church lies in the spiritual order, and is its representative, it is equally clear that every controversy between her and a sect or an individual, let the question be what it may as to its form, is at bottom a controversy between the two orders, and resolves itself in the last analysis into the question, Which of the two orders is supreme? Hence we say truly, that all the great controversies of every age turn on the question of the mutual relations of the two orders, and can be disposed of only by first disposing of the question, whether the supremacy belongs to the spiritual authority, or whether it belongs to the temporal.

Reduced to its simplest expression, common sense, no doubt, decides the whole controversy; for no man capable of understanding the terms can hesitate to say at once, that the spiritual order is supreme, and prescribes the law for the temporal. This is the traditionary wisdom of mankind, and is also a simple dictate of the reason of all men. Yet it is precisely this that all who oppose the Church do really

deny, although they may not in general be distinctly conscious of the fact. Most men's heads are confused, and the bulk of mankind, educated or uneducated, at best see men only "as trees walking." They have only a dim and confused view of the questions before them; they do not see them distinctly, in their simplicity and integrity, and seldom see them at all except from the special point of view of their own passion, prejudice, or interest. Hence they affirm or deny more or less than they intend, and often without the slightest suspicion of what it is in reality that they are affirming or denying. In general thesis, a man will admit the authority of the state, and yet in defending some special thesis he will deny it; so in general thesis he will concede without the least hesitation the supremacy of the spiritual, while in every special thesis he defends he will deny it, and assert the supremacy of the temporal. It is the special, not the general, that characterizes, and hence we are to characterize or judge men, not by what in a general thesis they may concede, but by what they assert or deny in their special theses.

In judging the mass of non-Catholics, we make no account of the fact, that in general thesis they concede Christianity to be the true religion, or the spiritual authority to be supreme, because in their special theses they always deny both the one and the other. But in reasoning with them, in endeavoring to refute them, we make use of what they concede in their general thesis as the principle of their refutation. It is only in this way that men are to be refuted and brought back, as far as reasoning brings back, to the truth. A man's special thesis can be refuted only by being shown to be contrary to his general thesis. If men did not concede generally that the spiritual is supreme, or if this, or a more general truth than this which implies it, were not a truth of common sense, or a dictate of the reason of all men, we should and could have no *data* from which to refute those who oppose the authority of the Church, and in their special theses assert the supremacy of the secular order. Proceeding on the principle admitted by all in general thesis, that the spiritual is supreme over the temporal, we established in our last Review, in the article on the *Two Orders*, the supremacy over the temporal order of the Catholic Church, and therefore of the Sovereign Pontiff, her visible head and supreme governor.

We do not disguise from ourselves or from our readers, that this conclusion is exceedingly offensive, not only to schismatics, heretics, apostates, and infidels, but also to many who would fain pass for good Catholics. We cannot help this. We have every disposition in the world to render ourselves agreeable to all men, and we take no pleasure in displeasing others. But the truth is neither theirs nor ours. It is independent of both them and us, and it would be no less truth were we to disguise it or to deny it. Our affirmations do not make truth; our denials cannot unmake it. The laws of logic are not of our creating, and are not subject to our control. We are ourselves as much subjected to them as are any of our readers. What would be the gain to our readers or to ourselves, were we either to reason illogically or to misstate facts? Our sophistry could not alter the truth, and our misstatements could not change the nature of the facts themselves. If our conclusion is true, it is all important, and should be told and accepted by all men; if it is not true, let it be refuted. In either case, there is no occasion to be angry with us. If the truth offends, it is not he who tells it that is in fault, but he whom it offends. If we err, it may be our misfortune, but it is no reason why you should be offended with us. To err is human, and it is only when a man errs through neglect of doing his best to obtain the truth, or persists in his error after it has either been rationally refuted or declared to be an error by a competent authority, that he can be blamed for it.

We know the doctrine we contend for is offensive to men who forget heaven, and seek only earthly felicity, or who seek to serve at the same time two masters, — God and Mammon; but is it not rather with themselves than with this doctrine that they ought to be offended? Earthly felicity is not the end, nor one of the ends, of man. In the present providence of God, man is not placed here to enjoy, to have his heaven in this world. He is here for trial, in a state of probation, to prepare for another world, and to secure his heaven in a life after death. This world is not our proper country, is not our home, is not our permanent abode. It is transitory, and with all that it contains passes away, and leaves no trace behind, any more than the keel that splits the wave, or the bird that cleaves the air. Man was not made for this world, nor for its fleeting pleasures.

He was made for another world, and his true country, his true home, his true good, is in heaven, which can be reached only by passing through the dark valley of death. All here is of value only in relation to our future life, only as subordinated and made subservient to the final end for which our Creator designed us. All experience proves that we have and can have no real, no permanent good here, because our end is not here. The error is not, then, on our part, or on the part of those who subordinate earth to heaven, or the temporal to the spiritual, but on the part of those who persist in seeking their good from the temporal order, in believing that they are placed in this world to enjoy, and in acting as if earthly felicity were the final destiny of man.

But after all, the doctrine we advocate is not hostile, but in reality favorable, to the real well-being of man, even in this world, and there are ample reasons why we should love as well as believe it. Truth is always good, and, when rightly apprehended, commends itself to our hearts no less than to our understandings. The supremacy of the spiritual, the supremacy of the Church, the power claimed and exercised by Popes and Councils over temporal sovereigns, against which we hear so many violent outcries, is not only in accordance with truth, is not only the order established by God himself, but useful and even necessary to the temporal, the preservation of social order, the maintenance of civil and political liberty, and the promotion of civilization. In other words, the maintenance in practice as well as in principle of the supremacy of the spiritual order represented by the Church and her Sovereign Pontiff is the necessary condition of all real good for this world, as well as for the world to come; and hence they who oppose us have no less interest than we in maintaining it.

Yet let it not be forgotten, that we state here a fact which may induce men to desire the doctrine, not a conclusive argument for its truth, or reason why we are to believe it. The positive institutions of God can be concluded only from positive revelation, and are to be submitted to only on the ground that they are his, and he commands us to receive and obey them; not because we find them useful or necessary to the temporal order. "Seek first," says our Lord, "the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto you." Here is the doctrine we contend for, in all its length and breadth. If we seek first

the kingdom of God and his justice, that is, maintain in all things the supremacy of the spiritual order, all these things, that is, all that we need or that is good for us in the temporal order, shall be added unto us ; but it is not for the sake of these *adjicienda*, these goods in the temporal order, that we are to seek the kingdom of God and his justice. Our Lord is not assigning a reason why we should seek God, but why we should not be anxious for temporal goods. To seek God for the *adjicienda* would be to make them the primary object of our seeking, and to fall into the precise error of the heathen and the old carnal Jews, who subordinated the spiritual to the temporal, against which our Lord admonishes us. The Church is not instituted for the promotion of the earthly well-being of man, individual or social ; for that well-being, as we have seen, is not the end for which man was designed by his Creator. She is not placed in this world for the promotion of civil and political liberty, civilization, or temporal prosperity ; but to teach, direct, govern, and assist us to gain heaven, the only end for which we exist. This, the glory of God in the salvation or beatitude of souls, sanctified by him through her ministry, is the sole end of her institution. This glory of God in the salvation of souls is the sole reason why we should embrace her, and submit ourselves unreservedly to her direction. Yet as she is in the world, though not of it, and affects all our interests in life, we may lawfully consider her influence on the temporal order, either as a means of augmenting our love for her, or of removing the obstacles which timid and worldly-minded people find to yielding themselves to her authority ; or rather, as the means of removing all our anxiety about the temporal order, of assuring ourselves that, if we are faithful to her, the temporal order can suffer no detriment, and all temporal good that can be called good will follow without any special care on our part, or direct labor for its promotion.

The very doctrine we maintain prohibits us from seeking the spiritual for the sake of the temporal, or religion, so to speak, for the sake of politics. By the supremacy of the spiritual, we do not mean merely its superior rank, or the inferior rank of the temporal, in the hierarchy of life. We mean altogether more than this. The spiritual is not only superior to the temporal, but is its sovereign, and prescribes its law, — the end it is to seek, and the rules by which it is to

seek it. The end, and the sole end, of man is spiritual. He has, *in hac providentia*, strickly speaking, no temporal end, and therefore no absolute temporal good, greater or less. Every creature exists for some end, which is its good. The good of a creature and its end are one and the same thing. Consequently, there is good or evil for a creature only in relation to its end. All that aids a creature in gaining its end is good for that creature; all that turns it away from that end, or hinders it from gaining it, is evil for it. Man's end is spiritual, and therefore there is for him, strictly speaking, only spiritual good, and the temporal is, and can in the nature of things be, good for him only as it aids him to gain his spiritual end, his heavenly end, for which alone in the decrees of God he exists. The temporal in itself is not evil, for no work of God is evil; neither is it in itself good for us, for it is not our end, and therefore it is and can be good for us only relatively to the spiritual, inasmuch as it is subordinated and made subservient to the spiritual. Evidently, then, it is not lawful for us to seek the spiritual for the temporal, the kingdom of God and his justice for the sake of having all these things after which the heathen seek added unto us,—although if we seek first, as the primary object of our pursuit, the kingdom of God and his justice, these things, as far as they can serve us, will be added to us.

We insist here and everywhere, now and always, on the fact, that in relation to man the universe itself has no temporal end. Man exists in the designs of his Creator solely for a spiritual end, and would so exist even if he existed, as he does not, for a natural as well as a supernatural beatitude. God, whether we speak of natural or supernatural morality, is the sole final cause of man. The temporal, by the very fact that it is temporal, and does not exist for itself, is not and cannot be our final cause. We might as well call it our first as our last cause. Nothing can be a first cause that is not in itself complete, absolute, independent, self-existent, and eternal; and nothing else can be a real final cause. Hence the Apostle teaches us that all things are *for* God, as well as from him, by him, and in him. It is true, that man is not all spirit, that he has a body as well as a soul; but the body is for the soul, not the soul for the body. Is it not so? Who dares say that the soul is for the body, the spiritual for the secular, the eternal for

the temporal, the heavenly for the earthly, the Divine for the human? Who dares say that it is for the body to give the law to the soul, the senses to reason, the secular to the spiritual, the temporal to the eternal, the earthly to the heavenly, man to God? The very thought is no less absurd than impious. The reverse every body knows is the fact. Then the end of man, individual or social, and therefore of the temporal, is spiritual, in the spiritual order; and here is the foundation of the supremacy of the spiritual order, and of the Church as representative of that order, or as instituted to teach and govern us in relation to our spiritual end. Hence all secular life is subordinated to a spiritual end, and must receive its law from the spiritual, not from itself, or the temporal order; and therefore from the Church, if she has been instituted to teach and govern us in relation to our final end, that is, in relation to salvation, to our eternal beatitude in heaven.

We are, then, always to seek the spiritual, or, in other words, religion for its own sake, not for the sake of the *ad-jicienda*. This is frequently forgotten even by men who mean well to religion. Because "these things" are clearly seen to be added unto those who forsake all for religion, or those who yield a filial submission to the Church, some argue as if *therefore* we should seek religion. It is clear from history, that the Church is favorable to civil and political liberty, to civilization, and the general temporal well-being of the people, while Protestantism, in proportion as it loses the Catholic elements retained by the early Protestants, tends to barbarism, and to the intellectual and social degradation of the people; therefore, say some, we should be Catholics, not Protestants; but this argument conceals a subordination of the spiritual to the temporal, and therefore cannot be used otherwise than as a mere *argumentum ad hominem*. The Church was not, we repeat, instituted for temporal ends. It is he who will lose his life for Christ's sake that will save it, and he who seeks to save it that will lose it.

The whole Christian economy is founded on the denial of nature, and reverses the maxims of the natural man; because it starts with the assumption that man's nature has fallen, and by the fall has been turned away from God, therefore from good. Nature is not destroyed by the fall, but it has received a violent shock, which has turned all its tendencies in a direction from God, its supreme and only

real good. Regarded in themselves, inasmuch as they belong to our original physical being, all our primitive tendencies are good, for, so considered, they are the work of God, and no work of his is or can be evil. But if we follow them we depart from our good, for being turned away from God, they conduct us, not towards our end, but from it. If our nature remained in its normal state, if it stood with its face towards God, not averted from him, its primitive tendencies would all be so many indices of its true end, and we might adopt with perfect safety the old heathen maxim, "Follow nature," or the modern Transcendental rule, which is virtually the same, "Obey thyself," "Follow thy instincts." But averted as our face is from God, we can attain to him only by conversion, and must adopt the Christian rule, "Deny thyself, crucify nature." Here is the difficulty; and here is the great fact which condemns not a few who are far from meaning to deny all religion. There are many who admit that our end is supernatural, who yet fancy that our natural tendencies lead us in its direction, and therefore that they may be safely followed as far as they go. Nature, they suppose, moves in the right direction; but it cannot of itself go to the end, and its deficiency must be supplied by grace. But this is a grand mistake. Our end lies not in the direction of our natural tendencies since the fall, but in the opposite direction, and therefore the natural man must be arrested and converted, turned round, before he can move towards God, his last end and supreme good. And as good for us is only in relation to our last end, it follows that there is no good, absolute or relative, but in denying nature, and in making a holocaust of it to God. We must not seek God in addition to the creature, nor for the sake of the creature, but for himself, and the creature in him and for him. Such, indeed, is our frailty, that we cannot, while in the flesh, love him so permanently, purely for his own sake; yet we must aim to do it. Fénelon's error was not in asserting that God is to be loved for his own sake alone, or that we can so love him in this life, but in supposing that we can attain to such a degree of charity, even in the flesh, as so to love him habitually, without any reference to him as the object of hope, or as our supreme good. This is not possible, for while in this life hope is always a virtue, and a charity so perfect as to exclude it is reserved for the blest. We are therefore permitted to seek

God as our own good, — to have respect to his rewards, but not for the sake of a good which he is not, or which is not from him and in him. Hence we can never propose the *adjicienda*, which lies in the temporal order, as an end to be sought, or God as to be sought for their sake; for this would be to lose both him and them. “He that will save his life shall lose it.”

The error we here point out is that into which the secular authority in nearly all ages has fallen. That authority seldom openly denies all religion, but it is very much in the habit of seeking the kingdom of God and his justice for the sake of the *adjicienda*, a temporal or secular end. Princes seek to protect and support religion, not for its own sake, or for the spiritual welfare of themselves or their subjects, but for the sake of the state, or rather as an instrument of their own selfish ambition. Their study is to use religion, not to serve it. Some few princes, like Theodosius the Great, Charlemagne, St. Henry, St. Stephen, St. Louis, St. Edward, and perhaps half a dozen others of England and Spain, sought indeed to serve religion, and to promote it for the sake of their own salvation and that of their subjects; but as a general rule, they subordinate religion to politics, and protect it, if at all, only as a part of the machinery of government. They proceed on the assumption that all is for the state, and that the end of man is to be governed, or to accomplish the will of the temporal power; and they imagine that they have the right and the duty to use religion as the means of sustaining their own power, and keeping their subjects in submission to their despotic and too often oppressive rule. These remarks, unhappily, apply to professedly Catholic as well as to non-Catholic sovereigns. The emperors of Constantinople, professedly in communion with Rome, rarely suffered the Church in their dominions, save as far as they could control her affairs and make her subservient to their political purposes. Frederic Barbarossa of Germany, Philip the Fair of France, Henry Plantagenet of England, as well as a multitude of minor sovereigns, all professed to be Catholics, and there is no reason to suppose that any one of them ever meditated a renunciation of the faith, or for a moment wished the Catholic religion abolished in their respective states. They only wished to prevent it from being their sovereign, and to make it subservient to their temporal views. They would have

religion but for the sake of the *adjicienda*, not for the sake of God and heaven. The same is true of all the Catholic sovereigns of Europe since the Protestant Reformation. We are not aware of a single Catholic sovereign in modern history that has regarded religion in any other light than as a branch of the police, although several of them have been personally pious. As princes, they have asserted the total separation of the two orders, and in their public and official conduct have looked upon the Church merely as the auxiliary of the government, and religion as subordinated to the interests of state.

It is to this fact that we must attribute the frightful scandals of Catholic Europe for the last two centuries. The revolt and opposition of the Protestant nations of Europe in the sixteenth century, and the wars which followed for over a hundred years, enabled the Catholic sovereigns to assert their independence in temporals of the spiritual power, to suppress the Estates, and to establish their absolute power. From the latter half of the seventeenth century, absolutism was established throughout nearly all Europe. It was successfully resisted, after half a century of civil war, only in England, and even there only for the Protestant portion of the population. As far as Catholics were concerned, whether English or Irish, the state even there was absolute, sovereignly despotic and oppressive. In all the great Continental states the political order was based on the despotic principles of pagan Rome's degenerate Cæsardom. The maxim of the old Roman law, *Quod principi placuit, id legis habet vigorem*, was everywhere adopted. In no Catholic state even was the Church free. She was everywhere circumscribed by the secular power, and could communicate with her members, or they with their Head, only by virtue of a royal or imperial *placet*. The assemblage in council of her bishops was prohibited, and the bishop could not address a pastoral to his flock without the license of the secular authority. The secular power went so far as even to prohibit bishops in the same kingdom from corresponding with each other. The state was not satisfied with being independent in temporals, it even assumed to be supreme in spirituals, maintaining that religion was for the state, and bound to serve its interests, or rather the pleasure of the sovereign. The chief agent in effecting the degradation of religion in the Catholic states

of Europe, in the seventeenth century, if we except, and perhaps if we do not except, Cardinal Richelieu, was Louis the Fourteenth, the greatest revolutionist France has ever had; for the chiefs of her revolutions in 1789 and 1848 only followed his example and sought to carry out his principles. They only attempted for the people what he effected for the prince. The civil constitution of the clergy condemned by Pius the Sixth was only the necessary pendant of the *Declaration* which he forced from the French clergy in 1682, and which, though annulled by Innocent the Eleventh, continued, and perhaps still continues, to be regarded by the civil authority as in force. Spain, once the most Catholic state in Europe, with the accession of Philip the Fifth, the grandson of Louis and the first of her Bourbon sovereigns, lost almost the last relic of her civil freedom, and adopted the despotic maxims which France had borrowed from the Byzantine court and pagan Rome. Portugal followed in the train, and at the beginning of the present century had proceeded so far as to prohibit all communication on the part of her clergy with the Holy See. In Catholic Germany and the present empire of Austria, the same maxims attained. Joseph the Second, aided by his Protestant minister, Kaunitz, brought the Church in his empire to the very verge of schism, suppressed over two thousand religious houses, and expelled some twenty thousand religious, assumed the sovereign control of ecclesiastical affairs in his dominions, and prohibited all communication with Rome save through the government; and his infamous laws against the freedom of the Church, and subjecting ecclesiastical affairs to the control of the Imperial Chancery, remained in force till the accession, in 1848, of the present pious and noble-spirited young emperor of Austria. Such was the freedom of the Church throughout Catholic Europe from the death of Cardinal Mazarin down to the revolutions of 1848.

Now in this fact we may find the proximate cause of that corruption and social degradation of the Catholic population of Europe, in the eighteenth century, especially in France under the Regency, and at the breaking out of the revolution of 1789, which non-Catholics, in their profound philosophy, charge upon the Catholic Church. This corruption and degradation have no doubt been exaggerated, and were more than matched by those of Protestant Eu-

rope ; yet they were undeniably great and scandalous, and we have no disposition to deny or to disguise them. But they resulted from the separation of the temporal and the spiritual, from the temporal independence of sovereigns, the restrictions placed by these independent sovereigns on the freedom of the Church, and the efforts of princes, statesmen, lawyers, and philosophers to subordinate religion to the state, and to make its ministers mere police officers. It cannot be contended that this separation, this independence, these attempts of the secular power, and these restrictions on the freedom of ecclesiastical discipline, are due to the Church, and approved by her ; for she always opposed them, and did all in her power to resist them, as non-Catholics and Gallicans not only concede, but contend, since their standing charge against her is, that she seeks to rule over temporal sovereigns, and to be supreme in all things. The civil governments, during the period we are considering, were independent of the Church ; the sovereigns ruled in civil matters as seemed to them good, regardless of all admonitions of the spiritual authority ; and they stripped the Church in their respective dominions of all her possessions, of all her rights and liberties which they regarded as incompatible with the sovereign power and the true interests of the secular order. They followed the counsels, not of the Church, but of civil lawyers, enlightened and free-thinking statesmen, and liberal philosophers. Their ministers were frequently Protestants, and even Jews, men who, we are to presume, had none of the bigotry and superstition of the Dark Ages ; and if sometimes they were served by Churchmen, they were such as had nothing of the spirit of the Church, such as paid no respect to what are called Ultramontane doctrines, and such as preferred the temporal to the spiritual, and subordinated the Church to the state. Their policy was precisely, at least in principle, that which all who oppose the Church approve and contend for even now, and directly opposed to that Catholic policy of the Middle Ages against which our liberal editors protest, and try to laugh at us for seeking to revive. How, then, can its natural and inevitable effects be charged to the Catholic religion ? Have you not declaimed with all the strength of your lungs against the power formerly exercised by Popes and Councils over temporal sovereigns ? Do you not protest, in season and out of season, against all inter-

vention of the Church in secular affairs? Do you not claim the whole temporal order for Cæsar, and boldly assert his right to govern it independently of all control or dictation on the part of the spiritual authority? Do you not fearlessly maintain that Cæsar has the right to subordinate the administration of religion to the interests, or what he judges to be the interests, of the state, and to deprive the Church of all power over the state, or to resist its enactments? Is not this what you are asserting for him now in Piedmont and Switzerland? How, then, hold the Church responsible for the temporal condition of the people during the period when your own policy prevailed? From the last half of the seventeenth century down to our own days, Cæsar has been independent of the spiritual authority; he has had the supreme control of the temporal order, and prohibited the discipline of the Church so far as he saw proper, as Lord John Russell proved, in order to justify his Ecclesiastical Titles Bill. Where, then, is the justice in holding her responsible for the evils which have accrued in the temporal order under Cæsar's absolute sway? Do you need to be told, that, if you separate the temporal from the spiritual, and prohibit the Church from all interference in the temporal order, you must charge to Cæsar, to the state, not to her, the evils that you may find in that order to deplore? You could charge them to the Church only on condition that Cæsar had submitted himself to her direction in both temporals and spirituals, and she had encountered no resistance in either order to her commands. We deplore as much as any one can the moral and social degradation of the people of Europe during the eighteenth century; but we cannot forget that the generations so immoral and so degraded were formed under the despotism of Cæsar and the prevalence of Gallicanism, or the doctrine that separates entirely the two orders, denies the Church all authority over temporals, and proclaims the emancipation of civil rulers in their public capacity from the law of God as interpreted by the Church, and we find no cause to blame her, but only most powerful reasons for asserting the necessity and utility of maintaining her supremacy in all things, and of condemning in the strongest terms of which language is capable the folly and impiety of those sovereigns, statesmen, lawyers, courtiers, and demagogues who seek to restrict her freedom, to restrain her discipline, and to

deprive her of her right to pronounce judicially on the morality of the acts of the secular power.

It is a grave mistake to suppose that all is Catholic in Catholic countries, and that the Church there has everything in her own way. Scarcely a professedly Catholic government, from the first Christian Emperor down to the last of the German Kaisers, or to the present Emperor of the French, has left the Church perfectly free to enforce in her own way her own discipline, and has been ready in all things to lend her, when requisite, the support, for that purpose, of the secular arm. As a general thing, professedly Catholic governments, as well as others, have shown themselves at all times jealous of the ecclesiastical authority, and sought to treat ecclesiastics officiating in their respective dominions as subject to their jurisdiction. They never willingly recognize the Church as the kingdom of God on earth, independent of all earthly kingdoms, and above them all, instituted for the express purpose of making the kingdoms of this world the kingdoms of God and of his Christ, — of teaching and directing all men and nations in the way of holiness. Even when they cheerfully admit her as doctrine and as worship, they only reluctantly recognize her as a kingdom, as government, as law. They claim to be themselves, each in its own dominions, the supreme and only government, and hence, when the Church presents herself in the aspect of a government, and of a government that claims to govern not only abstractions, rites, and ceremonies, but men, and men, too, in every department of life, in their souls as well as their bodies, in their relations to earth as well as to heaven, to their temporal rulers as well as to their spiritual chiefs, she seems to them a dangerous rival, and they place themselves on their guard against her, and seek to deprive her of her governing power, and to confine her action to a subordinate sphere. This would be well enough, if the secular government were, as it assumes to be, the supreme and only government, if God had nothing to do with the temporal order, or if it had pleased him to intervene in the government of mankind only through the medium of the state; that is, if the state, and not the Church, were the kingdom of God on earth. It would also be well enough, if the Church were a mere human institution, and not, as she is, the Church of God, divinely constituted and commissioned for the very pur-

pose of teaching and applying to sovereigns as well as to subjects, and to sovereigns in their public and official capacity as well as in their private capacity, the supreme law, the law which all alike, and in all things, are bound to obey. But nothing is or can be more unreasonable or unjust, when it is conceded, as all must concede, that the spiritual order is supreme in all things, and when it is understood that the Church is God's representative, and sole representative, of the spiritual order on earth.

Nevertheless, this jealousy on the part of Catholic, as well as non-Catholic states, is a "fixed fact," and imposes restrictions on the liberty of the Church. The Church, being herself a purely spiritual kingdom, spiritual in her origin, in her proceeding, and in her purposes, has not of herself, in her own body, the means requisite to give to her discipline its proper effect in the temporal order against the consent of the temporal authority. Her canons cannot have their civil effect without the concurrence of the state, and the state will rarely give its concurrence without some concession on the part of the Church, and a concession which restricts the exercise of her spiritual authority. The state will do nothing gratuitously; it will do nothing from a sense of obligation on the part of the secular power to obey and serve the spiritual; it always insists on treating with the Church as a foreign, or at least as a coördinate power. For every service it performs for religion it demands a concession. One concession granted paves the way for another, which, if not granted, is usurped, and the Church generally finds herself obliged in the end to acquiesce in the usurpation as the less of two evils. In this way the Church is so hampered by precedents, concessions, and concordats, that she often finds herself less free in Catholic than even in non-Catholic countries.

In fact, the worst enemies the Church for the last two hundred years has had to contend with, have not been either Protestants or Turks, but the professedly Catholic governments of Europe. The old French Revolution and the late revolution that established a republic, or rather the tyranny of the Triumvirate, in Rome, were bad enough in all conscience, but they were not so bad as the royal and imperial governments of the greater part of Catholic Europe. They were too violent to last long, and their evil effects could be only temporary. The injury done by open

violence, though terrible for the moment, is necessarily short-lived. After the storm there comes the calm, in which the damages undergone may be repaired. But the evils which result from foresight, from a deliberate and settled policy, though imperceptible at first, prove, in the long run, to be the most deplorable, and, moreover, precisely those which it is the most difficult to repair. A Constantius is a more fatal persecutor than a Decius or a Diocletian. These nominal Catholic sovereigns, professing themselves to be sons of the Church, contributing, it may be, to the maintenance of the clergy and to the pomp and splendor of public worship, perhaps, like Louis the Fourteenth, though wellnigh in open schism with the Church, going even so far as to tolerate no worship but the Catholic, and using their military force to suppress hostile sects, yet constantly encroaching on the ecclesiastical authority, demanding concession after concession, and threatening universal spoliation or schism, if she does not accede to their peremptory demands, backed by the whole physical force of the kingdom, are really more injurious to the cause of religion, more hostile to the influence of the Church, than open and avowed persecutors, even the most cruel. Under pretence of favoring religion, and providing for its wholesome and efficient administration, they labor to enslave and corrupt it. The Church has to bear with them, to negotiate with them, and, to escape the evils of spoliation or schism, to yield to them, as far as she can without self-annihilation. In consequence, religion becomes half secularized, her ministers dependent on the temporal sovereign, and the faithful, no longer fed on strong meat, become weak and puny, and fall prostrate at the first blow of adversity. All this must deeply afflict our Mother, the Church, and cause her to weep tears of blood over the sad condition of her children. We cannot name a single professedly Catholic state that has afforded, for these three hundred years, more than a momentary consolation to the Holy Father. The bitterest enemies of the Holy Father have been of his own household, and the only sovereigns in the eighteenth century, and the first half of the nineteenth, that treated him with respect, were, we grieve to say it, sovereigns separated from his communion. Pius the Seventh was indebted to Great Britain, Russia, and Prussia, for the restoration of the temporal possessions of

the Holy See, usurped by one Catholic Emperor and retained by another. How absurd, then, to suppose that all in Catholic states is Catholic, that even professedly Catholic sovereigns are always, or even ordinarily, the obedient sons of the Church, and that she is responsible for all that is done in countries where she is legally recognized!

We have, as Catholics, not a few grievances to complain of in this country, but there is no Catholic country in the world where the Church is as free and as independent as she is here, none where the Pope is so truly Pope, and finds, so far as Catholics are concerned, so little resistance to the full exercise of his authority as visible Head of the Church. The reason is, not that the government here favors or protects the Church, but that it lets her alone. Yet we cannot help thinking, that, were our Republic to establish the Catholic religion by law, and profess itself Catholic, it would very soon seek to subject the Church to its authority, to abridge her freedom, and labor to obtain the control of ecclesiastical affairs. It would soon fancy, that, in return for the great favor to the Church of professing the Catholic religion, it ought to have a voice in her government, — at least the nomination of bishops, or a veto on their nomination; and the first to suggest something of the sort, we need not doubt, will be some miserable Catholic politician, demagogue, or courtier, borrowing the civil maxims of pagan Rome, or of the Low Empire, and anxious to prove to his non-Catholic colleagues that he is too liberal and enlightened to submit to priestly dominion. Alas! scandals must needs come, but woe unto him by whom they come. The Church in this world is always the Church Militant, and the empire of Cæsar is always, when not subjected to the law of God as she interprets it, the empire of fraud and violence, against which she does and must wage unceasing war.

Our constant readers know perfectly well that we have no sympathy, republican as we are, with the European revolutions of the last century and the present; but they may not have observed that we have always maintained that those revolutions were, though not justified, provoked by the despotism and corruption of morals and manners which preceded them. Their causes, aside from the inborn corruption of human nature, are to be sought in the tyranny and licentiousness of the royal and imperial courts of Eu-

rope, which the assertion of the independence of the temporal order, and the encroachments of the secular power on the spiritual, rendered the Church unable to correct. The European sovereigns, by asserting their independence, by separating the temporal from the spiritual, by rejecting the authority which in happier times Popes and Councils had exercised over the temporal, and by subjecting the ecclesiastical affairs of their respective states to the control in a greater or less degree of the secular power, were able to render themselves absolute and to reign as despots, pretending, with James the First of England, that royal pedant, to hold their crowns immediately from God, and therefore to be responsible for their public and official conduct directly to him, and to no other; or, in other words, to be subject to his law only as interpreted by themselves for themselves, and not as interpreted for them by the Church of God. Borrowing from Protestant England the doctrine of the divine right of kings and passive obedience, a doctrine which lost the unhappy and wrong-headed Stuarts the crown of the British Isles, and which, as understood in opposition to the right of the Church to teach and apply the law of God to sovereigns as well as to subjects, is a virtual assertion of political atheism, they expelled the Church from the state, and fancied that they might disregard all her admonitions, and govern according to their own arbitrary and despotic wills, without any impeachment of their orthodoxy or their personal piety. Though holding themselves in their public and official conduct entirely independent of the Church, they yet, for the most part, professed the Catholic religion, and insisted on its being the religion of their subjects. They insisted that it should prescribe the duty of subjects to honor and obey their sovereigns, but took good care to prevent it from prescribing to the sovereign the correlative duty of practising justice towards his subjects, especially from pointing out explicitly to sovereigns what is the justice they owe to those intrusted to their government. They thus degraded religion in the popular estimation, rendered her unable to restrain the lawlessness of sovereigns, and presented her to the people as the accomplice of despotism, and as upheld solely to enable kings and kaisers the more effectually to oppress their subjects. They thus necessarily begat in the minds of the people a distrust of the clergy, and weakened the hold of religion on the popular heart.

Moreover, the example of the greater part of the courts of sovereigns was any thing but edifying. This was especially true of the French court, which, from Francis the First down to the death of Louis the Fifteenth, was unenviably distinguished for its profligacy. Francis the First is a favorite with the popular writers of France, and we deny not that he may have had some generous impulses, but both as a sovereign and as a man he deserves utter detestation. As a sovereign he fought against the Head of the Church of which he professed to be a member, leagued with the Turks, the avowed enemies of Christendom, and introduced them into Hungary, Italy, and even his own kingdom of France. As a man, he was a monster of vice and profligacy, and there goes a story of a beautiful maiden of the South of France, selected by a town council to present him a petition, who was so alarmed by the libidinous looks he cast upon her, that, as soon as she escaped his presence, she washed her face with *aqua fortis* and destroyed her beauty for life, — a far more heroic act than that of the ancient Lucretia, so extolled by ancient and modern poets. Henry the Third would have been distinguished even in Sodom; Henry the Fourth was notorious for his profligacy, and if he embraced the Catholic faith, he took good care never to practise Catholic morals. Louis the Thirteenth was weak and sickly, and we know nothing against his personal character; but Louis the Fourteenth till his old age led a scandalous life, and even after he was broken by his misfortunes he wished to make his bastard progeny sovereigns of the Most Christian Kingdom and eldest daughter of the Church. The Regent Orleans and Louis the Fifteenth, with his *parc au cerfs*, and his Pompadours and Dubarrys, shameless harlots, for his prime ministers, have become proverbial for all ages, and can hardly be matched among the basest sovereigns of the Low Empire or most degenerate Cæsars of pagan Rome. The profligacy of the court extended to the nobility and higher classes, and the corruption of morals and men now became general. Civil tyranny kept pace with the loss of decency and the increase of vice; and what wonder, that, when it began to excite the spirit of revolt against the government, the altar was associated with the throne, and priests shared in the hostility incurred by kings and their ministers and courtiers?

Alas, poor people! had you been better informed, or had

you been better able to discriminate, you would have seen that your profligate masters had sacrificed the freedom of the Church before they sacrificed yours, and that she had become the victim of their tyranny before you, and for the sake of you, because she would protect your rights and preserve you from slavery. If she continued to preach submission to you, it was not because she approved the conduct of your masters, or the manner in which they treated their subjects, but because submission was your wisest course, because she would open to you a source of spiritual consolation, and because she would preserve you in a condition to save your souls, — after all, the only thing a wise man can look upon as worth a thought or a wish. Had she broken openly with the profligate sovereigns, it would have remedied no evil, and only made matters worse. You yourselves, corrupted by the false doctrine of the independence of the temporal order, by the all-prevailing Gallicanism which they had commanded to be taught you, would have supported them against her, had she fulminated her spiritual censures against them, and have regarded her as transcending her province, and encroaching on the prerogatives of sovereigns. She did all that you permitted her to do for you; she was the only friend you had left on earth, and you were worse than mad when you turned against her, cursed her as your enemy, and plunged your daggers into her maternal bosom.

Nevertheless, these revolutions were provoked by the despotism and licentiousness of the courts and higher classes, and were only a just judgment of God on the lawless sovereigns and nobles for their outrages upon his immaculate Spouse. Deplorable as have been their ravages, in vain were it to deny that they have been serviceable to the cause of religion, and therefore to mankind. They have taught the people, for some time to come, at least, we trust, the madness of rebellion, and the folly of attempting by anarchical and infidel revolutions to realize a paradise on earth; they have broken many of the bonds with which the Church had been bound by civil tyrants; and they have impressed effectually on the minds of sovereigns, we would fain hope, that, if they would have religion serve the state, they must leave her free, — free to follow her own laws, under the direction of her own divinely appointed chiefs, without any let or hindrance from them. They

have done this, because they have appeared in their own character, as open enemies of religion, as undisguised persecutors of the Church, which never suffers, but always gains, by open, avowed persecution. It is disguised persecution, persecution not seen by the faithful to be persecution, and which finds an accomplice in their loyalty, and deprives them of the merit of martyrdom, that does the mischief. We are no enemies to the monarchical form of government, and we do not believe that the democratic form, even tempered as it is with us, is adapted to any European state; but we confess that we have no tears to shed over the fate of the royal or imperial families of Europe, dethroned or exiled or guillotined by these Jacobinical revolutions. Especially have we none for the princes of the house of Bourbon. They, with the exception of the all but martyred Louis the Sixteenth, deserved all they suffered, and still suffer, for their jealousy of the Papal power, and their unrelenting persecution, in France, Spain, and Naples, of the children of Loyola.

These remarks and historical references, while they amply vindicate the Church from all responsibility for the corruption and degradation of Catholic Europe, in the last or the present century, prove that the utility of religion even in a social and political point of view depends entirely on her being recognized as supreme, and sought for her own sake, not for the sake of that utility. We wish to impress this truth on a class of friends who regard themselves as having been enlightened by recent events, and who now are loud in declaring the worthlessness of all institutions, social or political, not based on religion. Events have taught them that the state, that society itself, is an idle dream, without religion for its support; *therefore*, say they, we must have religion. But we fear that, while these recognize the utility and the necessity of religion, they do not recognize the only conditions on which it can serve their purpose. To seek religion for the sake of society, is to seek the kingdom of God and his justice for the sake of the *adjicienda*. It is to subordinate the spiritual to the temporal, and to deny the supremacy of the Church. Emancipated from religion, we grant, there is no state, no society, properly so called. In the absence of religion men can only vacillate between despotism and anarchy. The independence of the tem-

poral order was first asserted in favor of sovereigns, and the result was despotism, the loss of all civil freedom, and the general dissolution of manners. It was then asserted in favor of the people, and the result was anarchy, and the threatened dissolution of all society. The people themselves, alarmed at the abyss opening before them, have just now recoiled, and evidently recur once more to monarchy, — to throw themselves into the arms of despotism again, as the less of two evils? Perhaps so, and certainly so if the independence of the temporal order continues to be asserted. This will be followed by new popular revolutions; for if sovereigns are not bound to submit to the law of God as interpreted by the Church, the people are not bound by that law so interpreted to obey their sovereigns, and they will continue to seek relief from despotism in new revolutions, as they will seek relief from anarchy in new returns to despotism. All this is evident, and the only remedy is in religion. But if we seek religion expressly as a remedy for this evil, for the state, or for society, and not for itself, not for a spiritual end, it will avail us nothing; for we then leave the temporal order supreme, make its well-being the end, and religion merely the means. Religion must be sought, not as the means, but as the end, of the temporal, and as the means solely of saving our souls, and glorifying God, or it can serve no good purpose whatever.

Furthermore, it is not religion, solely as an abstraction, as doctrine, or as *cultus*, that will serve our purpose here; it must be religion in her proper character, religion as law, religion as government, religion as a kingdom, — the kingdom on earth of the King of kings and Lord of lords. It pleased the Almighty to found on earth, for the government and salvation of men, a spiritual kingdom; not an invisible kingdom, but a visible kingdom, — as visible as the kingdom of France or of Great Britain. This kingdom we call the Church, and the Church is everywhere represented in the Holy Scriptures as a kingdom, the kingdom of God set up on the earth. She is instituted to teach, to pray, to give thanks, to be the medium of grace, but she is also instituted to govern, and is invested with plenary authority, and all the faculties and organs necessary to govern. As sentiment, as doctrine, as worship, the Catholic sovereigns of Europe of whom we have spoken, even at the worst, ac-

cepted religion, protected it, and enforced its observance. Probably not one of these sovereigns, and very few of their ministers, ever believed or thought for a moment that the state could be firm, or society exist, without religion. There is no non-Catholic sovereign even, as far as we are aware, that doubts the absolute necessity of religion to maintain society and secure the stability of civil government. Victoria of Great Britain, Nicholas of Russia, the Grand Turk, is as certain of this as Francis Joseph of Austria, or Napoleon the Third of France. It is the commonplace of all statesmen in all countries and ages of the world. Even Robespierre was convinced of it, and inaugurated the worship of the *Etre Suprême*, and the most debauched set of French atheists demanded a *culte*, and instituted the worship of Reason, under the symbol of an infamous prostitute. The point is not to maintain religion in general, or even the Catholic religion simply as dogma and worship, but to maintain the Catholic religion in all its authority as the kingdom of God on earth. The spiritual order, all must admit, is supreme; but it has pleased our Heavenly Father to give this order a visible embodiment, a visible and special representation, to maintain, as far as possible with the free will of man, its supremacy in the affairs of the world. He has not given it two representatives, one in spirituals, and the other in temporals, because to have done so would have been to divide what is essentially indivisible. The state, as distinguished from the Church, is purely temporal, and therefore has, and can have, no spiritual function. But to suppose it the representative of the spiritual, in so far as the spiritual applies to the temporal, would be to suppose the temporal spiritual, and would in effect be, in all that relates to the temporal order, the emancipation of the state from the law of God, and the subordination of the spiritual to the temporal, contrary to the admitted truth, that the spiritual order is supreme. Supposing, then, a representative at all of the spiritual order, we must suppose that representative is one and indivisible, and represents the whole spiritual order on earth. There is no alternative, then; either the Church is that representative, that embodiment, and has alone the authority to apply the spiritual to the whole temporal, state and all; or the state itself represents the spiritual, and the spiritual is absorbed in the temporal, and the state has the sole authority,

as Hobbes taught, to interpret and apply the law of God in all things, — which is even a more absolute civil despotism than that of the Grand Turk, who in his spiritual decisions must consult the Grand Mufti, the Mollahs, or doctors of the law. The last, no man in his senses can admit, for it is the virtual denial of the spiritual, and the assertion of the supremacy in all things of the temporal, which is itself virtual, if not formal, atheism. We must then take the other alternative, and assert the Church as the sole representative of the spiritual, and therefore as the supreme and only spiritual authority on earth. Consequently, as the spiritual is confessedly the sovereign of the temporal, we must admit her, not as the state, or as the supreme temporal authority, but as the supreme authority for applying the spiritual to the state, and determining the spiritual law, which in all its acts the state is bound to consult and obey; and it is only when so admitted, so recognized, that she can afford a firm support to the state, or save society from dissolution. She was not so admitted by the Greek Emperors of the Low Empire, and they and their empire have passed under the dominion of the Moslem, and become only a by-word and a reproach. She was so admitted for a time in Western Europe, and the barbarians were civilized, the states and empires of the modern world founded, and modern civilization created and cherished. She ceased after the Protestant rebellion to be so admitted, and the state became a prey to anarchy, and society itself, three years ago, seemed threatened with utter extinction. It is only by being so admitted again, that society can be reestablished, and good order confirmed.

It is, then, the Church as a spiritual kingdom, the kingdom of God on earth, through which God governs secular kingdoms, and through which secular sovereigns are responsible to him for their exercise of their powers, that we want, on which we must place our dependence, and for which we must contend, if we expect religion to save society and confirm the state. Discipline belongs to the Church as much as doctrine, and she bears the keys as well as the word, and her liberty is as much infringed when she is denied the liberty of exercising the power of the keys, as when she is denied the liberty of teaching, or of celebrating Mass. She has authority over all persons, whatever their state or dignity, to bind and loose, and God assures her that whatever

she binds or looses on earth shall be bound or loosed in heaven. This power is that which constitutes her a kingdom, and gives her the faculty to govern. Without it she might teach and pray, and advise, and entreat, but could have no power to make her doctrines observed or her precepts obeyed. To deprive her of this power, to prohibit her from fulminating spiritual censures, and binding the violator of God's law, whoever he may be, would be to reduce her to the level of a sect or of a school of philosophy; and to resist the exercise of this terrible power is no less sinful than to deny the truth she teaches. It is by this power especially that she is able to enforce the obedience of subjects to their sovereigns, and the practice of justice by sovereigns to their subjects, and therefore it is only by recognizing this power, and allowing her free scope for its effectual assertion, that she can exercise that guardian care of the state, and have that conservative influence in society, which late events have proved to be so indispensable.

This granted, it is easy to see the wisdom and necessity of the Papal constitution of the Church. The Church is a kingdom, a power, and as such must have, if she is to exercise her authority, a supreme chief. This authority is to be exercised over states as well as over individuals; therefore the Church as a government must be Catholic, for otherwise it could not govern all nations; it must be one and Catholic, otherwise it would be subjected by each sovereign in his own dominions. And this unity and Catholicity are impossible without the monarchical constitution, without its subjection to a single head, with supreme authority over the whole body, prepared at any moment to exercise that authority on any point and against any enemy that may be necessary. This is the point towards which we have been looking from the first, and contains the practical lesson which we wish to impress on the minds of our readers. The Church is built on Peter, and its defence is all included in the defence of Peter, as the state is defended in defending its sovereign. *Ubi Petrus, ibi Ecclesia.* But though we have reached the point at which we have been aiming, we must reserve its development and defence to a future number.

We have reserved ourselves hardly any space to speak of the works placed at the head of this article; but it is not necessary to speak particularly of them. The first is a well-

known treatise on the pontifical authority, especially in General Councils, and is a complete refutation of all who pretend either that the Council is above the Pope, or that there can be a Council without the Pope. The second is a highly esteemed work by the learned Archbishop of Baltimore. It is an able and learned defence of the primacy of the Holy See. It, however, defends the power exercised in the Middle Ages by the Supreme Pontiffs over temporal sovereigns on the principles adopted by the excellent M. Gosselin, instead of defending it on the principle of divine right, though we have no reason to suppose that the illustrious author would object to the ground on which we have defended it. The third, though a recent work, is already known to all our readers. It is from that sincere and disinterested Catholic statesman, the noble Count Montalembert, and is worthy of the high estimation in which he is held by the Catholic world. Its design is to recall the Catholics of France to the political principles on which they have stood for the last twenty years, and on which they have gained such important and unexpected victories. It is not written to oppose the new imperial *régime*, but to prevent the cause of Catholicity from appearing to be identified with the cause of absolutism or despotism. Some may think it was uncalled for, but no one, it seems to us, can doubt that the object for which it was written is great and good. We need not say, that with the principles of the book we wholly agree, for our readers know perfectly well that we stand equally opposed to anarchy, on the one hand, and to despotism, on the other. We have labored for the last six years to separate the Catholic cause from that of revolutionism, and we should be sorry not to labor with equal earnestness to separate it from the cause of despotism, if the occasion should demand it. We were not edified, in 1848, by those Catholic periodicals in France which sought to identify our religion with democracy; we are just as little edified, in 1853, by the effort of the same journals to identify it with absolute monarchy. But whether there is any reason to fear that Napoleon the Third will wholly annihilate representative government in France, and attempt to establish what M. Troplong, one of his chief advisers, calls *equalitarian despotism*, is a question which we are not called upon to decide, and on which we offer no opinion. For the good done by Louis Napoleon, we are grateful; for

whatever service Napoleon the Third may render to religion, we shall also be grateful; but as a Catholic journalist we have no disposition to be either his partisan or his opponent, — to rank ourselves either with his friends or his enemies. The cause we defend is above that of emperors and dynasties, of empires or republics, and independent of them all. Yet we thank M. Montalembert for what we regard as his well-timed work, and though some may blame him, the time perhaps will come when more than one of his enemies will be glad to share in its merits.

ART. II. — *Life of Mrs. Eliza A. Seton, Foundress and First Superior of the Sisters of Charity in the United States.* By the Rev. CHARLES I. WHITE, D. D. New York: E. Dunigan and Brother. 1853. 12mo. pp. 581.

As the foundress of an institute the benefits of which are widely diffused, Mrs. Seton has claims on the gratitude and admiration of the public. Her talents and acquirements were of a high order, as her literary remains show, which Dr. White has collected with great industry, and combined with skill, so as to form an autobiography, unconsciously composed by this eminent lady. Taken from the higher walks of life, she was chosen for a work of charity, which requires the endurance of much humiliation and of painful labor. Brought up out of the communion of the Church, she was led to the faith by a wonderful disposition of Providence, and to found an institute which should serve as a practical demonstration of its heavenly influence. It was by the rude discipline of adversity that she was prepared for her good mission. Having accompanied her husband to Leghorn in a voyage undertaken for the recovery of his health, she saw him succumb to the fell disease, and found herself a young widow in a foreign land, encumbered with the charge of five children. In the excellent family with which Mr. Seton had had commercial relations she found true friends, who by their virtues and counsels soon led her to recognize the claims of the Catholic Church on her obedience.

The volume before us sets forth in great detail the sentiments and virtues of Mrs. Seton whilst yet a Protestant. The learned author has been careful to remark, in the Appendix, the difference between the moral virtues and pious sentiments of persons out of the Catholic communion, and the higher inspirations of faith in the children of the Church. This distinction we would gladly see transferred to the body of the work, that less enlightened readers might know how to appreciate the interesting details of the early life of this distinguished lady.

It is an error to suppose that the Catholic Church regards as vicious and sinful all that is done independently of the saving influence of faith. The axiom of the Apostle, "All that is not of faith is sin," * although followed in the Pontifical by this paraphrase: "It is schismatic, and out of the unity of the Church," — is not so understood as to imply that what is done in unbelief is necessarily sinful. Interpreters, in fact, admit that the text does not regard the theological virtue of faith, but the practical persuasion which each one may have of the lawfulness of his actions; since to do what conscience forbids is a transgression of that law which God has engraven on the human heart. The application made of the text to faith strictly so called, is plainly according to the custom of the ancient Fathers, and of the Church herself, who uses the words of Scripture to express some doctrine, or principle of action, otherwise well established. Our nature, though fallen, is not totally depraved. We have lost the gifts which Adam received as head of our race, and we have incurred the penalty of his disobedience; but all traces of the pristine dignity of our nature have not disappeared. The total depravity of fallen man is a Calvinistic error, abhorred by the Church, which regards man as despoiled of the gift of original justice, and weakened and wounded in his natural faculties, but not deprived of free will. He is powerless in all that regards salvation; he cannot of himself have a good thought conducing to supernatural happiness; but he is not utterly incapable of moral good. Without the light of faith, and even without the grace of Christ, actions may be performed in the natural order conformable to the law which is written on our hearts, and consequently good and

* Rom. xiv. 23.

praiseworthy in themselves. A heathen may cherish sympathy for a suffering fellow-being, and aid him by a generous benefaction. An unbeliever may be temperate, truthful, just, and faithful in the various relations in which he stands to the members of society. Vicious men may have certain redeeming traits of character, and the most degraded may sometimes act from the impulses of their better nature. Hence the Roman Pontiffs justly condemned the assertion, that "all the works of unbelievers are sins, and the virtues of the philosophers are vices." The same authority proscribed the kindred proposition, that "free will without the assistance of God's grace is only good for sinning."*

We may advance a step in our inquiry, and consider whether supernatural virtue and good works can exist without true faith. It is certain that the inspirations of the Holy Ghost disposing the mind to believe, precede actual faith, so that faith is not the first grace, but may be preceded by many others. Not only the good thoughts which occur to the mind, directing its inquiry, and the impulse to pray that light may be given from above, but also inward movements of grace to give alms, or perform other good works, may go before the knowledge of revealed truth. When Saul cried, "Lord, what wilt thou have me do?" he had already received grace, moving him to seek the knowledge of salvation, and disposing him to perform what should be made known through the ministry of Ananias.

It is now time to face the difficulty presented by the letters of Mrs. Seton, written when an Episcopalian, and to examine whether her tender sentiments of piety, her performance of all the duties of child, wife, and parent in strict dependence on God, her submission to the Divine will in the severest visitations and bereavements which she suffered, her religious exercises, the devout reading of the Psalms and other portions of Scripture, the recital of the various services in the Book of Common Prayer, the receiving of the Communion according to the same ritual, in fine, all those exercises which in the sects are believed to mark a Christian spirit, are to be regarded as empty sentimentality, delusions of mind, counterfeit works, utterly unworthy of the Divine acceptance. The delicacy of this

* Propositions of Baius.

investigation must not prevent our approaching it with freedom. Of the sincerity of this excellent lady there can be no question. She acted according to her knowledge, and from the best motives: but was she in a state of darkness and sin? or was she already acceptable, because following the light that was given her? It is beyond doubt that without faith it is impossible to please God, and although the Apostle in the passage just cited specifies the Divine existence and the rewards of futurity as the objects of faith, yet throughout this Epistle he shows it to be of a most comprehensive character, embracing all the works of God, and all his revealed counsels. The reason for insisting on these primary truths in that place, is because he speaks of Henoch, who lived at a very early period, when revelation embraced but these points, with the hope of a Redeemer, which may be considered as implied in the latter; and because he lays down a condition for salvation, indispensably requisite in every variety of circumstances in which man may be found. The fulness of Christian truth may be unknown, the voice of the messenger of Christ may not have resounded in remote regions; but everywhere shines the light which enlighteneth every man coming into this world, and the common Father of all is present to each one, whom He has formed to His own image, and whom He moves to seek happiness by obeying the law which is within him, and suing for pardon and mercy. St. Alphonsus, after Gotti and other learned divines, holds that in such circumstances salvation is attainable without the knowledge of the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation; but only in the supposition, that supernatural grace inspires faith, and the disposition to obey God in all things. For those to whom the Gospel is preached, eternal life is to be secured only through the knowledge of Jesus Christ, the messenger and Son of the only true God, with whom he is one in power and nature. No one can be saved, no one has ever been saved, unless through the grace purchased by the death of Christ, "for there is salvation in no other"; but this grace may be bestowed by Divine mercy even on those who have never heard that saving name. It is no obstacle on their part, that they know him not, since their mere negative unbelief has been declared by the highest authority in the Church to be without sin, inasmuch as they have never heard the preaching of his Gospel. The want of bap-

tism, which is necessary for salvation, is supposed, by the respectable divines to whom we have referred, to be supplied by the disposition of the will to obey God in all things, and by the earnest desire to obtain his succor and mercy. In stating this opinion, we are pleased to have it in our power to show that the tenet of exclusive salvation is compatible with the tenderest charity and most indulgent consideration for all the members of the human family, in every variety of circumstances. The Church, although a visible society, may embrace many who are not externally connected with her, since she is the Spouse of Him, who, seeing the secrets of the heart, knows who are his own. She must not be conceived in too material a manner, as if she were a walled city, protecting only those who are actually within the inclosure. Her privileges are extended to all who heartily desire them. An adult, who, in extreme necessity, is baptized by a sectarian minister without any approval of his error, is not aggregated to the sect, the baptism being of Christ, with whose Church he becomes incorporated. Such is the judgment of Augustine.* Catechumens prematurely snatched from life are generally regarded as virtually in the Church, if they have earnestly desired baptism, although this great Doctor abstained from any expression of confidence in their happiness.

Faith necessarily implies the assent of the human mind to the whole revelation of God, promulgated by his authorized messengers, since Christ commanded his Apostles to teach all things whatsoever he had delivered to them; and subjected to condemnation those who refuse to believe their preaching. It is conceded that ignorance may exist without fault in reference to many of the revealed doctrines on the part of individuals who have not had opportunity of instruction, and that this may be without detriment to their salvation, inasmuch as in the disposition of their minds and hearts they embrace all that God has revealed. St. Augustine, whilst excusing involuntary errors against faith in one who was baptized in the Catholic Church, but with erroneous views, says: "I do not call such a one a heretic, unless, when the Catholic doctrine is manifested to him, he resist it, and cling to his error."† Even learned divines

* *De Bapt. contra Donatistas*, Lib. I. n. 3.

† *Ibid.*, Lib. IV. c. 16.

may mistake in points undefined, or whose definition is involved in obscurity, without incurring the guilt of heresy, since, as the same saint was wont to say, "I may err, but I never will be a heretic." Heresy implies obstinate attachment to one's own opinion, in defiance of the authority of the Church.

After all these explanations, which to many of our readers must prove tedious, we reach the point that is involved in the case before us: Can faith exist where the authority of the Church and her doctrines are positively rejected? In cases where the evidences have been sufficiently presented to challenge investigation, and move to assent, the answer must plainly be in the negative; but where the prejudices of education interfere, where the social position of the individual limits his opportunities of instruction, and where, nevertheless, a pious disposition is cherished, and the great mysteries of Christianity are devoutly accepted, will the rejection of Catholic doctrines prove fatal? We feel our incompetency to pronounce judgment in a question which involves the consideration, not only of external means, but of the inward workings of divine grace; but we must say that the whole tenor of the Divine economy is unfavorable to the supposition that faith can exist in such circumstances. If it wholly or principally depended on the opportunities of instruction, or the dispositions of individuals, we should at once plead the apology of thousands, who, although in the midst of opportunities, are precluded from enjoying their benefit, and whose sincerity and zeal, according to their knowledge, we feel bound to suppose; but faith is eminently the gift of God, gratuitously bestowed, according to the secret counsel of his will, not as a reward for moral virtue or good works, but oftentimes despite of most grievous prevarications. God speaks to the mind and heart, independently of preachers, monitors, or books, — "the Spirit breatheth where he will." To suppose that he moves to the belief of the mysteries, whilst he leaves the mind unenlightened in regard to the authority by which they are proclaimed, — that he imparts pious dispositions for the exercise of Christian virtues, whilst he leaves unremoved a mass of prejudice against the Church which he has purchased with his blood, — is so much like making his operations clash with his institutions and putting him in opposition with himself, that we cannot believe

it. We see nothing inconsistent in supposing that an individual divinely enlightened and moved should not have the means of realizing his desires by embracing the communion of the Church, and we consider his salvation secure before Him to whom the secrets of the heart lie open; but reserve on the part of God, the withholding of light to know the Church, which is his dwelling, his Spouse, the pillar and the ground of the truth, is to us incredible. We do not, however, rely on our own views in a matter of such moment; but look for guidance to the ancient fathers, of whose general teaching on this point St. Augustine is a competent witness. He maintains that heresy and schism are sins against the Holy Ghost, which are utterly irremissible, until divine grace, subduing the obstinacy of the human heart, disposes it to seek pardon in unity. All the pretensions of sects are utterly exploded by him, on the ground that to admit them would be to put Christ in opposition with himself, and make the Holy Ghost an approver of revolt against authority divinely constituted. "Lest any one should imagine that the kingdom of Christ is divided against itself on account of those who in the name of Christ form their conventicles out of his sheepfold, he says, 'He who is not with me is against me, and he who gathereth not with me scattereth'; in order to show that they belong not to Him, who, gathering together out of his fold, gather not, but scatter. Then he added, 'Therefore I say unto you, every sin and blasphemy will be forgiven to men: but the blasphemy of the Spirit shall not be forgiven.' Here manifestly he forces us to understand, that the forgiveness of every sin and blasphemy cannot take place elsewhere than in the congregation of Christ, which does not scatter; for it is gathered in the Holy Ghost, who is not divided against himself, as the unclean spirit is. Wherefore all congregations, or rather dispersions, which style themselves churches of Christ, and are divided and opposed one to the other, and hostile to the congregation of unity which is his true Church, do not belong to his congregation, although they appear to bear his name." * This passage is particularly strong against the authors of schism, but not without awful import in reference to all whose misfortune it is to be numbered among their followers. Although

* Serm. LXXI. n. 36, 37.

the sin may not be imputed to them, they bear its penalty, by the mysterious dispensation of God, who visits the sins of parents on their children to the third and fourth generation. "The truth rejects you all alike, good and bad,"* says Augustine to the Manichæans.

We admit and maintain the distinction between the original authors of heresy and schism, and their remote followers, who by birth and education, rather than their own act, are estranged from the Church. The former are utterly inexcusable, being guilty of a most grievous sin by the wanton violation of unity; whilst their descendants may be excused, wholly, or in part, at least for a time, from the formal guilt of schism or heresy. This distinction, although seldom adverted to by the Fathers, was not unknown even to those whose language against sectaries is most severe. St. Augustine, writing to Glorius, Eleusius, and two grammarians called Felix, who were still engaged in the Donatist schism, in consequence of their forefathers having forsaken the Church, tells them that in addressing them he does not regard them as heretics, since they grieved over the separation, and were solicitous to have unity restored, and he accepts their desire to know the truth as an earnest of their readiness to embrace it. "The Apostle Paul, indeed, said, 'A man that is a heretic after admonition, avoid, knowing that he that is such a one is subverted and sinneth, being condemned of himself.' But those who defend their opinion, even though false and perverse, without obstinacy, or contention, especially if they have not broached it themselves with presumptuous audacity, but have received it from their parents, who were led astray and fell into error, and if they seek the truth carefully and earnestly, ready to embrace it as soon as they find it out, are not to be classed with heretics. If I did not believe you to be so disposed, I should scarcely undertake to address you." This just distinction we accept most willingly; but we must observe, that, in the mind of Augustine, it does not admit that very free interpretation which is usually given it. The persons whom he addressed lamented the schism, although as yet not entirely disabused as to the facts which had given occasion to it, and such was their anxiety to see unity reëstablished, that

* *Contra Faustum*, Lib. XX.

they induced St. Augustine to visit a Donatist bishop, who was known to them to be well disposed. The letter is wholly taken up with explanations directed fully to enlighten them; but so far from flattering them that they were safe, on account of the excellent dispositions which they entertained, Augustine, in the concluding paragraph, tells them, that, if they do not forthwith abandon the communion of the schismatics, even with the sacrifice of their most cherished attachments, they will most certainly be involved in the common ruin. "You see all these things, and you know and deplore them; yet God also sees that nothing obliges you to continue in a schism so pestilential and sacrilegious, if, in order to obtain a spiritual kingdom, you overcome carnal affection, and to escape eternal punishment you fear not to forfeit human friendship, which will be of no avail in the judgment of God." Augustine insists that no alternative is left them but to embrace the communion of the Church, or fall under the vengeance of God who has established it. "No one can cancel from heaven the Divine decree; no one can cancel from the earth the Church of God." If the many writers who have quoted the introductory words of this letter had adverted to its close, they would hardly have relied on them as proof that sectaries of good faith are secure of salvation. The exordium is directed to account for his entering into correspondence with persons estranged from the Church, but whose good dispositions led him to regard them as free from that obstinacy which marks the blind abettors of error. The charity of Augustine, and his desire to conciliate, induced him to offer a similar apology for the Manichæans, whose errors, he trusted, proceeded from ignorance, rather than malice; "*imprudentius, quam malitiosius*";* although no one will pretend that he held forth to them any hope as long as they continued attached to their sect, and opposed to the Church of God. His good sense likewise taught him to distinguish the man who through interest or ambition broaches or abets heresy, and his deluded followers, who are led away by the appearances of truth and piety;† as also between him who knows the vanity of sectarian pretensions, and yet through human motives supports the sect, and another who in good faith clings to it, as to the

* *Contra Ep. Manichæi.*† *De Util. Cred.*

Church of Christ.* But to none of them does he promise any security, unless they embrace the communion of the true Church to whom the promises were made.

Yet eminent divines, such as Tournely, Billuart,† Bellarmine, Perrone, hold that there may be in the sects persons of good faith and pious dispositions, who, although not recognized by the Church as her children, because she cannot judge of the secrets of the mind and heart, — *Ecclesia non judicat de occultis*, — are such in the sight of God. It is not our province to condemn an opinion so respectably supported without censure from the ecclesiastical authorities; on the contrary, our feelings and wishes prompt us to embrace it; but it is proper to state, that no Catholic divine ever advanced the latitudinarian view now so popular. Divines speak of uneducated persons, or of others deprived of opportunities of information; they suppose them to be baptized, and also to be firm believers in the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation; and in such dispositions of heart, that they would readily embrace all revealed truth, if it were propounded to them. 'This well-guarded expression of hope for those whose misfortune, rather than fault, it is to be out of the communion of the Church, is now extended, by a false benevolence, to persons of cultivated minds, great powers of discernment, abounding in opportunities from private research and communication with others, — even to persons unbaptized, and without any certain conviction of the leading mysteries. Sometimes they who have sat repeatedly under the sound of the voice of the authorized ministers of Christ, and who have perused the ablest vindications of Catholic doctrine, are excused because they did not attain to certain conviction of the truth. This, however, was not the judgment of the Apostle in regard to those who rejected the Gospel as not sufficiently proved to demand their assent. "If our Gospel be hidden, it is hidden in those who perish, in whom the god of this world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers, that the light of the Gospel of the glory of Christ should not shine unto them!" Christ himself declared subject to condemnation every one who refused to believe the Gospel preached by his messengers. The Apostle of love distinguished the

* *De Bapt. contra Donat.*, Lib. I. n. 5.

† *Tract de Fide*, Diss. V. Art. III.

spirit of truth from the spirit of error, by the docility with which the Divine word is accepted or rejected. None who at any time have had the benefit of Catholic instruction are in the number of those for whom the indulgence of divines offers a plea. None who have had serious doubts of their safety out of the Church, and none who have been strongly impressed with her titles to submission, even although they may not have been thoroughly convinced, are considered excusable, since they were bound to pray earnestly, and pursue the inquiry. The restrictions pointed out by the advocates of this view render it, indeed, of very rare application. Of course, God only can know the secrets of the human heart and of his own counsels, — the graces bestowed, the opportunities afforded; and if it be rash to anticipate his judgments by condemning all who appear aliens from the Church, it is still more unwarrantable to promise confidently that mercy which he has not promised.

The plea of ignorance is not very complimentary to our fellow-citizens, who pride themselves on superior knowledge and sagacity. We heard once of a pupil of the Irish National Schools, who was closely questioned by a Protestant gentleman, whose wealth and dulness entitled him to rank "a fool of quality," as to his chances of salvation, determined as he was to live and die a Protestant. The youth, with some embarrassment, replied, in a manner that mortified his examiner: "Perhaps, Sir, you are in invincible ignorance."

Allowing, however, the plea to be available, we should not forget that it is not a title to beatitude. Although one might not be chargeable with neglect to seek instruction, or with placing any direct obstacle to the light of faith, he cannot attain to salvation, unless through the knowledge of revealed truth, since God, who wills all men to be saved, wills them to come to the knowledge of the truth. Ignorance may subject the servant to fewer stripes, but it furnishes no claim to a supernatural reward. Faith, more or less enlightened, and explicit, in its principle and germ is so necessary, that the Council of Trent teaches that no one was ever justified without it. This seems to be forgotten by many, who gratuitously suppose that ignorance is faultless in itself and in its causes, and liberally promise heaven to those who are thus excusable. After hearing a discourse on "saving ignorance" from a popular lecturer, a school-

master observed, that ignorance was a strange road to heaven.

Sincerity, or good faith, can with greater plausibility be alleged in behalf of the great multitude of those who are separated from the Church. The prejudices of education and the influence of society prevent their discovering her claims to their obedience. Opportunities of information abound; investigation is made; favorable impressions are occasionally received; but conviction is seldom reached. They reject our doctrines and oppose them, in perfect good faith, imagining that they thereby do God honor, and uphold the pure Gospel. The Jews were sincerely zealous for the Divine honor, whilst they clung to the Mosaic observance, but their zeal was not according to knowledge. Were they faultless, or in the way of salvation, whilst they rejected the Saviour and his Gospel? Sincerity, like ignorance, may extenuate and sometimes excuse what is wrongfully done, but it is no passport to beatitude. "There is a way that seemeth right unto man; the ends whereof lead to death." *

There are some whose charity leads them to hope for the salvation of the ministers of the sects, even of men of learning and research, whose talents are actively employed in assailing the Church. We raise no question as to their sincerity; but to excuse them, we must suppose either that the Catholic doctrine is not supported by sufficient evidence, or that the necessary grace of God is withheld from them. The former supposition conflicts with the fact of revelation, for the testimonies of God are exceedingly credible. If grace be withheld, we must refer it to the secret judgments of the Deity. Saul also was sincere in persecuting to death the first professors of the Gospel; yet he was not wholly excusable, for he declares himself guilty of contumely and blasphemy in persecuting the Church of God, and he puts himself at the head of sinners. As he obtained mercy because he acted through ignorance in unbelief, so they may be arrested in their course, and divinely enlightened to discover and embrace the truth; but to hope for their salvation whilst they continue unrepentant of their opposition to the Church, is contrary to every intimation of the Divine economy contained in the Scriptures or the fathers.

* Proverbs xvi. 25.

When St. Augustine, on a visit to Cæsarea, met with Emeritus, a Donatist bishop, who had been one of the most strenuous defenders of the schism, he addressed the faithful, expressing his confidence that by their prayers he would be drawn to unity and to salvation. "The Lord our God, who willed us to come to you, who ordered us to seek him, who put him in our way, will also, with the assistance of your prayers, grant us to reach his heart, to rejoice in his embracing unity, to give thanks to God for his salvation, which he cannot have but in the Catholic Church. Out of the Catholic Church a man may have every thing but salvation. He may have dignity; he may have the sacrament; he may sing Hallelujah; he may answer Amen; he may retain the Gospel; he may have faith, and preach in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; but nowhere, unless in the Catholic Church, can he find salvation." *

The great cause of latitudinarian views is the forgetfulness that faith is a mere gift of Divine bounty, to which man has no title and to which he oftentimes unconsciously presents many obstacles. It is well for us to believe, that every one is sincere, virtuously disposed, and ready to embrace the truth if it were presented to him surrounded with its evidences; but under the pretext of charity, we must not judge so favorably of our fellow-man as to disregard the counsels and laws of the Deity. He has made a revelation, which he has commanded his ministers to proclaim to all his intelligent creatures. No one can be saved who does not believe it, when propounded by them in his name, since "he that believeth not shall be condemned." This is the law of Christ and his Gospel, which we cannot alter or modify.

True Catholic charity is best manifested by availing ourselves of all suitable opportunities to communicate to others the knowledge of saving truth, in the confidence that, being sincere and well disposed, they will certainly embrace it. St. Augustine, writing to Anthony, a convert from Donatism, expressed his solicitude for the conversion of the other members of his family: "I desire and pray that your family likewise may have the one faith and true devotion, which is exclusively Catholic." Then, encouraging him to

* *Sermo ad Cæsar. Eccl. Plebem*, no. 6.

present efforts for this purpose, he says : “ There is scarcely any one solicitous for the salvation of his soul, and on that account intent on ascertaining the will of the Lord, without obstinacy, who with the aid of a good guide will not discover the difference between any sect and the one Catholic Church.” *

The case of a lady like Mrs. Seton, brought up in religious sentiments, and receiving with docility the teaching of a Church which claims authority in controversies of faith, presents the most favorable view of that disposition of mind, which many are disposed to consider as implying a saving faith in revealed truth. We consider all baptized persons as having entered the Church by baptism, which is appropriately styled its gate, since, by whatever hands it may be administered, it is still the baptism of Christ, as was triumphantly maintained by Pope Stephen in the third century. This principle affords perhaps the strongest argument that can be urged in favor of those who are not in actual communion with the Church. The validity of baptism administered by heretics being established, which, however, supposes its due administration, it necessarily follows, that infants so baptized are sanctified in Christ, since they can present no obstacle to his grace, which is communicated in the sacrament. They consequently retain it until they forfeit it by wilful sin, which cannot be committed before they attain to the use of reason. Thus all children baptized in any of the sects are claimed by the Catholic Church as her own, until they renounce their privilege by the profession of heresy, which supposes a more mature judgment than that which is necessary for the commission of an ordinary sin. According to the language of Augustine, the Spouse of Christ brings forth to him these children by the sects, as by her handmaids.† They, however, cease to belong to her, when they disown her as their mother. It easily happens, that at an early age parents instil into the minds of their offspring their own prejudices against the Church; but the guilt of heresy implies the act of the child himself obstinately rejecting the truth sufficiently propounded.‡ We leave to others to indulge the greatest latitude of Christian charity, in excusing the errors into

* Ep XX.

† *De Bapt.*, Lib. I. c. 15.

‡ Bergier, article *L'Église*.

which children are led, and to cherish hope of their salvation till such age as they deem suitable; but for ourselves, our estimate of the secret workings of divine grace forbids us to regard as children of the Church those who at any age expressly discard her authority. We are willing to believe that their ignorance may be excusable; but as faith is a positive gift, we look for its manifestations in the docility of mind which marks every one who is taught of God. It may be that this existed in a mind like that of Mrs. Seton, who clung to the sect in which she was educated until she was brought in contact with the Catholic Church in her visit to Italy, with her sick husband; a proof of which may be derived from the readiness with which she assented to its authority and doctrine. Up to that time she appears to have been in perfect good faith, and the sentiments of piety which she cherished being in the main correct, we care not to dispute about their precise character and value. Of course we regard her sentiments and feelings in regard to the Communion, as given in her sect, as mere delusions of a mind not yet enlightened to know the great mystery of the Real Presence. As to the rest, it is enough for us that, like the devout centurion, she was brought to the knowledge of the truth, as it is in Christ and in the Church; and her conversion may serve to confirm the sentiment of Bishop Hay, himself a convert, who, strong in the maintenance of the principle, that salvation can be had only in the Church, expresses his conviction, that, when God by his grace enlightens and moves persons out of her communion, if they prove obedient to his impulses, they will be drawn finally within her pale. If persons apparently sincere and well disposed, distinguished by pious sentiments and works of charity, live and die out of the Church, it is not for us to pronounce judgment; but we should refer it to the secret counsels of God, who has mercy on whom he will, and leaves whom he will in the obduracy of his heart. Pride oftentimes taints those actions which men highly prize, and many other secret obstacles may exist to the free dispensations of divine grace. Our solicitude to vindicate the Divine justice is altogether misplaced, since his judgments are righteous, needing no support from man. When it happened in the days of Augustine that a candidate for baptism, whose conduct was edifying, was snatched out of life before receiving the sacrament, this great doctor did

not venture to give any assurance of his eternal happiness, although there was certainly ground for hope ; much less did he undertake to plead the cause of God, who deprived him of the opportunity of regeneration ; and when, on the contrary, a play-actor, or a licentious man fell sick, sought baptism, and slept in Christ, he regarded his salvation as certain. In either case, he adored the Divine counsels ; and exclaimed devoutly, “ O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God ! How incomprehensible are his judgments, and unsearchable his ways ! ” *

This reserve is in striking contrast with the false liberality which confidently proclaims the happiness of the departed, even of the unbaptized, and of those whose views of religion had been decidedly deistical. Their sincerity, their benevolence, their love of truth, is praised without measure, and no doubt is entertained that they have found acceptance. This confidence is still greater in regard to those who have manifested religious sentiments, expressed hope in Christ, called on him for mercy, although they may have had no certain convictions of the great mysteries of faith. It proceeds from an erroneous persuasion, that all have a strict and natural right to eternal beatitude, or that the least good disposition insures its attainment. Such, however, is not the teaching of God’s Church. Faith is the free gift of God, granted according to his secret counsels ; grace is not of works ; salvation is of the Lord. We must, then, adore his judgments, and await the manifestation of their justice.

We are by no means satisfied that the persuasion of the truth of the Christian mysteries, which is generally entertained by persons brought up in the various sects, claiming praise for orthodoxy, should be dignified with the name of faith. This implies absolute conviction, whilst professors of such doctrines often betray uncertainty, or, at most, a conviction grounded on motives that are not calculated to remove all doubt. Infallibility being disclaimed by all the sects, and each individual feeling that he is liable to error, the belief of revealed mysteries can scarcely be supposed to pass the limits of probable opinion. Early impressions and associations concur to attach men to the church of their baptism, as they are wont to call the sect in which they

* Apud Aug. Serm. XXVII. de Ps. xcvi.

have grown up, and to make them view with reverence its leading doctrines, — particularly those which they have been taught to regard as fundamental: but on what can they rest the certain conviction of their truth? We are told, on the Bible, the word of God; but this is so variously interpreted, that many, professing unqualified reverence for its oracles, deny the great mysteries of religion. The foundation of certainty being wanting, the belief of sectaries can only be a favorite opinion on grounds deemed satisfactory, but not certain, or a vague acquiescence in the teachings of their sect. In fact, they generally attach little importance to dogmatic faith, as if conscious that no security could be given for its truth, and rely wholly on personal assurance of one's own justification, by the imputation of Christ's merits, as the true justifying faith. We may be pardoned, therefore, for doubting whether in any instance the persuasion of sectaries can fairly be called faith. Their sincere attachment to the leading doctrines of Christianity we do not question; their pious dispositions and tendencies we do not doubt; but we fear that they have not that deep and unshaken conviction which constitutes divine faith, and which is the result of the recognition of an infallible authority.

As to their virtues and good works, we have no hesitation in recognizing in many strict morality, active benevolence, and, to our view, excellent dispositions. We have no doubt that many act, not merely from the impulse of a good heart, but under the influence of Christian principle, having present to their minds the high considerations of religion. We are willing to believe that they practise that

“Virtue which Christian motives best inspire.”

St. Augustine observes, that pastures nourished with the rain of God are sometimes found by the sheep of Christ on the dry and barren mountains of heresy, inasmuch as the sects have the Scriptures and the Sacraments; “*aliquando inveniunt ibi oves pascua de pluvia Dei, habent enim et ipsi Scripturas, habent Sacramenta.*” * Of these, however, the moderns only retain Baptism, the Eucharist being a mere symbol and figure. Yet he held that all their works, however in themselves praiseworthy, are fruitless to

* Serm. XLVI. n. 11.

salvation. "Do you not see how the various sects pray, fast, give alms, praise Christ? They have the blossom, but they have not the fruit." * Again he writes: "Who-soever is separated from this Catholic Church, however laudable his conduct may appear to himself, shall not attain to life, but the wrath of God continues on him for this one sin, that he is separated from the unity of Christ." † He insists that the penitential tears of the sectarian cannot avail for the remission of sin, whilst the sin of separation is undeplorded and uncorrected: "If any one out of the Church repents of his sins, continuing in his heart impenitent of this great sin, by which he is estranged from the Church of God, what avails him that repentance, whilst by that very fact he sins against the Holy Ghost, being separated from the Church, which received this privilege, that forgiveness of sins should be imparted in her communion, through the Holy Ghost." ‡ The reason relied on by Augustine was the want of that divine charity by which Christ wished his followers to be bound together in unity. He applied the forcible language of the Apostle to works of this character: "If they distribute their goods to the poor, as many do, not only in the Catholic Church, but also in various sects; if, like us, in times of persecution, they deliver their bodies to the flames for the faith which we hold in common; yet because they do this in a state of separation, not bearing with one another in love, nor taking care to preserve the unity of spirit in the bond of peace, being without charity, notwithstanding their many qualities, which are of no avail, they cannot attain eternal salvation." §

Our readers may be surprised at the frequency of our quotations from St. Augustine; but his high authority, as the most eminent Father of the Latin Church, will plead our apology. Besides, he presents in his writings, on the points which we have examined, the doctrine of St. Cyprian and the Fathers generally. There is a special reason for submitting these many passages to consideration, inasmuch as the complimentary introduction to a letter written by

* Serm. XXXVIII. *de Verbis Eccl.*, n. 16.

† Ep. CXLI. *alias* CLII.

‡ Serm. LXXI. *de Verbis Ev. Matt.*

§ *De Bapt. contra Donat.*, Lib. I. n. 12.

him to persons about to quit schism has been taken as the basis of a theory, which, as popularly applied in our day, nullifies the great truth delivered by the Apostle, that as there is one Lord, so there is one faith, without which it is impossible to please God.

The works done out of unity, from motives of religion, may, however, be serviceable, inasmuch as they remotely dispose for faith, when performed in sincerity, under the impulse of divine grace. The inclination to works of benevolence, even from mere natural sympathy, is good; but when prompted by a regard for the injunctions of the Gospel, it may be presumed to proceed from an impulse of the Holy Ghost, who, although he may not as yet dwell in the soul, may move her to act from supernatural motives. If she prove obedient to this movement of grace, she will also be prompted to pray; and in proportion to her docility and fervor, light will be given her to seek for instruction from the authorized ministers of Christ. To Cornelius, "a religious man, and one that feared God, with all his house, and gave much alms to the people, and prayed to God always," the angel appeared with the consoling assurance: "Thy prayers and thy alms have ascended for a memorial in the sight of God. And now send men to Joppa, and call hither one Simon, who is surnamed Peter; he shall tell thee what thou must do." * In reference to this fact, St. Augustine remarks: "Since whatever good was in his prayers and alms could not avail him unless he were incorporated with the Church by the bond of Christian communion and peace, he is directed to send to Peter, and through him he learns Christ; being baptized also by him, he is associated with the Christian people by sharing in their communion, with whom he was already united by the mere resemblance of good works." † We regard the case of Mrs. Seton as a happy illustration of this order of divine economy. It was her misfortune to be educated in a sect. She possessed, nevertheless, excellent moral and religious dispositions, — she prayed and acted according to her knowledge and opportunities, — and God called her from darkness to light, and made her that was sterile fruitful in good works, and even the joyful mother of many children.

* Acts x. 2, 4, 5.† *De Bapt. contra Donat.*, Lib. I. n. 10.

It is the blessing which the Church imparts to her most devoted children, to impress their own image on thousands by means of religious institutes, and thus to continue for ages the good which they commenced in life. Mrs. Seton did not neglect the duties which she owed to her offspring, whom she loved with great tenderness; but her charity took a wider range, embracing in its expanse the destitute and suffering of all classes. Two of her children still survive, one of them occupying a respectable position, and the other devoted to works of mercy in a kindred institute to that which her mother founded. The number of her spiritual daughters, who rise up and call her blessed, emulating her zeal while they venerate her memory, cannot easily be counted. Had she lived in society, she would no doubt have continued to adorn it, and to edify all those of her acquaintance; but how limited would have been her influence compared with that which she now exercises, through those angels of charity who are everywhere found solacing the afflicted and guiding the orphan! Her biography will be read with deep interest by a large number; but to increase its circulation, we venture to suggest, that the second edition should be reduced to a much smaller size and price. The details of her early life might be omitted, and the work might commence with her first insight into the Catholic faith. The notice of many individuals incidentally connected with the commencement or progress of the institute might also be less elaborate and eulogistical. There are names such as those of Dubourg, Cheverus, Carroll, which cannot be too highly honored; but all the figures of a group may not admit of the same high coloring or prominent position.

The Catholic public owe much to Dr. White for this contribution to our literature, which must prove acceptable to all who admire virtue in its most attractive form, accompanied by refinement and manifested in blessings. He has shown great tact, judgment, and ability in the performance of this labor of love.

ART. III. — *Two Sermons preached before the Twenty-eighth Congregational Society in Boston, on the 14th and 21st of November, 1852, on leaving their Old and entering a New Place of Worship.* By THEODORE PARKER, Minister of that Society. Boston: Crosby, Nichols, & Co. 1853. 8vo. pp. 56.

THEODORE PARKER, as our readers are aware, is a Protestant minister of the Congregational order, in this city, who has gained within the last few years no little notoriety. He was brought up, we believe, in the way of thinking of our Puritan fathers, but made his first appearance before the public as a minister in connection with the Unitarian Congregationalists. What he calls himself now, or wishes others to call him, we are unable to say; but judging from the Sermons before us, we presume he would not be pleased to be called a Christian, and would prefer to be called simply a man, perhaps, THE MAN, by way of eminence, as the only real and true man among us.

In the commencement of his career, we knew Mr. Parker well, and regarded him as a young man of great promise; he was of the same school with ourselves, and was closely connected with our dearest personal friends; we counted much on him as a fellow-laborer in the work in which we were then engaged; and were among the very few Unitarian ministers who ventured to defend him from the attacks of his more conservative brethren. We did not, however, accept even then all his views, and we detected in him a disposition to push Protestantism even farther than we were prepared to go; but we trusted that as he grew older he would become less unbelieving, and more Christian, and as we knew him to be well grounded in the great Protestant principle of the right of private judgment, we gave him our hearty sympathy, and such support as we had to give. We knew him to possess good natural abilities, great quickness of mind, a ready wit, and a brilliant fancy, — to be a diligent student, a great reader, and a scholar of more than ordinary attainments among the scholars of our country, and we hoped that he would ultimately prove a real benefactor to his race. It was thus we regarded him when we were ourselves still a Protestant, dreaming of "the Church of the Future," or of a new Church to be founded

by men, and as far in advance of the old Church, as the old was in advance of Greek and Roman Paganism. We may say, now that we can look upon him and his works from the Catholic point of view, that he is a more consistent Protestant than we ever were, or ever could have been, and has proved himself, upon the whole, an abler man than we ever expected him to be.

Mr. Parker complains in these Sermons of the opposition he has encountered, represents himself as persecuted, and tells us that he is hated, perhaps no man in the community more so. We think he is mistaken in this. No man in this community differs more widely from Mr. Parker than we do, more thoroughly detests his views, or has written so much against them; but the thought of hating him never came into our head or our heart. Hatred cannot be felt by us for such a man as Mr. Parker; we pity him too much to hate him. He is not, and never has been, a persecuted man; he is and always has been treated with remarkable tenderness; and he enjoys a consideration and exerts an influence which prove that the Protestant heart of the community beats in secret unison with his own. He may not be personally popular, but it appears to us that he fancies himself persecuted and hated simply because he has an overweening love of approbation, and has placed his pretensions a little too high. He has learning, wit, eloquence; but he is neither strong nor amiable. He has a little dash of sentimentalism; but he has not the large, loving heart. He has no consideration for others, no self-forgetfulness, no disinterestedness, no generosity. He can never understand what he owes to an opponent, and has nothing but sarcasm and abuse for those who differ from him. He attacks every class of the community, denounces every doctrine and institution not in accordance with his private reason, and when called upon to defend his own course, he either takes refuge in undignified silence, or replies with a repetition of his sarcasms and abuse. He denies all authority, and then frets and scolds, or whines and whimpers, because he is not listened to as a divinely commissioned teacher. He proclaims the absolute right of private judgment in all men, and then regards himself as personally attacked, insulted, abused, persecuted, if others exercise the right of private judgment against the doctrines he puts forth. He denies the authority of the Church, of

the Bible, of Prophets, Apostles, and even our Lord himself, and yet feels that we do him great wrong when we refuse to accept his own utterances as divine oracles, and to bow down to him as more than Bible, Church, Prophet, Apostle, or Messiah, and worship him as the Incarnate God. His pride blinds his judgment, and prevents him from seeing that, if there is any hostility to himself personally in this community, it is provoked by his own selfishness and arrogance, by his own want of proper consideration for others, and neglect of the ordinary courtesies of civilized life. He professes to be a man, and yet is grieved that he is not treated as a god; to speak merely from his own heart, and yet demands that he be listened to, if not as God, yet as one authorized to speak in the name of God. He ought to see that this is absurd, and that he must prove himself a god before he can reasonably complain of not being worshipped as God; or at least that he is authorized by God to speak in his name, before he can expect us to receive his utterances as divine oracles, or embrace them as truth merely because they are his utterances.

We have no disposition to single Mr. Parker out from the Protestant world as a special object of our attack, — we would rather defend him from the attacks of his Protestant brethren; but we confess that he renders this difficult, by his uniform refusal to reply to the objections seriously and respectfully urged against his doctrines. Mr. Parker, we may presume, regards the views which from time to time he puts forth as important; and he must know, since he rejects all authority, that the simple fact that he puts them forth is not a sufficient reason why we should believe them. He must regard himself in putting them forth as making his appeal to reason, and therefore as bound to abide by the judgment of reason. When, then, his views are taken up by others, and good reasons, or what appear to men of solid judgment as sufficient reasons, are adduced for not entertaining or for rejecting them, he is bound by every principle of reason and morality, either to reply and show that those reasons are inconclusive and his views may be true in spite of them, or else abandon his doctrines themselves, as shown to be untenable. This is a simple dictate of common sense. But this Mr. Parker never does. In no instance that has come to our knowledge has he ever met an objection that has been urged against his doctrines.

He cannot be reasoned, coaxed, or shamed into a reply, we say not to attacks on himself, but to sober arguments against his views. Who attacks them, he seems to hold, attacks him personally, and as it is more dignified and manly to leave attacks on ourselves unreplied to than it is to reply to them, he concludes that he is not only under no obligation to reply to the objections urged against them, but that he really deserves honor for his magnanimity in forbearing to do so. This is a part of Mr. Parker's conduct that we cannot easily defend, and it necessarily excludes him from the class of honorable opponents, and even of honorable men. He will not reason or give a reason to those that ask him for the hope that he professes to have in him. He shrinks from every challenge. This is a charge against himself personally, which he can refute or wipe out only by changing his course; although we admit that his refusal to reply to arguments against his views is his best policy, in case he loves his own views more than he loves truth, for were he to undertake to defend them against sharp-sighted opponents, he would very soon find that he could no longer hold them without incurring universal derision.

It is singular that it should be so, and yet you never find a man denying all authority in matters of belief who does not require you to listen to him as one having authority. A Catholic in stating what his Church teaches, that is, in teaching the dogmas of his Church, is clear, precise, and positive, because he speaks by an authority not his own, and to which he owes himself the same submission that is exacted of others. He when questioned has only to answer, 'The Church teaches it; or if that answer does not suffice, he simply adduces the divine commission of the Church to teach, and there ends the controversy. In all this he himself counts for nothing; his personal authority is considered neither by himself nor by others. He claims nothing for himself, and never dogmatizes. He tells only what he is told, and places himself above nobody, and asks nobody to believe any thing on the strength of his wisdom, sagacity, virtue, or learning. He is or may be perfectly humble, and there is nothing in his position or conduct to offend the pride of the most sensitive. God is all and in all, and the Church, as the organ of the Divine word, is always between him and his audience. A true

Catholic, then, can never be a dogmatist, can never be arrogant, can never assume any authority of his own. In discussing matters not decided by his Church, or what are regarded as open questions, he may be firm, decided, earnest; but he relies not on his personal convictions, and claims respect for his opinions only in so far as he supports them by solid reasons. We hear ourselves sometimes accused of dogmatism; but we only smile at the charge. In stating the defined doctrines of the Church and the universal dictates of reason, we always speak affirmatively, and state them as matters not to be disputed, not indeed because we state them, but because taught by an authority which cannot err, and which all alike are bound to accept. We thus state dogmas, but do not ourselves dogmatize, for they are not laid down as dogmas on our authority. In open questions, we never state our opinions as dogmas; we always give them as opinions, and, of course, as matters which may be disputed, for opinions, be they yours or mine, are always open to discussion; it is only faith, which is not opinion, but certain truth, that may not be questioned. Undoubtedly, we hold our opinions important, and defend them with earnestness, but we never yet felt that they were important because they were ours, and we never expect them to be received by others, except in virtue of the reasons independent of ourselves that we assign for them. Others have the right to dispute them, and if they show solid reasons against them, we are bound to abandon them. Thus it is with us, thus it is with every Catholic. There is no egotism, no assumption, no arrogance. The appeal is made never to a private, but always to a public tribunal, to a Catholic authority, to the Universal Church in matters of faith, and to universal reason in all other matters.

But the man who, like Mr. Parker, rejects all authority, who denies the authority of the Church, the Scriptures, and the common reason of mankind, and asserts the unrestricted freedom of private judgment, is sure to set himself up as authority, and to claim for himself personally all the authority and infallibility that we Catholics claim for the Sovereign Pontiff or the Church of God. Mr. Parker will suffer no authority in matters of belief above his own private judgment, and yet he sets himself up as supreme pontiff and god. No doubt he does it unconsciously, yet he does it; and we feel at every page of his writings

that here is a mortal man, a weak and erring man, affecting to speak in his own name with divine authority. Whence comes this? It comes, dear reader, from the fact that the human mind is so constituted that it cannot dispense with the principle of authority, and must always recognize and assert it in some shape or other. The fact is certain. All nations and all individuals in all ages of the world have, so far as history and tradition can be relied on, always admitted all the authority that we Catholics assert and contend for, and the difference is never as to the authority, but as to whom it belongs, or who or what are its organs. The atheist admits it no less than the theist, only he ascribes it to nature, and the other to God. The divine, the pontifical, and the political authority was recognized and asserted by Pagan no less than by Christian Rome. The pagan Emperors claimed, and by their pagan subjects were acknowledged, to be at once emperors, supreme pontiffs, and gods, as every tyro in Roman history knows. The Protestant reformers, though they rejected the authority of the Church, and made war on the principle of authority itself, yet recognized as much authority as they opposed, and claimed it for the prince, the state, the Scriptures, the sect, or the individual. They acknowledged even in spite of themselves a supreme authority somewhere to decide all questions of belief and conduct, and it were no difficult matter to resolve all the controversies of their motley descendants into disputes as to whom or what is this authority, to whom it belongs, and who or what is its organ. Your modern liberalism, which rejects the Church, the Bible, and kings and kaisers, and assumes for its motto, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, though affecting to deny all authority, yet asserts the supreme authority of the people, and tells us of people-king, people-pontiff, and people-god. The Come-outers, the men and women who deny the Church, the king, and the people, yet assert the same authority for each individual, and maintain boldly that each individual has the right to say for himself, "I am the state, I am the church, I am sovereign pontiff, I am God." The reason lies in the constitution of the human mind, and in the nature of things. To speak in the language of a prevalent philosophy, which, however, is not ours, the *ideas* of the true and the good are inseparable from human reason, and the idea of supreme authority is

inseparable from the ideas of the true and the good. Hence the human mind cannot operate without asserting supreme authority for both intellect and will, and when the individual fails to recognize it elsewhere, he necessarily asserts it for himself, and falls into the palpable absurdity of denying all authority, and of asserting supreme authority for his own personal convictions. He cannot help himself if he would, because supreme authority is an eternal truth, because it really exists, and the human mind cannot deny it, any more than it can affirm pure negation. The Church lies, no doubt, in the supernatural order, above the reach of natural reason; but she is constituted in harmony with the principles of reason, and not one of her principles can be denied without denying reason itself; and there is no normal exercise of reason without the full recognition of the principles on which she is constituted, and on which she uniformly insists.

Freedom is not in exemption from all authority, but in exemption from all unjust, usurped, or false authority. Tyranny is not in the exercise of authority, but in the exercise of a usurped authority, and hence tyranny and the loss of freedom are always in proportion to departure from the authority of God, or rejection of the authority which he delegates. They who depart the farthest usurp the most authority, and are the greatest tyrants in principle, and as none depart farther than Mr. Parker, so nowhere will you find a greater tyrant, or one less the friend of true freedom, whether civil or religious. We never read any writings which were more despotic in principle, or which contained less of the spirit of true liberty, than those of Mr. Parker. There is liberty on his tongue, but none in his heart; there is in words the proclamation of brotherhood, in spirit there is only rancor, hatred, bitterness, spite. Asserting the absolute freedom of opinion, he denounces in the severest terms all who do not agree with him; contending for the utmost freedom of action, and the rectitude of all human conduct, he denounces as monsters of iniquity all who do not square their lives by the arbitrary rules he chooses to lay down. Asserting in lofty terms the infallibility of all human nature in all ages and nations, he holds all men but himself to have fallen into damnable errors, and to deserve to be compassionated as fools or to be execrated as the enemies of God and man. Does he r d his con-

sistent in all this? Can he not understand, that if all opinions are free, all are equally respectable? that if each has a perfect right to form his own opinions for himself, no one can be rightfully censured for his opinions, let them be what they may? that if each man's conscience is his sovereign rule of right, he has no right even in thought to arraign any man for his conduct, however different it may be from that enjoined by his own conscience? that if each man's reason and conscience are infallible, or if human nature in all men be infallible, there is and can be no error or sin in the world, and therefore he has no right to censure or accuse any one or any thing in the universe, in past or present times? It is hardly consistent for an optimist to talk as a pessimist, although professed optimists we have generally found to be in practice the most bitter and censorious of our acquaintances. They seem to think that holding all to be good gives them the privilege of denouncing all as evil, as to profess philanthropy gives one the privilege of hating every man in particular, and disregarding all the ordinary affections, courtesies, and civilities of life.

We are very far from wishing to throw any doubts on Mr. Parker's honesty or sincerity. We have been ourselves a Protestant minister like himself, and perhaps when we were so, we had most of the faults we detect in him; but he strikes us as greatly deficient in candor, we will not say in stating his own views, but in stating the views of others. He is not truthful, and he misstates apparently without scruple what he terms the popular theology. What he terms popular theology is for the most part Protestant theology, for which, as a general thing, we have as little respect as he has; but we hold that, however absurd or mischievous the views or systems which we oppose may be, we are bound in conscience to represent them correctly, and to oppose them for what they really are, not for what they are not. A victory gained by misrepresentation is never honorable to him who gains it, and of no advantage to the cause of truth. Now Mr. Parker uniformly misrepresents the popular theology, especially in those respects in which that theology coincides with ours, and all his witticisms and capital hits are founded on gross misrepresentations, and what seem to us wilful misstatements. It is reported that, preaching one day, he remarked that

“with regard to the Bible different views are entertained. Some hold,” he said, “to its plenary inspiration, that every word from the beginning of Genesis to the end of Revelation was dictated by infallible inspiration, and that the angels in their song at the birth of Jesus quoted the Septuagint version, and misquoted as they sang.” The point of the joke supposes, as every one may see, that the angelic song, the *Gloria in Excelsis*, professes to be a quotation from the Septuagint, and is a misquotation; but in fact it professes no such thing, and nothing in it or in the Scriptures gives one any right to pretend that it claims to be a quotation. The joke was obtained simply at the expense of the truth, and a false impression was made upon the audience, the majority of whom most likely would never think of questioning the fact assumed. This is only a specimen of what meets us on almost every page of the author’s theological writings. The Sermons before us are full of misstatements equally gross and barefaced, some of which before we close we may have occasion to point out. This fact proves that, though Mr. Parker may be sincere and honest in his views and aims, he is not an honest scholar, and is worthy of no reliance when the views and aims of others are concerned. He is not truthful, and evidently acts on the principle that the end sanctifies the means. We are sorry that it is so, for these things naturally excite hostility to him, and prevent us from assuming that the opposition he complains of is purely opposition to his doctrines, and from giving him our unqualified esteem as a brave man bravely struggling to sustain a cause which he regards as just and noble, although deceived. We esteem high moral qualities, even in the natural order, wherever we discover them, and we sometimes discover them coupled with false doctrines, — doctrines which we look upon with abhorrence; but we confess that we cannot esteem a man who lacks candor and truthfulness, who seems prepared to resort to any means which promise him a momentary triumph, or an undeserved laugh at his opponents. We cannot laugh with such a man, however witty, for his laughter is Satanic; we cannot laugh at him, for to witness the abuse of the noble powers which God gives us is always painful.

We confess, and we are sorry to be obliged to confess, that we cannot regard Mr. Parker as either a strong or a

truthful man. He is not a man of broad and elevated views, of high and generous aims, of a frank and noble nature; in his most serious efforts and loftiest aspirations there is always something low, something mean, something paltry. We always find something sinister and cowardly in every page of his writings, or at least something weak and spiteful, and he is the last man of our acquaintance to whom we could award the high praise he most covets, that of true manliness. Yet, with all these drawbacks, Mr. Parker is far from being unpopular, and he is not seldom commended for the lofty and stern morality of his preaching. He may not be as fashionable as some of his brother ministers, but he is by far the first Protestant minister in this city as to talents, learning, and influence. It is idle to attempt to ignore him, or to pretend that his influence is diminishing. There is no evidence that he is sinking, or is likely to sink, into insignificance. For eight years he has sustained himself and continued to interest one of the largest Protestant congregations in the city, and that too in spite of the Protestant press and pulpit and the personal disadvantages we have indicated. He and his followers have just left their old and entered a new and much superior place of meeting, and it would seem that the number of his hearers is constantly increasing. His influence is not confined to this city. Strangers from all parts of the United States who visit us flock to hear him; his partisans are numerous in every town in the Commonwealth, and he is invited to lecture before lyceums and literary institutions in other and distant States of the Union. His works are republished in England, and the party in Great Britain represented by the *Westminster Review* refer to him as the great man of our country, and reckon him as one of the great men of the age. He is a fact in our community, nay, in the American and British Protestant world, which cannot be overlooked, and which wise men must meet and dispose of as best they may.

Now the fact of the comparative popularity and undeniable influence of such a man in a Protestant community is very significant. We cannot ascribe it to his personal qualifications, we cannot ascribe it even to his eloquence, his wit, or his learning, — at least only in part; we cannot ascribe it any more to mere popular caprice or love of novelty. Certain it is that it can be explained only by con-

ceding that he strikes a chord which vibrates through the whole heart of our Protestant community, and expresses its own secret thought, better than it can express it for itself. His strength lies in his genuine Protestantism, in his harmony with the Protestant tendencies of the community, and his bold development and eloquent statement of what Protestantism has seldom avowed to itself, it may be, but of what, as Dr. Newman would say, it has all along *meant*. He holds the place he does, because, disregarding the exterior forms of the Protestant world, its cant and pretensions, its shams and inconsistencies, he makes himself the faithful exponent of the interior spirit and meaning of Luther's Reformation; because he tells in tolerably unequivocal terms, if not what that Reformation professes to be, at least what it really is; if not what it is with the Protestant sects who still make some pretensions to dogmatic theology, at least what it must become, and rapidly is becoming, with all. It is in him we can best study Protestantism, and in this point of view his doctrines become significant and worth considering. Happily for us, he has given in these two Sermons, especially in the first, as clear, as precise, and as unequivocal a statement of his views, as it was in his nature to do. He is rendering an account of his stewardship, and reciting what he calls his theological programme, or, as our politicians say, "defining his position." After premising that he and his followers take their stand on "the great Protestant principle of free Individuality of Thought in Matters of Religion," he proceeds:—

"My scheme of theology is very briefly told. There are three great doctrines in it, relating to the Idea of God, the Idea of Man, and of the Connection or Relation between God and Man.

"First, of the Idea of God. I have taught the Infinite Perfection of God; that in God there are united all conceivable perfections,—the perfection of being, which is self-existence; the perfection of power, almightiness; the perfection of wisdom, all-knowingness; the perfection of conscience, all-righteousness; the perfection of the affections, all-lovingness; and the perfection of soul, all-holiness;—that He is perfect Cause of all that He creates, making every thing of perfect material, from a perfect motive, for a perfect purpose, as a perfect means;—that He is perfect Providence also, and has arranged all things in his creation so that no ultimate and absolute evil shall befall any thing that He has made;—that, in the material world, all is order without freedom, for a perfect end; and

in the human world, the contingent forces of human freedom are perfectly known by God at the moment of creation, and so balanced together that they shall work out a perfect blessedness for each and for all his children.

“This is my idea of God, and it is the foundation of all my preaching. It is the one idea in which I differ from the Antichristian sects, and from every Christian sect. I know of no Christian or Antichristian sect which really believes in the infinite God. If the infinity of God appears in their synthetic definition of Deity, it is straightway brought to nothing in their analytic description of the Divine character, and their historic account of his works and purposes.

“Then, of the Idea of Man. I have taught that God gave mankind powers perfectly adapted to the purpose of God; — that the body was just what God meant it to be; had nothing redundant, to be cut off sacramentally; was not deficient in any thing, to be sacramentally agglutinated thereunto; — and that the spirit of man was exactly such a spirit as the good God meant to make; redundant in nothing, deficient in nothing; requiring no sacramental amputation of an old faculty, no sacramental imputation of a new faculty from another tree; — that the mind and conscience and heart and soul were exactly adequate to the function that God meant for them all; that they found their appropriate objects of satisfaction in the world; and as there was food for the body, — all nature ready to serve it on due condition, — so there was satisfaction for the spirit, truth and beauty for the intellect, justice for the conscience; human beings — lover and maid, husband and wife, kith and kin, friend and friend, parent and child — for the affections; and God for the soul; — that man can as naturally find satisfaction for his soul, which hungers after the infinite God, as for his heart, which hungers for a human friend, or for his mouth, which hungers for daily bread; — that mankind no more needs to receive a miraculous revelation of things pertaining to religion than of things pertaining to housekeeping, agriculture, or manufactures; for God made the religious faculty as adequate to its function as the practical faculties for theirs.

“In the development of man’s faculties, I have taught that there has been a great progress of mankind, — outwardly shown in the increased power over nature, in the increase of comfort, art, science, literature; and this progress is just as obvious in religion as in agriculture or in housekeeping. The progress in the idea of God is as remarkable as the progress in building ships; for, indeed, the difference between the popular conception of a jealous and angry God, who said his first word in the Old Testament, and his last word in the New Testament, and who will never speak again till ‘the last day,’ and then only damn to everlasting ruin the bulk of mankind, —

the difference between that conception and the idea of the Infinite God is as great as the difference between the 'dug-out' of a Sandwich Islander and a California clipper, that takes all the airs of heaven in its broad arms, and skims over the waters with the speed of wind. I see no limit to this power of progressive development in man; none to man's power of religious development. The progress did not begin with Moses, nor end with Jesus. Neither of these great benefactors was a finality in benefaction. This power of growth, which belongs to human nature, is only definite in the historical forms already produced, but quite indefinite and boundless in its capabilities of future expansion.

"In the human faculties, this is the order of rank: I have put the body and all its powers at the bottom of the scale; and then, of the spiritual powers, I put the intellect the lowest of all; conscience came next higher; the affections higher yet; and, highest of all, I have put the religious faculty. Hence I have always taught that the religious faculty was the natural ruler in all this commonwealth of man; yet I would not have it a tyrant, to deprive the mind or the conscience or the affections of their natural rights. But the importance of religion, and its commanding power in every relation of life, that is what I have continually preached; and some of you will remember that the first sermon I addressed to you was on this theme, — The Absolute Necessity of Religion for safely conducting the life of the individual and the life of the state. I dwelt on both of these points, — religion for the individual, and religion for the state. You know very well I did not begin too soon. Yet I did not then foresee that it would soon be denied in America, in Boston, that there was any law higher than an Act of Congress.

"Woman I have always regarded as the equal of man, — more nicely speaking, the equivalent of man; superior in some things, inferior in some other: inferior in the lower qualities, in bulk of body and bulk of brain; superior in the higher and nicer qualities, in the moral power of conscience, the loving power of affection, the religious power of the soul; equal, on the whole, and of course entitled to just the same rights as man; to the same rights of mind, body, and estate; the same domestic, social, ecclesiastical, and political rights as man, and only kept from the enjoyment of these by might, not right; yet herself destined one day to acquire them all. For, as in the development of man the lower faculties come out and blossom first, and as accordingly, in the development of society, those persons who represent the lower powers first get elevated to prominence; so man, while he is wanting in the superior quality, possesses brute strength and brute intellect, and in virtue thereof has had the sway in the world. But as the finer qualities come later, and the persons who represent those finer qualities come later into prominence; so womankind is destined one day to come forth and introduce a bet-

ter element into the family, society, politics, and church, and to bless us far more than the highest of men are yet aware. Out of that mine the fine gold is to be brought which shall sanctify the church, and save the state.

“That is my idea of man; and you see how widely it differs from the popular ecclesiastical idea of man.

“Then a word for the Idea of the Relation between God and Man.

“I. First, of this on God’s part. God is perfect Cause and perfect Providence, Father and Mother of all men; and He loves each with all of his Being, all of his almightiness, his all-knowingness, all-righteousness, all-lovingness, and all-holiness. He knew at the beginning all the history of mankind, and of each man, — of Jesus of Nazareth and Judas Iscariot; and prepared for all, so that a perfect result shall be worked out at last for each soul. The means for the purposes of God in the human world are the natural powers of man, his faculties; those faculties which are fettered by instinct, and those also which are winged by free-will. Hence while, with my idea of God, I am sure of the end, and have asked of all men an infinite faith that the result would be brought out right by the forces of God, — with my idea of man, I have also pointed out the human means; and, while I was sure of the end, and called for divine faith, I have also been sure of the means, and called for human work. Here are two propositions: first, that God so orders things in his providence, that a perfect result shall be wrought out for each; and, second, that He gives a certain amount of freedom to every man. I believe both of these propositions; I have presented both as strongly as I could. I do not mean to say that I have logically reconciled these two propositions, with all their consequences, in my own mind, and still less to the minds of others. There may seem to be a contradiction. Perhaps I do not know how to reconcile the seeming contradiction, and yet believe both propositions.

“From this it follows that the history of the world is no surprise to God; that the vice of a Judas, or the virtue of a Jesus, is not a surprise to Him. Error and sin are what stumbling is to the child; accidents of development, which will in due time be overcome. As the finite mother does not hate the sound and strong boy, who sometimes stumbles in learning to walk; does not hate the sound, but weak boy, who stumbles often; and does not hate the crippled boy, who stumbles continually, and only stumbles; — but as she seeks to help and teach all three, so the Infinite Mother of us all does not hate the well-born, who seldom errs; does not hate the ill-born, who often transgresses; and does not hate the moral idiot, even the person that is born organized for kidnapping; — but will, in the long run of eternity, bring all these safely home, — the first murderer and the last kidnapper, both reformed and blessed. Suffering for error and sin is a fact in this world. I make no doubt it

will be a fact in all stages of development in the next world. But mark this : It is not from the anger or weakness of God that we suffer ; it is for purposes worthy of his perfection and his love. Suffering is not a devil's malice, but God's medicine. I can never believe that Evil is a finality with God.

“ II. Then see the relation on man's part. Providence is what God owes to man ; and man has an unalienable right to the infinite providence of God. No sin ever can alienate and nullify that right. To say that it could, would seem to me blasphemy against the Most High God ; for it would imply a lack of some element of perfection on God's part ; a lack of power, of wisdom, of justice, of love, or of holiness,—fidelity to Himself. It would make God finite, and not infinite.

“ Religion is what man owes to God, as God owes providence to man. And with me religion is something exceedingly wide, covering the whole surface, and including the whole depth of human life. The internal part I have called Piety. By that I mean, speaking synthetically, the love of God as God, with all the mind and conscience, heart and soul ; speaking analytically, the love of truth and beauty, with the intellect ; the love of justice, with the conscience ; the love of persons, with the affections ; the love of holiness, with the soul : for all these faculties find in God their perfect Object,—the all-true, all-beautiful, all-just, all-loving, and all-holy God, the Father and Mother of all.

“ The more external part of religion, I have called Morality ; that is, keeping all the natural laws which God has writ for the body and spirit, for mind and conscience and heart and soul ; and I consider that it is just as much a part of religion to keep every law which God has writ in our frame, as it is to keep the “ Ten Commandments ” ; and just as much our duty to keep the law which He has thus published in human nature, as if the voice of God spoke out of heaven, and said, “ Thou shalt,” and “ Thou shalt not.” Man's consciousness proclaims God's law. It is nature on which I have endeavored to bottom my teachings. Of course this morality includes the subordination of the body to the spirit, and, in the spirit, the subordination of the lower faculties to the higher ; so that the religious element shall correct the partiality of affection, the coldness of justice, and the short-sightedness of intellectual calculation ; and, still more, shall rule and keep in rank the appetites of the body. But in this the soul must not be a tyrant over the body ; for, as there is a holy spirit, there is likewise a holy flesh. All its natural appetites are sacred ; and the religious faculty is not to domineer over the mind, nor over the conscience, nor over the affections of man. All these powers are to be coördinated into one great harmony, where the parts are not sacrificed to the whole, nor the whole to any one part. So, in short, man's

religious duty is to serve God by the normal use, development, and enjoyment of every limb of the body, every faculty of the spirit, every particle of power which we progressively acquire and possess over matter or over man.

“The ordinances of that religion are, inwardly, prayer of penitence and aspiration, the joy and delight in God and his gifts; and, outwardly, they are the daily works of life, by fireside and street-side and field-side, — ‘the charities that soothe and heal and bless.’ These are the ordinances, and I know no other.

“Of course, to determine the religiousness of a man, the question is not merely, What does he believe? but, Has he been faithful to himself in coming to his belief? It may be possible that a man comes to the conviction of Atheism, but yet has been faithful to himself. It may be that the man believes the highest words taught by Jesus, and yet has been faithless to himself. It is a fact which deserves to be held up everlastingly before men, that religion begins in faithfulness to yourself. I have known men whom the world called Infidels, and mocked at, who yet were faithful among the faithfulest. Their intellectual conclusions I would have trodden under my feet; but their faithfulness I would fall on my knees to do honor to.

“Then the question is not how a man dies, but how he lives. It is very easy for a dying man to be opiated by the doctor and minister to such a degree that his mouth shall utter any thing you will; and then, though he was the most hardened of wretches, you shall say ‘he died a saint’! The common notion of the value of a little snivelling and whimpering on a death-bed is too dangerous, as well as too poor, to be taught for science in the midst of the nineteenth century.

“I have taken it for granted also, that religion gave to men the highest, dearest, and deepest of all enjoyments and delights; that it beautified every relation in human life, and shed the light of heaven into the very humblest house, into the lowliest heart, and cheered and soothed and blessed the very hardest lot and the most cruel fate in mortal life. This is not only my word, but your hearts bear witness to the truth of that teaching; and all human history will tell the same thing.

“These have been the chief doctrines that I have set forth in a thousand forms. You see at once how very widely this differs from the common scheme of theology in which all of us were born and bred. There is a vast difference in the Idea of God, of Man, and of the Relation between the two.

“Of course I do not believe in a devil, eternal torment, nor in a particle of absolute evil in God’s world or in God. I do not believe there ever was a miracle, or ever will be: everywhere I find law, — the constant mode of operation of the infinite God. I do not believe

in the miraculous inspiration of the Old Testament or the New Testament. I do not believe that the Old Testament was God's first word, nor the New Testament his last. The Scriptures are no finality to me. Inspiration is a perpetual fact. Prophets and Apostles did not monopolize the Father: He inspires men to-day as much as heretofore. In nature, also, God speaks for ever. Are not these flowers new words of God? Are not the fossils underneath our feet, hundreds of miles thick, old words of God, spoken millions of millions of years before Moses began to be?

"I do not believe the miraculous origin of the Hebrew Church, or the Buddhist Church, or the Christian Church; nor the miraculous character of Jesus. I take not the Bible for my master, nor yet the Church; nor even Jesus of Nazareth for my master. I feel not at all bound to believe what the Church says is true, nor what any writer in the Old or New Testament declares true; and I am ready to believe that Jesus taught, as I think, eternal torment, the existence of a devil, and that he himself should ere long come back in the clouds of heaven. I do not accept these things on his authority. I try all things by the human faculties; intellectual things by the intellect, moral things by the conscience, affectional things by the affections, and religious things by the soul. Has God given us any thing better than our nature? How can we serve Him and his purposes but by its normal use?

"But, at the same time, I reverence the Christian Church for the great good it has done for mankind; I reverence the Mahometan Church for the good it has done, — a far less good. I reverence the Scriptures for every word of truth they teach; and they are crowded with truth and beauty, from end to end. Above all men do I bow my face before that august personage, Jesus of Nazareth, who seems to have had the strength of man and the softness of woman, — man's mighty, wide-grasping, reasoning, calculating, and poetic mind; and woman's conscience, woman's heart, and woman's faith in God. He is my best historic ideal of human greatness; not without errors, not without the stain of his times, and, I presume, of course not without sins; for men without sins exist in the dreams of girls, not in real fact; you never saw such a one, nor I, and we never shall. But Jesus of Nazareth is my best historic ideal of a religious man, and revolutionizes the vulgar conception of human greatness. What are your Cæsars, Alexanders, Cromwells, Napoleons, Bacons, and Leibnitz and Kant and Shakespeare and Milton even, — men of immense brain and will, — what are they all to this person of large and delicate intellect, of a great conscience, and heart and soul far mightier yet?

"With such ideas of man, of God, and of the relation between them, how all things must look from my point of view! I cannot praise a man because he is rich. While I deplore the vulgar

rage for wealth, and warn men against the popular lust of gold, which makes money the triune deity of so many men, I yet see the function of riches, and have probably preached in favor of national and individual accumulation thereof more than any other man in all New England, for I see the necessity of a material basis for the spiritual development of man; but I never honor a live man because he is rich, and should not think of ascribing to a dead one all the Christian virtues because he died with a large estate, and his faith, hope, and charity were only faith in money, hope for money, and love of money. I should not think such a man entitled to the praise of all the Christian virtues.

“And again, I should never praise or honor a man simply because he had a great office, nor because he had the praise of men; nor should I praise and honor a man because he had the greatest intellect in the world, and the widest culture of that intellect. I should take the intellect for what it was worth; but I should honor the just conscience of a man that carried a hod up the tallest ladder in Boston; I should honor the loving heart of a girl that went without her dinner to feed a poor boy; the faith in God which made a poor woman faithful to every daily duty, while poverty and sickness stared her in the face, and a drunken husband smote her in the heart, — a faith which conquered despair, and still kept living on. I should honor any one of these things more than the intellect of Cæsar and Bacon and Hannibal all united into one: and you see why; because I put intellect at the bottom of the scale, and these higher faculties at the other end.

“I put small value on the common ‘signs of religion.’ Church-going is not morality: it is compliance with common custom. It may be grievous self-denial, and often is. Reading the Bible daily or weekly is not piety: it may help to it. The ‘sacraments’ are no signs of religion to me: they are dispensations of water, of wine, of bread, and no more. I do not think a few hours of crying on a sick-bed proves that a notorious miser or voluptuary, a hard, worldly fellow, for fifty years, has been a saint all that time, any more than one mild day in March proves that there was no ice in Labrador all winter.” — pp. 5 – 16.

Much more to the same effect we might extract, but this long passage will suffice to put our readers in possession of Mr. Parker’s views. From it they cannot fail to perceive that he unhesitatingly rejects all supernatural revelation, the whole gracious providence of God, and accepts only a very meagre system of naturalism, or natural mysticism. He, in words at least, admits a creative God, but he admits no gracious providence, and the only providence he recognizes is the providence which he says God owes to

man. God, in all he does for us, is simply paying us what he owes us, which excludes all conception of grace or bounty. If God is in his providence only paying his honest debts, where is the room for gratitude? We may be very glad that he pays us what he owes us, but we can owe him no thanks. Mr. Parker is very clear in stating what God owes to us, but very vague and confused in stating what we owe to God. He fails, also, to explain how the Creator can render himself the debtor of his creature, who is and must be his absolute property. He does not tell us how the infinite, the perfect, the absolute God can be placed in the category of relation, and he does not inform us what is the ground of the reciprocal relation he assumes between God and man. God, if absolute, perfect, infinite, cannot be the subject of any relation whatever, and can never be necessarily under any obligation to any of his creatures. They can never oblige or bind him to them, for they are bound in all they have and are to him, and whatever he owes them, he owes them only in consequence of his own promise, in which it is impossible for him to lie, freely made to them, either in creating them or through revelation to them.

The author, it is clear, intends to assert the absolute perfection of God, and at the same time the innate goodness of man. He asserts that God always does his own will, which is true, and that man, though endowed with free will, always does the will of God. He denies the Fall, and maintains that all the Creator's works are now as perfect as they came from his hands, and perhaps even more so, for he holds the modern doctrine of progress. How, then, does he explain the origin of evil, the error, sin, and guilt of man? We cannot understand how there can be any sin, or any thing, on his system, wrong in man. Yet no Calvinist, gloating over his absurd doctrine of total depravity, ever found more in the world to condemn, or less in the general conduct of mankind to approve! He makes the test of a man's virtue to be, not his obedience to God, but his fidelity, his truthfulness to himself. Thus an atheist, if true to himself, is a good man, a religious man, and should escape all personal censure. A very convenient doctrine this, which canonizes every man, whatever his errors or iniquities, if in them he is only faithful to his own convictions and instincts. Anger, revenge, lust, are as natural in some men

as love, mercy, and purity ; and consequently they in whom they are so cannot be truly moral without indulging them. This is your preacher of a lofty and stern morality, entitled to denounce weekly the Christian world for its vices, crimes, and sins ! These vices, crimes, and sins must be, on his system, in mortification, self-denial, or the restraint which in obedience to the teachings of the Gospel Christians have endeavored to practise.

The author clearly rejects the doctrines of original sin, of redemption through the cross, of regeneration, and final beatitude. He denies both heaven and hell, and gives it as an instance of popular error on the part of our Lord himself, that he taught eternal torment. If he believes in a future life at all, he believes in only a natural immortality, while he denies a future state of retribution, or of rewards and punishments, in which he is less Christian than the ancient Gentiles, and falls below the heathen, none of whom, except here and there an individual, ever denied a future state of existence and retribution. What the heathen denied was not the immortality of the soul, but the supernatural beatitude of the saints, and the resurrection, that is, the resurrection of the body. The life and immortality brought to light or revealed by our holy religion is not the natural immortality of the soul, but the supernatural life and immortality, or immortal glory, of the saints, purchased by the merits of the Incarnate Son of God. The resurrection of the dead, which we profess to believe, is the resurrection of that which dies, therefore of the body ; not of the soul, for the soul never dies, except morally, and consequently there can be no resurrection of it from the dead.

The reader will perceive that the author denies prayer in the Christian sense, that is, the propriety of prayer as a petition, and represents popular theology as teaching that prayer changes the mind of God. Here is another instance of his misrepresentation. Popular theology does not teach that prayer changes the mind of God, nor is it necessary to assume that God cannot answer our prayers without changing his purpose. God grants us harvests in answer to our industry in cultivating the earth, and if we neglect to till the earth, and to put in the seed in due season and due order, he withholds the harvest. Does our industry change the mind of God ? In the universe of God there is a vast system of means adapted to ends, and if the means

are complied with, the ends are secured ; if they are neglected, the ends are not secured. Prayer, in the designs of Providence, is a means to certain ends ; in other words, God gives certain things to them that ask them, and withholds them from those who refuse to ask for them. Where in this is the notion that prayer, any more than industry, changes the mind of God ?

The author insinuates that the Christian plan of redemption is an afterthought with God ; that sin took him by surprise, and defeated his original intentions, and hence the God of popular theology is not infinite either in knowledge or in power. This is another instance of misrepresentation, and of very false reasoning. Popular theology teaches nothing like this. It never teaches that the redemption became necessary in consequence of any original defect in man as he came from his Creator, or any thing in man's transgression that thwarted the original designs of the Creator. If man had not sinned, the redemption would not have been needed and would not have been made, although the Son of God might even then have become incarnate, not to make satisfaction for sin, but to elevate and ennoble human nature by its union with God. Yet that man would sin was known from the beginning, and the decree to redeem him through Christ crucified was coeval with the decree to create him. Hence our Lord is called "the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world." Would Mr. Parker maintain that an infinite God cannot treat his creatures differently according as they use or abuse their free-will, and that he must treat the creature the same and give him the same reward, or secure for him the same end and by the same means, whether the creature conduct in one way or another ? If so, as he must do, in order to justify his insinuations, can he not see that it is he who limits the power and freedom of God, and who denies the very infinity he boasts of holding ?

Mr. Parker, as is evident from the extract we have made, denies the inspiration and authority of the Holy Scriptures, and perhaps in terms, too, which bring him within the statute against blasphemy. "I do not believe," he says, "in the miraculous inspiration of the Old Testament or the New Testament. I do not believe that the Old Testament was God's first word, nor the New Testament his last. The Scriptures are no finality to me. Inspiration is a perpetual

fact. Prophets and Apostles did not monopolize the Father. He inspires men to-day as much as heretofore." Here the inspiration, the supernatural inspiration, of the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament is not only denied, but denied with a sneer, and their authority is plainly set aside in the declaration, "The Scriptures are no finality to me." It amounts to nothing that he says, "Inspiration is a perpetual fact," for he can admit none but simply natural inspiration, since he says, "I do not believe there ever was a miracle, or ever will be." No miracles, then no miraculous, then no supernatural inspiration, and then no supernatural revelation of the will of God, either in ancient or modern times. He who so maintains denies *in toto* the Christian religion, and is far less of a Christian than were the old heathen; for none of them, as we recollect, except avowed atheists, ever went so far as to deny all miracles and all supernatural revelations from God to man. The author is a great believer in progress, but old Plato and Cicero were some distance in advance of him, save in the work of denying. But after all, what a singular confusion of ideas he must labor under, to imagine that to have revealed his whole will to man in ancient times, through Prophets and Apostles, reflects dishonor on the infinity of God, and is a disadvantage to mankind in the present! Cannot the author conceive that God, in revealing himself formerly, did it not merely for the private benefit of those by whom he revealed himself, but also for all who should believe in him through their word? Would he have us suppose, that only they by whom God founds a state or organizes a civil government can be benefited by it? Is not the chief benefit for those who are to live under the government through all the ages of its continuance and wholesome operation? Are we who live under our free institutions less favored than they by whom they were introduced and established?

Mr. Parker rejects the Scriptures and the Church; he goes farther, or what by some may seem to be farther, and denies even our Lord himself. "I do not believe," he says, "the miraculous character of Jesus. I take not the Bible for my master, nor yet the Church; nor even Jesus of Nazareth for my master." This is plain, and unambiguous. No man of common sense and common information can pretend after this to regard Mr. Parker as a Christian, un-

less it be an apostate Christian, as was the Emperor Julian. "I am ready to believe that Jesus taught, as I think, eternal torment, the existence of a devil, and that he himself should ere long come back in the clouds of heaven. I do not accept these things on his authority. I TRY ALL THINGS BY THE HUMAN FACULTIES." Here it is; he denies the authority of the Bible, of the Church, of Jesus of Nazareth, and admits only that of the human faculties, that is to say, of Theodore Parker! But he is not content to stop even here; he goes so far as to charge our Lord with error and sin. "He [Jesus] is my best historic ideal of human greatness; not without errors, not without the stain of his times, and, I presume, of course not without sins; for men without sins exist in the dreams of girls, not in real fact." Thus our Lord is reduced to the level of a simple man, to nothing but a man, and an erring and sinful man, stained with the errors and sins of the age in which he lived. This is enough. And this is said in this city, by a professed Christian minister, pastor of the Twenty-eighth Congregational Society in Boston, and published by a respectable firm, one member of which is, we believe, an Episcopalian. How will our professedly Christian community, pretending immense reverence for the Scriptures, making the Bible an object of their idolatry, bear to have their secret told in such plain and unequivocal terms? As they have borne it, we presume, for the last eight years, — with an affected contempt, but inward respect, for the preacher and his preachment.

Mr. Parker's standing and success in Boston, the Geneva of the New World, this old Puritan city, once pronounced the paradise of Protestant ministers, are an admirable comment on the innate tendencies of Protestantism, and, to all who can trace effects to their causes, a full proof of the position we have so often assumed, that "Protestantism is not a religion." It is in vain that Protestants affect to disown Mr. Parker, for, say what they will of him, he is a consistent Protestant, and far more consistent, and for so much far more respectable, than they who would disown him. He is, doctrinally considered, only Luther developed or completed. He rejects indeed all dogmatic Protestantism, but dogmatic Protestantism from the first was only an inconsequence. Protestants, having rejected all ecclesiastical authority, every thing like a Church with either the

authority or the capacity to teach, retained no right to dogmatize, no authority competent to impose dogmas of any sort. They could dogmatize only by assuming what in protesting against the Church they declared to be an unjust and usurped authority. To denounce all dogmatic teaching, and therefore all dogmatic Protestantism, is only to be a consistent Protestant, is only to be true to the great Protestant principle of private judgment. There are only two great systems possible, the supernatural and the natural, the Jewish and the Gentile, the Catholic and the Protestant, the Church and the world. These two systems have always been in the world and in mortal conflict, and he who adheres not to the one must necessarily accept the other. All attempts to reconcile the two, and to embrace both at once, are only so many compromises of principle, and are as absurd as to say in the same breath, "Good Lord," and "Good Devil."

The one system is based on the fact that God in his original plan, if we may use the word, intended man for a supernatural destiny, which he forfeited by sin, and regains only through the merits of Christ crucified. Man, if he had not sinned, could never have gained by his own natural forces his destiny, and he needed grace before the Fall as well as since, to elevate him to the plane of the supernatural beatitude for which his Maker designed him. This fact our dogmatic Protestants overlook or deny. They assume that the heavenly beatitude, the true end for which we are to live, was within the reach of our nature or our natural faculties prior to the Fall, but is altogether above them since that deplorable catastrophe. Hence their absurd and monstrous doctrine of total depravity, which teaches that original sin consists, not only in the loss of original justice in which man stood before transgression, but in the loss of our natural spiritual faculties, and the corruption of our whole nature. Hence their doctrine of redemption, which makes the work of the Redeemer merely that of reintegrating nature, or rather, of atoning for transgression, and conferring upon the elect by free grace, without any reference to their personal character, the beatitude which, if we had not sinned in our first parents, we could have attained to by our natural forces. Here was the fundamental theological error of Luther, Calvin, Baius, and Jansenius, and this error Mr. Parker sees clearly enough,

and very properly rejects ; but in rejecting it he merely frees the original naturalism asserted by these heresiarchs from its inconsistencies, and denies the supernatural altogether. But the fact is, that man was before the Fall under a gracious providence, and was constituted in a state of justice or sanctity by supernatural grace, a grace which elevated his nature to the plane of his supernatural destiny. If Adam had not sinned, this grace would have been transmitted to his posterity in the order of generation ; but by sinning he forfeited it for himself and all his posterity. Original sin consists in the loss of this original supernatural justice or sanctity in which man was constituted by grace, not by nature. In losing this, in being violently despoiled of it by sin, man lost also the integrity of his nature, exemption from disease, from death, &c., — which is not a part of pure nature, and which was a favor granted on condition of obedience, — and became wounded in his natural faculties, his natural understanding being darkened and his free-will attenuated. But he lost no natural faculty, and his essential nature remained wholly unchanged. Nature by the Fall was despoiled of supernatural grace and gifts, and turned away from God, that is, escaped from its original subjection to his law, and now needs to be converted, before its natural motions can tend towards him. Still, we have essentially the nature, and all the nature, we had before transgression.

The redemption of Christ is not to restore to nature lost faculties, is not to change our nature, or to confer on us heaven as a free gift, in spite of our own exercise of free-will, or irrespective of our intrinsic justice ; but to make satisfaction by obedience for disobedience, to heal the wounds of free-will suffered by the Fall, and to elevate us to the plane of our supernatural destiny, or to infuse into us the grace which restores to us the supernatural ability to gain a supernatural beatitude, that is, a beatitude above the reach even of our unimpaired natural forces. If Mr. Parker had known this view, he would have seen that his reasons for rejecting the Protestant popular theology are no reasons for rejecting the Catholic, and that his sneers do not affect us in the least, save so far as he seeks to convey the impression, that on these points Catholics and the so-called Orthodox Protestants hold the same doctrine. But as man could never have gained heaven by his natural

powers, and as he had by sin forfeited and lost the grace by which he was constituted originally in a state of justice or holiness, it is evident that he could be saved and gain his supernatural beatitude only through a Redeemer. Hence the Christian religion has always been the only religion by which man could come to the knowledge of the means and conditions of salvation; and as these means and conditions necessarily pertain to the supernatural order, it is plain that the Christian religion must have been communicated to man, if at all, supernaturally, as the whole economy of redemption and salvation was necessarily supernatural. Hence the Christian or Catholic system necessarily supposes that the requisite knowledge and helps to gain our predestined end must come to us *ab extra*, instead of coming from ourselves, — from God, and not from man, — and therefore depend entirely on the Divine will, and must be received on Divine authority; for it is evident that we can know nothing of the matter save by a supernatural revelation, and accomplish nothing save by the Divine assistance, not included in nature, but graciously bestowed to supply the inherent inadequacy of nature. It is equally plain that the truth of the whole revelation must be taken on authority, not on interior and intrinsic evidence, whether that authority be that of Patriarchs, Prophets, or Apostles, the Scriptures, the Church, or unwritten tradition, because being above natural reason it must be received by faith, and not by sight, and faith is, by its very definition, assent on authority, and, to be true faith, must be assent on an authority which cannot err.

Now this system of supernaturalism is what we call Catholicity, — a system which teaches us that we are designed for a supernatural beatitude, and therefore can attain it only by grace, and since we have fallen, only by the grace of redemption through Christ crucified. Christ, indeed, was actually crucified only about eighteen hundred years ago, yet the system of redemption and beatitude through him, in virtue of his incarnation and merits, was revealed in substance to our first parents, and has always been in the world, as the one only true religion for all times, places, and persons. It was the primitive religion of the race, and has been transmitted to us from Adam, through the Patriarchs, the Synagogue, and the Roman Catholic Church. Through this channel it has been trans-

mitted in its purity and integrity. The faith of the people of God before the coming of Christ was the very faith which we now profess, only they believed in a Christ to come, and we in a Christ who has come, and our faith is far more explicit than was theirs. That Catholics are of the spiritual line of the Patriarchs and of the faithful Jews, and thus distinguished from and opposed to that of the Gentiles, is a fact that no person who has investigated the subject can for a moment doubt. This system, common to us and the faithful before Christ, embraces as one of its essential elements an authoritative priesthood, and is, as even its enemies concede, — sometimes assert as a reproach, — a sacerdotal system. Strike out the priesthood, and authoritative teachers, and you demolish the whole system, and it becomes, practically considered, nothing more than a forgotten dream.

Now it is obvious to every man of ordinary information, that Protestants of every sect reject expressly the sacerdotal principle, and also that of authority, and then, of necessity, this whole system of supernaturalism. Take them as distinguished from Catholics, and it is clear that they accept the elementary principles, not of the Catholic or supernatural system, which is common to us, the Patriarchs, and the Synagogue, but of the system opposed to it, that is, naturalism, gentilism, or heathenism. The Gentiles of the old world did not reject all at once the primitive religion. Nay, they seem to have retained much of the primitive tradition, though in a corrupt form, perverted from its original sense, and mingled with their own speculations and fancies. They seem to have begun by merely rejecting the authority of the Patriarchs, and establishing national religions, under purely national priesthoods; which is not singular, since the royal and priestly dignities were originally united in the person of the patriarch. When the family through apostasy and violence gave way to the nation, and the national — gentile — order supplanted the patriarchal, it was perfectly natural that the sacerdotal dignity no less than the royal should become national, and sometimes the priesthood be superior and sometimes inferior to monarchy. But as the national order succeeded to the patriarchal only through the rejection of the authority of the primitive traditions, and the emancipation of natural reason, either that of the state or that of the individual, —

in the ancient world rarely that of the individual, — from its subjection to primitive revelation, gentilism was in principle the assertion of naturalism, and the rejection of true supernaturalism. It became in the end, we all know, not merely naturalism, but demonism, for all the gods of the heathen were devils. The pagan religions, aside from their superstitions, were, as contrasted with the Catholic religion, what Benjamin Constant calls Free Religions, especially under the Greek and Roman type, because they recognized no authoritative teachers, and no divinely consecrated priesthood. None of them demanded as their basis faith, in the supernatural sense, or proposed for man as his reward a supernatural beatitude. Their priests were conjurers or jugglers, rather than priests, and had none of the characteristics of teachers and pastors. They gradually sunk into insignificance and contempt, and left, so far as the civil authority did not intervene, the human mind free to speculate and err uncontrolled.

. Protestantism differs, no doubt, externally from the various forms of heathenism, and bears traces of having separated from Catholicity since the coming of Christ and the introduction of the New Law; yet in principle it is, like gentilism, a rejection of the Catholic system, and therefore an assertion of pure naturalism. It rejects the priesthood and all authoritative teaching. Its constant tendency is to become a free religion, subjected to no superhuman authority. Episcopalians cannot induce the world to call their ministers priests, and the majority of them laugh at the teaching authority of their so-called bishops. Whoever has been a Protestant knows well that he experiences a constant struggle between reason and what he terms faith; that is, between his private judgment and the fragments of supernaturalism which Protestants have retained, or endeavour to retain, from the Catholic Church. Every thinking Protestant knows that the Mysteries which are still held by some Protestants have very little significance for him, that they seem to him to have no sufficient reason, and to be utterly repugnant to his general system of thought. He may think he ought to believe them, and fear that he will be damned if he does not, and yet he is conscious that he has no adequate authority for believing them, can see no purpose they can answer, and is constantly tempted, when he reflects on the subject, to reject

them. He never, so to speak, takes to supernaturalism ; he wishes to be free from it ; he inwardly rebels against it, and feels that, if he was permitted to fall back on natural reason, he should be freed from an intolerable thralldom, and be far less unhappy. The force of habit, of education, of the remains of Christian tradition, and perhaps the interior workings of Divine grace to effect their conversion, restrain many Protestants, perhaps the majority of them, from following what seems to them the more reasonable course ; but, nevertheless, their supernaturalism is regarded as an inconsistency, and is felt to be an intolerable burden, which they would gladly throw off if they dared. Hence it is, that, when a young man of some energy and independence of thought, bred a Protestant, not of the liberal sort, once becomes distinctly conscious of doubting the Mysteries professedly retained by Protestants, he can hardly help regarding all that Protestants say, and even say well, in defence of Christianity in a general way, as mere cant or sophistry, and as said, not from conviction, but in the way of their craft. It rarely has any weight with him, because he cannot understand any reason for it on avowed Protestant principles, and because it is all repugnant to his natural reason, sometimes even more than to his natural heart. All this shows that there is an innate repugnancy in Protestantism to the whole Catholic system,—to all real supernaturalism,—and therefore that Protestantism is essentially naturalism, and retains the supernatural only by doing violence to itself.

This struggle between faith and reason is something wholly foreign to the Catholic mind, and the real Catholic finds it hard, unless he has been bred a Protestant, even to conceive of it, because Catholicity, though it requires us to do violence to the flesh, never requires us to do violence to reason. Catholicity is not a rationalistic, but it is a rational religion, and at every step satisfies the demands even of the most rigid reason. We were told so before we came into the Church, but we could hardly believe it, and even when we were permitted to enter, we did not doubt but we should still find something of that interior struggle between faith and reason, which had rendered us so miserable as a Protestant, so hard is it for a Protestant mind to conceive the possibility of perfect harmony between faith in the supernatural and the dictates of reason. We

have not thus far been troubled with any struggle of the sort, and we are unable to conceive how, as long as we remain a Catholic, we can be, because in Catholicity all has a sufficient reason, is sure to have a purpose worthy of itself, and nothing is required to be believed but on an adequate authority, and thus the demands of the highest reason are satisfied. The Mysteries are not, indeed, taken on the authority of natural reason; nevertheless, they are taken on an authority which natural reason finds to be sufficient for all her wants. The Protestant, the best-disposed Protestant, cannot conceive this to be even possible, and when we say it is not only possible, but a fact, he distrusts either our honesty or our judgment. He immediately begins to adduce things which we as Catholics must believe, which seem to him incredible, and which really are incredible to him in his present state. But whence all this? The reason is, that faith and reason are to him on his Protestant principles really antagonistical, and the one can exist only by the expulsion of the other. They are so to him because his own supernaturalism is incomplete, fragmentary, incoherent, and, as far as he can see, answering no purpose but the support of a sham ministry. This shows that the order of his thought is naturalistic, and that, instead of being truly of the line of the Patriarchs, he is of the line of the Gentiles, and in order to be consistent with himself he must reject whatever is supernatural, and fall back on pure naturalism; that is, deny the Fall, deny original sin, the necessity of mediation, of the atonement, of redemption, assert, with Luther and Calvin, that man was made for a beatitude within the reach of his natural forces, and hold that he can now as well as ever attain it by the normal use of his natural faculties, without supernatural assistance.

Protestantism, by rejecting the sacerdotal principle and that of authoritative teaching, — which it certainly does, because it confessedly has no sacrifice to offer, and its boasted principle is private judgment, — and by asserting that the beatitude for which man was designed by his Maker was within the reach of man's natural faculties prior to transgression, and therefore within the natural order, plainly denies, it seems to us, all supernaturalism, and commits itself irrevocably to naturalism. We cannot see how it can be otherwise, since it denies that the beatitude for which man was made was in the supernatural order, and allows it to be

supernatural only in relation to his fallen nature. It is evident that man lost by sin no natural faculty, for he is still man, which he would not be if deprived of any natural faculty, especially if deprived of his spiritual faculties, reason, and free-will, as Luther and even Calvin teach. If he is man, he retains his essential nature, and therefore all his natural faculties. If, then, his beatitude was ever within the reach of his natural faculties, it must be still, and therefore the whole system of grace or redemption and salvation through the cross falls to the ground, because it has and can have no sufficient reason, — no end to answer.

The great and fundamental error of all Protestantism seems to us to be precisely in the denial of the Catholic doctrine, that man was originally designed, not for a natural, but a supernatural beatitude, — supernatural, not only in relation to his present state, but also in relation to his original state prior to transgression. To this fundamental error, we think, may be traced all its special errors, and all the horrible doctrines of the modern infidel world, and that too whether this error was adopted prior to the rejection of the Catholic priesthood and the authority of the Church, or whether it was adopted subsequently, in order to justify that rejection. Certainly it is an error which excludes the supernatural, and involves pure naturalism. We repeat, therefore, that Mr. Parker, in rejecting all dogmatic Protestantism, all the Christian mysteries, the whole traditional system of supernaturalism, and falling back on nature and the human faculties alone, is a consistent Protestant; and whatever censure he may deserve from us, he deserves none from his Protestant brethren, and his success is a proof that not a few of them fully agree with us in this.

In conclusion, we would say a word to Mr. Parker himself, if we had not good reason to believe that nothing we can say will weigh a feather with him or his followers. We know, perhaps, even better than he does, the world in which he lives, for we lived in it before he did, and have lived longer than he has; we know his system, if system it can be called, as well as he knows it, and knew it, and preached it in all its essential features, while he was still pursuing his academical studies. We have no trouble in understanding either his system or his position, and we are not at all disposed to deny, that, apart from his relation to the

Protestant world, he has some good aspirations, and at least glimpses of some truths, which are not only truths, but truths of considerable magnitude. He has detected much of the hollowness of modern society, and sees with tolerable clearness the vanity of the pursuits of the so-called respectable classes, though in this respect he falls far below Carlyle, and even Emerson. He sees that the morality of our Protestant community is mere decorum, worldly prudence, or thrift; that its faith is opinion, and opinion but loosely held, and that its piety is mere cant or fanaticism. He wants to see revived in it a living faith, to see around him, though he understands not what it is, or what are its conditions, a pure and spiritual morality. All this, and much more to the same effect, we are quite willing to concede him. But whatever of truth he sees is no novelty to the Church, and exists in her doctrines, in its unity and its integrity. The results he wishes he can never obtain save through her ministry. The evils he deplures are only the natural consequences of rejecting her authority, despising the graces which she dispenses, and falling back on naturalism. He is very wrong in confounding even dogmatic Protestantism with Catholicity, and holding the Church responsible for the errors and vices which she anathematizes, and which prevail only because she is not loved, honored, and obeyed. What he complains of is the legitimate fruit of the naturalism to which he is himself wedded, and to render that naturalism more pure is only to aggravate the evils he at times so eloquently deplures, and so energetically denounces. They come not from the aspiration of men to an heroic sanctity and a supernatural beatitude through the grace of Christ, but from the fact that men propose to themselves only a natural beatitude, only a heaven in the natural order. And how does he propose to cure them? Solely by confining men to that order, and preventing them from aspiring to any thing above it. He thinks he proposes a lofty ideal, when he proposes simple nature; the Catholic regards his loftiest ideal as far too low and uninspiring; he thinks he preaches a pure and spiritual morality, and yet it is only the morality of the Epicurean sty. Were his intellectual and moral system to prevail, mankind would forget their true dignity as men, and sink to the level of mere animals. He offers the famishing soul only husks with the swine,

and seeks to satisfy the deep wants of our spiritual nature with mere provender for the body. But the soul possesses a dignity and worth far above his most sublime conceptions, and disdains the highest and most perfect natural beatitude. We know something of these cravings of the soul which he and his friends experience, and we can tell him that nature has nothing wherewith to satisfy them. She is impotent to quench the thirst, or to appease the hunger of the soul, because the soul was never made for a natural beatitude. All he can offer the soul at best is knowledge of natural things, wealth, honor, and sensual pleasures, and she never — the experience of all ages, of our own perhaps more than most others — finds her appropriate food in these, which soon pall upon her taste and are loathed. You must seek farther, and on a higher level. Confined to nature, you must soon sink below nature, and live only as the beasts that perish, or, as you seem to be doing, fall into downright demonism.

It is a sad mistake on the part of Mr. Parker and his friends to suppose that nature is able to suffice for our beatitude, or that to assert for man a supernatural beatitude, and bid him through grace aspire to it, is a degradation of his nature. Mr. Parker professes to believe in a future life and a future heaven for all men, for he is a Universalist, and believes in the eternal torment of no one. Can he tell us what is to constitute that heaven, the beatitude of that future life? It must, according to him, be a natural beatitude, and therefore be a beatitude within the conception of the natural man, and of the same order with that which nature gives in this life. What is it to be? The practice of virtue? The practice of virtue is not without its satisfaction, we are willing to admit, but mankind generally do not find it sufficient to induce them to make the sacrifices which it usually demands, and, moreover, the practice of virtue appertains to a state of probation, not to a state of final beatitude, and is a means of obtaining our end, not our eternal end itself. Heaven, then, which is our end, cannot be placed in the practice of virtue. In what then? In progress, indefinite progress from the imperfect to the perfect? But progress is going towards heaven, and must end when we reach it, and therefore cannot be heaven itself. If it is to be endlessly continued, heaven is never to be gained, and then perfect

beatitude is for no man. Does it consist in loving? Whom or what? In loving our fellow-creatures? Who knows not that creatures can never exhaust our love, or satisfy the soul's need of loving? God? As seen in nature with our natural faculties, through a glass, darkly? We see him thus now, and yet thus to see him is not perfect beatitude. Turn the matter over as you will, and give what answer you please, if you concede only natural beatitude, you can hope for nothing hereafter above what we experience here, nothing but a second and unimproved edition of our present life, which, even in its best state, falls immeasurably below a happy life. Say we not well, then, that Mr. Parker's highest ideal is far too low and worthless for us. We look for a heaven of perfect beatitude, and we aspire, not in our own strength, but by the proper exercise of our faculties, excited, elevated, and assisted by the grace of God purchased for us by the merits of his dear Son, obedient for us even to the death of the cross, to see him not merely through a glass darkly, as reflected by his works, whether of nature or of grace, but face to face as he is in himself, and to feast our soul eternally on his infinite fulness, his infinite wisdom, beauty, goodness, and love. Is there degradation to our nature in this? You think so, only because you borrow your notions from Protestant theology, and suppose that grace supersedes nature, instead of elevating and assisting it, and that heaven is conferred, not as that for which we are intrinsically prepared, and as a reward of our personal holiness, but as a simple gift irresistibly conferred by a sovereign act of favor, irrespective of our personal character; as the Catholic holds it, it is the supernatural elevation of our nature to union with God as the SUPREME GOOD.

ART. IV. — *Lezioni per ciascun Giorno del Mese di Maggio, tratte dall' Operetta sull' Amore di Maria di D. ROBERTO, Eremita Camaldolese di Monte Corona. Prima Edizione Napolitana. Migliorata e corretta per Cura di L. M. Napoli: Presso Gaetano Nobile. 1843. 24mo. pp. 252.*

THE little book the title of which we have placed at the head of this article is so full of the spirit of love and devotion to Our Lady, and of true and genuine piety, that we regret not to have met with it until quite recently, and we are so charmed with it that we cannot forbear to commend it to the attention of such of our readers as may be unacquainted with it.

The style of the work is not brilliant, but it is simple, sweet, and full of unction. It was written in the solitude of the Camaldolese Hermitage of Monte Corona, of which the author had been for forty years a holy and edifying member. He writes the work, he tells us in his Preface, in order to excite in himself, no less than in his readers, the love of Mary.

The reasons he gives why we should love and honor the blessed Mother of God, are her many perfections and graces, natural and supernatural, which render her most amiable to all men, the great love which she bears us, and the incalculable advantages we derive from loving her, both in life and in death, in time and in eternity.

It is impossible for the human heart not to love; it must feel some affection; but its love is often thrown away and lost on an unworthy object. Nothing is more common than to see men led astray by their affections. What misery is theirs who set their hearts on wealth, and live and labor only to acquire it! Honor is but a name without a substance; who ever gained it and found it not to perish within his grasp? Yet such is the folly of men, that they flutter around its vain splendor till at last, after a perpetual struggle to attain it, they are consumed by that which they hoped would raise them above others, and make them as gods. "They became," as says the prophet, "abominable as those things which they loved." (Osee ix. 10.)

But however low the love of abominable or unworthy

objects may sink us, the love of a worthy, a noble object equally elevates us above our present condition ; and the more worthy, exalted, and holy the object of our affections, the more worthy, exalted, and noble do we become. It is, then, a matter of the greatest moment, that we select wisely the object on which we bestow our love. The author's aim and purpose are to point out a truly worthy object for our love, and to incite us to give it our hearts. Such an object is Mary, most worthy of the love of all men.

But let it not be said, that, in consecrating our whole heart to Mary, we defraud God of the pure and entire love which he requires for himself alone, which he commands us to give him, and which he will not permit to be given to a creature.

"God is indeed," says the author, "jealous of his love, but he is not jealous of the love we bear to Mary, nor can this love be prejudicial to that sanctity and perfection which he desires of us. I may even say, the more we love Mary, the more we shall love God, and the more shall we please him ; and we shall advance in sanctity and perfection in proportion as the love of Mary increases within us. There is no shorter, easier, or more secure way of attaining to the perfect love of God, than that of loving Mary.

"The love of God consists in a perfect conformity to his divine will. 'If you love me,' he says to his Apostles, 'keep my commandments.' (St. John xiv. 15.) Now the precise will of God is, that we serve, honor, and tenderly love Mary. She is, after the most holy Humanity of Christ, the most perfect of his works ; and what workman is there that is not pleased, that does not desire, to have his works admired, praised, and held dear, especially the most excellent of them all, that on which he most prides himself, since the praise and glory of the work redound to the praise and glory of the workman, and are wholly converted into them ? Must it not, then, be most pleasing to God, must he not desire, that we love and esteem that work which he has made to show forth his omnipotence, his infinite wisdom, and love, and in which his labor and workmanship are so resplendent and bright, that the saints have termed it 'a miracle of the Divine Power,' — *miraculum Divinæ Omnipotentia* ?

"God commands us to obey our prelates, to be subject to them (Heb. xiii. 17), and 'to obey our carnal masters, as Christ' (Eph. vi. 5). If, then, he wills and commands us to love, honor, obey, and serve our superiors even of this world, what love, obedience, and veneration must he not desire us to show to her who is our Lady and Mistress, the Queen of the world, and who with truth may say : 'By me kings reign and lawgivers decree just

things ; by me princes rule, and the mighty decree justice.' (Prov. viii. 15, 16.)

"She is our Mother, even more really so than our natural mother. Christ gave her to us as such, in the person of his beloved John, when dying on the cross. As our Mother, she loves us most tenderly ; she protects and defends us, provides for us, and helps us in all our necessities, both spiritual and temporal. Imagine, then, what love it must be the will of God that we should render such a Mother, — the will of that God who gave us an express command to honor and love our natural parents, even though they love not us, — 'Honor thy father and thy mother.' (Exod. xx. 12.)

"In short, not to enlarge on the innumerable titles which she has to exact of us, if I may so speak, an *infinite* love, she is the Mother, truly the Mother, the Daughter, and Spouse of God himself, — all titles which partake of the infinite, and consequently bear with them and demand an infinite esteem, veneration, and love. It is the will of God that we love and honor his servants as so many gods ; — *Ego dixi, Dii estis*, 'I have said, Ye are gods.' And can it be his will that we should leave without honor, without service, and without love, his Mother, his Daughter, his well-beloved Spouse, — that Mother, that Daughter, and that Spouse to whom he confesses himself indebted, — her from whom he received his humanity, to whom he gave ready obedience, and whom he served in this life, — whom he loved, loves, and will love eternally above all his works ('The Lord loveth the gates of Zion above all the tabernacles of Jacob'), — whom he has honored and exalted above all the orders and hierarchies, and who is his only love, his only consolation, his only glory ('One is my dove, my perfect one is but one') ?

"No, do not believe it, but rather be persuaded that it is the will of God that we should serve her, honor her, and love her with our whole soul, with our whole strength, and with all tenderness ; and that the more we love her, the more we shall please him.

"But what are the intrinsic reasons why it is so pleasing to God that we should honor and love his most holy Mother ? There are two, which I trust will appear to you stronger than all others, and make you resolve to dedicate yourself entirely to the love of Mary.

"The first is the honor and glory of God. The primary object of our love and devotion is God, regarded, as theologians say, *terminative*, as our last end ; the secondary object is the saints and the Blessed, and above all the Most Holy Virgin, who are all regarded *transeunter*, as things belonging and directed to God. *Devotio quæ habetur ad sanctos*, says St. Thomas,* *non termi-*

* *Summa*, 2. 2, q. 82, a. 1.

natur ad ipsos, sed transit in Deum, in quantum scilicet in ministris Dei Deum ipsum veneramur. 'The devotion to the saints does not terminate in them, but passes to God, inasmuch as it is God whom we venerate in his servants.' Now if this be so, (and who does not see that the honor, service, and love we bear to Mary is the honor and glory, service and love, of God himself?) 'all the honor bestowed on the Mother redounds to the Son,' *Omnis honor impensus Matri, redundat in Filium,** and 'the praise of the Mother belongs to the Son,' as says St. Bernard, *Non est dubium, quidquid in laudibus Matris proferimus, ad Filium pertinere,†* 'for the honor given to his Mother tends to the praise and glory of the Saviour,' *Ad laudem enim et gloriam pertinet Salvatoris, quidquid honorificum suæ impensum fuerit Genitrici.‡* 'Let us venerate and love the most glorious Virgin Mary,' says Father Alexis of Sales, 'since the honor and love we bear her redound wholly to the glory and honor of our Master and Saviour Jesus Christ.' And who knows not that all the service done to any saint for the love of God tends wholly to the glory of God himself, by whose grace and benefits that saint is what he is? In honoring, then, the Blessed Virgin as the most excellent and perfect of all creatures, we in reality confess that all those things which render her worthy of our regard and admiration are derived from his liberality, and we give him, at the same time, immortal thanks, praising and magnifying him who raised a creature, like unto ourselves, to such perfection and glory. We may add, that the worship and reverence exhibited by men to the Mother, *in grace* and through love of the Son, are received by the Son as a thing that belongs to him, since they are offered to the Mother in regard of the Son, and because it is known with what incredible love he loves his Mother.

"The second reason is our own profit and advantage, which God wills, desires, and procures us in all possible manners. The Most Holy Virgin is not one of those creatures that 'separate us from God.' O, no! She is a creature who draws, allures, obliges, and constrains our love, to make thereof a most pleasing gift to God; she wishes us hers, that she may make us belong entirely to God; she wishes us to love her, that she may make us enamoured of her Son; and therefore she draws and leads us to God, and does not separate and remove us from him. As says the pious author of a work on the love and worship of the Mother of God, the devotion and love of the Son increase with that which men bear the Mother, because the Mother, being most faithful to the Son, draws and conducts to him all who approach her, and endeavors to reconcile and unite them closely with God. And by

* Hieronym. *ad Eustoch.*

† Homil. IV., *Super Missus.*

‡ S. Bonaventura in *Psalt. B. V.*, psalm. *Si vere utique.*

this you may see how great the advantage is to ourselves, and wherefore I say, that the more we love Mary, the more we shall love God, and that there is no shorter, easier, or safer path by which we may attain to the perfect love of God, than a tender and sincere love of Mary.

“If, then, you wish to love God, and to love him ardently and constantly, love Mary, and love her with ardor and perseverance. If you wish to be holy, and if you wish to be so quickly and easily, love Mary, and love her tenderly and fervently. Pay no attention to those who, guided, as we may piously believe, by a good zeal towards God, but certainly with little piety and devotion towards the Blessed Virgin, either destroy or in some manner diminish her most beautiful praises, or wish to reform or else entirely abolish certain religious practices in her honor, which the piety of the faithful or the most ancient custom of the Church has introduced and hitherto continued. But consider that there is no measure in the honor and love of the Virgin, because she surpasses, transcends all praise, all honor, according to the words of St. John Damascen: *Virgo omnium encomiorum legem excedit*; and therefore St. Ambrose asserts that no one can sufficiently and worthily praise the Most Holy Virgin, except God himself: *Beatam Virginem pro dignitate laudare nemo potest nisi solus Deus*. And with him agrees Andrea of Crete: *Virginem, Dei est laudare pro dignitate*.

“Let us, then, serve, praise, honor, and love Mary without measure, without bounds, because we shall thus give God an infinite pleasure, and we shall soon become saints, and great saints.” — pp. 16–21.

Who shall tell the love Mary has for us? Does a mother love her children? If so, Mary loves us. We are all her children. Jesus, dying on the cross, says to her, “Woman, behold thy son,” and in the person of the beloved disciple gave us all to her as her children. Who shall fathom the abyss of that mother’s heart? If only a mother can know a mother’s heart, who shall know the heart of that dear mother, who loves us incomparably more than ever earthly mother loved her son? The least service we render her fills her heart with joy, and a hundred and a thousand fold does she repay it, in this life and in the other.

“But if Mary,” says the author, “is so grateful for every little service we do her, what gratitude must she not show him who sincerely and cordially loves her, who gives her the most humble and respectful proofs of his service and his love? She loves all in gen-

eral ; but those who with a special desire to serve her, with tenderness of affection, and with fidelity consecrate themselves to her love, place in her their whole confidence, their whole soul, — these indeed are the most precious jewels of her crown, the richest portions of her inheritance, and the most sensitive portion of her heart, her especial, her dearest, her choicest favorites. *Ego diligentes me diligo.* I love, she says, them that love me, and I not only love them, but I *cherish* them with the partiality, the tenderness, of a mother and of a spouse. The word *diligere*, which she here uses, signifies much more than *amare*, since *amare* is a common term for love of all sorts, however low its sphere or ordinary its character ; but *diligere* signifies a very strong, special, and most partial love, and distinguishes and selects the one loved, and prefers him to all others. Mary is not satisfied with saying she merely loves those that love her, *Ego amantes me amo*, but, *Ego diligentes me diligo*, that she distinguishes and selects them and prefers them to every one else, in graces, favors, love, and protection. *Agnoscit Virgo et diligit diligentes se, et prope est in veritate invocantibus se, præsertim his, quos videt sibi conformes factos in castitate et humilitate, et totam spem suam post Filium suum in ea posuisse.* ‘The Holy Virgin acknowledges,’ says St. Bernard,* ‘and dearly loves, them that love her, and she is near them that call upon her, especially those whom she sees like her in chastity and humility, and after her Divine Son have placed their whole hope in her.’ She desires to be loved ; she goes before, entices, seeks after some one to give her his heart. She entreats him, ‘My son, give me thy heart.’† ‘She preventeth them that covet her, so that she first showeth herself unto them.’‡ *Ipsa tales quærit*, says the great Saint Bonaventura,§ *qui ad eam devote et reverentur accedunt ; hos nutrit, hos in filios suos suscipit.* ‘She seeks for those who devoutly and reverently approach her ; these she cherishes, these she adopts as her children.’ And in fact, the demonstrations and expressions of love which this most kind Lady has deigned to use with her lovers are most wonderful. They seem almost incredible. In the preceding Lesson we have related a great many, and we will give a few more here in confirmation of her loving gratitude and most partial tenderness towards whomsoever consecrates his heart to her love. A Spanish youth of the Cistercian Order had dedicated himself entirely to the service and love of Mary, so that he had her ever in his thoughts, in his heart, and in his mouth. He became seriously sick, so that his recovery was beyond all hope, and in this state the Most Holy Virgin, his Lady and his love, appeared to him, and assured him that on the seventh day from that she would return and receive his soul. When the seven

* Serm. super *Salve Regina*.

† Wisdom vi. 14.

‡ Prov. xxiii. 26.

§ *Stimul. Divin. Amor.*, p. 3, c. 16.

days were passed, the prior of the monastery saw during the night a company of most beautiful young men, all clothed in white, come to receive and accompany the soul of the fortunate youth, who, full of joy, amid the melodies of the angels, breathed forth his most happy soul into the arms of his most beloved Lady.* A lover of Mary became so enamored of her beauty and merit, that his life was no more than a continual death, amid sighs and tears. He wept and lamented so greatly, that he at last moved the most kind Virgin to compassion, and one day, when he had prayed and wept more than usual, she appeared to console him, seated in all her beauty on a throne of seraphim. The devout lover, being unable to restrain himself at such tenderness and return of love, was so overcome by the vehemence of his ardor, that, lost in a sea of love and contentedness, he breathed forth his happy soul.† Behold with what promptness and delight Mary returns the affection of them who love her! Unhappy that we are! we sometimes lose ourselves for creatures that value not, care not, for our affection, are not pleased with our service; perhaps contemn and laugh at our most passionate attachment for them, and our most heartfelt and tender expressions, and who are not even grateful for our most precious gifts, which they consider simply their due. And shall we not resolve to love her who, possessing little less than infinite merit, yet loves us so tenderly, so earnestly desires our heart, is pleased with our affection, and responds to our love with the most obliging demonstrations of gratitude, the most constant fidelity, and effects the most advantageous to our highest interests? Let us no longer be so foolish. Let us love Mary, who alone can make us contented and happy in this world by her love, and for ever blessed in the next by the enjoyment of her and of God." — pp. 155 – 160.

We are tempted to make one more extract from this charming volume.

"Mary loves us, and she loves us, as we have shown, with an insuperable and invincible love, more than could all the mothers, sisters, and spouses of the world, if they should all unite with one heart to love us. She loves us with a most effectual love, desiring, willing, and procuring our greatest temporal and spiritual good; and what is still more, she loves us although ungrateful, faithless, and sinful. How much would she love us, then, if we corresponded to her love, loved her in return, were faithful to her, and gave her our whole confidence, our whole heart! We have seen that she is most grateful, and knows no bounds in her love for those that love her, and loving us in this manner and so effectually, will she not wish to see us contented and happy? Will she not wish to secure

* Pelbart, *Stellar.*, lib. 2, part 3, art. 3, *Hesar*, etc.

† Pelbart., *Nierem.*, L'Honer, Bibl. man.

our eternal beatitude? Will she not advocate our cause before the tribunal of the Divine Mercy? Will she not incessantly request of God our eternal salvation? Who can doubt it? If she has not permitted those who could no longer live to pass from this life, even requiring a dispensation of the laws of nature to recall those who were almost dead, that they might not perish eternally, merely because they had preserved some shadow of devotion, and had placed some confidence in her protection, will she permit the truly devout, her faithful lovers, to perish? O, I should think a doubt so impious, so injurious to her, little less than blasphemy! No, no, Parthenio. She wishes absolutely our salvation; she wishes us to praise and bless her, — to thank and love her eternally in heaven, — and therefore she desires and continually prays to her Son for our salvation. And if she wishes it, and requests it, will her Son deny it? Will that Son, who has granted her a hundred and a thousand times the salvation of the most obstinate, the most desperate, the most hopeless sinners, — will that Son deny her the salvation of her faithful servants, of her tender lovers, — that Son who has given her the half of his kingdom, making her Queen and Mother of Mercy, precisely because he wishes all to be saved, — that Son who, wishing to redeem the human race, deposited its whole price in her hands,* — that Son who has committed to her the dispensation of his blood,† that she might dispense it to her children?‡ Sooner shall the heavens fall, and the earth be burnt to ashes. It is impossible that the Mother of God should not obtain what she asks of her Son.§ What she seeks, she finds, and her prayer is always heard.|| And it is certain that if, *per impossibile*, Mary should demand the salvation of a sinner, and on the other side all the angels, all the saints, and all the just should demand his condemnation, the sinner would be saved, because Mary alone would be heard. Because, says St. John Damascen, there is as it were an infinite distance between the Mother of God and his servants; because God loves the Virgin alone more than all the elect; and finally, because the prayers of the saints, as says St. Antoninus, rest solely on His mercy; but the prayer of Mary rests on her own merits, she having merited *de congruo* for the predestined all the helps of grace,¶ and on the right which, as Mother, she has over Christ, who as her son, by the law of nature and evangelical

* *Redempturus humanum genus, pretium universum contulit in Mariam.*
— S. Bernard., *De Aquæduc.*

† *Commissa est illi Domini sanguinis dispensatio.* — S. Anselm.

‡ *Et Filiis suis postea dispensare.* — S. Bernardin. da Siena.

§ *Impossibile est Deiparam non exaudiri.* — S. Antonin., part 4, tit. 15, c. 17, § 4.

|| *Quod querit invenit, et frustrari non potest.* — S. Bernardus.

¶ *Recapito, De Sign. Prædestin.*, c. 12, n. 279.

justice, can deny her nothing. *Oratio sanctorum innititur tantum misericordiæ ex parte Dei ; oratio autem Mariæ etiam juri naturali et justitiæ Evangelii.* 'Therefore, he adds, the prayer of the Virgin has almost the force of a command. *Oratio Deiparæ habet rationem jussionis et imperii.** The question is treated by Suarez,† and solved as I have here explained it ; and the Doctors all agree in this, that neither the power nor the will can be wanting to Mary. *Nec facultas, nec voluntas illi deesse potest.* She has the power and the will to save us ; we shall then be saved.

“ In confirmation of this necessary conclusion, and for your greater consolation, let us see what the Saints and Doctors say on this point ; and because there are many who treat this subject, I will, without any order of preference, give you them one by one in their very words. And first of all, I meet with the celebrated sentence of St. Anselm ; ‡ given by St. Bonaventura,§ which, for its greater credit, was subjected to the examination of the theologians, and, as Mendoza || attests, was found true in all scholastic rigor. St. Anselm then says : ‘ O most blessed Virgin, as it is impossible for any one to be saved abandoned by thee, so it is impossible for him to perish who turns to thee, and is regarded by thee.’ *Virgo beatissima, sicut impossibile est ut a te despectus salvetur ; ita ad te conversus et a te respectus impossibile est ut pereat.* This is, in truth, O Parthenio, a great sentence, and one that should greatly console the lovers of Mary, and take from them all fear and apprehension for their eternal salvation. And St. Anselm confirms this as his opinion in many places. ‘ It is sufficient that thou desirest our salvation, O Mary, and we cannot but be saved.’ *Tantummodo velis nostram salutem, et vere nequaquam salvi esse non poterimus.* ‘ He shall not hear the eternal curse, for whom Mary shall pray even once.’ *Æternum væ non sentiet pro quo vel semel oraverit Maria.* After St. Anselm comes St. Antoninus, who says the same thing in almost the same words. *Sicut impossibile est, ut illi a quibus Maria oculos suæ misericordiæ avertit salventur, ita necessarium est, quod hi ad quos convertit oculos suos pro eis advocans, salventur et conglorificentur.* ‘ As it is impossible that they should be saved from whom Mary turns away the eyes of her mercy ; so also it is necessary that they upon whom she turns her eyes, advocating their cause, should be saved and be glorified.’ ¶ And here take notice of the word *necessary*, by which he means that those who are devout to Mary must necessarily be saved. In the third place comes St. Bonaventura, who in a great many places agrees with St. Anselm, saying, *Qui perstat in obsequio tui, procul fiet a perditione.* ‘ He that perseveres

* S. Antonin., part 4, tit. 11, c. 17, § 4.

† Tom. II. part 3, disp. 23, sect. 2.

‡ *De Excell. Virg.*, c. 11.

§ *Virid.*, lib. 2, prob. 9.

¶ *Specul. Virg.*, c. 3.

¶ St. Antonin., part 4, tit. 5.

in thy service shall not be lost.' *Pax multa diligentibus te Domina ; anima eorum non videbit mortem in æternum.* ' They that love thee, O Lady, shall enjoy much peace ; their soul shall not see death for ever.* ' To know thee, O Virgin, Mother of God, is the way of immortality, and to recount thy virtues is the way of salvation.' *Scire et cognoscere te, Virgo Deipara, est via immortalitatis, et narrare virtutes tuas est via salutis.*† *Auditi, gentes, qui cupitis Regnum Dei : Virginem Mariam honorate, et invenietis vitam æternam.* ' Give ear, O ye nations, that desire the kingdom of God ; honor the Virgin Mary, and you shall find eternal life.'‡ *Qui acquirunt gratiam Mariæ, cognoscentur a civibus Paradisi ; et qui habuerit characterem ejus, adnotabitur in libro vitæ.* ' They that gain the favor of Mary shall be acknowledged by the citizens of Paradise ; and they that bear the mark of her servants shall be registered in the book of life.'§ *Qui speravit in illa porta cæli reserabitur ei.* ' The gate of heaven shall be opened to him who has hoped in her.' St. Bernard called the love of Mary, and devotion to her, a certain sign of obtaining eternal salvation, — *certissimum signum salutis æternæ consequendæ.* And the Blessed Alain says, *Habenti devotionem hanc, signum est prædestinationis permagnum.* ' This devotion is a sure sign of predestination to the possessor.'” || — pp. 189 – 194.

These extracts will serve as a specimen of the style and spirit of this admirable work, and will satisfy the devout reader that the author writes with a genuine love of Mary. We have too limited an acquaintance with the excellent works on devotion to Mary with which our literature abounds, to be able to speak of the merits of this volume in comparison with other works of its class ; but we have found none which has edified us more, or which contains more appropriate or more profitable meditations for the beautiful devotions of the month of May, or more properly the month of Mary. The heathen dedicated this month to the worship of an impure goddess, and most fitting is it that Christians should devote it to the worship of Mary, the mother of chaste love ; and better helps to the appropriate devotions of the season, or indeed for any other month in the year, than are to be found in the little volume before us, can hardly be desired. The work, as far as we are informed, has not been hitherto translated into our language, and it is therefore with pleasure that we learn

* In Ps. 118.

§ Id. in Specul.

† In Ps. 83.

|| Part 2, *Rosar.*, c. 11.

‡ S. Bonav., in Psalt.

that a translation of it from the Italian into English is now in preparation. We are sure it will be welcomed as a very acceptable addition to the many excellent works already in possession of the faithful for the devotions of our Most Holy Mother.

We need not say that works on the love and veneration of Mary can hardly be too much multiplied, for that love and veneration cannot be carried to excess. No doubt, wherever there is strong faith and lively devotion, without proper instruction, there may chance to be manifested now and then something of superstition, whether the immediate object of worship be the saints or even God himself; for there is nothing which men cannot abuse. But superstition, except as combined with idolatry and unbelief, or misbelief, is not one of the dangers of our times; and as the worship of Mary is the best preservative from idolatry, heresy, and unbelief, so is it the best preservative from superstition. Her clients will never become spiritual rappers, or abettors of modern necromancy. Her devout children will not be found among those who call up the spirits of the dead, and seek to be placed in communication with devils. The devils fly at her approach, and all lying spirits are silent in her presence. She is Queen of heaven and earth, and even rebellious spirits must tremble and bow before her. Demon-worship is undeniably reviving in the modern Protestant world, and especially in our own country, and even in this good city of Boston; and there is no room to doubt that it is owing to the abandonment of the worship of Mary, which carries along with it the abandonment of the worship of her Son, the Incarnate God. Where Mary is not loved and honored, Christ is not worshipped; and where Christ is not worshipped, the devils have the field all to themselves. The first symptom of apostasy from Christ and of a lapse into heathenism is the neglect of the worship of his Most Holy Mother, and the rejection of that worship as superstition or idolatry; because that involves a rejection of the Incarnation, which comprises in itself all Christianity. Christianity is held only when the Incarnation is held, and when that is held, Mary is held to be the Mother of God, and deserving of all honor as such. We cannot doubt the propriety of worshipping Mary till we have doubted her relation as Mother of God, and to doubt that is to doubt the whole Mystery of the Incarnation.

In its bearings on Christian faith and worship, then, we cherish the love of Mary, and are anxious to see devotion to her increased. But we are also anxious to see it increase, as the best preservative against the moral dangers of our epoch. Mary is the mother of chaste love, and chaste love is that which in our age is most rare. The predominating sin of our times is that of impurity, at once the cause and the effect of the modern sentimental philosophy. All the popular literature of the day is unchaste and impure, and it boldly denounces marriage as slavery, and demands that loose reins be given to the passions. Catholic morality is scouted as impracticable and absurd; law is regarded as fallen into desuetude; intellect is derided; reason is looked upon as superfluous, if not tyrannical; and the heart is extolled as the representative of God on earth. Feeling is honored as the voice of the Most High, and whatever tends to restrain or control it is held to be a direct violation of the will of our Creator. Hence passion is deified, and nothing is held to be sacred but our transitory feelings. Hence everywhere we find an impatience of restraint, a loud and indignant protest against all rule or measure in our affections and all those usages and customs of past times intended as safeguards of manners and morals, and a universal demand for liberty, which simply means unbounded license to follow our impure or perverted instincts, and to indulge our most turbulent and unchaste passions, without shame or remorse.

The sentimental philosophy taught by that impure citizen of Calvin's city of Geneva, Jean Jacques Rousseau, in his *Confessions* and *Nouvelle Héloïse*, and which is popularized by such writers as Goethe, George Sand, Eugene Sue, Thomas Carlyle, Theodore Parker, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Margaret Fuller, and, to some extent, Bulwer Lytton, consecrating corrupt concupiscence, has effected an almost universal dissolution of manners and depravation of morals. All bonds are loosened, and the very existence of society is threatened by the fearful and unrelenting warfare waged upon the family as constituted by Catholic morality. The terrible revolutions which for the last sixty or seventy years have shaken society to its foundations, and which have been repressed and are held in check for the moment only by the strong arm of arbitrary power, are only the outward manifestations of the still

more terrible revolutions which have been going on in the interior of man; and the anarchy which reigns in society is only the natural expression of the anarchy that reigns in the bosom of the individual. In the non-Catholic world, and even in nominally Catholic countries, impurity has gained a powerful ascendancy, and seeks to proclaim itself as law, and to denounce whatever is hostile to it as repugnant to the rights both of God and man. Chastity is denounced as a vice, as a crime against nature, and the unrestrained indulgence of the senses is dignified with the name of virtue, nay, is denominated religious worship, and we may almost fear that fornication and adultery may again be imposed as religious rites, as they were in ancient Babylon and other cities of the East.

The last, perhaps the only, remedy for this fearful state of things, is to be sought in promoting and extending the worship of Mary. Society is lapsing, if it has not already lapsed, into the state in which Christianity found it some eighteen hundred years ago, and a new conversion of the Gentiles has become necessary. Christian society can be restored only by the same faith and worship which originally created it. Jesus and Mary are now, as then, the only hope of the world, and their power and their goodwill remain undiminished. The love of Mary as Mother of God redeemed the pagan world from its horrible corruptions, introduced and sustained the Christian family, and secured the fruits of the sacrament of marriage. It will do no less for our modern world, if cultivated; and we regard as one of the favorable signs that better times are at hand, the increasing devotion to Mary. This increasing devotion is marked throughout the whole Catholic world, as is manifest from the intense interest that is felt in the probable approaching definition of the question of the Immaculate Conception. Nowhere is the change in regard to devotion to Mary as the Mother of God more striking, than among the Catholics of Great Britain and of our own country. This devotion is peculiarly Catholic, and any increase of it is an indication of reviving life and fervor among Catholics; and if Catholics had only the life and fervor they should have, the whole world would soon bow in humble reverence at the foot of the cross. It is owing to our deadness, our lack of zeal, our lack of true fervor in our devotions, that so many nations and

such multitudes of souls are still held in the chains of darkness, under the dominion of Satan.

There are two ways in which the love and service of Mary will contribute to redeem society and restore Christian purity, — the one the natural influence of such love and service on the heart of her worshippers, and the other the graces which in requital she obtains from her Son and bestows upon her clients. Mary is the mother of chaste love. The nature of love is always to unite the heart to the object loved, to become one with it, and as far as possible to become it. Love always makes us like the beloved, and we always become like the object we really and sincerely worship. If we may say, Like worshippers, like gods, we may with equal truth say, Like gods, like worshippers. The love of Mary tends naturally, from the nature of all love, to unite us to her by a virtue kindred to her own. We cannot love her, dwell constantly on her merits, on her excellences, her glories, without being constantly led to imitate her virtues, to love and strive after her perfect purity, her deep humility, her profound submission, and her unreserved obedience. Her love checks all lawlessness of the affections, all turbulence of the passions, all perturbation of the senses, fills the heart with sweet peace and a serene joy, restores to the soul its self-command, and maintains perfect order and tranquillity within. Something of this effect is produced whenever we love any truly virtuous person. Our novelists have marked it, and on the strength of it seek to reform the wild and graceless youth by inspiring in his heart a sincere love for a pure and virtuous woman; and the most dissolute are restrained, their turbulence is calmed, their impure desires are repressed, in the presence of true virtue. If this is so when the beloved is but an ordinary mortal, how much more when the beloved, the one with whom we commune, and whose virtues we reverence and long to possess, is Mary, the Mother of God, the simplest and lowliest of handmaidens, but surpassing in true beauty, loveliness, and worth all the other creatures of God!

When the type of female dignity and excellence admired is that of an Aspasia, a Lamia, a Phryne, a Ninon de l'Enclos, society is not only already corrupt, but is continually becoming more corrupt. So when the type of female worth and excellence, the ideal of woman, is Mary,

society is not only in some degree virtuous, but must be continually rising to sublimer excellence, to more heroic sanctity. The advantage of having Mary always before the minds and hearts of our daughters, as their model in humility, purity, sweetness, and obedience, in simplicity, modesty, and love, is not easily estimated. Trained up in the love and imitation of her virtues, they are trained to be wives and mothers, or holy virgins, spouses of Jesus Christ, sisters of the afflicted, and mothers of the poor. The sentimentalists of the day tell us that it is woman's mission to redeem society from its present corruption, and we believe it, though not in their sense, or for their reasons. Woman has generally retained more of Catholic faith and morality than has in these evil times been retained by the other sex, and is more open to good impressions, or rather, offers fewer obstacles to the operations of grace. During the worst times in France, when religion was abolished, when the churches were desecrated, the clergy massacred, and the profane rites of the impure Venus were revived, the great majority of the women of France retained their faith, and cherished the worship of the Virgin. We have no sympathy with those who make woman an idol, and clamor for what they call "woman's rights," but we honor woman, and depend on her, under God, to preserve and diffuse Catholic morality in the family, and if in the family, then in the state. There is always hope for society as long as woman remains believing and chaste, and nothing will contribute so much to her remaining so, as having the Blessed Virgin presented to her from the first dawn of her affections as her Mother, her Queen, her sweet Lady, her type of womanhood, a model which it must be the unremitting labor of her life to copy.

Undoubtedly the love and service of Mary are restricted to Catholics, and to those Catholics not undeserving of the name; but this is no objection to our general conclusion. We are too apt to forget that the Church is in the world, and that it is through her that society is redeemed, — too apt to forget that the quiet and unobtrusive virtues of Catholics, living in the midst of a hostile world, are always powerful in their operations on that world; and that the world is converted, not by the direct efforts which we make to convert it, but by the efforts we make to live ourselves as good Catholics, and to save our own souls. The little

handful of sincere and devout Catholics, the little family of sincere and earnest clients of Mary, seeking to imitate her virtues in their own little community, are as leaven hidden in three measures of meal. Virtue goes forth from them, diffuses itself on all sides, till the whole is leavened. No matter how small the number, the fact that even some keep alive in the community the love and veneration of Mary, the true ideal of womanhood, the true patroness of the Christian family, the mother of chaste love, adorned with all the virtues, and to whom the Holy Ghost says, "Thou art all beautiful, my dove," must have a redeeming effect on the whole community, and sooner or later must banish impurity, and revive the love of holy purity and reverence for Catholic morality.

For, in the second place, the worship of Mary is profitable, not only by the subjective effect it has upon her lovers, but also by the blessings she obtains for them, and, at their solicitation, for others. In these later times we have almost lost sight of religion in its objective character. The world has ceased to believe in the Real Presence; it denies the whole sacramental character of Christianity, and laughs at us when we speak of any sacrament as having any virtue not derived from the faith and virtue of the recipient. The whole non-Catholic world makes religion a purely subjective affair, and deduces all its truth from the mind, and all its efficacy from the heart, that accepts and cherishes it, so that even in religion, which is a binding of man anew to God, man is every thing, and God is nothing. At bottom that world is atheistical, at best epicurean. It either denies God altogether, or excludes him from all care of the world he has created. It has no understanding of his providence, no belief in his abiding presence with his creatures, or his free and tender providence in their behalf. Faith it assumes is profitable only in its subjective operations, prayer only in its natural effect on the mind and heart of him who prays, and love only in its natural effect on the affections of the lover. This cold and atheistical philosophy is the enlightenment, the progress, of our age. But we who are Christians know that it is false; we know that God is very near unto every one of us, is ever free to help us, and that there is nothing that he will not do for them that love him truly, sincerely, and confide in him, and in him only.

Mary is the channel through which her Divine Son dispenses all his graces and blessings to us, and he loves and delights to load with his favors all who love and honor her. Thus to love and serve her is the way to secure his favor, and to obtain those graces which we need to resist the workings of concupiscence, and to maintain the purity of our souls, and of our bodies, which are the temple of God. She says, "I love them that love me," and we cannot doubt that she will favor with her always successful intercession those whom she loves. She will obtain grace for us to keep ourselves chaste, and will in requital of our love to her obtain graces even for those without, that they may be brought in and healed of their wounds and putrefying sores. So that under either point of view the love and worship of Mary, the Mother of God, a mother yet a virgin, always a virgin, virgin most pure, most holy, most humble, most amiable, most loving, most merciful, most faithful, most powerful, cannot fail to enable us to overcome the terrible impurity of our age, and to attain to the virtues now most needed for our own individual salvation, and for the safety of society.

In this view of the case, we must feel that nothing is more important than the cultivation of the love and worship of Mary. She is our life, our sweetness, our hope, and we must suffer no sneers of those without, no profane babblings about "Mariolatry," to move us, or in the least deter us from giving our hearts to Mary. We must fly to her protection as the child flies to its mother, and seek our safety and our consolation in her love, in her maternal embrace. We are safe only as we repose our heads upon her bosom, and draw nourishment from her breasts. The world lieth in wickedness, festering in moral corruption, and it is a shame to name the vices and iniquity which everywhere abound. Hardly has childhood blossomed into youth, before it withers into old age. We have no youth, we have only infancy and worn-out manhood. What is to become of us? Our help is in thee, sweet Mother, and we fly to thy protection, and, O, protect us, thy children, and save us from the evil communications of this world, lost to virtue, and enslaved to the enemy of our souls!

ART. V. — *Compendium Theologiæ Moralis, Auctore JO-
ANNE PETRO GURY, S. J., in Collegio Romano, et in
Seminario Valsensi prope Anicium, Professore. Lug-
duni et Parisiis. 1850. 2 tom. 18mo.*

IN our Review for January last, we continued our remarks on the excellent book of Father Gury, and we hope to be able to bring them to a close in our present number. In our January article we cited a few passages bearing upon topics which are now of peculiar interest to Catholics in this country. The prospects of Catholicity here, owing to the mercy of God and to the portentous emigration from Catholic countries, during the last twenty years, are undeniably good. Yet the visible and invisible enemies of the Church seem to hope from that very emigration disastrous results for the Papal Chair. *Convenerunt principes in unum adversus Dominum, et adversus Christum ejus.* They meet at World's Conventions, and at Madiat gatherings, and they endeavor, with a zeal worthy a better cause, to convince Protestants, who are, or profess to be, alarmed at what they call the growth of Popery in America, that the second, or, at farthest, the third, generation of Catholics in this country will be any thing but Papists. It cannot be denied, that, humanly speaking, their anticipations are warranted by facts. No human institution, were it the most cunning production of the concentrated thought and labor of the most cunning men, could possibly withstand the opposition which the Church in this country has met, meets, and is to meet. The same thing is true of the Church, at a hundred epochs of her history which we could name. Within the memory of men now living, two illustrations of this matter have been permitted by the providence of God. The crusade of Young Europe against the Church, in the time of Napoleon the First, and the hardly less general attack of 1846–49, are the cases to which we refer. It certainly must cause no little wonder among the princes who met together to conspire against the Lord and against his Christ, that their well-digested plans should have failed in so signal and ignoble a manner. We can easily conceive the deep and deadly disappointment which filled the hearts of Kossuth, Mazzini, Baird, and company, when the exquisite schemes of the last revolution were frustrated by

unforeseen and humanly inexplicable causes. They must have felt as did the baffled Randal Leslie, who, "amidst the bewilderment of his thoughts, — at a loss to conjecture how this strange mischance had befallen him, sought to ascertain what fault of judgment he himself had committed, — what thread in his web had he left ragged and incomplete. He could discover none. His ability seemed to him unimpeachable, — *totus, teres, atque rotundus*. And then there came across his breast a sharp pang. For so vital a necessity to all living men is TRUTH, that the vilest traitor feels amazed and wronged, — feels the pillars of the world shaken, when treason recoils upon himself."

So, we repeat, feel the baffled conspirators against the peace of Christendom. Under a human aspect, the present state of Europe is passing strange. In May, 1848, what uninspired man could have foretold it? Consider that in that month all France, Germany, and Italy were at the mercy of the enemies of the Church of God, and, as they thought, were in their hands as clay in the hands of the potter. Look at the state of the world now, when only four years have passed away, and see how the Lord hath laughed them to scorn. To say nothing at present of the majestic attitude of the Church in America, look at France, Austria, and Italy, with their respective governments re-established, and far more than reestablished. Think what a change was that wrought, sorely against their will, by the revolution in Austria, which enabled the young and pious Francis Joseph to decree and to bring about the downfall of Josephism. What a change in France, when a Napoleon the Third, who *may*, and we hope will, turn out to be the eldest son of the Church, was elevated upon the ruins that French atheists had made, and has to construct from those ruins another FRANCE. What a change in Italy! A writer in a contemporary revolutionary publication, who professes to be in the secrets of 1848, says that the fate of the other Continental revolutions depended upon the event of the Roman conspiracy. It is quite probable. The Church was the real power to be overcome, and the instalment of Mazzini in the place of Pius the Ninth might well appear to the revolutionary crowd as a centre of unity to the European Reign of Terror. It must be confessed that all the art and all the force at the command

of revolutionary Europe were employed to keep Mazzini at the Capitol. Yet there is the unarmed Pontiff, returned to his chair. The man who under God restored the Pope to Rome was, five years ago, a private citizen, without position, influence, or means, and as little likely to do such great things as any John Smith of them all. Napoleon the Third must not seldom, when he is alone, wonder at the things which have been done by his instrumentality. Pray God he may always remember whose instrument he is! The moment in which he shall say, even to himself, "*I did it!*" will be the beginning of his fall.*

The defeat of the revolution would not be so apparent, if the Pope had remained inactive, or at least quiet, since his return to Rome. The newspapers said that, as he had been restored by foreign bayonets, he would at least abandon the lofty prerogatives of St. Peter's Chair, and demean himself as a quiet creature of the bayonets which brought him back to the Vatican. Unquestionably, any, even the slightest, evidence of subserviency, on the part of Pius the Ninth, to the governments of Austria, Spain, Naples, and especially of France, would be most soothing to Red Republican nerves, inasmuch as it would enable them to get a little insight into the nature of the force that so unexpectedly crushed them. But no such evidence has been given. The majesty of St. Peter's Chair is asserted as vigorously in France, Austria, Naples, and Spain in 1853, as it was a hundred — two hundred — years ago; nay, more vigorously. And what is also to the purpose, the claims of that Chair are acknowledged in those countries now as they were then. No statesman thinks of asking concessions of Rome because of the revolution of 1848. And why not? Did it ever happen before, that a person restored to power by foreign intervention was not required to concede something to the intervening powers? Never, except at Rome, where it has happened right often. Will it ever happen again? Only at Rome. And why? Why should Rome, a weak power in a temporal point of view, enjoy such a privilege? Why should she enjoy it in an age like this, when material

* In speaking of the agency of Louis Napoleon in restoring the Pope, we must not, however, forget that he was sustained by the majority of the representatives of France, and that he only shares with Catholic France the honor of the noble deed.

power is the only force publicly recognized? How is it that this weak power, which, as men say, is upheld only by foreign bayonets, is enabled to speak to Sardinia and to New Granada in a tone no less authoritative than that employed by Gregory the Seventh, in speaking to the Catholic governments of his day? How is it that in England, the hereditary enemy of Rome, the words of Pius the Ninth are inflexible law, — law which the imperial majesty of Queen, Lords, and Commons can gainsay, but cannot withstand? Seven hundred years ago, — and we earnestly recommend this consideration to those Catholics who suppose that the interference of Popes in what are called temporal affairs, in ancient times, was based, not upon divine law, but upon the temporary concessions of kings, — seven hundred years ago, — seventeen hundred years ago, the Papal Chair, in its intercourse with human governments, used language not a syllable less authoritative than the language held by Pius the Ninth in speaking to human governments in this year of grace, 1853. If the words of the unarmed Pontiff were powerless, — if they were like the words of a Patriarch of Constantinople, *once* the proud rival of Rome, now so low that even savages will not do her honor, — an argument might be raised. It is worthy of remark, that the heretical Patriarch of Constantinople usurps a tone not less dogmatic and decided than that of the Holy See. Yet who cares for it? Who does not care for the words of Pius the Ninth? It is not a little singular, humanly speaking, that Divine Providence should have selected as an especial field whereon to manifest the power of its earthly representative, the unarmed, meek priest of the Vatican, a country like England, which established a counterfeit Church against Rome, — which refused to recognize the existence of such a person as the Pope, and of such a place as Rome, and which has, these three centuries nearly, regarded herself as the earthly head of the Protestant league. She selects the hour when Rome is apparently weak to establish Protestant colleges for Catholic boys, and Rome quietly crushes the colleges. Rome divides her territory into dioceses, and sends a cardinal to London, notwithstanding the laws which provide that England shall not thus be divided, and that no cardinal shall tread English ground. Her ministers endeavor to find for her a logical ground whereon to stand, and, to their surprise, and

her discomfort, they find that the ground so earnestly sought is Roman ground. Through the mercy of God, many of them have returned to the Church, leaving her to the fate which God has decreed for those who have eyes, and see not, — who have ears, and hear not. *Induratum est cor Pharaonis.* The English Pharaoh is not a tittle less obstinate than the Egyptian was of old. England calls these and similar Roman movements Papal *aggressions*. It is a significant name. Had Russia, or France, or any first-rate power, — nay, had all combined attempted to do in England a tithe of what the unarmed Pontiff, in what looked like his hour of weakness, *has* done in that nation, what wars would have ensued! It *was* an aggression, — though not in the sense pretended, — and England, which knew no such place as Rome, and no such person as the Pope, has been compelled to submit. A few Guy Fawkes processions, a few church burnings, a Madiai meeting, a preconization of apostates like Gavazzi and Achilli, make up the sum of her weak protest against the everlasting Power that long since fulminated against her a sentence which no created power ever yet withstood, and which stands calmly by to await the inevitable result. When will earthly rulers comprehend that the Church, the *Catholic* Church, the *Roman* Catholic Church, the POPE, when we come to the last analysis, can also say, *Per ME reges regnant, et legum conditores justa decernunt?*

While writing these sentences, we read, from the last steamer's despatch, that Kossuth and Mazzini are in the field, or rather, overlooking it from a safe distance. Italy, it is said, is once more in arms. The story, as it is told in the papers, sounds very like a fabrication. Yet it is quite possible that the revolution has broken out again; for it is no secret that Mazzini and his company have their allies, bound by the ties of secret association, in every European city. We have been prepared these two years to hear without surprise that the enemies of the Church had again inaugurated the reign of terror. If it be true that they are now in the field, we must think that they have chosen an unfavorable time; for the governments are now on their guard, are vigorous and active, and will not show the weakness and irresolution of 1848. If they knew how to select their time, it is possible that they might triumph again for a season. A new revolutionary

movement, a miracle apart, is sooner or later inevitable; but, miracle or no miracle, it must finally be crushed. The present generation must pass off, and a new generation, reared according to Christian rule, must step upon the stage, before the revolution will be buried in the grave which befits it, — but buried there, whence it sprung, it assuredly will be.

Not only faith, but history, and a cool glance at the character of the men and the means upon which European democracy relies, assure us that the revolution, although it may cause much misery to the people, will fail, — meanly fail. A repetition of the scenes of 1848–49 may be in store for the world. They may endure longer than they did then; but their final and utter disappearance is as certain as it is that the sun will rise to-morrow. Hence we Catholics can afford to wait with a calm assurance of the result, taking care, however, to pray while we wait. The Pope may again fly from Rome, but penitent Rome will see him return in triumph to his chair. So we are not disturbed by the reports of a new revolution, for we well know that, if it have broken out, God permits it for the greater punishment of sinners, and for the greater exaltation of his Church. We know, too, that the Pope driven from Rome is more powerful than the Pope quietly seated in the Vatican. If the revolutionists were wise, they would let Rome, which means the Pope, alone. While playing out their game in other countries, they would strain every nerve to sustain the Pope at Rome in the very fullest exercise of the powers signified by his triple crown. Their reign might, in that event, last a little longer.

We repeat, then, that it is not a little singular, humanly speaking, that the Pope at no time, not even in the days of Hildebrand, exercised his powers more vigorously than he has since 1848. Even America has recently borne witness to this truth. Tuscany is certainly less than Rome, and the Grand Duke is a less important personage than the Pope. It is foolishly supposed in this country, that the two criminals called Madiari, who have been justly punished by the Tuscan authorities for revolutionary plots, were punished by Papal authority. So President Fillmore, through Mr. Secretary Everett, has, to use the caustic language of Archbishop Hughes, “become a petitioner side

by side with Lord Roden, and taken his place of hope and expectation in the antechamber of the Grand Duke of 'Tuscany.' The petition should not have been sent, for it was based upon false information, and it is likely to be received in a manner not at all flattering to our national pride. The Grand Duke can too easily retort. And as the common impression seems to be that the Grand Duke, like other sovereigns, reigns through the Pope, — *per me reges regnant*, — the petition should have been intrusted to Mr. Cass junior, and presented at the Vatican.

Father Gury, with his usual brevity, states the principles upon which these remarks are founded. He says (p. 58, Vol. I.), that all *human laws*, inasmuch as they are *secondary* rules, and subordinate to the First Rule, or law, — *primam regulam*, — are subject to the divine, or eternal laws, and that they bind in conscience only because of the law of God which commands us to obey them. He observes (p. 70), that a law of the Church binds, although it may not have been accepted in a particular state, — say England, — in consequence of a prohibition on the part of government. For the Church receives her power from Christ, and not from the civil authorities, of which she is therefore absolutely independent. The Pope (p. 61), either of his own authority or with a Council, can make laws for the whole Church, because to the Pope *alone*, as the successor of Peter, power over the whole Church was given by Christ. God only (p. 60) is supreme and universal Legislator, from whom, necessarily, all other legislators, whoever they may be, receive all their power, either mediately or immediately.

A little reflection upon these pregnant sentences will enable the reader to understand why the Pope, in 1853, is as powerful a personage as he was in 1253, and why Catholics, revolution or no revolution, Mazzini or no Mazzini, hear of these wars and rumors of wars with comparative equanimity, as knowing that God will assuredly direct whatever may happen to the greater exaltation of his Church, and to the greater confusion of his enemies.

We have dwelt upon this subject, because it has a direct bearing upon the thesis which was treated in the concluding portions of our last article on Father Gury. If, as faith, history, and baptized common-sense assure us, the anti-Catholic war now raging in Europe will end in the

defeat of our enemies, *a fortiori* the same war, which, under other forms it may be, is raging in America, will end in a similar defeat on this side of the ocean. Self-interest, the singular facilities afforded in this country for the acquisition of riches, mixed marriages, atheistical education, the structure of American society, which presents innumerable points of contact between Catholics and Gentiles in every department of political, civil, and social life, and, finally, our "democratic institutions," are means relied upon by our enemies for the subversion of the Church in this New World. In our number for January we offered a few considerations upon all these means of perversion, excepting the last, to which we shall refer before we close. So confident are some Protestants that these means are likely to bring about a general apostasy from the Church, that their leaders, in reply to anxious questions asked at London conferences, assure their British fellow-laborers in the bonds of Protestantism that there is no longer reason to apprehend any danger from the great Catholic Emigration. The second generation of Catholics, say they, or, at farthest, the third generation, will either become Protestant, or be so deeply imbued with the liberal spirit of American Protestant institutions, that the remnant of their Catholicity will do us no harm.

Protestants are not remarkable for clear views or for clear expressions when they treat questions of this sort. They have a confused idea that the engines set in motion by them may uproot Catholicity from the soil. We referred to this notion, which is certainly cherished by fanatical Protestants of the more ignorant class, when we said that anti-Catholic schemes which fail in Europe will, *a fortiori*, fail in America. One reason is that the Church, in this country, is free. Few, if any, secular trammels are imposed upon her by the law. It is true that in political, civil, and social life Catholics suffer many temporal disadvantages on account of their faith; but persecution of this sort never checked the progress of Catholicity. On the contrary, it is a fact familiar to the most common experience, that the Church thrives upon persecution. "Blessed are ye," says our Lord, "when they shall revile you, and persecute you, and speak all that is evil against you, untruly, — *mentientes*, — for MY SAKE." Indeed, if the enemies of the Church could repeat, in America, the scenes

of blood which they have so often caused, and which, notwithstanding the experience of eighteen centuries tells them that their machinations injure only themselves, they are threatening to repeat in Europe, it is plain enough that Catholicity here would be, as usual, the only gainer in the long run. Meanwhile the Church is free, in the sense that the American government does not pretend to the slightest prerogative of interfering with her in any of her operations in this country. She is therefore relieved from the necessity of encountering a thousand obstacles which she meets in Catholic countries, where even the best sovereigns, the Saints Henry and Louis, could not always resist the temptation of interfering with her affairs, which they could neither understand nor manage, and where the crowd of kings were bent upon making her a tool, — a noble tool, but still a tool of state. The absolute freedom of the Church in America, in this respect, is an obstacle in the way of Protestants, in their war against her, which they cannot remove, and, to do them justice, which they cannot understand. They take strange ground when they say that perfect freedom will endanger the existence of the Church in America. Where are the evidences of that danger? In the decline of Protestantism, the growth of Catholicity, — in the increasing subserviency, so broadly contrasted with Catholic freedom, of Protestantism to the mob, — in the multiplication of dioceses, missions, cathedrals, churches, religious houses, educational establishments, — in the fact that the Catholic voice has become so strong that Catholic principles have twice, if not thrice, of late been invoked in the settlement of American questions of the utmost importance? Surely these and similar developments do not portend evil to American Catholic life.

There is, however, another aspect to the question. It is undeniable that the peculiar "institutions" relied on by Protestants, although in assaulting the Church they will fare as the gates of hell have always fared in their attempts against the Rock founded by Christ, have yet picked off many unwary stragglers, and made of them as respectable Protestants as the nature of the case admits. The number of individuals who have been lost to the Church, and therefore to themselves and to heaven, in consequence of the want of churches, sacraments, and priests, and in consequence of our "democratic institutions," has

been much exaggerated of late in certain quarters ; but it is, nevertheless, very great. The loss of even one soul from these causes is a serious matter. But losses in consequence of the lack of spiritual assistance are, in the natural course of things, becoming more and more rare. Apostasies occasioned by "democratic institutions" are not numerous; more are caused by mixed marriages and godless schools; yet democracy, understood by many to mean atheism in politics, it is to be feared, causes, if not formal apostasy to any very great extent, at least much deadly sin. The exciting questions in regard to government and society agitated in the Old World during the last few years, and which cost so many thousands of lives in the streets of Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome, were freely discussed among ourselves, and although the discussion here did not end in an "apostrophe to the sword," as in Ireland, or in a terrible use of the sword, as on the Continent, it disclosed one very important fact; namely, that large numbers, who should have known better, were disposed to regard the revolutionary demon as an angel of light, and to lend him at least the support of their sympathy. It made it evident that the doctrine which teaches that democracy is the final cause of creation, and that all other forms of civil polity are illegitimate, usurpations of popular rights which of themselves justify rebellion without other cause, and which asserts the inherent and underrived sovereignty of the people, placing the irresponsible will of the multitude above all law, was a doctrine very generally held, almost as generally as its English and French atheistical authors could desire. Religion was declared to have nothing to do with politics, and we were compelled to witness the strange and afflicting spectacle of men calling themselves Catholics, professing to believe in the Holy Catholic Church, who nevertheless declared themselves wholly independent of her authority in all matters temporal, educational, or political. The evil was increased with us, since the great majority of Catholics here are Irish, or of Irish descent, by the ill-advised movements in Ireland during those eventful years. Some enthusiastic young men, impatient of "peaceful agitation" for legislative redress of grievances, undertook to improvise an Irish revolution, with what success it is needless to say. In their movement, the result of which the world has seen,

they endeavored to make it appear to Irishmen here and at home that the Irish cause, the justice of which no one questions, differed in no essential particular from that of the Continental democrats, radicals, or Red Republicans, and that the Irish clergy, in opposing their attempted revolution, transcended their sacerdotal province, and interfered with what was none of their business. Here were two grave errors which these young men committed, which, with other kindred errors and influences not necessary to specify, but which may all be summed up and referred to the spirit of rebellion congenial to fallen man, and which, strangely enough, renders him more impatient of a legitimate than of an illegitimate authority, led large numbers to forget the first principles of the Catechism, and to lend their active sympathy to the sworn enemies of that very Holy Catholic Church in which they professed to believe. Of course, under these errors and influences, sin, mortal sin, was often committed, and hence the tribunal of reconciliation and the altar were necessarily called upon to meet them. There arose a cry against "political priests." The cry, whatever else we may say of it, disclosed at least the extent of the ruin which modern democracy, as understood by the revolutionists and their sympathizers, had brought to souls, and the ruin it must still bring, if not resisted by the pastors of the Church. It was insisted on that democratic principles should be applied to the preaching of the Gospel, and to the administration of the Sacraments.

A popular vote, or the voice of a baptized radical, or an article in a paper controlled by a fallen Catholic, was regarded by some as a decision to which the priest, sent to preach and to teach, — the bishop, set by the Holy Ghost to rule over the flock, — the Pope, the very Vicar of Jesus Christ, — should submit. The radical, who seldom heard Mass, and never went to confession, volunteered not only to instruct, but to threaten the priest, and to tell him what doctrines he should not preach from the altar, and what decisions he should not give in the confessional. The fallen Catholic, it must be admitted, was logical in his doctrine. His democratic principles urged him to be consistent, — to apply them universally. They were Protestant, — atheistical; and if they were true in the street, in the shop, in the house, in the town-hall, how could they be false within

the walls of the "Catholic *meeting-house*"? They were adopted by him in the exercise of his sacred right of thinking for himself, — why should he give them up at the dictation of priest, bishop, or Pope?

Happily for souls, the mercy of God has so ordered it, that men who adopt false principles do not always carry them out to their full extent, and draw from them their last logical consequence. Thorough consistency would have made formal apostates of all these men. They would find only in the Protestant meeting-house a place, a desk, and a minister adapted to their views. Since 1848, moreover, people have had time for reflection. The current of thought has turned against the revolution. The follies and the crimes of the revolutionary leaders, their work resulting in destruction, without a rebuilding of the ruin which they everywhere left behind them, have become sufficiently apparent. On three occasions public feeling has been tested with satisfactory results. Kossuth has been decidedly rejected; Louis Napoleon has thus far been accepted; and Free-Soil radicalism has been condemned in the late Presidential election. The number of Catholics who cling to doctrines which the Church has anathematized is becoming smaller and smaller, and their influence has nearly gone. There have been two Jubilees within the last four years.

Nevertheless, such is the calamitous condition of the times, that there are still individuals who profess to be Catholics, while they openly avow atheistical doctrines. There are some who never approach the tribunal of mercy, because they know the sin will not be forgiven unless restitution be made. It is a common obstacle to confession. The restitution in this case, whether it consist in a reparation of scandal given, or in an abandonment of hitherto cherished errors, seems to many to be too hard a condition of reconciliation. Here is a point to which the attention of pastors in their respective portions of God's field is no doubt specially directed; many of the people are in danger of forgetting, if they have not already forgotten, their Catechism, in so far as it treats of the fourth commandment. Obedience is coming to be regarded, if not as a vice, at least as a shameful weakness; and we are forced to inquire whether obedience be really a Christian virtue, or only an evangelical counsel; whether disobedience to lawful authority be not a sin which easily becomes mortal, and there-

fore incurring eternal damnation ; and whether disobedience to legitimate authority be not an ordinary sin ? If it be, then the Protestants who augur good to themselves from the Catholic emigration are not wholly out in their calculations. Protestantism, and through it its father, the Devil, gains *souls*. Provided he gains these, think you he cares whether they come to him by formal apostasy, or by the breach of a commandment, be it the fourth or the sixth ? He gets them at any rate. Protestants are satisfied even if a Catholic stops short of formal apostasy. They prefer the radical Catholic, other things being equal, to the apostate, because when a Catholic goes over to heresy his motives are commonly so clearly criminal that even Protestants are rather ashamed of him, and scarcely know what to do with him. But a body of men lodged in the house of the deathless enemy of Protestantism, — men who, like them, revile the master of the house, but who refuse to go or to be turned out of it, may do them a little service. The Sacrament of Penance and the unity of the Church are the points of Catholicity peculiarly objectionable to Protestantism ; for the first affords a remedy to a disease which it does not wish to see healed in men, and the last, importing, as it does, the communion of saints, and the union of the humblest Catholic with the Pope through his bishop and pastor, makes the Catholic Church a kingdom, — a society with an established and irresistible government, — makes it one body with a front that no enemy has broken or can break. Humility and obedience, virtues necessary to salvation doubtless, are capital sins according to Protestantism, — they are the sum of sin. Hence, if a Catholic will renounce them, — if he will neglect the confessional, and stoutly declare his independence in all matters which he thinks not directly belonging to faith or morals, and of all ecclesiastical authority, he will be to Protestantism as welcome an ally as it can have, because, so far as in him lies, he has stripped Catholicity of its divine prerogatives and made it a mere sect. Indeed, our liberal young Catholics are inclined even to plume themselves upon their readiness to avow in public meetings their persuasions that the Church is only a “certain religious sect,” merely one among the innumerable sects of Christendom. With this concession, Protestantism has ample reason to be satisfied, for it reduces the Church to its own level. Alas that Catholics should be found who can play the viper,

and try to sting their Mother, the Church, as she presses them to her life-giving bosom! *Dicetur ei, Quid sunt plagæ istæ in medio manuum tuarum? Et dicet, His plagatus sum in domo eorum qui diligebant me!*

Disobedience was never other than an ordinary sin, and it is assuredly as common now as it ever was. Take aside a Catholic who has been bitten by the serpent of liberalism, and who is unwilling to turn his eyes to the sign of redemption that can heal him. Ask him to repeat the fourth commandment. Perhaps he has forgotten it; for the word *commandment* stinks in the nostrils of liberalism, and it is unwilling to receive a commandment even from God, unless it have the privilege of interpreting it in its own way, — that is, unless it can set itself above God, — a thing which Satan tried to do, and did not succeed. Perhaps, however, he remembers it. “Honor thy father and mother.” The commandment is easily fulfilled. The common interpretation of the precept is, that one should abstain from getting a bad name in the newspapers by positive ill-treatment or infamous neglect of one’s father or mother, and that the child should be obedient when disobedience is impossible, or when the penalties of disobedience are sharp and certain. Not the least Satanic characteristic of our age is the declaration of independence from parental control which children are expected by the world to make before they are old enough to walk alone. Slang expressions are substituted for the sacred names of father and mother, and the vile terms adopted very fairly express the intensity of the honor in which they hold their parents. Suppose, however, that the son endeavors to honor his father and mother. He is prone to think that he has kept the commandments. Did he study the Catechism when he was a boy? Yes. Let him repeat the explanation of the fourth commandment. He has forgotten it. But is he not bound in conscience to observe the substance of those things which he learned from the Church, when he was a child, as belonging to this commandment of God? Assuredly he is. And if the negligence be notable, and in a grave matter, may not his soul be in some danger? It may. Let us then turn over the leaves of a sixpenny Catechism. “*Are we commanded to obey only our father and mother?*” Not only them, but also our bishops, pastors, magistrates, and masters.” “*What is forbidden by this com-*

mandment? All contempt, stubbornness, and disobedience to our lawful superiors." Here is what the Catechism teaches. But these answers are susceptible of a benignant interpretation, and so a liberal fancies that he may save himself from the charge of breaking this commandment. The Bible, the word of God, is liberally interpreted in these days, so that it is made to mean any thing but what it says. Why should not the commandments be interpreted in a like manner? Why should they not be explained so as to mean that a man must not do that which he does not wish to do? Indeed, indeed, they are so explained. Take the commandment in question as an example. Parents are to be honored in the manner as above set forth. Bishops and priests are to be treated with a certain degree at least of outward respect, while they confine themselves to their spiritual functions, and leave the entire management of politics and of temporal matters generally, ecclesiastical property included, in the hands of seculars. As for magistrates, they are the creatures of the popular vote, — they are our servants, — they are made and unmade by our breath. Masters! We have none! We are sovereigns; we are not slaves!

Father Gury, *De Obedientia et Reverentia civium erga temporalem auctoritatem*, says: —

"We are bound by the natural law and the divine positive law, under the titles * of loyalty and duty, to reverence and obey our temporal superiors. For in the temporal order they stand to us in the place of God. Hence the Apostle † says: 'Let every soul be subject to higher powers, for there is *no power but from God*, and *those that are ordained of God*. Therefore he that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. And *they that resist purchase to themselves damnation*. For he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. Wherefore be subject of necessity, not only for wrath, but also for *conscience's sake*.' Wherefore," continues Gury,

* *Titulo pietatis*. Since the times of *Pius Æneas* the gentile world has lost the idea to which this term, *pietas*, belongs, and so the word is not easily translated. One of the terms used in the text, *loyalty*, is getting to be quite as strange to most ears. *Pietas*, in this connection, partakes of the meaning of the words employed above. It also conveys the notion of filial devotion.

† Rom. xiii. 1. et seq.

“ the Catechism of the Council of Trent treats of this obligation, together with the reverence due to parental and ecclesiastical authority.* Explaining the saying that magistrates are to be honored with an honor in a certain sense divine, the Catechism goes on to say: ‘ For if we render them honor (*cultum*), that is given to God, so a high dignity commands the veneration of men, inasmuch as it is an image of the Divine power, and with reverence we recognize in it the providence of God, who has assigned to magistrates (*principes*), as to His procurators, the direction of public affairs, and whom He regards as ministers of His power.’ See also many texts of Scripture, particularly that of 1 St. Peter ii. 13: ‘ Be ye subject therefore to every human creature for God’s sake, whether it be to the king as excelling, or to governors as sent by Him for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of the good. For so is the will of God, that by doing well you may put to silence the ignorance of foolish men, — as free, *and not as making liberty a cloak of MALICE*, but as servants of God.’ ” (Tom. I. p. 257.)

How harshly these sentences grate upon modern democratic ears! They have almost lost their meaning, in these Gentile days; and hence Protestants, with their customary irreverence for the word of God, never hesitate to reject a passage which does not suit them, or to explain it away in a manner which has a parallel, so far as we know, only in the desperate efforts which the unhappy Puseyites, who knew well that they should read their abjuration of their thrice-pestilent heresy, made to explain the Thirty-nine Articles of the English Establishment in some non-natural sense that would make them, in despite of the proprieties of the language, signify precisely what their framers meant they should not signify. But our present discourse is directed to Catholics. Is it not true that the doctrine here set forth sounds strangely also to many of them? Will not even some who call themselves Catholics denounce these sentences as favoring tyranny, as opposed to democracy, as subversive of the divine right of the people to self-government, as repugnant to all “civil and religious liberty,” and as fit only for slaves? How many of them will thus talk? Does not the spirit of the age — always

* P. III. 4 Præc. xvii. — xx.

an evil spirit — incite us all to talk in that strain? Since when was the unbaptized man, whose face is turned away from God, willing to practise Christian obedience, or any other supernatural virtue? Since when has the baptized man been freed from the temptation to imitate the unregenerated man in this, as in other sins?

It is not our purpose, in this article, to argue the point between radicalism and Christian politics. We have often discussed it, and shall often discuss it again in our pages. Our present purpose is to cite decisions of positive law, and to put two or three questions. One is, whether there is any divine law which convicts modern democracy of sin. Another is, what sort of a sin is it? Finally, whether Catholics in our country have been, are, or may be tempted to commit it. It is clear enough, if religion be supreme over politics, as it certainly is, — if modern radical doctrines be at variance with the fourth commandment, as they certainly are, — if this fourth commandment be yet binding upon the conscience of men, as nobody can deny, and if its breach incurs the penalty of eternal damnation, as it certainly does, — that, notwithstanding the outcry of baptized and unbaptized radicals, the sin must be placed in the same category with murder, theft, and lust, — all which three sins, by the way, seem so naturally to flow from modern radicalism, that Europe, in 1848 and the following year, became almost a Sodom because of them, and therefore must be admitted by all to fall legitimately under the cognition of the pastor of souls. The disturbed Catholic radical, then, if there be such a creature left among us, must admit that, in this matter as well as in others, he is bound to hear the Church, and must obey her voice, unless he is willing to renounce his hopes of eternal life. Well, the passages of God's word which we have quoted are very plain, and their sense is not easily mistaken. If you were a Protestant, you would scornfully reject them, or irreverently construe them in such way as would suit the "exigencies of the age," that is, the exigencies of your unruly passions, and of mine. But, as you profess Catholicity, and as you hold, in a general way, that you must hear the Church, and submit your own notions, picked up in the streets, to the voice of the Church when she tells you plainly what you must do to be saved, it is undeniable that, when she tells you that the profession of modern radicalism is a deadly

sin, you must not go about calling it a virtue, — you must not pride yourself upon holding it, and if you do, you must take care to renounce it a few moments before your death, supposing that you have the grace to die leisurely, with the Sacraments, and in your perfect senses, — a grace which does not, believe us, always attend the dying radical. Now the passages of God's word which we have cited are plain, are they not? Do they seem, in any way, to favor radical doctrines? You cannot, without declaring your absolute independence of the Church, and therefore of God, interpret them in your own sense, for no "prophecy of the Scripture is made by private interpretation." Infidels may wrest these Scriptures, as they always have done, to their own perdition, but you do not expect perdition, — at least you are not willing to meet it. You find in your profession of Faith the following paragraph: "I also admit the Holy *Scriptures*, according to that sense which our Holy Mother, the Church, has held and does hold, to whom it belongs to judge of the true sense and interpretation of the Scriptures." You must then take these passages in the sense of the Church.

Father Gury, after quoting them, and referring to the following authorities, among others: "*Fere omnium Patrum verba*; for example, *S. Just. Apol.* 1. 17; *S. Theoph. Antioch. ad Autol.*, Lib. I. 11; *S. Clem. Const.*, Cap. 12; *Tertull. ad Scap.*, Cap. 2; *S. Greg. Naz.* IV. 17; *S. Chrys. Hom. V. ad Ant.*; *S. Iren. adv. Hæres.*, Lib. V. 24; *S. Aug. in Ps.* 124, n. 7, *et De Civ. Dei*, Lib. V. 10, 11, 14, 15; *Conf. et Litt. Enc. Greg. XVI. et Pii IX.*, — propounds the question, "Is it ever lawful to refuse obedience to the constituted authorities of the land?" and answers: "In this matter, the doctrine of the Holy Scriptures, of the Fathers, of Popes, of Councils, of the Catechism of the Council of Trent, of St. Liguori,* and also of Gregory the Sixteenth, in his Encyclical Letter, Aug. 15th, 1832, and which expresses the entire Catholic tradition, may be summed up in a few words. As it is evident that human authority is *never* to be obeyed in those things which are contrary to the law of God, so it is clear that even wicked rulers, even if they abuse the authority confided to them, are most assuredly to be obeyed in all things which are *per se* lawful. 'From the

* *Hom. Ap.* VIII. 13.

pure sources of Scripture and tradition,' says Gregory the Sixteenth in his Brief of June, 1832, 'we are most plainly taught that the obedience which men are bound to pay to the authorities constituted by God, is commanded by a law which no man can rightly gainsay.'"

Father Gury then asks, "whether it may ever be lawful to rebel." And he answers, "NEVER!" He cites St. Liguori, who most emphatically condemns a contrary doctrine advanced by Gerson, "as most false and pernicious." * Both Gregory the Sixteenth, *in loc. cit.*, and St. Liguori, *ib.*, cite St. Thomas,† *De Reg. Princ.*, Lib. I. cap. 6, who asks, "What remedy is to be applied, if the government be excessively tyrannical? A modern radical would answer, An "apostrophe to the sword." And a liberal use of the sword, a Bem or Garibaldi would answer. The author of the work cited replies, that "the remedy is to turn to God." He adds, that, "if a people who are in this condition expect to obtain an answer to their prayers, they should *abstain from sin*, because by the Divine permission *bad men sometimes obtain sovereign power in punishment of the sins of the people.*"

This is strange doctrine, we repeat, to radical ears. It is founded upon the eternal truth, that it profiteth a man nothing to gain the whole world, if he lose his own soul. If the radical object, that this is making every thing of the other world, and nothing of this, we cannot deny it. Catholicity does not permit us to put earth before heaven, man before God. Radicalism does, but with what success even for this life, the poor, ill-used world knows too well. What have radicals, from Core, Dathan, and Abiron down to Kossuth, done to heal real evils? When or where did they fail to leave the land in a condition worse than that in which they found it? And when did a radical ever die any other than the death of a dog? Generally to the mortal eye — always to the eye of faith — "the earth broke asunder under their feet, and, opening her mouth, devoured them, with their tents and all their substance, and they

* *Hom. Ap. VIII. 13.*

† The work here cited is included in the works of St. Thomas, but that it was written by him has been questioned, and judging from its style, we certainly should not regard it as the production of the Angelic Doctor. — *Ed. B. Q. Review.*

went down alive into hell, the ground closing upon them, and they perished from among the people." * This story is told by Moses of certain radicals, who, in his time, talked precisely as the radicals of Europe talked in 1848. There is nothing new under the sun.

Father Gury, in his tract *De Legibus* (pp. 60 *et seq.*), has a few paragraphs which we will copy, as illustrative of the subject under consideration. Speaking of the efficient cause of Law he says: "When legitimate superiors, according to just law, command a thing to be done, they must be obeyed. This is certain, whether they received their authority immediately from God, or mediately from him through the people. For, in either case, they are placed by God to govern society, and therefore they reign by his authority. Hence, *in practice*, the famous question, whether secular rulers received their power mediately or immediately from God, is of no moment whatever." † In either case the law is to be obeyed. Radicals are in the habit of talking as if God reigned or had authority only in heaven. Whereas his government is as supreme, universal, and sure on earth, as it is in the other world. The radical may object, that, when a *legitimate* ruler commands a *just* thing, he may be obeyed. But when he is not legitimate, and when he commands an unjust thing, what then? We answer, that radical opposition to a government is an *a priori* argument in favor of that government. Radicals, in all countries, who set themselves up as state physicians, never turn out to be any other than quack doctors. The last state of a country managed by them is always worse than the first. If they drive out one devil from the nation, they introduce seven, each more wicked than the first. When a radical counsels reform, and when his selfish notions are not immediately apparent, as they generally are, he should be prepared to show that the measure proposed by him is really a good measure, that it is possible and expedient, and that the removal of what he calls an abuse will not bring about worse abuses. Per-

* Num. xvi. 31.

† This question has a practical importance in determining the relations of the temporal to the ecclesiastical sovereign, and the responsibility of the prince to the nation. It has, however, none in regard to the obligations of the individual. — *Ed. B. Q. Review*.

haps some one of the radicals who have figured in the world as reformers has satisfactorily met these difficulties. If so, we would be glad to know who he was, and when and where he lived. Then it is quite fair to ask him by what authority he denies the legitimacy of his ruler, or the justice of a law. The ruler can show his commission to govern, — ask the radical to show his. His authority is of his own creation. Perhaps, in a city numbering two hundred thousand inhabitants, he can get a few hundreds to attend his “indignation meetings,” and the cheers of his little knot of partisans are mistaken for the voice of the nation. But the same difficulty recurs, for they have as little right to speak in behalf of the nation as he has. Until they can show a commission superseding that of the ruler, who certainly has a commission, they are simply criminals.

Father Gury, in the same tract *De Legibus* (Cap. IV. art. 2, p. 69), thus discourses of the Acceptation of Law. It is a submission, on the part of at least the better and sounder portion of the people, whereby subjects formally or virtually accept the law. The author adds that, *per se*, the law, so far as its power of binding subjects is concerned, by no means depends upon its reception on the part of the people; otherwise all real authority and power, under any form of government, would be lost, and all social order would be at an end. Moreover, the following is a condemned proposition. It is the 28th among those condemned by Alexander the Seventh. “The people commit no sin, even when without any cause they do not receive a law promulgated by the chief of society.” *Ita omnes*, says Gury. We will close this portion of our article with a quotation from the tract already cited (Cap. V. art. 1), on the binding force of law. “*Per se*, a human law, promulgated by a legitimate ruler, can bind in conscience before God. For superiors are constituted by God with the power of commanding others. Hence, he that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. And they that resist purchase to themselves damnation.”

It is true that most of the citations we have made are from the introductory tracts in the science of Moral Theology; indeed, chiefly from the tract *De Legibus*. We wish here to call the attention of our readers to the state of things which has suggested our remarks, such as they are.

Such tracts as *De Pœnitentia*, and others not necessary to name, are, no doubt, studied well by those whom they concern; but is the case the same with the tract *De Legibus*? Theft and robbery are high crimes. So are disobedience and rebellion. Are they so regarded? Is it not the tendency, the spirit, nay, the COMMANDMENT of the age,—of this age of revolutions, to regard a crime, when committed against society, as worthy of an immortal crown, which, if committed against the humblest member of society, would be adjudged by the most radical jury worthy of the halter? Do not newspapers,—do not orators,—does not the creature of newspapers and of orators, “free and enlightened public sentiment,”—declare that murder and theft are crimes which deserve death or imprisonment when committed against the individual, and are virtues when committed against a nation? Read the leading articles in those newspapers which are “the most extensively circulated,”—read “popular speeches delivered to crowds of admiring citizens,”—read the speeches, the *two* speeches, of that simple tool of Kossuth and Mazzini, the poor, unfortunate Meagher, the dupe who has duped better men than himself,—and note the preconization of men as heroes and martyrs, because they were not private, but public, murderers and thieves. Pray, what else are the leaders of the Red Republican revolution in Continental Europe? When the state of Austria, or France, or Massachusetts, or any state, takes the life of a man, or deprives him of the whole, or of a part, of his property, it does it in its sovereign capacity,—it has received a COMMISSION to do such things,—it is, as the Apostle says, God’s minister; an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil. Only a magistrate, deriving his power immediately from God, or from God through the state, and therefore, as Gury observes, in either case God’s representative, can deprive the subject of property or of life. When a private person does the same thing, he is executed, or otherwise punished, because he had no right to do it,—he had no commission,—he rested upon his own authority, and so was a thief or a murderer. Now in what does he differ from modern revolutionists? That they shed rivers of blood, and appropriate millions of property, is notorious. They carry war into communities, and lay them waste with fire and sword, causing incalcu-

lable misery to thousands of bereaved families, without a commission other than that given and signed by themselves, — precisely the commission under which Professor Webster murders Dr. Parkman, and under which a thief breaks into a house to steal. Nay, the murderer and the thief can plead an excuse which Mazzini, Kossuth, and company cannot plead ; for most urgent private necessities — perhaps the want of bread — may have led him to the commission of murder and of theft, whereas Meagher, and other apologists for the wholesale murderers and thieves of Continental Europe, cannot urge a like excuse in behalf of their clients. It is not, of course, to be supposed that a few secret and wholly irresponsible clubs, scattered through the Continental cities, can give Mazzini and Kossuth a commission to murder and to rob. These men have no right, collectively or individually, to take property or life, and they cannot give a right which they have not themselves. It is sheer nonsense to call these secret clubs of midnight thieves and assassins by the name of the people, for they form not one hundredth part of the people. They were not commissioned by the people, they are not in any way the representatives of the people, over whom they, although few in number, exercise a reign of terror because they meet secretly. No one knows who they are, when or where they meet, or at what corner of the street, at what time of the day or night, some one of their hired assassins may be lying in wait to plunge a knife into his heart. It is known that they are few, and that the cowardice, or the simple, peaceful habits of the population, together with the secrecy of the meetings and the knowledge that the assassin is always ready to strike down a peaceable citizen at the command of the midnight gang, enable the few to keep the many in check, if not in bodily terror. Darkness and secrecy are powerful means of controlling men. Eastern tyrants and European revolutionists know it well. A few desperate men, say a thousand, with astute, unprincipled leaders, and with a gang of assassins in pay, can overawe a population of two hundred thousand inhabitants. It was done at Rome and in other cities in 1847–49. And the thousand men, with, of course, a few exceptions in favor of crazy enthusiasts, whose proper place was the madhouse, were desperate men of broken fortunes, who had nothing worldly to lose, and every thing to gain, by

revolution. Our genuine Abolitionists declaim against the tyranny of the American government in terms wonderfully like those which the European revolutionists employ against their own states. They are also a very small minority of our own population, — perhaps, like the Continental Reds, one in two hundred. Suppose our American people to be the quiet, peaceable population that the inhabitants, the *people*, of Europe are, and suppose that our Abolitionists meet secretly, and adopt the tactics of the European friends of the unhappy sophomoric Meagher. They would establish in America the reign of terror which the Reds have established in Europe. And do not lose sight of the fact, that our Abolitionists complain of a despotism which, if it be what it is said by them to be, is quite as atrocious as that equally imaginary despotism of which the Reds and their *liberalized* Catholic friends in this country prate, in their bombastic flights of what, in circles which are easily satisfied, goes by the name of eloquence. Why, our Free-Soil papers here in Massachusetts are now declaiming against the State Legislature in terms which Kossuth and Mazzini would do well to embody in their next proclamation against the Austrian and Italian governments. Finally, let it be remembered that, if all moral theology is to be thrown to the winds in this way, there is in *no* country, no matter how justly and wisely it may be administered, the least security against a revolution got up by a few men of desperate fortunes, against the general sense of the community. Our *liberal* Catholic friends would do well to remember this fact; — as for Protestant sympathizers with European revolutionists, it is useless to ask them to remember things which they have never learned. The principle which the revolutionists assert would justify any number of men, no matter how few, in any country, even in America, in conspiring for the overthrow of no matter how legitimate and good a government, and in committing robbery and murder to any extent, provided the conspirators call themselves patriots, profess to rob and murder, not in their own name, but in the name of the country, and deliver speeches full of high-sounding words signifying nothing, or worse. We wonder that ordinary criminals, murderers, highwaymen, and others, have not taken the hint given them by their more criminal brethren, and that they have not presented

their pistols or knives at the peaceable wayfarer in the name of the sovereign people,—in the name of God, Liberty, and Humanity. They might as well. Many of Mazzini's Roman patriots came from the mountains, where they had been living as freebooters, to assist in the inauguration of the ridiculous republic. When the thing was crushed by the mercy of God and the loyalty of the French nation, the brigands returned to their mountain fastnesses to escape the halter, and they have been ever since occupied in the pursuit of their trade, which is that of relieving the wayfarer of his money always, and of his life in most cases, as their caprice may determine. They are ready, at a moment's warning, to leave the mountains, and make the streets of Rome swarm with "Roman patriots." So easy is it to transform a highwayman into a patriot! Few men are more astonished at the change than the transformed man himself is.

The revolutionary doctrine is partly based upon the proposition, with which modern liberal writers are so deeply enamored, that democracy is the normal state of society, and that royalty is intrinsically a usurpation, against which the people, or any portion of them, provided it be large enough to excite a mob, can justly rebel. All Catholic doctrine and practice condemn this theory, as we have seen. We would like to have a *Meagherized* reader of theology, if there be such a person in the world, explain the solemn offices, prayers, and use of consecrated oils, which the Church of God appoints for the coronation of sovereigns, and the prayers which are offered, even in the Holy Sacrifice, for the king, or emperor, or chief magistrate, by whatever name he may be called under the constitution of the land. What do these offices, prayers, and unctions mean? Do they mean any thing? Does the Church of God, in using them, institute a solemn mockery of holy things? Are the prayers of the Church heard in heaven? Then, when the Church prays for the sovereign, and against the enemies of the state, does she mean what she says when she prays, or are her supplications poured forth in behalf of Kossuth, Mazzini, and company?

The tract *De Legibus* is read by some in the school of *ethics*. Ethics in Catholic schools, however new-fashioned, presuppose the reality of the natural law. In some establishments ethics are not made a separate branch of

study. In others they are presented in a modern, that is in a materialistic, or at least in an anti-scholastic method. In other schools ethics take their natural place as a tract in Moral Theology. This was and is the Catholic arrangement, and a departure from it has done the cause of moral theology no little disservice. There are some who will pass over our citations from Gury with the remark that they are too commonplace. Precisely for that reason we have cited them. The first chapter of the Catechism is the most commonplace chapter in that wonderful book; but is it not the very chapter which, in these days, when the truths it sets forth are so universally neglected or forgotten, should be stamped upon every regenerated heart in characters of living fire? The tendency of the separation of ethics, and particularly of the tract *De Legibus*, from moral theology, has had a tendency, which is now become more than a tendency, to regard disloyalty and rebellion, if not quite blameless, as a mere philosophical sin. Hence Mazzini, Kossuth, Meagher, and company are sometimes gently reprehended for imprudence, enthusiasm, and impatience, but are not held guilty of mortal sin.

We here take our leave, as a Reviewer, of Father Gury. If our voice could reach him, we would express our deep thankfulness for the good which he, as a master in moral theology, has done us, a humble student. We earnestly wish that some one of our enterprising Catholic publishers would import a number of copies. Perhaps a chapter adapted to peculiarly American wants, and written by an experienced theologian, would be a useful addition to the work. We intended to have made some further citations, but those we have made will, we trust, sufficiently commend the work, as well as sustain the remarks we have based upon them. We conclude by thanking the author again for the pleasure and profit we have derived from his pithy volumes; and we hope they will, especially the tract *De Legibus*, be diligently and reverently studied by all who have the direction of public opinion.

ART. VI. — *L'Ami de la Religion, Journal et Revue Ecclésiastique, Politique, et Littéraire.* Paris. February 1, 1853. No. 5483.

AMONG the numerous Catholic journals in France, there is none which, upon the whole, we prefer to the *Ami de la Religion*. It is conducted always in good temper, with great sobriety, solid learning, and sound judgment. Its tone is always free and independent, but it eschews novelties in theology, philosophy, politics, and literature, and is seldom diverted from its straightforward course in order to conform to the popular passion or caprice of the hour. It is usually well informed, and its statements are always made conscientiously; and without meaning to imply that we never find in it an opinion or a judgment from which we are disposed to dissent, we think it a model which all Catholic journals would do well to copy, especially in controversies which from time to time arise among Catholics themselves.

It is not unknown that several important questions have of late divided our Catholic friends in France, and given rise to very important controversies, such as the use of the Greek and Roman classics in the education of youth, and the competency of natural reason to attain to the principles of the law of nature, or natural morality, independently of the Christian revelation. The first of these questions seems now very nearly settled, and the extreme views of the excellent Abbé Gaume appear to be generally rejected. That there is no little paganism in modern society no one can really doubt, but that it has been introduced by using pagan classics as text-books in learning Greek and Latin, or that it would be eliminated by banishing them from our schools, and substituting the Scriptures and the Fathers, is not generally believed. On this question we gave our views one year ago, and have no disposition to go further into the discussion of it. The point which most struck us in the Abbé Gaume's work was its implied condemnation of the Church, popes, bishops, and great teaching orders, who had allowed the classics to be used for the last four hundred years in our Catholic schools. Education is under the supervision of the Church, and if she has sanctioned or suffered systems and methods of education in

schools under her control which have a direct tendency, as the Abbé Gaume and the *Univers* contend, to paganize society, her infallibility cannot, as it seems to us, be defended, and we must abandon her to her enemies. The opponents of the classics, as good Catholics, we must believe, had no right to condemn their past use in Catholic schools. All they had a right to do was to meet the question, whether, owing to the peculiar state of society at present, it would not be wise to discontinue them, — a question which we are not competent to decide, and which we leave to authority to dispose of, without obtruding any opinion of our own, either one way or the other. As long as the proper authorities judge proper to continue their use in Catholic schools, we must believe it to be proper; for they are our judges, not we theirs. We may say, however, that our sympathies in the controversy have been with the *Ami de la Religion*, and not with the *Univers*; for it has treated the subject in a Catholic spirit, while the *Univers* has treated it somewhat in a Protestant spirit.

The *Univers* is an able and brilliant journal, but it is the organ of a party. It is more brilliant than solid, and is imprudent and rash. We like its zeal; we like its earnestness; we like its Ultramontanism; but we cannot think that profound reverence for the Holy See and a perfect willingness on all occasions to submit without reserve to the Supreme Pontiff authorize one to treat bishops with disrespect. The party of which the *Univers* is the organ seem to be wanting in proper respect for all authority in the Church subordinate to that of the Pope, and to forget that bishops are placed over them by the Holy Ghost, and that they owe them submission. We cannot be accused of Gallicanism, or of the slightest Gallican tendency, and we go to the full length in asserting the prerogatives of Peter. Peter speaks to us through the Pope, but ordinarily the Pope speaks to us through our own bishop, and we appeal to our bishop, not from the Pope indeed, but to know what it is the Pope decides or commands. Our own bishop, as long as he is in communion with Rome, is to us the organ of the successor of Peter, as that successor is the organ of Peter himself. To despise our prelates is as anti-Catholic as to despise the successor of Peter. This important truth seems to us to be lost sight of, or but dimly seen, by the party in question, and

they appear not seldom to imagine that professions of profound respect for the Papacy authorize them to disregard the episcopacy; but no man who is wanting in submissiveness to his bishop can have a proper respect for the Pope, from whom his bishop has received his mission. I love, honor, and obey the Pope in the person of my bishop, as I love, honor, and obey my bishop in the person of my parish priest approved by him. To forget this, and to assert the Papal at the expense of the episcopal authority, is to run to an extreme no less dangerous than that of asserting the episcopal authority at the expense of the Papal. Errors of every description will soon become rife in the very bosom of the Church, if we forget that our bishops are pastors and teachers, and contend that even we laymen are at liberty to broach and defend any opinion we see proper, till there is obtained a formal decision against us from the Holy See. When the bishop of my diocese tells me that I am wrong, I am at least to presume that I am wrong, and to desist; and, except in extraordinary cases, I know no right I have to prosecute an appeal from his decision, for he is the Church to me. If he has erred, it is for his superior, not for me, to set him right, for he is placed over me with authority from the Holy Ghost both to teach and to govern me.

Lay journals, that is, journals conducted by laymen, are too apt to forget this, and to arrogate to themselves the right of judging the conduct of bishops, and of summoning them to the bar of public opinion, to answer for their administration. Journalists are very prone to regard themselves as overseers of the Church, and as invested with a supervision of all orders of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. But we need not say, that they have no authority in the Church, that they are as journalists neither pastors nor doctors, and that our Lord has assigned them no place in the government of his spiritual kingdom on earth. We have no right to publish a single word on religious or ecclesiastical matters without the permission of our ordinary, and even with that permission we should never publish any thing without the supervision of one who has authority to teach. If we forget this, and assume to ourselves the right to give freely, at our own pleasure, our own views of the government or administration of ecclesiastical affairs, and to interpret Catholic doctrines accord-

ing to our own private judgment, all our zeal, all our good intentions, and all our labors in defending religion and society against avowed enemies, even granting that we possess the most profound reverence for the Pope, will make but poor amends for the internal disorders we shall create, and the scandals we shall occasion.

Another controversy which is still going on is a philosophical controversy between the so-called Traditionalists and Rationalists, although these terms are exceedingly ill chosen. This controversy relates to philosophy, and the leader on one side is a M. Bonnetty, a layman, editor of the *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne* and the *Université Catholique*,—a man of good intentions and ardent zeal, with a little knowledge of almost every thing, but without any great strength or clearness of intellect, although he does not appear to be at all wanting in self-confidence. He finds much fault with the philosophy taught in most Catholic schools during the last three hundred years, and charges Catholic professors during that long period with having taught a philosophy which is uncatholic, unchristian, and directly leading to rationalism, pantheism, and socialism, because it recognizes in natural reason the power to attain to some elementary truths, and to distinguish, up to a certain point, between right and wrong in the natural order. He maintains, on the other hand, that we have, and can have, no natural knowledge of God or of duty, and that all we do or can know of either we know from an exterior supernatural revelation alone. That this is contrary to the philosophy which has always been taught in Catholic schools, ever since there were such schools, that it is contrary to the teaching of St. Augustine, St. Anselm, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventura, Suarez, Bossuet, Fénelon, not to say St. Paul, and common sense, there can be no question. The Abbé Cognat, editor of *L'Ami de la Religion*, enters the lists against M. Bonnetty, and maintains against him, not only that his own philosophy is unsound, but that he cannot condemn as he does that which has hitherto been taught, without failing in the respect which he owes to the Pope, bishops, doctors, and religious orders; for to say that these have, for three hundred years, taught, or suffered to be taught, in Catholic schools a false philosophy, or a philosophy which leads directly to rationalism, pantheism, and socialism, is to

pass upon them a severe condemnation, in which the Church herself cannot but be implicated. We have seldom seen a man more essentially used up, so to speak, than M. Bonnetty has been by the Abbé Cognat, and his feeble attempts to vindicate himself betray, we are sorry to add, either a confusion of understanding, or a want of strict moral honesty which we should hardly expect from a man in his position.

We have allowed ourselves to criticize with some freedom the psychological method of philosophizing countenanced to some extent by now and then even a Catholic professor, but we have never dreamed of setting ourselves up against the great Fathers of the Church, the mediæval doctors, and the distinguished moderns, such as Bossuet and Fénelon, or of passing a wholesale censure upon the philosophy taught in Catholic schools. We have criticized the Cartesian philosophy as to its method, not because it accords with the teachings of St. Augustine, St. Anselm, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventura, Suarez, and other approved doctors of the Church, as does M. Bonnetty, but precisely because it does *not* so accord. Bossuet, Fénelon, and other distinguished French Catholic philosophers, ordinarily ranked as Cartesians, avoid what we regard as unsound in the Cartesian system, or so explain it as to render it harmless. This system leads to pantheism as taken up and interpreted by non-Catholics, — who plant themselves on its errors, and not on its truths, we contend, — not as taken up and applied by our Catholic divines. But we are surprised to find M. Bonnetty ranging in the same category, under the name of rationalists and Cartesians, St. Augustine, St. Anselm, all the schoolmen, Liebnitz, Malebranche, Bossuet, and Fénelon, and making, furthermore, no distinction between psychologues and ontologists. He may be a learned man, a pious man, but he must permit us to tell him that he is no philosopher, and metaphysics is not his vocation.

In an article on Francis Newman's work on the True Basis of Theology, in our Review for October, 1851, we intimated that M. Bonnetty was a Lamenesian; but we were mistaken. Lamennais in his system denied the individual reason, but asserted what he called common sense, or the reason of the race. M. Bonnetty denies both, and contends that the condemnation by Gregory the Sixteenth

of the reason of the race, as asserted by the author of the *Essai sur l'Indifference*, was *a fortiori* the condemnation of individual reason. So M. Bonnetty must be understood as denying natural reason altogether, all power in man to *invent*, as he says, — to find, discover, or to know any thing, as we should say, — save as communicated to us by an external supernatural revelation. Man by nature, then, is irrational, and the old definition of man as “a rational animal” must be given up. Naturally considered, he is unintelligent, and the power we find within him to distinguish between truth and falsehood, right and wrong, must be regarded, not as a faculty of his nature, but as purely a supernatural gift, held from grace, not nature. The absurdity of a doctrine like this is too glaring to need any refutation. M. Bonnetty himself shrinks from it when hard pressed, and says he only means that man can know nothing of dogma and morals save through the medium of an external supernatural revelation! If he means Christian dogmata and morals, no Catholic disputes him, for these, being supernatural, are ascertainable only as supernaturally revealed. If this is his meaning, he is merely making much ado about nothing. But when he is shown this, he will not abide by his qualification, and flies back to the doctrine that we have no natural knowledge, no natural power of knowing, which we suppose means that there is for us no natural truth, no natural morality, no natural order. But if there is no natural, how can there be a supernatural, — no nature, how can there be grace?

What M. Bonnetty is really driving after, we are unable to say. We are inclined to think he does not know himself. We have ourselves contended, and still contend, that, without the aid of the Christian revelation, — a revelation made in substance to our first parents, transmitted in its purity and integrity through the Patriarchs, the Synagogue, and the Catholic Church, in a corrupt form through the Gentiles, even to us, — it is impossible to construct a complete and adequate system of moral and speculative truth even of the natural order; not indeed precisely because to do so transcends the intrinsic power of natural reason, but because natural reason in our present state is obscured by our passions, and diverted from the truth by the disturbing influences of the flesh. Practically, we cannot construct a complete and independent system of philosophy or of natu-

ral theology by natural reason alone, operating without any knowledge of revealed truth, because of these disturbing influences; and therefore we ourselves embrace no particular philosophical system, ancient or modern, and treat philosophy, not as an independent science, but as the rational part of Christian theology. Yet we recognize the two orders of truth, the natural and the supernatural, philosophy and revealed theology; the former evident to natural reason, and the latter evident only to faith. Natural reason precedes revelation, and grace presupposes nature. Natural theology does not repose on faith, but on science, and is the preamble to faith, although we cannot construct it in its perfection, without the reflected light of faith. Revelation is of grace, and the whole Christian order, though it has jurisdiction over the whole natural order, is something vouchsafed us over and above nature, not to complete our nature, not to fit it for a natural beatitude, nor to give us the initiatory knowledge and love of God in the natural order, or as author of nature; but to fit us for a supernatural destiny, to enable us to know and love God in the supernatural order, and to attain to a supernatural beatitude, that of seeing God as he is, by the supernatural light of glory. God could, if he had chosen, have left us in a state of pure nature, and therefore to a purely natural beatitude; and to that natural beatitude we must have been naturally able to attain, otherwise it would not have been natural. To suppose that this natural beatitude included no knowledge of God as the author and end of nature, no recognition and observance of a moral law, would be simply to suppose that man is naturally a mere brute, and that his power to distinguish even in the natural order between truth and falsehood, right and wrong, is a supernatural gift, which cannot be admitted for a moment without falling into heresies expressly condemned by the Church. It is true, God did not leave us in a state of pure nature, having from the first designed something better for us; but we must remember that grace does not supersede nature, nor transform nature physically. We lost by the Fall our original supernatural endowments, and what theologians call the *indebita*, but not at all our nature itself, nor any part of it, regarded as pure nature. *Seclusa ratione culpæ*, we are born with the precise nature, taken as pure nature, with which we were originally created, and therefore must

have all the purely natural powers that we should have had if we had been created for a purely natural destiny. The only conceivable natural destiny of man is to know and love God in the natural order, for he is the final cause of the natural as of the supernatural. We must have naturally all the power, of distinguishing between truth and falsehood, good and evil, right and wrong, that we should have had if no supernatural revelation had been intended for us, and if we had not been appointed to a supernatural destiny. Then M. Bonnetty must deny that man is a rational animal, and contend that he is naturally a mere brute, or else admit that he can by natural reason attain to a knowledge of God and duty in the natural order, and therefore that there is such a thing as natural theology and natural morality.

It is possible that Father Chastel and other opponents of Bonnetty, the philosophical godfather of one of our more distinguished Catholic journalists, run to an opposite extreme, and claim for independent natural reason a power greater than we can safely concede it; and, indeed, the Jesuit Father, as cited in the *New York Freeman's Journal* some time since, maintains propositions which we regard as philosophically unsound, although he goes no farther than many had gone before him, and among others the eminent Cardinal Gerdil, decidedly one of the first philosophers of the eighteenth century; but however this may be, there is a law of nature, a natural as well as a revealed law, and a natural law is one which nature is adequate to keep, and therefore to know by its own powers. The Church administers this as well as the revealed law, but we must be careful neither to deny it nor to confound it with the supernatural law of Christ. Otherwise we shall lose the distinction between nature and grace, and find ourselves utterly unable to sustain Catholic theology against the heresies of Luther, Baius, and Jansenius. M. Bonnetty seems to us occasionally to do both, and we see not how he can do either without blundering as a philosopher and failing in respect to the Church as a Catholic. All our theologians, as far as we are informed, recognize moral virtues as distinguished from the theological virtues, and if they, teaching for these eighteen hundred years with the approbation of the Church, have all erred in this respect, we should like to know how her infallibility in teaching is to be maintained; and if any one of us has at the present day the right

to set aside on his own authority what they have uniformly taught, we should also like to be informed what fault is to be found with the Protestant principle of private judgment. Against the charge of rashness and of Protestantizing, M. Bonnetty succeeds, we are sorry to see, in defending himself only by sophistries which are little creditable, and by denying his own plain and recorded language, or at least giving it an interpretation the reverse of its plain and natural sense. The fact is, he has committed, with real Catholic intentions, we doubt not, grave blunders, fallen into serious errors, and has not the manliness, when it is proved to him, to own it. No Catholic should ever suffer himself to love his own opinions more than Catholic tradition. In studying the controversy which his statements have excited, we have been led to fear that we ourselves have been in danger of failing in our respect to Catholic professors. We are not aware that on this subject of philosophy we have committed ourselves in our writings, but we fear that we have allowed ourselves to think and speak of the philosophy which we have assumed to have been taught for a long time in Catholic schools and seminaries in a manner which did not become us, and which implied on our part an error analogous to that which the *Ami de la Religion* charges against M. Bonnetty, and we ourselves against the Abbé Gaume's work on the use of the pagan classics. The Church can neither teach nor sanction or tolerate the teaching of error, and therefore we are not at liberty to maintain that she has ever suffered in any age the teaching in her schools by her doctors and approved professors, without a word of censure or even of admonition, philosophical and theological systems which lead directly to naturalism, pantheism, or atheism, as M. Bonnetty rashly asserts.

We notice in some of the late numbers of the *Ami de la Religion*, some severe criticisms by the learned and judicious Abbé Gaduel, Vicar-General of the Bishop of Orleans, on a recent work by the distinguished Spanish statesman, Donoso-Cortés, of whom we have often had occasion to speak in terms of high commendation. We have not seen the work criticized, but from the extracts made by the Abbé Gaduel, the fidelity of which we cannot doubt, it would seem that Donoso-Cortés has not only expressed himself with great looseness and inaccuracy, but has emit-

ted grave errors on God, the Trinity, original sin, and free-will. If the extracts are not essentially modified by the context, he will have hard work to defend himself from having fallen, unconsciously, we trust, into the Jansenistic heresy on liberty, the common Protestant heresy on original sin and human depravity, and the well-known errors of Cousin and his school on God and the Trinity. The Abbé Gaduel is a profound theologian, one of the best theologians in France, truly modest and unassuming, and a most worthy man, and he is not likely to bring the grave charges he does without at least some reason. We have ourselves a profound respect for Donoso-Cortés, and we hope the matter is not so bad as it appears, and that he will either prove his orthodoxy or frankly retract his errors. But we have read with great pain a letter of his to the *Univers*, published in that journal of the 28th of January last, which seems to indicate that he takes very erroneous views of his responsibility as a writer, and that he does not feel himself bound to inquire whether he has erred or not, unless called to an account by some one higher in authority. We insert the letter, together with Abbé Gaduel's admirable answer.

“ *Paris, Jan. 23, 1853.*

“ SIR : —

“ Various reasons have prevented me from reading the articles which, as it seems, a religious journal has just published on my writings. I am very much engaged, and the few moments I can spare for reading I devote to the masters. I will not be tempted to enter into a controversy with any one, still less with one who is wholly unknown to me. Nevertheless, I need only to know that I am accused of falling into so great a number of heresies, to declare that I condemn whatever the Holy Catholic Church, whose submissive and respectful son I have the happiness to be, has condemned, condemns, or may hereafter condemn, in others or myself. To make this declaration, I have no need to wait till the Church herself speaks ; it is enough that a single man accuses me of grave error. To such accusations I am always ready to respond *by this declaration*, without previously inquiring whether he who makes them is a priest or a layman, obscure or renowned, ignorant or learned.

“ Accept, &c.

“ JUAN DONOSO-CORTÉS.”

This letter, we confess, is not what we should have expected from its distinguished author. Its declaration of

orthodoxy is too general, when no one questioned his orthodox intentions, and the point was to respond to specific accusations of error, and its tone is arrogant and almost contemptuous. 'The Abbé Gaduel replies with great keenness, but with good temper and true politeness, through the *Ami de la Religion* of the 1st of February.

“MONSIEUR LE MARQUIS :—

“The letter which you have published in the *Univers* of the 28th of January last, in reference to the criticisms which I have felt it my duty to publish on your *Essai sur le Catholicisme, le Liberalisme, et le Socialisme*, has decided me to assume the honor of writing you.

“I assure you, Sir, that nothing can be added to the respect, the esteem, and love which I entertain for your honorable person, and which are surpassed only by the respect, esteem, and love which we all ought to have for truth, our common and sovereign good. These sentiments I have frequently expressed; I have expressed them with warmth in my remarks on your Essay; and the letter you have just published is not of a nature to change them.

“You say in your letter that you have not read, and that your numerous and important engagements will prevent you from reading, my criticisms. It must, therefore, be impossible for you to appreciate them. For this reason, as well as for others, the delicacy of which I respect, I can enter with you into no explanations of them.

“You say, moreover, that, without believing yourself obliged to examine whether your book contains the numerous and grave errors with which, right or wrong, I as well as others have reproached it, it is enough for you to declare that you condemn whatever the Holy Catholic Church, whose submissive and respectful son you have the happiness to be, has condemned, condemns, or may hereafter condemn, in others or yourself. 'This disposition, Sir, on the part of a man whose faith and virtue are so well known as yours, can surprise no one; and if some day your occupations permit you to read my criticisms, you will discover that I have throughout regarded that excellent disposition as unquestionable. I have been happy constantly to express it, in language the most sincere and unaffected.

“Nevertheless, will you permit me, Sir, to tell you my whole thought on this subject? I think, and in reflecting on it before God, you, I must believe, will think with me, that the truth in matters of Catholic faith and doctrine is too great, too serious, and too holy a thing, for a religious writer accused of grave errors, although in good faith, to discharge his duty to it by a general declaration of obedience to the Church. Whoever the writer be, priest or layman, as you say, obscure or renowned, ignorant or learned, and what-

ever his engagements, he is bound to examine his book, or cause it to be examined, to see if it contains the errors alleged against it; and if on examination it is found in fact to contain them, it is his duty to acknowledge them, and to remove the danger by suppressing them.

“It is true, Sir, I have not the honor of being known to you, — I am very little known to the public; but even if I had the honor of being personally known to you, it would give me no right to such confidence, that, on the authority of my assertion alone, you would be obliged to recognize and disavow the errors I have believed I discovered in your writings, and which I have pointed out. Permit me, however, to say, that when a man, though personally unknown to you, who is a priest, and who has passed all his life in studying and teaching religion, points out in your book what he considers grave errors, when he cites the texts in which these errors are expressed, and opposes to them the Catholic truths which he believes to be attacked by them, must it not appear to you, Sir, that it is your duty to find leisure to attend to the subject? My inquietude ought to excite yours; and were I in your place, I think I should entertain some doubt, and be led to inquire if I was not held before the public and my readers to something more than a general declaration, which is by no means sufficient to put readers on their guard.

“If I am not your judge in this matter, neither are you, I think, your own judge. But you have ecclesiastical superiors whom you respect, and by whom you are highly esteemed. If you will go no higher, there is a bishop or an archbishop, whose diocesan you are. Why not submit your book to his judgment? If I am deceived, I am ready to make you with all simplicity a public apology; but if the judges of doctrine recognize in your published writings the errors which I have myself discovered in them, you must make in simplicity reparation for them, in the mode and manner determined by superiors and counselled by your own faith and virtue.

“I will add, that M. Louis Veuillot, having published and propagated your book, in a *Bibliothèque Nouvelle de Religion*, intended for a large number of readers, is no doubt held to the same duty, in which there is assuredly, either in your case or his, nothing repugnant to the sincerity, the rectitude, and the modesty of a Catholic.

“As to the articles which M. Louis Veuillot has published in some recent numbers of the *Univers* on my criticisms, I am sure, Sir, that a man of your character and gravity can have had nothing to do with the manner in which they treat the truth of Catholic doctrine and theological instruction, the most holy things on earth. But I cannot help feeling a lively regret that you have had the misfortune to be defended by such methods. The sad use which the editor makes of the talent which God confided to him to be better

employed, is very much to be regretted. He frequently compromises the best causes by the manner in which he treats them, a manner, he will permit me with sorrow to add, as little worthy of them as of his own faith and heart. How far removed, Sir, your thoughts and style are from his manner of writing! I have read your *Discourses* and *Essay* with extreme attention. Among the many admirable things in them, I have had, it is true, to regret some errors which gravely offend the truth; but I assure you, that never have you written any thing that appeared to make a jest of the discussion of the gravest truths. Jeering laughter, and what St. Paul calls *scurrilitas quæ ad rem non pertinet*, are things as foreign to the dignity of your character, as they have always been to the gravity of that noble and serious Spanish nation to which you belong, and which you so worthily represent among us. We in France sometimes appear light and frivolous; but we were never so, at least in religious matters, before the author of the *Provinciales* and Voltaire opened among us that pernicious school whose language no true Catholics can ever permit themselves to borrow.

“Permit me, Sir, to say in conclusion, that, whatever may be the issue of the present controversy, as Christian charity in your regard has suffered nothing in my heart, so I hope that yours will indeed pardon me the pain which I may, without willing it, and solely in defence of the truth, have caused a man whom I highly honor and always shall honor.

“Be pleased to accept, Monsieur le Marquis, the homage of the sincere and particular respect with which I have the honor to be

“Your most humble and most obedient servant,

“L’ABBÉ GADUEL, Vic.-Gen.,

Formerly Professor of Theology.”

We have inserted this correspondence because it affords some useful hints on the ethics of controversy, and because we wish to bring it under the notice of those Catholic writers who are apt to forget their duty to the public and their readers. These writers, conscious of the rectitude of their intentions, suppose that, when grave errors are pointed out in their publications, it suffices to respond by a general declaration of their disposition to obey the Church, which nobody questions, and which all heresiarchs in the outset are always ready to profess. We have on more occasions than one contended that something more is necessary, and we are happy to be sustained in our views on this subject by so able and learned a theologian as the Abbé Gaduel. When a man, even in good faith and with proper dispositions, publishes a book, in which some one, presumed to

know something of the subject it treats, points out grave errors against Catholic doctrine, cites the texts in which they are expressed, and opposes to them the Catholic truths they offend, he is held to something more than a general declaration of obedience; and whatever his engagements, he is bound to examine, by himself or by another, his book, to see if it contains the errors alleged, and either show publicly that it does not, or to repair the scandal he has given by publicly retracting them. If he has not the leisure, he must make it; and this too when his accuser is a layman, as well as when he is a priest, if that layman has made respectable theological studies, and is known to write only with the permission of his ordinary. The man who has had leisure to publish must find leisure to respond to the grave errors gravely pointed out in his publications. This is his duty to the public and to Catholic doctrine, which he has no right to compromise.

The strictures of the Abbé Gaduel on the *Univers* are severe, but we are sorry that we cannot say they are undeserved. The *Univers* is well known as one of the leading Catholic journals of Europe, and no one doubts its Catholic intentions any more than its brilliant wit and rare ability. It makes loud professions of Ultramontanism, and brave war against old-fashioned Gallicanism, which has no longer any representatives, or at most not more than three or four, among the bishops of France; but it seems to imagine that the profession of Ultramontanism will atone for all manner of sins against bishops, priests, and distinguished seculars. It has abundance of zeal, but it lacks discretion, and seems never to have considered that even the truth may suffer by an indecent and untruthful manner of defending it. From what we have seen of the *Univers*, we should judge that it had studied its ethics of controversy in the school of Pascal and Voltaire, and when its opponents happen to be distinguished Catholics, not of an innovating disposition, it seems to scruple at no means which may tend to crush them. It forgets truth and decency in their regard, and resorts to wit, sarcasm, ridicule, sneers, misstatement, perversion of meaning, and impugning of motives, as seems to it necessary or convenient. It seems to employ against its Catholic opponents the usual tactics of vulgar Protestants against Catholics, and of vulgar infidels against Christians. We hardly need say, that all this is as

offensive to Catholic morality as it is to good taste; religion under any and every point of view is too grave and too holy a matter to be treated with levity. We regret to say these harsh things of the *Univers*, which, after all, has many good qualities, and we would not say them, if we did not perceive a disposition on the part of one or two Catholic journalists in our own country to take it for their model, very much to the scandal of good Catholics.

We have been deeply pained, we may say disgusted, with the indecent manner in which the *Univers* treats that noble champion of Catholic principles and Catholic rights, the illustrious Count de Montalembert, for his recent remarkable, and, under the circumstances, heroic publication on *Catholic Interests in the Nineteenth Century*. It keeps no measure with this distinguished Catholic author and statesman. It misrepresents his book, perverts his plainest and most obvious sense, maligns his motives, and labors to wither him with its sneers, and to overwhelm him with abuse. In the name of religion, outraged in the person of one of her noblest and purest, firmest and most generous sons, we protest against this scandal. Whether Montalembert be right or wrong in his book, he deserves far other treatment from the Catholic journalist. That book, say what you will of it, is only a masterly statement and defence of the principles which its author has uniformly professed and acted upon ever since he entered public life, and if offensive, contains no new offence, and provokes no new hostility. The author can have committed by it no other offence than that of proving that he remains unchanged and firm amid the changes and defections of others, and that he refuses to abandon the ground on which Catholics have everywhere stood for the last twenty years, on which they have fought so many battles, and gained so many victories for the freedom of religion. Does the *Univers* feel that Count de Montalembert's consistency casts a reproach upon its own? Why should it? It too has been consistent in its way. Very true, in 1848 it was rabid for democracy, and told us it was all over with kings; in 1850 it was a loyal Bourbonist, maintained that the only salvation of France was the Count de Chambord; and in 1852 it became the incense-bearer of Cæsarism, denounced discussion and constitutional liberty, sneered at representative or parliamentary govern-

ment, and sung the praises of absolutism ; but in all this it was consistent with itself, for it only obeyed the dominant public opinion of its countrymen, or changed so as to be always with the party in the ascendancy.

We find no fault with the *Univiers* for supporting the new imperial government of France ; the greater part of the French bishops and clergy seem to believe it, all things considered, the best government for their country, and that suffices for us. We do not understand M. Montalembert himself to be disposed to disturb it, or to throw any obstacles in its way. He accepts Napoleon the Third for his sovereign, although he wishes stronger guaranties for public liberty than are afforded by the present constitution of the empire, and in this, as at present informed, we certainly agree with him. But be this as it may, we cannot pardon the *Univiers* for its unchristian treatment of a man who is so dear to Catholics, and who has deserved so well of them, as Count de Montalembert, whom we have so long known and revered as the political leader of the Catholic party in France. Nor can we pardon its attempts to make it appear that there is a solidarity between Catholicity and absolute governments. Absolute government may be a necessity in France at the moment ; if so, let the *Univiers* advocate it for that country ; but let it not attempt to advocate it as a necessity for all countries and for all times, as the normal political order, and labor to erect absolutism into a dogma of faith. Its sneers at constitutional liberty, and at parliamentary or representative governments, tend to compromise such Catholics as live under a republic or a constitutional monarchy, and to place them in a false position. They put weapons into the hands of their enemies, which they can wield with unpleasant effect against them. In this country and in Great Britain, in Belgium, Holland, Prussia, Russia, and some of the smaller German states, the greatest disservice you can render Catholics is to defend in their name absolute governments. France is not all the world, and a Catholic journal should remember that there is a solidarity between Catholics of all nations, and that it is its duty not to defend what it may regard as the interests of its own country in such manner as to compromise the interests of Catholics in other countries. We ourselves live under a republic, and though we have no wish to force republi-

canism on others, we love and cherish it for ourselves. While we respect monarchy where it is the legal order, we demand from Catholic journals equal respect for republicanism wherever it is the legal order, as it is with us. We have opposed those who sought to revolutionize monarchical Europe in favor of democracy; we will oppose no less strenuously those who may seek to revolutionize our own country in favor of monarchy. While we respect the rights of monarchists, we expect Catholic journals in monarchical states to respect the rights of republicans in republican states. It is too late to attempt to convert us to absolutism. Absolute monarchy has existed in France, in Spain, and some other countries, and we have seen what society became under it. If the loss of popular liberty follows the loss of the freedom of the Church, the loss of the freedom of the Church has always thus far followed the loss of popular liberty, and we have never found the Church free save in free states.

We have therefore been most happy to find so eminent a Catholic as Count de Montalembert, when so many Catholic journals, frightened at the threatened horrors of socialism, were beginning to despair of liberty, and to advocate a return to unmitigated despotism, raising his eloquent and powerful voice to declare that there is no solidarity between Catholics and absolute governments, and to demand, not the Church for the sake of liberty, which is a subordination of the spiritual to the temporal, but liberty for the sake of the Church. In doing so he has gladdened our hearts, and checked a tendency which was rapidly showing itself in more quarters than one, and from which great evils were to be apprehended. All in his book may not be sound; he may have here or there seen things in a too favorable light, and fallen into some exaggerations; but he has uttered a timely word, an eloquent word, and let Louis Veuillot's *Univers* say what it may against him or it, the true CATHOLIC UNIVERSE has heard it with reverence and gratitude, and will, we venture to predict, cherish him in its heart of hearts when the misguided journalists who deride him to-day, and condemn him because unable to appreciate the pure and lofty principles which govern him, are forgotten, with all their works.

ART. VII. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *A History of the Attempts to establish the Protestant Reformation in Ireland, and the Successful Resistance of the Irish People, from 1510 to 1830.* By THOMAS DARCY M'GEE. Boston: Donahoe. 1853. 12mo. pp. 376.

MR. M'GEE is well known to the public generally as the editor of the *American Celt*, perhaps the very best Catholic Irish paper published on this continent, and to our readers particularly as the writer of a very interesting article on "The Reformation" in Ireland, inserted in this journal for July, 1852. Carried away for a time, like so many other young men of more enthusiasm than solid learning and experience, in the revolutionary doctrines and movements of our age, he appeared lost to the Catholic cause; but he has finally, by the grace of God, been enabled to return to sound Catholic politics, and is now one of our most sincere, most earnest, and most able Catholic writers. The work before us is merely an historical sketch, but it is in the main a sketch from the hand of a master. It wants filling up, and more elaboration in details, to be really what it professes to be; but, nevertheless, it is a very interesting and spirited book, and gives the reader a more clear insight into the persecuting policy of Anglicanism, and the brave resistance of the Irish people, a better and more comprehensive view of the wrongs of Ireland and the patient endurance of her people, than any other popular work that we are acquainted with. It must prove an acceptable offering to the Irish people, whithersoever they are scattered abroad, and tend, wherever it is read, to increase their reverence for their persecuted ancestors, and to confirm them in the faith of their fathers.

2. *The Spaewife; or the Queen's Secret. A Story of the Reign of Elizabeth.* By PAUL PEPPERGRASS, Esq. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1853. 12mo. pp. 142.

MESSRS. MURPHY & Co., one of our most enterprising Catholic houses, have brought out this book in a style highly creditable to them as publishers. The work itself is one of high pretensions as an historical novel, and has been elaborated with great care and pains, by an author who is already advantageously known to our public, and from whom we have much to expect. It has been favorably received, generally commended by the Catholic press, and men whose literary tastes and judgments we are bound to respect have pronounced it a masterpiece of its kind. It is written with ability, and is certainly a very interesting production; but, with profound respect for its author, we must say that we are not quite satisfied with it. It strikes us as too grave for fiction, and too light for history. Its interest is too uniformly tragic, a good deal of it lacks *vraisemblance*, and its characters, except the Irish characters, are not always happily drawn. The old Knight, for instance, is represented at one stage as too imbecile for the spirit and energy he betrays at another. The Scotch dialect used by the Spaewife, we have been told by competent authority, is Scotch only in the sense that it is not English. We can

hardly credit the wonderful success with which the Irish courtier discomfits single-handed the whole London mob. The *morale* of the book is open to criticism. Elizabeth is lauded too highly as Queen, and blackened too much, we think, as a woman. She certainly was no saint, but her private morals, bad as they may have been, were not worse than those of more than one contemporary Catholic sovereign. It seems to us hardly worth while to revive, at this late day, the gossip and scandals of her time. Her acts as Queen, not her vices as a woman, plunged England into heresy and schism. The secret on which the book turns is at best doubtful, at any rate rests on no adequate historical authority. The author makes a confessor tell his penitent, who professes to be in possession of the Queen's secret, that on no account whatever can she with a good conscience disclose it. Whence, then, has the author himself obtained the right to reveal it? Even if true, we can see no good purpose that can at the present time be answered by bringing the fact to light that Elizabeth had a bastard son. She did what she was permitted to do, and has gone to her own place, and there let us leave her.

The author informs us that this book is merely introductory to another which he is preparing on Mary, Queen of Scots. We hope that he will not, as we fear from this he is disposed to do, ascribe in whole or in part the treatment of Mary by Elizabeth to her jealousy of her as a woman. Mary was, we firmly believe, innocent, and we have the respectable authority of Benedict the Fourteenth for saying that she died a martyr to her religion. It was Elizabeth the Protestant Queen, not Elizabeth the woman moved by petty female jealousy or rivalry, that persecuted Mary, dethroned and imprisoned her, and finally beheaded her. Let us not attempt to rob Mary of her glorious martyrdom, nor to relieve the Protestant Queen of England of her fearful responsibility. Catholic historians and novelists should take higher and more comprehensive views of the causes that produced the terrible events of Elizabeth's reign than was taken by the gossips of the time.

3. *History of the United States, from the Discovery of the American Continent.* By GEORGE BANCROFT. Vol. V. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 1852. 8vo. pp. 459.

THE fifth volume of Mr. Bancroft's History appeared at the close of the last year, but too late for us to announce it in our January number. It continues the history of the Colonies from 1763 down to 1768, and is to us the most interesting and the least objectionable of any of the volumes that have yet appeared. It contains some, but comparatively few, of the faults we have previously pointed out in Mr. Bancroft's work. If the remaining volumes show an equal improvement on the preceding, we shall have no great fault to find with them, and shall begin to be proud of our countryman.

BROWNSON'S
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JULY, 1853.

ART. I. — *Histoire de l'Église de France pendant la Révolution.* Par M. L'ABBÉ JAGER. Paris: Chez Firmin Didot Frères. 1852. 3 Tomes. 8vo.

THESE three volumes by the Abbé Jager furnish, upon the whole, the best and most satisfactory history of the French Revolution, from 1788 to 1793, that we have read, and we have been reading histories of that Revolution ever since we can remember. As a history of the Church in France, it stops too soon, unless more volumes are to be added; and it is not so full as we could wish in its details of the clergy during the period from the abolition of the Catholic religion to the suppression of the Constitutional Church by the Concordat of 1802, the most glorious period for the clergy of France since the early days of the Gallican Church. We want a fuller history of the sufferings and fidelity of the confessors and martyrs among the French clergy, religious, and faithful, from 1792 to 1802, than any we have seen, or, so far as we are aware, has as yet been published. A full history of these martyrs and confessors would be no less edifying than that of the Christians during the persecutions of the early ages, and would prove that, however far France for the moment had gone astray, or however frantic she had become, her heart remained at all times thoroughly Catholic, and that not in vain had she placed herself under the protection of the Most Holy Mother of God.

Certainly, prior to 1789, the clergy and religious of France were far from being in all respects an edifying body, and

several members of the episcopacy, as well as a large number of the second order of the clergy, were tainted more or less with the new doctrines of the philosophers, and gave much scandal; but when the hour of trial came, it is remarkable how few were found wanting, and seldom, if ever, in any country or in any age, has the Church suffered so severe a persecution, in which the constancy and firmness of her children were upon the whole more consoling to her maternal heart. The Catholic heart is not grieved at suffering and martyrdom; it is grieved only by the prevarication or the apostasy of the faithful. Comparatively few of the French clergy of either order prevaricated, and still fewer apostatized. The great body of them listened to the voice of the Holy Father, and chose to suffer imprisonment, exile, and death rather than desert their faith, and admit the supremacy of the temporal over the spiritual. It was not, as we had been early taught to believe, as royalists, except in rare instances, that the clergy were persecuted; it was as Catholics, and their fidelity was first and foremost fidelity, not to the monarchy, but to Catholicity, — not simply to their king, but to their God. This puts for us a new face on the conduct of the revolutionists, and on the constancy and sufferings of the clergy, and commands the highest love and reverence for Catholic France from every Catholic heart.

The deputies of the clergy in the States General of 1789, especially those chosen from the *curés*, committed, there is no question, great mistakes; and if they had been more firm in maintaining the rights and interests of their order, it is not impossible that the Revolution would have been arrested, and France spared the horrors and bloodshed that followed. But we should not forget that we live after the Revolution, and are able to judge of the conduct of all parties as instructed by its example. In 1789 there were only a few who could foresee what a people clamoring for liberty, with the rights of man, benevolence, and brotherly love on their lips, would do when broken loose from the restraints of authority, and taking themselves for their own guides and masters. How could these country curates, who were not without sympathies with the people, who had grievances of their own to redress, and who knew little of the world out of their respective parishes, distrust the fair-spoken demagogues, not yet known to be demagogues

who made them fair promises, and seemed to them to be intent only on removing real evils, and regenerating political France? Who could expect them, till their faith as Catholics was directly attacked, to foresee the dangers threatened to religion by the political reforms proposed? Surely religion is not the accomplice of tyranny, and is no supporter of political and social abuses, and what danger then has it to apprehend from correcting these abuses and providing guaranties for public liberty? None in the world, if you attempt it only by lawful means, under the direction of men who have the real interests of religion and society at heart, and in obedience to the call of reason and charity, and not by unconstitutional means, under the direction of infidel philosophers, Jansenistic demagogues, and visionary theorists, and in obedience to the call of revenge, selfish ambition, wild enthusiasm, and Utopian dreams. But this was but imperfectly seen at that time, because there had been no recent experience to enlighten the mass of ecclesiastics, and because for a hundred years the tendency in France had been to regard politics as an independent order, entirely distinct and separate from religion. The clergy had accepted and been indoctrinated in the Four Articles of 1682, and were as unprepared to appreciate as they were to withstand the movements of 1789.

The clergy, with some honorable exceptions, certainly betrayed in the beginning the interests of their order; but in this they did no more than had been done by the Assembly which put forth the famous Four Articles a hundred years before, and they betrayed their order not now in favor of the king, as did that Assembly, but, as they believed, in favor of the nation and of liberty. The nobility, too, were false to their own order, and the king betrayed both nobles and clergy, and the monarchy to boot. It seems to have been one of the misfortunes of the time, that the king, the nobles, and the clergy looked upon their respective orders as personal matters, rather than constituent elements of French society. Louis the Sixteenth was no fool; he had good natural parts, had been well educated, was sincerely pious, and had a most excellent heart; he loved his people, and there was no sacrifice that he was not willing to make for their good; but he could never understand, nor be made to understand, that the quarrel was not personal, or that it was France,

not simply himself and family, he sacrificed in refusing to defend the throne. Not one drop of blood, he said, shall be shed for me or my family. This was well, was noble, for Louis the Sixteenth as a private man, but for him as king it was not well. It was either an abdication of the sovereignty, or else an implied assertion that he was king only for his private benefit. He was not king for his private benefit or that of his family, but for the benefit of France, and it was his duty to defend his rights, not for his own sake, but for the sake of the public good. The rights of the crown were not his private property; he held them as a sacred trust, and was bound to defend them, and to the full extent of his power to transmit them unimpaired to his successor, according to the fundamental constitution of the kingdom. He might have restored and he ought to have restored to the Estates of his kingdom the rights which his predecessors had usurped; but to go farther was to become himself a revolutionist, a traitor to France. Unhappily, he never understood this, and, unwilling to shed blood in his own personal cause, he would suffer no efficient steps to be taken to protect the monarchy. Louis the Fourteenth claimed the crown as his private property, and usurped the rights of the nation to his own profit; Louis the Sixteenth regarded it equally as his private property, and parted with it to the injury of the nation, and to the profit of nobody. We honor in him the generosity, the humanity, and the self-denial of the private man, but we are obliged to censure and almost despise the weakness of the sovereign.

The nobility, for far less honorable motives, were faithless to their order. Nobility was an order in the state, and existed and was supported for a public reason. It had no doubt private rights or privileges which it might surrender, but it had no right to annihilate itself as one of the Estates of the kingdom. France was in theory, and had been in practice, a constitutional monarchy. The government consisted of the king and the three Estates,—the clergy, the nobility, and the commons,—sitting in separate houses and voting by orders. True, the Estates or States General had not been summoned since 1614, that is, for a hundred and seventy-five years, which was a serious damage; but the summoning of them in 1788 to meet in 1789 indicated the intention to restore the legal constitu-

tion of the kingdom to its vigor. The law which required the Estates to sit in separate houses, and to vote by orders, should have been enforced from the first, or rather should not have been suffered for a moment to be drawn in question. It never would have been questioned but for the revolutionary doctrines of the followers of Voltaire and Rousseau, and of these doctrines the nobility were at the time the chief patrons. The nobility were indeed the last to unite with the Tiers État, but it is clear that they held out not from patriotic motives; and when they did unite, and consent that the three orders should be merged in a single National Assembly, and vote *per capita*, they abandoned, through selfishness and hatred of the clergy, their own order. They united with the deputies of the commons in abasing the royal authority, and in despoiling the clergy, evidently with the expectation of gaining for themselves what was wrested from the king and clergy. But when they had unduly depressed the royal authority, and sacrificed the clergy, their turn came round, and they became the victims of their allies, the commons. They were compelled either to emigrate, or to atone for their infidelity with their blood on the Place de Grève, while the lurid light of their burning castles gleamed on the midnight sky. They, by attacking the old constitution of their country, hoped to gain something for themselves; but the king and clergy, by abandoning their trusts, could only expect to lose their personal advantages, and their conduct, however mistaken, or deplorable in its results, commands in some measure our respect, because it was disinterested.

With all the faults committed by the deputies of the clergy, it must be acknowledged that it was chiefly among them that were found men who really comprehended the nature of the struggle in which the nation was engaged, who defended old rights and privileges on the true ground, and who knew how to reconcile authority with liberty. There was no class of deputies in the Constituent Assembly that showed so much patriotism, so true a love of liberty, so much statesmanship, and so much real courage, as the clergy; and if they committed faults, nobly, heroically, and amply, with a few exceptions, did they atone for them. Only four bishops out of one hundred and thirty-five took the oath to the civil constitution of the clergy, and of the second order of the clergy, less than

one third; and a large number of these subsequently retracted, were reconciled to the Church, and atoned for their crime by suffering heroically for the faith. This fact, so honorable to the French clergy of the period, proves of itself that the so-called Gallicanism, however earnestly it may have been adopted by the court and a few courtier prelates and dignitaries of the Church, was more of a speculation than a settled doctrine with the French clergy in general. In the hour of her pride and her prosperity, France preached Gallicanism, set up her nationalism against the Papacy; but always in her heart of hearts she was the most papistical of all Catholic nations, and most favorably in this respect does her conduct contrast with that of England under Henry the Eighth, as well as with that of Germany under Joseph the Second. It is customary with some, even at the present day, to sneer at the French seminaries as Gallican; but as stanch Ultramontanists as we have in our own country may be found among bishops and priests who studied their theology in the Seminary of St. Sulpice at Paris. We confess that we love and honor Catholic France, and all the more, the better we become acquainted with the ecclesiastical history of the Gallican Church in the terrible days of the old Revolution.

The Abbé Jager is an able writer, and his views are in general profound and just; but in tracing the causes of the Revolution, he does not seem to us to go far enough back. He traces them back only to Voltaire and Rousseau. The influence of these two chiefs of the army of Satan, we by no means deny. The philosophy they taught or encouraged, the abominable doctrines they inculcated, and the political speculations which they, especially the latter, so widely circulated, and which were so eagerly caught up by the *bourgeoisie* and the younger members of the nobility, no doubt had an immense influence in weakening the hold of religion on the hearts of multitudes, in corrupting the manners and morals of the higher classes, and in giving to the Revolution its special tone and character; but we think the real authors of the Revolution are to be sought in Louis the Fourteenth, and the Assembly of 1682. Louis the Fourteenth had usurped all the powers of the state for the crown, and established, in defiance of the old constitution of the kingdom, absolute monarchy, which, as long as man remains what he is, can

be in practice only despotism. Having virtually suppressed the States General, he left no organized check on his arbitrary will, except the Church. So long as the great body of the people of any country hold the Catholic faith, absolute monarchy can exist only in name, if the Church be left free, and her bishops and clergy independent of the state, responsible only to their own spiritual Chief. Louis could effect his purpose and establish the absolutism he adored only by destroying the freedom of the Church and the independence of the clergy. This he attempted to do by the Declaration he forced from the too famous Assembly of 1682. That Declaration was indeed drawn up by the great Bossuet, whom we cannot allow ourselves to speak of with the slightest disrespect, and whom we deeply venerate for his piety, his learning, his talents, and the eminent services he has rendered to religion; but it is probable that he acted from prudential considerations, and consented to go the length of the Four Articles, only that he might prevent the Assembly from going farther, and rushing into absolute schism and heresy. It might be feared, and we presume Bossuet did fear, that, in the temper of the king and of many prelates and ecclesiastics at the time, there was danger that France would follow the example of England under Henry the Eighth, separate herself from the Holy See, and set up a national Church under the king for pope, and the Archbishop of Paris, perhaps, for patriarch, — a measure which would have pleased the courtiers, and enchanted the Jansenists. But we do not think the danger was so great as was apprehended, for France has always been in her heart attached to the Holy See, and never could be rendered schismatic, save for a brief moment. Louis the Twelfth was obliged to abandon the Conciliabulum of Pisa and his five cardinals, and the great Napoleon, in the height of his power, found it necessary to dissolve the Council he had convoked against unity. The Catholic sentiment of France under the Directory rose against the civil constitution of the clergy, and would soon have forced the government, whoever was at its head, to reëstablish communion with Rome. After the first rude shocks, after the first stunning effects of the revolutionary measures, the faith and piety of the nation began to revive, and Bonaparte only anticipated the real wish of France in soliciting the Concordat of 1802. Nevertheless,

Bossuet may have feared a schism, and is to be excused if he did, and his motive is to be honored, even if, enlightened by subsequent events, we are forced to doubt the correctness of his judgment.

The Four Articles of the French clergy have generally been opposed, at least as far as we are informed, almost exclusively on the ground that they deny the infallibility, unless accepted by the Church, of the Papal definitions of faith and morals; but this denial is not their essential character, and is only incidental to their main purpose. The infallibility of the Pope, when defining faith or morals for the whole Church, we are told, may be denied without formal heresy, because it has been controverted, and has not yet been formally defined; but, with the great body of Catholics, we hold it to be true, and should regard ourselves as guilty *in foro conscientie* of heresy were we to deny it, for the evidence of its truth is conclusive to us, and it is not of Catholic faith only in the sense that the Church has not by a formal judicial act so defined it. But the Four Articles bear on our present discussion only in their teaching as to the relations of the two powers, the spiritual and the temporal. The essential point of the Gallican Declaration is the assertion of the entire separation of Church and State, the denial to the Church of all authority, direct or indirect, over the temporal order, and the declaration of the absolute independence of the state in temporal affairs, as expressed in the first of the Four Articles: "*Beato Petro ejusque successoribus Christi vicariis ipsique Ecclesiæ rerum spiritualium et ad æternam salutem pertinentium, non autem civilium ac temporalium, a Deo traditam potestatem. Reges ergo et principes in temporalibus nulli ecclesiasticæ potestati Dei ordinatione subjici, neque auctoritate clavium Ecclesiæ directe vel indirecte deponi, aut illorum subditos eximi a fide atque obedientia, ac præstito fidelitatis sacramento solvi posse, cumque sententiam publicæ tranquillitati necessariam, nec minus Ecclesiæ quam imperio utilem, ut verbo Dei, Patrum traditioni et Sanctorum exemplis consonam, omnino retinendam.*" We certainly do not mean to imply that it was the intention of the Assembly to assert the absolute independence of the temporal order, for they were Catholics and intended to assert nothing contrary to Catholic faith; their purpose was, we suppose, to deny the temporal au-

thority of the Church, and to assert the independence of kings and princes in temporals.* They no doubt held that the state is bound to be just in the management of temporal affairs; but, by denying all authority of the Church as a government over princes in the temporal order, they left the prince free to judge for himself, in that order, of the justice as well as of the wisdom or prudence of his acts, and therefore emancipated him in temporals from all obligation to obey the law of God as interpreted and applied by the Catholic Church, which was in effect to emancipate the whole temporal order from its subjection to the spiritual order; for the Church, the Pope as visible head of the Church, is the sole representative of the spiritual order on earth. They declared the prince free, so far as the Church is concerned, to rule his subjects in the temporal order as he saw fit, and gave him the right to adopt any and every measure of public policy which he should judge to be for their temporal prosperity or well-being. They thus entirely separated politics from religion and morality, withdrew them from all spiritual jurisdiction, and abandoned them to the judgment, the mercy, the will, or the caprice of Cæsar, with no right on the part of Peter to take the least conceivable cognizance of his temporal government. Consequently, they removed by their declaration all check imposed by the Church on the arbitrary will of the sovereign, and left Louis the Fourteenth the absolute monarch he wished, and, till God began to send him afflictions, he was determined, to be.

* From some things Bossuet subsequently wrote, it might perhaps be said that the real intention of the Assembly was not so much to assert the independence of the prince in temporals, as it was to assert the authority of the Pope in spirituals, and define the boundary beyond which the state or civil authority could not pass without encroaching on the inviolable province of the Church. We would gladly believe that this was the intention of the Assembly, and we are inclined to believe that it was in the main the intention of Bossuet himself. He not unlikely meant nothing more than to draw the line beyond which it was not possible to go without falling into manifest heresy and schism, and therefore to save the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, and not to reduce it to its lowest point. But after all, the circumstances under which the Assembly was summoned by the king, and put forth its declaration, force us to believe that the purpose of its members was to assert as broad a margin for the civil authority as they could without rushing into open heresy and schism. The Declaration seems to us, when interpreted by its history, to have been made in the interest of the state, rather than of the Church, and with far more regard for the royal than the papal authority.

Under the political relation the Gallican Declaration of 1682 was simply the complement of the revolution of Louis the Fourteenth in favor of absolute monarchy; under the ecclesiastical relation it excluded the Church as a government from the state, and greatly weakened her moral force even in spirituals. It tended in the first instance to depress the power of the papacy in favor of the episcopacy; in the second instance, to depress the episcopacy in favor of the presbytery; and in the third, to depress the presbytery or the *clerici* in favor of the laity, and thus to prepare the way for the assertion of the absolute supremacy of the state, not only in temporals, but also in spirituals, as was fully proved in the proceedings of the National Assembly which decreed the civil constitution of the clergy. The original vice of the Four Articles was in the separation of the two powers, and placing the state and the Church, each in its own order, on the same footing, each holding immediately from God, independently of the other; which assumed the secular prince in seculars to be as high and as independent a sovereign as the Pope is in spirituals, or that God had made Cæsar as supreme in the temporal order as he had Peter in the spiritual order. It placed the two orders on a footing of perfect equality, and made Peter and Cæsar equally independent and supreme. If in spirituals Peter could say to Cæsar, "I am your master," in temporals Cæsar could say to Peter, "I am your lord, and you are my subject." To this specious theory, which is still popular even with many Catholics, there are one or two rather grave objections. In the first place, the normal relation of the two orders is not, and cannot be, that of equality or mutual independence, because the temporal order, as we have heretofore shown, exists for the spiritual, not for itself, and is therefore subordinate to the spiritual, and consequently subject to the spiritual sovereign, in obedience to whose authority the temporal sovereign must govern. This lies in the nature of the case, and cannot be denied, if we concede any spiritual order at all. In the second place, the separation of the two orders supposed is not and cannot be a fact. The two orders are distinguishable, but the temporal is never without the spiritual, any more than the creature is without the creator. It is impossible in practice to draw a broad line of demarcation between them, so that the one

shall never overlap the other. There is no state without law; there is no law without justice, and justice, whether natural or supernatural, is already in the spiritual order, and in some sense its very foundation. The Church in her tribunals takes cognizance of sins against natural justice, no less than of sins against faith and the Sacraments. Nobody can deny to the spiritual authority the right to do this, and contend that sins against natural justice are not sins against God, are not spiritual offences. The real office of the prince, the real mission of the state, is to maintain natural justice in society, and for this purpose the magistrate bears the sword; but the state is not constituted the supreme interpreter of the law of nature, the supreme judge to declare what is or what is not natural justice. Its office is principally executive, and is legislative or judicial only within the sphere of simple human prudence. It must learn the law, the justice, or the morality of its policy from the spiritual authority, and defer to it in every question of right and wrong in the natural, no less than in the supernatural order; for to interpret the law of nature, natural right, which the revealed law always presupposes and confirms, is just as much a spiritual function, as it is to interpret and apply the revealed or supernatural law itself. Now as the state supposes the natural law, as temporals are all subjected to this law, and cannot rightfully be withdrawn from the sovereignty of natural justice, to make the secular authority independent and supreme in civil and temporal affairs is to clothe it with spiritual attributes, and to declare it in the temporal order a real spiritual authority, which is to deny the very separation of the two powers asserted, and to fall into the contradiction and absurdity of declaring the purely temporal authority at once temporal and spiritual. The separation and independence of the two powers, declared by the Assembly of 1682, are therefore impracticable and absurd.

But grant it for a moment. Then the prince is and must be supreme judge of the natural law, as applicable to the temporal affairs of his subjects. The revealed law does in no instance abrogate the natural law. It presupposes and confirms it. Then nothing can be enjoined in the revealed or positive law that conflicts with the natural law. Then nothing demanded by the law of nature in re-

gard to the temporal well-being of mankind, or of a particular state, can contravene any thing contained in the revealed, supernatural, or positive divine law. The prince is supreme judge of the natural law as applicable to civil and temporal affairs, in regard to which, as say the Assembly of 1682, the Church has received no power from God. The prince, then, has the sovereign right to adopt any and every measure for the temporal well-being of his subjects or of his principality, that he judges to be authorized or permitted by the law of nature or natural justice. Suppose, then, he regards the modification or the suppression of the Catholic hierarchy, or the ecclesiastical organization in his dominions, as essential to that well-being. How can you deny his right to effect such modification or suppression? Do your best, then, your Gallicanism becomes Febronianism, and asserts the right of the civil authority, leaving the revealed dogma and the Sacraments untouched, to determine the government and discipline of the Church, and the civil constitution of the clergy decreed by the National Assembly in July, 1790, is only its legitimate development.

The Revolution of 1789, then, in our judgment, was, on the one hand, only the reaction of old constitutional France against the absolutism effected or very nearly effected by Louis the Fourteenth, and, on the other, the natural development of the independence of the civil authority asserted by the Declaration of the thirty-five bishops of the Assembly of 1682. Even the movement of Voltaire and Rousseau is in some sense justified by that Declaration. The Jansenists were the children of the Protestant Reformers, and the philosophers were the offspring of the Jansenists. But it cannot be denied that the Declaration of 1682 was favorable to the Jansenists, inasmuch as it depressed and restricted the power of the Holy See, detracted from the moral weight of the Papal constitutions, and rendered the suppression of heresy by the spiritual authority practically difficult, if not impossible. The Assembly practically asserted the right of inferiors to define the rights and powers of superiors, and when once the principle that inferiors have the right to define the authority of superiors is admitted, there is no end to its application. All authority is subverted, and superiors can have no authority, except such as the inferiors choose to concede

them. Jansenian bishops, under cover of this principle, could reclaim against the Papal constitution condemning them. Jansenian presbyters could reclaim against their orthodox bishops, as these had done against the Pope, and the laity could restrict the powers of the clergy of either order at will. The Jansenists were naturally irritated against the popes and bishops who condemned them, and the more so, in proportion as their respect for their authority was diminished. They became also irritated against the monarchy, which displayed its force against them, and the more so, in proportion to its responsibility, increased by the independence conceded to it by the Four Articles. Hence they prepared the way for Voltaire and Rousseau, and for the hostility to the Church and the monarchy, and to all authority displayed by the philosophers and their dupes.

Moreover, the Four Articles must, if reduced to practice, be so interpreted as to make the civil authority the sole and supreme judge of the natural law. The tone or temper of mind that would so interpret them would assert the natural as the limit of the revealed law, and assume that there can be nothing in the latter opposed to the monarch's interpretation of the former. But, after all, the monarch is human, and his authority is only human authority, which of itself alone does not and cannot bind in conscience. It binds conscience only by virtue of its conformity to the law of nature. But the law of nature is only another name for natural reason; consequently there can be in revelation nothing repugnant to natural reason. But reason is all and entire in every man, and therefore whatever claims to be the revealed will or law of God that is repugnant to my reason, is false, is fraud or imposture. In practice, with our corrupt nature, this will be my individual right to judge of the law of nature, and to reject as false, as fraud, as imposition, whatever is repugnant to my reason, to my will, to my passions, or to my caprice. Here is Voltaire, and the whole of him, and here, too, is Rousseau, at least in part. Rousseau was more comprehensive than Voltaire. Voltaire was simply the Luther of the eighteenth century; Rousseau was at once the Luther and the Calvin of the same century. He was a critic and destroyer, like Voltaire, like Luther; he was also a constructive genius, like Calvin. In destroying authority, he labored with Voltaire;

in seeking to construct, he went beyond him. The Four Articles had, in the secular interpretation of them, declared kings and princes absolute,—that is, had declared absolute and supreme the civil authority, or reasserted the old maxim, *Quod principi placuit, id legis habet vigorem*. But St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Bellarmine, Suarez, Du Peron, Fénelon, and nearly all Catholic doctors of any note, except Bossuet, who in this seems to have followed James the First of England and the jurisconsults of the courts of Frederick Barbarossa and Philip the Fair, teach that kings derive their power from God through the people, and hold it as a sacred trust from God for the nation. The real human sovereign, then, is not the king, but the people or the nation, and therefore the absolutism asserted by the Four Articles for kings and princes is, by an easy and necessary transition, asserted for the people or the nation. And here is the remainder of Rousseau, the democratic part,—the substitution of the nation or the people for kings and princes. As the people have the right to institute government for their common good, and as they are, since sovereign, the sole judges of what is or is not for their common good, they have the right to alter, modify, or suppress all existing laws, usages, institutions, of whatever name or nature, which they judge to be repugnant to that good, and to introduce such new institutions and laws as they judge to be favorable to it as they understand it for themselves. Here is the French Revolution, the suppression of the Catholic hierarchy, and the enactment of the Constitutional Church,—the substitution of democratic for monarchical despotism. All follows logically enough from the absolutism of Louis the Fourteenth, and the independence of the temporal authority asserted by the Assembly of 1682.

We think too much influence has been attributed to Voltaire and Rousseau, with their confederates. The Jansenists and Protestants had more to do with forming the civil constitution of the clergy, and the persecution of the Catholics, than the philosophers. We do not believe philosophers were ever able to revolutionize any state, either for good or for evil. They are a proud, high-prestending class, but usually weak and inefficient. Without the deplorable antecedents of Louis the Fourteenth and the Declaration which he forced from the French clergy,

Voltaire and Rousseau would have labored in vain to shake the faith of the French people, or to overthrow the French state. Their infidel philosophy had corrupted a portion of the nobility, and of the wealthier members of the *bourgeoisie*, it is true, but even at the opening of the States General it had not touched the great body of the nation. It prevailed in the chateaux, the saloons, and, to some extent, among the people in the capital and large towns of the kingdom; but it had hardly penetrated into the provinces, and the people generally retained their faith, as the instructions of the electors of all orders, especially of the clergy and the commons, to their deputies to the States General amply prove. Its adherents, in the beginning, were only a minority even in the States General, and if the friends of order and of religion had been as active and as energetic as their opponents, they could easily have crushed the revolution in the bud. The measures so hostile to religion afterwards decreed by the National Assembly, could not in the beginning have obtained even a hearing. The fatal measures which were adopted in the summer of 1789, when the clergy were everywhere applauded as the warm friends of liberty, would, notwithstanding the union of the three orders in a single assembly, voting *per capita*, have been indignantly rejected, had they not been looked upon as purely political measures, having no important bearing on religion. There was a strong dislike to absolute monarchy, there was an absurd craving for equality, that is, of every man to secure to himself the highest round of the ladder; but there was no general hostility to the Church, no general animosity against the clergy.

The first fatal measures, those which we can now easily see involved all that followed, were taken with the approbation or the acquiescence of the greater part of the clergy themselves, and supported by ecclesiastics, who proved, by their subsequent conduct, that they were firm in their attachment to the Church, and ready to die for the Catholic faith. They saw not, they suspected not, whither things were tending. They had been taught to regard politics as separate from and independent of religion. They had been trained under the Four Articles, and many of them under these articles as developed and understood by courtiers and Jansenists. Regarding politics as a distinct and

separate sphere from religion, they followed heedlessly the political direction given by the adroit few who wished to *deatholicize* France, without once stopping to inquire whether they were not conceding in the state principles which they must disavow the first moment they resorted to the rights and interests of religion. They did not think of applying their principles as Catholics within the arena of politics, and committed themselves to the dangerous measures before suspecting them to be dangerous.

Moreover, the bishops and clergy, conceding on all occasions the doctrine of the Four Articles, were unable to oppose with strict logical effect the attacks of the Revolution on the rights of the Church. They professed themselves ready to yield to it in every thing pertaining to the temporal order, in every thing that did not touch the spiritual authority. But who was to decide where the temporal ended and the spiritual began? The Church? Then the Four Articles had no sense, for then the Church was supreme in all things, inasmuch as she defined both her own powers and those of the state; and therefore the clergy, in saying they recognized the independence of the state or of the National Assembly in temporals, meant nothing, and used only vain words. The state? Then when the Assembly declared the measures it adopted purely political measures, the bishops and clergy were bound on their own principles not to oppose them, unless on political grounds. The bishops and clergy, throughout all the controversy excited by the anti-Catholic measures proposed by the *côté gauche*, were evidently embarrassed by the Four Articles. Their thought was sound, was Ultramontane, but they undertook to bring it out and defend it under Gallican forms, which deprived it of its practical power. What they wanted to say was: The Church is supreme, and you have no power except what you hold in subordination to her, either in spirituals or in temporals. You say your measures are only political, and are only such as you are free, by virtue of the independence of the political order, to adopt. This is nothing, for you are not your own judges in either order. You no more have political than ecclesiastical independence. The Church alone, under God, is independent, and she defines both your powers and her own. The question for you is not whether your

measures are purely political or not, but whether they are such as she leaves you free to adopt; for not even in the political order are you free to adopt any measures which she disapproves. This would have been plain, consistent, straightforward, and left no room for equivocation, for craft, or subtlety in confusing the question, and misleading the judgment; but this language the Four Articles forbade to be adopted.

Moreover, by having taught the people the independence and supremacy of Cæsar in the political order, they had given occasion for the mass of the people to entertain an honest doubt, of which the revolutionists availed themselves with terrible effect, whether the measures objected to by the bishops and clergy were not within the competency of the civil power. The enemies of the Church contended throughout that their measures touched only temporals, that they left the spiritual power, the Catholic religion itself, intact; and as they really made, so far as the poor people could perceive, no change in doctrine or worship, how were these poor people — who had always heard it said that the Church had no political power, that she is incompetent in temporals, and that all temporal affairs are of the domain of Cæsar, who is as supreme in his order as she is in hers — to be assured that the National Assembly had transcended the powers of the state, and that the opposition of the clergy to its measures did not spring from self-interest, fanaticism, or aristocratic and monarchical tendencies, instead of conscientious attachment to religion and fidelity to the Church? Certain it is, that large numbers supported the constitution, and persecuted the nonjuring clergy, who were by no means in their own estimation apostates. The majority of the National Assembly even intended to retain the Catholic religion, and went the length they did only because they held that the measures they adopted were political, and not spiritual, and therefore within the competency of the political power. Do Thomas F. Meagher, and the not inconsiderable number of Irishmen in this country who sympathize with him, intend to renounce their faith, or imagine that they cannot do all they propose to do without ceasing to be good Catholics? Not at all. They doubtless are well aware that they have no strong claims to be regarded as pious and devoted Catholics, but they suppose that their

movements are all in a sphere independent of the Church, and therefore such as may be prosecuted without any impeachment of their religion. These movements, in their judgment, are wholly in the political order, and they have heard it said, from their youth up, that the Church has nothing to do with politics, that she has received no mission in regard to the political order, and they therefore very naturally conclude that they are under no kind of obligation to render her any account of their political conduct. So was it with a large portion of the French people in 1789. In opposing the nonjuring bishops and priests they believed they were only asserting their natural rights as men, or as the state, and were merely resisting the unwarrantable assumptions of the spiritual power. If they had been distinctly taught that the political authority is always subordinate to the spiritual, and had grown up in the doctrine that the nation is not competent to define, in relation to the ecclesiastical power, its own rights, that the Church defines both its powers and her own, and that, though the nation may be and ought to be independent in relation to other nations, it has and can have no independence in face of the Church, the kingdom of God on earth, they would have seen at a glance, that to support the civil authority against the spiritual, no matter in what measures, was the renunciation of their faith as Catholics, and the actual or virtual assertion of the supremacy of the temporal order. Brought thus distinctly to the point, and compelled, without any subterfuge or any sophistry to confuse and bewilder their understandings, to choose between the Catholic religion and the constitutional religion, we feel confident very few would have prevaricated, and that the National Assembly would have found general execration, instead of popular support, for its schismatic and infidel measures. The independence of the political order asserted by the Four Articles laid the people open to the influence of artful leaders, who wished to destroy the Church, and rendered but too many of them deaf to the expostulations of their legitimate pastors. We look upon the French revolution, therefore, as a judgment of God on the king and nobility, and especially the clergy, for their unfaithfulness to their trusts, for their betrayal of the rights, and nonperformance of the duties, of their respective orders, and as a practical demonstration to the

whole world of the dangerousness to the state, to the nation, and to religion herself, of the doctrine asserted in the too famous Gallican Declaration of 1682.

There is always, even in the most Catholic times and in the most Catholic states, a party, more or less numerous, who have no conception of religion as law, or of the Church as a kingdom, with a constitution, laws, and chiefs of her own, set up on the earth with plenary authority, under God, over states and individuals,—a party who never think of the Church as a divinely constituted government, even in spirituals, and count for nothing her external organization, her mission, or her discipline. The Creed, the Sacraments, and the Ritual comprise, for them, the whole of religion, and they never can or never will understand why these may not be just as salutary when held out of unity as when held in it. If a bishop has really received the episcopal character, and if he holds the substance of the Christian doctrine, and observes the approved ritual, they see no reason why his ministrations are not of the same value, when he receives his mission, his jurisdiction, or investiture from the state, as when he receives it from the successor of Peter. The authority, the mission, external unity of the Church, or her unity and jurisdiction as a government, never strike them as essential elements of her constitution, or as necessary to be believed and maintained in order to believe and maintain the Catholic religion. Here was the difficulty in France during the Revolution. The great body of the faithful knew the Church as the revelation of God, as the sacraments, and as worship; but owing to the innate jealousy of the temporal power, and to the perhaps necessary prudence of doing or saying as little as possible to irritate this jealousy, or to give offence to Cæsar, no small portion of them had remained comparatively ignorant of her as the kingdom of God set up on the earth for the *government* of all men and nations, states and individuals. They recognized in her authority to teach the Symbol and to administer the Sacraments, at least in a restricted sense; but when there was question of government, and the word *kingdom* was mentioned, they thought only of the state, and were ready to exclaim, in their simplicity, with the Jews who demanded of Pilate the crucifixion of our Lord, “We have no king but Cæsar!” This is what gave to the Jansenists, Protestants, and phi-

losophers in the National Assembly, and out of it, their fearful power over a portion of the French people, and what took away from the faithful pastors their legitimate influence over their flocks.

In these revolutionary times the great point to be specially insisted on, it seems to us, is, that the Church is a government, a kingdom, the Kingdom of kingdoms and Principality of principalities. What is most important is, to understand that she is a power, an organized power, divinely constituted, assisted, and protected, representing the Divine authority on earth, and as such universal and supreme. How the state is organized, or by whom administered, is a matter of comparative indifference. The state may be monarchical or republican, aristocratic or democratic, if it only be understood and conceded that over it, as over every individual, there is a spiritual kingdom, a spiritual authority, commissioned by God himself, to interpret and apply his law to every department of human life, individual or social, public or private; for if such authority be recognized and submitted to, no interest, temporal or spiritual, can fail to be protected and promoted. Undoubtedly, the assertion of this authority is a delicate matter, owing to the utter confusion which obtains in men's minds respecting it; but we pray such of our readers as have some little candor and good-will to bear in mind that to assert this authority is by no means to merge the state in the Church, or to claim for the Church direct temporal authority, although even to claim for her direct temporal authority is not, to say the least, forbidden to the Catholic. What we here assert is, that the spiritual authority, in the nature of the case and by the express appointment of God, extends beyond what are ordinarily called spirituals, — to all matters which do or can interest conscience, or concerning which there can arise any question of right or wrong, true or false. The Church, we grant, nay, maintain, is spiritual, and governs in reference, and only in reference, to a spiritual end; but as the temporal order subsists only by and for the spiritual, she, though not it any more than God is the world, nor the temporal authority itself, has, as the God whose representative on earth she is, supreme authority over it, and the full right, under God, to prescribe to it the law it is bound in all things and at all times to consult and obey.

We do not, indeed, claim for the Church in relation to the temporal authority the right to make the law, for God himself, and he only, makes the law ; but we do claim for her the right to declare and apply his law to kings and princes, states and empires, as well as to individuals, in public as well as in private matters. The Church, of course, has no right to depose a legitimate prince, that is, a prince who has the right to reign, or to absolve his subjects from their allegiance, for she has no right to do wrong or to violate the law of God, and we are not at liberty to suppose that she ever does, ever will, or ever can, for she is holy and infallible by virtue of the indwelling and assistance of the Holy Ghost ; but she has the right to judge who has or has not, according to the law of God, the right to reign,—whether the prince has by his infidelity, his misdeeds, his tyranny and oppression, forfeited his trust, and lost his right to the allegiance of his subjects, and therefore, whether they are still held to their allegiance or are released from it by the law of God. If she have the right to judge, she has the right to pronounce judgment, and order its execution ; therefore, to pronounce sentence of deposition upon the prince who has forfeited his right to reign, and to declare his subjects absolved from their allegiance to him, and free to elect themselves a new sovereign.

She has the right, we say, to pronounce sentence, but whether the sentence shall be carried into effect or not in the temporal order depends, in point of fact, on that order itself ; not because she has no authority over the temporal power, but because she has no temporal arms with which to enforce the execution of her sentence. She bears indeed the temporal sword, but it was not the will of her Spouse that she should wield it with her own hands. She ordinarily exercises it only by the hands of the laity, and she has only spiritual means by which to compel them to exercise it according to her orders. So, however extensive her authority, or full her right over the temporal power, she depends solely on the faith and conscience of her children for its practical assertion beyond the sphere of the spiritual order. It is this fact, we apprehend, that has led so many to misconceive and to misstate her authority in regard to temporal sovereigns, and it is the misapprehension of this fact that usually so alarms Cæsar and his min-

isters. God respects in all men the free will of man, and forces no man into the Church or into heaven against his free will. There is no one who cannot, if he chooses, resist Divine grace, disobey the law of God, and lose his soul. God will have none but a free-will offering, none but a voluntary service, although those who reject his offers, refuse to serve him, and disobey his commands, do so at their own peril, and must suffer the consequences. So he has not willed that his Church should with her own hands wield the temporal sword, and has left the nations, not the right, but the ability, to resist her judgments, and to refuse to execute her decrees. If their faith and conscience will not lead them to execute her sentence, when that sentence requires the exercise of physical force, she can herself do no more, and the responsibility rests with them. Her practical power over temporal affairs is therefore restricted to that which is yielded her by the faith and piety of the faithful, although her right, her authority, is supreme and universal. If her children are uninstructed as to this right, if they grow up with the persuasion that she has no authority over temporals, and that her power is restricted to teaching the Catechism and administering the Sacraments, she will be able to exert little or no power over temporal governments, and her children, as in the French Revolution, will too often be found siding with the state against her, and rushing headlong into heresy and schism, to the ruin of the state and the perdition of their own souls. Nevertheless, her authority, her right remains; and not unfrequently her heavenly Spouse in a mysterious manner intervenes to vindicate it, and to carry her sentence into effect, as we saw surprisingly manifested in the case of the Emperor Napoleon the First. Schismatic Russia, heretical England and Prussia, and even infidel Turkey, were made in the providence of God instruments for the execution of her decrees, and inflicting merited chastisement on the persecutor of her Sovereign Pontiff. Napoleon laughed at the idea of an excommunication of a sovereign by the Pope in the nineteenth century, and asked, sneeringly, if the old man expected that the thunders of the Church would cause the muskets to fall from the hands of his soldiers. He had his answer on his retreat from Moscow, when the muskets did literally drop from their hands.

This power which we claim for the Church over tem-

poral sovereigns and their subjects is neither more nor less than the simple power of the keys. Bossuet, indeed, in the first of the Four Articles, denies that kings and princes can be deposed, and their subjects absolved from their allegiance by the power of the keys, and maintains that these give the Pope no right in civil and temporal affairs; but in this he clearly places himself in opposition to some of the greatest and most holy Pontiffs that have ever sat in the chair of Peter. St. Gregory the Seventh expressly deduces his right to depose princes and absolve their subjects from the power of the keys, and the authority of this Pontiff, canonized by the Church, is greater than that of Bossuet, or even the whole thirty-five French bishops who made the Gallican Declaration of 1682. Bossuet also is easily refuted by the reason of the case, unless he can, as he cannot, adduce a decision of authority, disclaiming the power in question. Popes have claimed it, have exercised it, and have never disclaimed it. They have uniformly deduced it from the power of the keys, and none have ever denied it. We have, we think, then, the right to insist that the power of the keys is unrestricted, or without other limitations than such as are imposed by its own nature. Our Lord says to Peter, "I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth, it shall be bound also in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven." (St. Matthew xvi. 19.) Here is conferred all the authority of the kingdom, and the authority of the Pope as the successor of Peter therefore has no other restrictions than those of the kingdom of heaven itself; and that authority, we have shown over and over again, by its own nature extends over the whole temporal order. This is evident, too, from the very purpose of our Lord in setting up his kingdom, that is, the Church, on the earth. He set up his kingdom on the earth to rule over the kingdoms of this world, and to make them the kingdoms of God and of his Christ. In giving the keys of this kingdom to Peter, he must from the nature of the case have given him through them all the powers necessary to accomplish that purpose; for he who imposes the end necessarily confers the right to use all the means necessary to effect it.

The king or prince holds either under the law of nature or the revealed law of God, and of course is bound to con-

form to the law under which he holds. If you say he holds under the revealed law, there is no controversy between us, for there is no question with any Catholic that the Church has supreme jurisdiction in every case that does or can arise under that law. If then you mean to oppose us, you must say that he holds under the law of nature, which is what all those who take the ground of Bossuet do say. The question then is, Has the Church, or has she not, supreme judicial authority in all cases that do or can arise under the law of nature? Has she, or has she not, the right to take cognizance of offences against the natural law, as distinguished from the revealed law? To a certain extent she certainly has, as every Catholic does and must concede. She does not, she cannot, indeed, abrogate the natural law, nor modify any of its essential provisions; but natural morality is no less within her jurisdiction than supernatural morality. She takes cognizance in her tribunals of offences against natural justice, as well as of offences against faith and the Sacraments, *for they are equally offences against God*, and offences against the natural law are accounted offences even of a deeper dye than those against the positive law. In the process of canonization, evidence is first taken with regard to the cardinal virtues, and if the candidate is found deficient in these, the inquiry stops and the case is dismissed. Obedience to the natural law lies at the foundation of all virtue, and where that is wanting, neither faith nor the Sacraments will avail us. If we have violated natural justice, we must make restitution before we can receive absolution. Certainly the Church has jurisdiction of cases under the natural law, as every one who has learned the Catechism, heard an instruction from the pulpit, or been to confession, must concede.

If the Church has jurisdiction in some cases under the natural law, she must have in all cases, unless some cases be specially excepted by God himself, and expressly reserved to another tribunal. No such cases can be alleged. There are reserved cases, as from a priest to the bishop, and from the bishop to the Pope, but none from the Supreme Pontiff himself. The Church, then, has supreme jurisdiction in all cases which do or can arise under the natural as well as the revealed law. The question then comes up, Are kings and princes bound by the natural law, that

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is, bound in their government of their subjects to observe the law of nature? They most assuredly are, if they hold under that law, and *a fortiori* if they hold under the revealed law, which presupposes and confirms the natural law. That law is the ground of their rights and the rule of their duties, and if they violate it, and rule unjustly, tyrannically, oppressively, they sin, and sin against God, for the natural law is law, is obligatory, only inasmuch as it is the law of God, or a transcript of the eternal law. Of that sin the Church may take cognizance as of any other sin, and bind or loose those guilty of it according to her own judgment in the case. If the sin is one that forfeits their power, according to the law of nature, and there is no evidence of repentance, and every reason to believe that it will be persisted in, she has the right to bind them, and to declare judicially that they have no longer the right to reign, and that their subjects are no longer bound to obey them; that is, to depose them, declare the throne vacant, and to absolve their subjects from their allegiance and declare them free to elect a new sovereign, for in all this she does only declare a simple fact. In doing this, it is clear that she only exercises the power of the keys, of binding and loosing, and that, if she could not do thus much, there would be a class of sins that exclude from heaven of which she could take no cognizance, and to which she could apply no remedy.

We concede that kings hold under the law of nature, and therefore that the rights and duties of sovereigns and of subjects remain even after the reception of the faith what they were before, or rather, that the reception of the faith annuls none of the rights of the sovereign, and releases the subject from no duty to his sovereign which he owed prior to the reception of Christianity, — what we understand to be the doctrine of St. Thomas on this subject. We do not suppose the Church has any power to annul these rights, or to dispense from these duties. But we reason on the supposition, that, under the law of nature, sovereigns have duties as well as rights, that subjects have rights as well as duties, and that the rights of sovereigns are forfeited when their duties are neglected, and the duties of subjects cease to oblige when their rights are systematically and perseveringly violated and trampled upon. We do not hold, we grant, the doctrine

of the divine right of kings, which was so strenuously advocated by James the First of England, and which was so ably refuted by Bellarmine and Suarez, both Jesuits, and by Cardinal Du Perron in his masterly discourse in the assembly of the States General of France in 1614. We believe in the divine origin of power, for, *Non est potestas nisi a Deo* ; but we do not believe that it ever becomes the private property or estate of any man, of any family, or of any set or class of men. Let who will be invested with it, it is a trust, a trust from God for the nation, and, like all trusts, liable to be forfeited by abuse. This is the doctrine, as we understand it, taught by all the great doctors of the Church, and especially by St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and the Jesuit Suarez ; and no one of any note, as far as we are aware, unless it be Bossuet, teaches any thing to the contrary. In none of the early Christian states formed by the Northern nations on the ruins of the Roman Empire was the principle even of hereditary monarchy acknowledged. In all those states formed under the auspices of the Church, not excepting England and France, monarchy was elective, and wherever it has become hereditary from father to son, it has been by a slow and gradual usurpation. France, in electing Louis Napoleon to be her emperor, has, in that respect, only returned to her ancient constitution ; and in elevating a new family to the throne, she has done no more than she did in the case of the Carolingians and in that of the Capetians. England in the case of Henry the Seventh, unless we assume that he reigned by right of conquest, in that of William and Mary, and in that of the Elector of Hanover, whatever we may think of the wisdom or of the motives of her acts, only returned to her original constitution, and exercised a right which, though long in abeyance, it would be difficult to prove had ever been absolutely lost. The principle of Oriental despotism, which assumes power to be the indefeasible right of the sovereign, and his subjects and their possessions his private property, is as repugnant to Catholic ethics as it is to public and private liberty. The kingdom is not, strictly speaking, the domain of the king, and the king, though he has the right to *govern*, has no right, if we may use the word, to *dominate*. Monarchy, in the sense of absolute domination, is expressly condemned by St. Gregory the First and St. Gregory the Seventh, treated

as a violence, and declared to originate in sin, — to be the offspring of violence and iniquity. Princes receive power from God to rule, not to enslave their subjects, to govern them as freemen, not as slaves, as men, not as things, — to govern as pastors or fathers, not as lords and despots, — in love, according to the rules of eternal justice, not in wrath, in hatred, or according to the promptings of their own passions, or the dictates of their own arbitrary will. The prince who does not bear this in mind, and rule according to the conditions of the trust he has received, forfeits his right to reign, and by that releases his subjects from their allegiance.

This is what we understand to be the law of nature on the subject, as interpreted and applied by the Church, and it is in the main the doctrine of all modern statesmen who profess to be the especial friends of liberty. It was to this doctrine that the English Parliament appealed against Charles the First and James the Second, and also the American Congress of 1776 against George the Third. The Church, then, in deposing a sovereign and absolving his subjects, does not abrogate the law of nature, but simply administers it. She really only declares the law, or pronounces judgment under it. It is not her judgment that makes the forfeiture, or that releases the subject; she only declares a forfeiture already incurred, and releases subjects already virtually released by the act of the prince. This declaration is necessary, because neither princes nor subjects can judge in their own case. If we allow the prince, as do the Gallican monarchists, to be his own judge, to interpret and apply the law for himself, he can tyrannize and oppress at will; and if we allow the people to be their own judges, as do the Gallican democrats, and concede that the sovereign is justiciable by them, we reverse all ideas of government, give them the right to refuse submission when they please, and can have nothing but universal revolution and disorder as the result.

Assuming that we have rightly interpreted the law of nature on the subject, political power is a sacred trust from God. The prince, then, is responsible to God for the use he makes of it. If responsible, his abuse of it is a sin, and a sin which may damn his soul. How, then, say that the Church has not, by virtue of the keys, the power to take cognizance of his public acts, to sit in judgment on him

in his public capacity, and bind or loose him as a sovereign? Does he not owe a duty to his subjects? If he deliberately neglects that duty, and tramples on their rights, does he not sin against justice, and sin grievously? How can you say, as a Catholic, that the Church can take no cognizance of that sin, and deal with the guilty prince as with any other sinner? But how can she do this without judging his conduct as temporal prince, and by what right can she do that, if she have no power over the temporal order? The power she has received with the keys is a power to take knowledge of sin, wherever or by whomsoever committed, and to bind or loose the sinner,—to acquit or to condemn him. The keys, then, do give her power to bind or loose monarchs as well as private persons, and in relation to sins committed by them in their public as well as in their private capacity. We must side with the Popes, then, even against Bossuet.

Subjects, again, owe allegiance to the legitimate prince, that is, as we have said, the prince who has the right to reign, and it is not a matter of indifference, in a moral point of view, whether they obey him or not. To disobey him, deliberately to refuse to obey him or to resist his authority, is a sin, and a grievous sin, against God; for subjects are bound to obey the civil magistrate, not for wrath, that is, to avoid the punishment he may inflict, but for conscience' sake, because God, in both the natural law and the revealed, commands them to be subject to the powers that be. But they are not bound to obey every one who claims, or has power to enforce, their obedience. They are not bound to obey the usurper, the tyrant, him who never had any right, or, if he had, has forfeited his right to govern, or him who commands them to do things contrary to natural justice, or things forbidden by the law of God. But the Church has undeniably the right to take cognizance of the sin of disobedience, and to bind or loose, according to her judgment in the case. How can she take cognizance of the sin and judge the sinner, that is, exercise the power of the keys, if she cannot take cognizance of matters in the temporal order, and decide who is or who is not a legitimate prince, when and to whom civil obedience is or is not due? Thus far the power of the keys undeniably extends, and if thus far, it extends to the sentence of deposition upon the prince, and to the

absolution of his subjects from their allegiance. The power denied to the Church by the Four Articles, then, must be conceded as included in the power of the keys, the power of binding and loosing, unless we take the ground that the civil power is not subject to the law of God, either natural or revealed; and if we take that ground, we have no right to censure the Sovereign Pontiffs for having exercised the deposing power, for they who hold themselves amenable to no law can appeal to no law for protection. The fact is, that the Church could never exercise her spiritual discipline, or accomplish her work of spiritual government, if her power of binding and loosing did not extend to sovereigns as well as to subjects, and to sovereigns in relation to their public trusts as well as to their private conduct.

The power which Bossuet denies the Church must be hers, for she is by her very mission bound to be the guardian and protector of the faithful. She has as God's Church the right to exist, and therefore has, by the law of nature even, the common right of self-preservation and self-defence. Thus, if attacked by an infidel, an heretical, or a schismatical power with an armed force, she has the right to call upon her faithful children to arm in her defence, and to make war on her enemies, as in the case of the Crusades, and the religious wars of the sixteenth century. She has the right and the duty to protect the faith and the virtue of her children, wherever they are, by all the means in her power. Thus, if a prince falls into schism or heresy, and attempts to pervert the faith of his subjects, and to carry them away with him, she has the right to declare him deposed, and his subjects released from their allegiance; for he by such conduct abuses his trust, and forfeits, even by the natural law, his right to govern. The law of nature binds all men to accept and obey the revealed law of God, as soon as it is sufficiently promulgated; for the law of nature binds all men to love, serve, and worship God in the way and manner he himself prescribes, therefore according to a supernatural law, if he reveals such law to them. Infidel princes cannot be forced to accept and obey such law, because God has chosen that faith should be voluntary; but they can be compelled by Christian princes to desist from persecuting those who have received it, and to leave their subjects free to em-

brace and conform to it if they choose. The Church, however, cannot excommunicate them, for they are not in her communion, nor depose them, if their subjects are infidels, for then they do not own her authority. They are without, and those without she does not judge. But princes made her subjects by baptism are to be presumed to have had the revealed law, the Christian faith, sufficiently promulgated to them to be morally bound to receive and obey it. They are then bound by their office to profess it, and to protect with their power the Church, who is its depository, and therefore the faithful in their respective states. If they do not, and use their power against her, to pervert or persecute the faithful, she as the guardian and protector of the faithful, and as authorized to interpret and apply the law of God, to bind and to loose, has the right, if no milder measures will answer, to declare them to have forfeited their right to govern, and their subjects to be absolved from all obligation to obey them. She has this right by virtue of the keys; she has it also by virtue of her obligation to protect the faith and virtue of her children; and she has it, finally, by virtue of her right of self-preservation, which includes, of course, the right of preserving the faith of the members of her communion. These considerations are sufficient, in our judgment, to save from the reproaches with which it is still loaded, even by some unreflecting and worldly-minded Catholics, the memory of those great Popes who have found it necessary to exercise authority over rebellious and sacrilegious princes, to smite them with the sword of Peter and Paul, and to declare them fallen from their rights as sovereigns. They were forced, in the cause of justice and the Church, to resort to extreme measures, and to exercise a most fearful power; but they resorted to those extreme measures with extreme reluctance, and only after all other measures had been tried and exhausted in vain. Their own hearts bled, and they delayed till longer delay would clearly have been a betrayal of their trust. Let us hope, and devoutly pray, that no occasion for resorting to such extreme measures may ever again occur, but at the same time let us dare own the past history of the Sovereign Pontiffs, and not fear to assert the inherent rights of the Church, freely and firmly, in meekness and humility, as becomes us, against all who question them.

It has been in no light or wanton spirit that we have discussed so much at length the mutual relations of the two orders, and asserted the subordination of the temporal, and the universal and absolute supremacy of the spiritual. It has been absolutely necessary to do it, in order to combat with any prospect of success the prevailing errors and heresies of our times. The flesh remains in Catholics, for baptism does not destroy concupiscence, which inclines to sin, and consequently they, as well as others, are liable to be affected in a greater or less degree by what is called the spirit of the age. The peculiar errors and heresies of any age they are in some measure predisposed to favor, and it is only by the powerful restraints of divine grace and the sleepless vigilance of pastors, and especially of the Chief Pastor, that they are held back within the limits of sound doctrine and lawful conduct. The radical and revolutionary spirit of our times has by no means been confined to those who are out of the external communion of the Church; the great body of the faithful have felt its workings in their own bosoms, even when they have through grace successfully resisted it; and many, too many, of them have yielded to it, followed it in its mission of destruction, and made shipwreck of both their virtue and their faith. In our own country our Catholic brethren have been and still are peculiarly exposed to its influence. The great body of them are still suffering under the sad effects of ages of oppression and misrule, and naturally regard as their friend any one who declaims hastily against tyranny and clamors for liberty and the rights of man. They find something within that responds to the burning words and daring measures of the revolutionary chiefs, and we have had men amongst us that would sooner die than renounce their faith, who yet have sympathized with Mazzini, Kosuth, Lédru-Rollin, and been ready to lend their active support to European Radicals and American Filibusters. We can account for it, and we may have much to say in exculpation of the simple faithful whose generous sympathies have been played upon by artful leaders, and who have been betrayed into measures of active hostility to the religion of their fathers, but it is nevertheless necessary to undeceive them, and this we cannot do unless we refute the notion they generally entertain, that religion has nothing to do with politics, and show them that according to

Catholic doctrine the Church is the judge of our whole duty, in whatever sphere or order it may lie.

The Church undeniably commands obedience to civil rulers, and ranks sedition and rebellion in the class of mortal sins; we must then, as Catholics, condemn *in toto* the revolutionary spirit and the revolutionary attempts of our times. We have here no option. Our duty is clear and undeniable. But while insisting on the duties of subjects, are we to forget the duties of power? Does the Church recognize in power no duties, and in subjects no rights? Does she bind the subject to obedience and loose the prince from the obligation to reign justly, for the common good of all his subjects? By no means. She is not the accomplice of tyranny, and she never asserts the rights of rulers and the duties of subjects, without at the same time asserting the rights of subjects and the duties of rulers. We could not, then, in justice to her, insist on the sin of disobedience, without touching on the sin of tyranny or oppression, or assert her authority to interpret and apply the law for subjects, without asserting also her authority to interpret and apply it for princes. Necessarily, then, have we been forced to consider her power over the political order, and her right to judge kings and princes as well as private persons; in a word, her supreme authority to apply the law of God for the government of all men and nations, in temporals as well as in spirituals. It were only calculated to excite hatred and distrust of the Church to represent her as merely commanding obedience, as simply instructing subjects in their duty, and never intimating that she also instructs rulers, and subjects them, proud as they may be, to her discipline, when they violate her rights, or sin against God by oppressing their subjects, whom they are bound to protect.

Moreover, the spirit of the age, while it declaims against monarchy, and makes war on kings and emperors, claims absolute independence for the civil power. It reasserts for the people, or for the demagogues as leaders of the people, the independence and supremacy which the German lawyers in the time of Frederick Barbarossa asserted for the Emperor, and which James the First and the Anglo-Protestant ministers under the princes of his family asserted for kings and all sovereign princes. It substitutes for kings and princes the people, and democratic for monarchical

despotism. To hear the men of our age talk, you would suppose the people were the Church, nay, God himself, the Most High, whose will is in all cases law, and supreme law. They bind kings, princes, and pontiffs, and assert the independence of the people, and tell us, that whoso dares disobey the people sins against God. Now people-god is no more to our taste than king-god, and it is no less idolatry to render supreme homage to the people than it is to render it to Caesar. The people are as much bound in their collective as in their individual capacity to obey the law of God. We have been able, therefore, to refute the error of our age, and to oppose despotism on the one hand and anarchy on the other, only by asserting the supremacy of the spiritual order, and defending the right of the Church to judge the political power, however constituted, and by whomsoever administered: that is, her right to subject rulers as well as ruled to her discipline, which right were a vain word, or a mere abstract right incapable of being practically asserted, without the papal constitution of the Church, and the plenary authority, as Vicar of God, of the Sovereign Pontiff. The controversies of the day have forced us to go thus far, and therefore, what we always do with extreme reluctance, to take part in disputes among Catholics themselves. We have been obliged to fall back on the strong Papal doctrines asserted by the Gregories, the Innocents, the Alexanders, the Bonifaces, and the Piuses, in opposition to the Gallicanism so rife in all the courts of Europe in the last century and the beginning of the present, and which in this country, England, and Ireland has been carried to a dangerous extreme for the purpose of conciliating power, which in all these states is inveterately hostile to Catholicity.

That what we have said on the delicate topics we have treated will be perverted, and made the occasion of saying hard things against our Church, we have no doubt, for we are well aware that it is precisely because the Church claims, and, when occasion offers, exercises, the power we have asserted for her, that the powers of this world hate her, and persecute her faithful children. But we cannot help it. The more moderate doctrines embodied in the Four Articles of the Gallican clergy have never saved Catholics from persecution, or reconciled Jansenistic, Protestant, or infidel governments to the Church. It was

tried by the English Catholics under Elizabeth and the Stuarts, and it did not save them from fines and imprisonment, or from being hung, drawn, and quartered, as traitors. It did not save the nonjuring bishops and clergy in France during the old revolution from being maltreated, imprisoned, massacred, or exiled. It never will save any of us, if we adhere to the Church at all, because the most ultra Gallican, if he means to remain in the communion of the Church, must, when hard pressed, fall back on the Ultramontane doctrine, and say, "It is necessary to obey God rather than men." There is a point beyond which submission to the temporal authority, whether monarchical or republican, aristocratic or democratic, is apostasy, and can in no sense whatever be tolerated. We must all say this, and our enemies know it; and they know that the great body of the faithful will place that point where it is declared to be by the Sovereign Pontiff.

The truth is, this world hates the Church because she condemns it, and do what we will, as long as she exists in the world, she must be the Church Militant. This world is given up to Cæsar, and Cæsar will tolerate no rival, much less a superior; for Cæsar expresses the pride of the human heart. He will always regard her presence as did Aman Mardocheus sitting in the king's gate, and erect his gallows fifty cubits high, on which to hang her. He will always oppose her in the name of this world, and declare her incompatible with civil government. She is incompatible with all *unjust* civil government, with all civil government that would govern by arbitrary will, irrespective of the law of God, and we cannot deny it, although she is well known to be the friend and firm supporter of every civil government that seeks to govern wisely and justly, for the common good of its subjects. Yet men with liberty and equality on their lips will still blaspheme her as the enemy of the state, now the enemy of power, and now the enemy of liberty. We cannot help it. It is in the nature of the men of this world to do so. We who have the happiness to know her doctrine and spirit, know how false and unjust all this is, but it is a part of our penance to submit to it. Nothing that we or any one else can say will commend her to those who hate her, and will not have her Spouse to reign over them. To us she is all beautiful, but for the men of this world she has no beauty or

comeliness, that they should desire her. To us she is the wisdom of God and the power of God, but to them she is foolishness or a stumbling-block. No explanation, no softening of her features, no apologies, can make them love her, or cease to fear her. We must then consult first of all the good of the faithful, and, while we are careful to offer no gratuitous offence to Caesar or his minions, we must study a wise boldness, and take care that the doctrines which will best succor the faithful in the hour of danger, and best enable them to detect and foil the designs of the enemy, be earnestly and specially insisted upon, and that they are never caught, as were so many in the French Revolution, doubting whether they are to side with the state or with the Church.

ART. II. — *Life of Mrs. Eliza A. Seton, Foundress and First Superior of the Sisters or Daughters of Charity in the United States of America; with Copious Extracts from her Writings, and an Historical Sketch of the Sisterhood from its Foundation to the Present Time.* By Rev. CHARLES I. WHITE, D. D. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1853. 12mo. pp. 581.

WE inserted a notice of Dr. White's *Life of Mrs. Seton* in our Review for last April. But as we then confined ourselves mainly to a discussion of the theological question raised by the very full account of Mrs. Seton's Protestant piety, we have thought a further notice of the work, prepared prior to that one, may not be unacceptable to the numerous friends of this eminent Catholic lady.

In Maryland, near the little village of Emmittsburg, in the Blue Ridge valley, close to the Pennsylvania line, stands the mother house of the Sisters of Charity in the United States, — a magnificent group of buildings, church and Gothic convent, and the various academical houses, combined into one superb and extensive institution. Brooding like a good angel over that beautiful valley, her beneficent influence extends from ocean to ocean, from the forests of Wisconsin to the sands of the Sacramento. Yet, less than fifty years ago, an untenanted house by

Tom's Creek was the only building there, and the meadows and fields that now display in their glad fertility the blessing of God and the peaceful labor of man, were in weeds and woods, — the half-reclaimed hunting-grounds of the vanishing Indian.

The volume before us explains this change. Though the unbelievers of the age smile disdainfully upon the authenticated miracles of our Saints, their nostrils will scarcely curl at this miraculous and material change wrought by the sanctity of one unaided woman.

Eliza Ann Bayley was born in the city of New York, on the 28th of August, 1774. Her father was a distinguished Protestant physician; her mother, the daughter of an Episcopalian clergyman. Deprived in her third year of her mother, the guardianship of her youth and the subsequent care of her education devolved upon her father, whose genius, acquirements, and devotion admirably fitted him for the delicate and difficult task. The presence of a hostile army, the doubt and danger of war, united them still more closely; filial piety, that exquisite, but now-a-days expiring virtue, was the spring of all her actions, the incentive to every exertion. This tenderness, depth, and purity of love was the first manifestation of her superior nature.

But with advancing years, the amiable qualities of her heart were combined with a quick apprehension, a sound judgment, and a fertile imagination. The Revolution had closed the few seminaries we possessed; but this was more than compensated by the sweet retirement of home, and the ever-constant supervision and instruction of her father. At the early age of eighteen, she began to display that deep devotion to God which characterized her after life. Shunning the follies incident to youth and beauty, and undazzled by the corrupting light of fashion, she repressed the vagaries of her mind by a diligent examination of her conscience; and with a philosophic insight, blended with humility, she rejects the false glitter that too often betrays. Graceful and well proportioned, — her features symmetrical as a Greek statue, — her eye, remembered yet by all who ever saw her, the mirror of a noble and intelligent soul, — she was sought by many, and eventually gave her heart and hand to Mr. William Seton, a New York merchant of the highest character and standing, — the friend

of Talleyrand, Perigord, and Otis, the correspondent of Crevécoeur. The world smiled upon their union; peace and prosperity promised an enduring blessing; and admiring friends prophesied their benignant hopes. But the designs of Providence transcend all human calculation. The yellow-fever shot its baneful breath upon her native city, imperilling the lives of her father and husband. Already we hear the articulated sigh of her soul for the hour when the shadows of life are exchanged for immortality and endless happiness, — for the hour of unspeakable joy, when the Eternal Presence bestows everlasting felicity. Nor was she untried: the sentimental eloquence of Rousseau and the salient poison of Voltaire had their charm for her enthusiastic nature, unwarned by the infallible guardian finger of Catholicity. But a soul blessed with such a vivid sense of her heavenly home repelled the charm of sophistry and wit. Temporal adversity, mercantile distress, inflicted a pang beyond the cure of French philosophy, and dissipated the eloquent, unmeaning whispers that tempt us to forfeit the tree of life for that of knowledge.

Mother of five children, a strict member of the Episcopal Church, her lot in life seemed cast. Yet such was the profound awe awakened in her by the Communion of the Lord's Supper, that her teeth clattered against the cup which contained the elements, and she envied the Catholics who believed in the Real Presence. Her youth had passed, but she laments it not; as if dimly conscious of her high calling, she welcomes the longer and more desirable middle age.

Her father's brilliant and useful career was drawing to a close: the medical profession had to lament the loss of one of its brightest ornaments, whose genius had deprived the croup of its terrors; his daughter had to weep for the tenderest of fathers. A martyr to his zeal and humanity, a fever caught at the Quarantine brought him to his bed, from which he never rose. In the affecting incident, where Mrs. Seton offers up her sleeping child as a sacrifice for her father's life, we have a glimpse of the vivid, sincere reliance on Divine assistance, which even then formed the basis of her character. After losing her father, her piety seems to deepen: the earth dwindles in her eyes, as the gaze of her soul seems to concentrate on heaven; her diary is filled with aspirations, holy resolutions, and acts of thanksgiving. But bitterer trials awaited, with chasten-

ing hand, to complete the union of her soul with God, and, through the darkness of sterner affliction, reveal the refuge provided for all the wounded and weary, in the spotless bosom of his Church.

Her husband's health declining, she resolved to accompany him to Italy: they embarked, and on the 19th of November, 1803, while the *Ave Maria* bells were ringing, arrived in the Mole of Leghorn, where they were quarantined four weeks. Her account of their Lazaretto life is painfully graphic;—the single window, double-grated with iron, through which a sentinel with a cocked hat and long rifle ministers to her wants,—unable to touch her step-brother, lest the dreaded yellow-fever might be imparted,—solaced by “Hail Columbia” played under her window, and consoled by the kindness of Mrs. Filicchi and the attentions of the Capitano. But the first days of this confinement were days of anguish;—her children impatient of their bleak prison; the sea-wind roaring through every crevice; her husband shivering on the cold bricks, unable to sit up, lifting his dim and sorrowful eyes with a fixed gaze to her face, mutely weeping. Yet the Capitano proved a kind-hearted man. The tone of her journal changes on the third day: curtained beds were brought, the benches fixed, even flowers lent their beauty and perfume to the temporary prison, and in her devotions, prisons, bolts, and sorrows were for a time forgotten. What human comfort was there, even had the freedom of Italy and all its sunshine and luxuries been hers,—her husband dying in a land of strangers, divided by the ocean from relatives and friends? He died at Pisa: even the tenderness of her Leghorn friends could not heal a wound like this. In the shadow of the Leaning Tower, with her own hands,—so timid were the on-lookers, so fearful of contagion,—assisted only by her washerwoman, she laid out the corpse. Sad reception in Catholic Italy! A weaker mind, or a heart a fraction less true, would have connected the Church with the land,—would remember the privations of the Lazaretto as samples of Catholic persecution, and the poor, kind Capitano as a remorseless inquisitor, fit for the denunciation of a Madiat meeting. But the mind of Mother Seton was already above the reach of vulgar prejudices: nor could the force of circumstance and natural antipathy prevent her soul from has-

tening to its God. How many in her situation would have recoiled, displaying the sad triumph of nature over grace? But her strength was equal to the trial, — a life of charity and sorrow had not been led in vain.

Florence offered a sanctuary to her grief. From the palace of the Medici, she could behold the Campanile of Giotto, and Brunelleschi's exquisite dome, more beautiful perhaps than St. Peter's: she could see the gentle Arno gliding at her feet, and afar off gaze upon the leafy Val-lombrosa: the Madonnas of Raphael, the Boboli Gardens, contributed their beauty to diminish her sorrow. But far more than these, the churches, — the sculptured chapels of Santa Croce, the ceiling of the Annunziata, the frescoes of Santa Maria Novella, the mosaic magnificence of San Lorenzo. "I saw a young priest," she writes, "unlock his little chapel with that composed and *equal eye*, as if his soul had entered before him. My heart would willingly have followed after." Who has not seen that *equal eye*, — the priest moving in the presence of his God, as distinguished from the minister conscious only of the presence of his congregation?

The altars of Florence, built of the rarest marbles and flashing with precious stones, so different from the counterfeit paint and plaster which poor Pugin so thoroughly detested, reminded her of the rich offerings of David and Solomon, and attested at least the sincerity of the worshipper. The *altar* of Catholicity impressed her with more awe than the *pulpit* of Protestantism had ever inspired. The Filicchis and other kind friends invited her to examine the doctrines of the Church whose service was so beautiful, and Mrs. Seton cheerfully listened to the enlightened conversation of the Abbé Plunkett, yet without apprehending any danger from "the charitable Romans," as she playfully styles them. In the church of Montanero, during the elevation of the Sacred Host, a belief in the Real Presence seems to have crossed her heart, leaving its sacred impression: but though, in her own artless language, "The other day, in a moment of excessive distress, I fell on my knees, without thinking, when the Blessed Sacrament passed by, and cried in an agony to God to bless me if he was there," — yet these pious impulses wanted the constancy and dignity of faith.

In this frame of mind she prepared to return to New

York in the same vessel which had brought her to Leghorn. They set sail: but a driving storm at night drove the ship against another, and in the morning, instead of hoisting sail for America, they were obliged reluctantly to put back. The visible finger of Providence had rescued the daughter from scarlet-fever, which appeared the next day, and preserved the mother for Catholicity. The prayer of St. Bernard to the Blessed Virgin, — sweet prayer by which thousands have been saved, whose priceless words are ever on the lips of saints, — first aspiration of maiden innocence, the last that guilty manhood clings to, — the nightly “Remember” of millions of souls! — the prayer of St. Bernard to the Blessed Virgin was the beginning of her conversion. “I said it to her” — the prayer — “with such a certainty that God would refuse nothing to his Mother, and that she could not help loving and pitying the poor souls he died for, that I felt really I had a mother. From the first remembrance of infancy, I have always looked, in all the plays of childhood and wildness of youth, to the clouds for my mother; and at that moment it seemed as if I had found more than her, even in the tenderness and pity of a mother. So I cried myself to sleep on her heart.” Is there any thing in literature more beautiful than that? We doubt it. “This evening, standing by the window, the moon shining full on Filicchi’s countenance, he raised his eyes to heaven and showed me how to make the sign of the cross. I was cold with the awful impression my first making it gave me. The sign of the cross of Christ on me! Deepest thoughts came with it, of I know not what desires to be closely united with him who died on it, — of that last day when he is to bear it in triumph.” After describing the Catholic life of the estimable family in which she lived, she adds: “I don’t know how any body can have trouble in this world who believes all these dear souls believed. If I don’t believe, it shall not be for want of praying. Why, they must be as happy as angels, almost.” Thus in the interval between her intended departure for New York, and her actual sailing on the 8th of April, two months, was the sacred impression of Catholicity indelibly stamped upon her mind and heart: even her little daughter lisped, “Are there no Catholics in America? Won’t we go to the Catholic Church when we go home?” During the fifty-six days of her voyage spent in converse

with Mr. Filicchi and in reading the lives of the Saints, she determined to embrace Catholicity, though it cost her, as perchance it might, every friend of her youth. On the 4th of June, 1804, she again beheld the Highlands of home, — again clasped her little ones in her arms; but a dying sister had scarce breath enough to welcome her, and the old home of plenty and comfort had become the home of poverty and sorrow. “My God, well may I cling to thee: for whom have I in heaven but thee, and whom upon earth besides thee!”

Pass we briefly over the period of temptation, hesitation, and trial, that ensued. The eloquent pleadings of the undaunted, ready, and sagacious Hobart, the persecution of her relatives, the expostulations of Anabaptist friends, the groans of Methodist servants, on the one hand: and on the other, the grace of God and the argument of the Filicchis. Doubt had breathed a sad weariness over life; but the struggle finished calmly at last, when abandoning all to God, a renewed confidence in the Blessed Virgin, whose mild and peaceful look reproached her, enabled her to take the final step. Vainly then were the Catholics of New York represented as public nuisances, — the offscourings of the people; she replied, “The congregation of a city may be shabby, yet very pleasing to God; — or very bad people among them yet cannot hurt the faith, as I take it.” Alas! if shining coats and feathered bonnets were passports to heaven, the Church of England would be well represented. “Come, my little ones,” she said, “we will go to judgment together, and present our Lord his own words; and if he says, ‘You fools, I did not mean that,’ we will say, ‘Since you said you would be *always*, even to the end of ages, with this Church you built with your blood, if ever you left it, it is your word which misled us: therefore please to pardon your poor fools for your own word’s sake.’” On Ash Wednesday, March 14th, kneeling before the little tabernacle, and great crucifixion over it, of St. Peter’s Church, she made a formal abjuration of Protestantism and profession of Catholicity. Then followed the unloosing after a thirty years’ bondage, then fell the chains as those of St. Peter at the touch of the divine messenger. What new scenes for the soul! — how bright the sun in those morning walks of preparation for communion! — deep snow or smooth ice, what matter! “I see

nothing but the little bright cross on St. Peter's steeple. At last God is mine and I am his. Now let all go its round. I have received him! To the last breath of life will I not remember this night of watching for morning dawn, — the fearful, beating heart so pressing to be gone, — the long walk to town, but every step counted nearer that street, — then nearer that tabernacle, — then nearer the moment he would enter the poor, poor dwelling, so all his own! Dance, my soul! like the royal prophet before his ark: for I am far richer than he and more honored than he ever could be. *Now the point is for the fruits.*"

Partly in her own language, and partly in the eloquent narrative of Dr. White, we have traced this rapid sketch of Mrs. Seton's life, — the dutiful child, the tender wife, the affectionate mother, the refined, intelligent woman, — in youth and maturity, in joy and sorrow. May the moral be, that every soul intent on truth will find it at last, — that heresy, whenever the heart is sincere, unwittingly leads to Catholicity. Though in Mrs. Seton's behalf the finger of an overruling Providence is strikingly manifest, yet not the less efficacious will be that benign influence over less favored souls, and not the less sure the unseen direction of the Guardian Angel. We have accompanied her to the reception of the bread of life, — to communion with the unnumbered saints and martyrs of the Church. The seed has fallen on good ground and taken root, and, in her own words, "*Now the point is for the fruits.*"

Weary of the empty pageantry of the world, and anxious to consecrate her life to the service of God, Mrs. Seton indulged a remote expectation of removing with her daughters to Montreal, where at some future period she might enter a religious community. Mr. Dubourg was the first to suggest the practicability of such a scheme within the limits of the United States, and by his influence she was induced to remove with her family to Baltimore. She was cordially received by Archbishop Carroll and all the clergy: welcomed by Colonel Howard of the Cowpens, and by others of the highest social standing. Assisted by the munificence of the Filicchis, she rented a two-story brick house near St. Mary's Seminary, where she designed opening a Catholic boarding-school. The quiet of Baltimore was a relief after the turmoil and vexation of New York. Close to the most elegant chapel in America, breathing the

summer fragrance of the surrounding orchards, protected by zealous friends, she enjoyed a respite from affliction in true liberty and sweet content. But the mere supervision of a school for her livelihood soon yielded to the hope of forming a society whose members would be specially consecrated to the service of God. The hope became an intention; and by the magnificent charity of the Rev. Mr. Cooper, the intention ripened into a fixed resolve. Baltimore was urged as the best locality for the Institution; but Mr. Cooper's wish, "*Be it Emmittsburg.*" prevailed.

In sight and within easy reach of St. Joseph's Academy, couched at the very foot of the mountains, the noble stone buildings of Mount St. Mary's College, shrouded by poplar and chestnut, look down upon the finely cultivated farms rolling in rich luxuriance beneath. The nursery of science and religion, the mother of bishops, her annals compose wellnigh half the history of the early American Church. Far from the bustle and dissipation of the city, remarkable for a pure and healthy atmosphere, surrounded by the wild grandeur of mountain scenery, rich in anecdote and tradition, hallowed by its saintly founders, watered by an unfailing fountain of the ice-brook's temper, it is to the Catholic mind the most classic spot in our country. But when Mr. Cooper said, "*Be it Emmittsburg,*" the prospect was less alluring. The country was but half cleared. John Dubois, a French priest, had built a log-house on the hill, and a brick church, which still stands, higher up the slope. "*Be it Emmittsburg*" meant this first, rough work of the future Bishop of New York.

Adopting a habit and name,—the Sisters of St. Joseph's,—Mother Seton, with her little band of ten assistants, repaired to their new home and occupied the log-house on the hill, until the farm-house on the property they had purchased in the valley was in a fit condition to receive them. When in possession of their humble abode, it was determined to form the institute upon that of the "Sisters of Charity" founded by St. Vincent of Paul in France, and measures were immediately taken to procure the constitution and rules of that society. Thus by slow degrees had her first indefinite hope of a religious life assumed a form and reality. The Montreal convent, the school in Baltimore, had resolved themselves into an institution whose daughters were destined to train our children in

knowledge and piety, to pluck the sting from poverty, to soothe the ravings of insanity, and beat back pestilence from moaning cities.

Mother Seton's object was the protection and education of the poor and afflicted. Your men and women of the world, your pious church-goers, ay, even those whose lives seem patterns of every virtue, are only sensible to the charms of youth and beauty, of strength and genius, of elegance and fashion. They are glad enough to welcome the prosperous, to succor distressed affluence, and will sometimes consent to self-sacrifice for those who are lovely in their sorrow. But it is only to the Catholic saint, that the remembrance of a crucified God stamps beggary with majesty, ulcers with beauty, unsightly poverty with magnificence. To such a soul the judgments of earth are reversed : genius and loveliness lose their charm and perhaps their glitter ; the wrinkle of care becomes the line of beauty, the scar a dimple, the gasp of fever the sigh of genius. The children of heresy have no conception of the majesty and attraction with which Catholicity invests affliction ; nor can they believe that the pale sister of the hospital finds in her hideous duties the consolations of the divinest love. But so it is. As man, our Saviour prayed the chalice might pass away ; but the spirit of God, if infinite happiness can perceive new rapture, exulted in the regeneration and redemption of man. As our likeness to Jesus of Nazareth increases, so melt the false standards of the world before the Christian measure, and the soul seeks its love in alleviating wretchedness and repressing crime.

As Mrs. Seton, the privations of the Lazaretto were severe chastisements,—the fear of losing friends perhaps delayed her Catholicity ; but as Mother Seton, she regards the death of her beloved sister as an evidence of God's special favor and protection.

To resume. So poor was her little chapel at St. Joseph's, that its chief ornaments were a framed portrait of our Saviour, two silver candlesticks, wild laurel, and paper flowers. Yet *there* Mr. Dubois said Mass every day. On Sunday they visited the mountain ; huge rocks, overgrown with moss and projecting over a ravine where a crystal stream rolls down the hill, abounding in craw-fish, and shaded with foliage and wild-flowers, form what has been from time immemorial the "Mountain Grotto." The

hand of piety had planted the cross beside an image of Her, the Help of Christians; and in that secluded spot those first sisters said their beads, or chanted "the Canticle of the Three Children." Their bread was rye, their coffee distilled from carrots, their Christmas dinner herring and a spoonful of molasses, their best feasts supplied by Mr. Dubois; but these and other trials were hailed as favors of the Divine Bridegroom.

In June, 1810, the school at St. Joseph's embraced forty scholars, whilst night and day the sick and ignorant of the country applied to the Sisters of Charity, whose number fortunately was increased by new admissions; four years after, the house was free from debt, and an asylum opened in Philadelphia.

One of the most beautiful passages in Mother Seton's life must have been her acquaintance with Mr. Bruté. Our lives are always influenced by other lives; there is no more beautiful study than the reciprocal influence of good and beautiful souls. Mother Seton was already grouped with Cheverus, Dubois, and Dubourg, when "the angel guardian of the Mountain," Mr. Bruté, joined that illustrious circle, and taught her soul how to preserve its peace amidst the trials of her position and the vicissitudes of earthly suffering. She could sympathize with his vivid, ardent fancy; she could follow his rapid, glowing ideas, which paused not for a full expression, but shone in broken flashes of word and sentiment; she could accompany him in his lofty and beautiful flights on the wings of faith, catch the fire of his thoughts, and commune with him in the enjoyment of their elevating power. The sainted Bishop of Vincennes played not the least part in the formation of that sisterhood whose charity adorns and blesses the cities of our Union. The whispers of that quiet valley, like the voice of Aquinas, were soon to spread over a continent. Aided by Mr. Tiers in Philadelphia, and conducted in New York by Sisters Rose and Félicité, the institution was branching into the widest usefulness; in January, 1817, through the exertions of General Harper, the act of incorporation was passed by the Legislature of Maryland.

Mother Seton was not only the principal of the religious department, but the guiding spirit of the school-room; she took charge of the highest classes, and on her daily visits to all the rooms, every eye beamed a welcome. She ap-

peared, not with the stiffness of the schoolmistress or the cold stateliness of authority, but as the fond, enlightened parent, whose elevated purpose elicits love and compels respect. Her manner was a happy blending of ardent zeal and maternal sweetness; her lips were rich with the legends of classic climes and her own varied experience; her severest reproof was a word, — her pardon, a kiss. Great indeed must have been the charm of her authority; to this day, the first pupils of St. Joseph's, though their children and grandchildren attest the flight of time, remember their valley mother as a bright spirit that shone on their youth, and treasure her words and letters with the utmost devotion. Mention her name, the calm eye of maturity will beam with its morning light, and before her portrait it is sure to drop a tear. For they had seen her fronting poverty with an equal gaze; they had seen her kneeling by her dying children, "in the tabernacle of the just," controlling her tears, stilling maternal anguish with unceasing prayer, and learning to rejoice in perfect submission to the will of God. Before them, a ministering angel she stood at the threshold of life; and as that ministering angel they will remember her to the end of their journey.

But grief and time, labor and disease, were telling on her frail body; her look is now all "for the dear *eternity* to which I slip along so gently and almost imperceptibly, that, though no evident change of constitution has taken place, I feel the general decay of poor, sinking nature enough to shorten the perspective of every scene beyond the present moment." We cannot do better than conclude our sketch in the very language of her eloquent biographer.

"From the attack of illness which she suffered in 1818, Mother Seton never entirely recovered. Her constitution had been completely shattered, and by greater exposure than her delicate health would permit, she contracted in the summer of 1820 a pulmonary disease which confined her during four months to her room, and baffled every effort of her medical attendants. As she approached the term of her earthly career, no change was visible in her dispositions, except that she became more united to God and more disengaged from all created things. Though her sufferings were very great at times, no complaint ever escaped her lips, and it was chiefly her moaning during sleep that indicated the severity of her pains. Such was her attention to improve every opportunity

of merit, that she felt distressed at the efforts which the affection of her spiritual daughters suggested for her relief, and submitted to them only by the advice of her director. If nature would sometimes manifest, under the influence of pain, an uneasiness which was altogether involuntary, she reproached herself with it, and immediately sought to efface it by the grace of absolution. Notwithstanding the painfulness of her situation, she was ever cheerful, ever ready to receive the visits of her sisters, and to give directions relative to the affairs of the community. As to the children of the academy, she delighted to hear them at their innocent sport, and to call them into her room to give them some token of her maternal kindness. The children of the poor school were special objects of her inquiry and affectionate regard. While prostrate on the bed of sickness, one of her former pupils, about to enter upon a long journey, called to see her, and before leaving she knelt and asked her blessing. Mother Seton, raising her hand, replied: 'God bless you, my loved child. Remember Mother's first and last lesson to you; seek God in all things. In all your actions submit your motives to this unerring test, "Will this be approved by his all-seeing eye?" If you do this, you will live in his presence, and will preserve the graces of your first communion. You will never see Mother again on this earth. May we meet in heaven. Three wheels of the old carriage [a term she often applied to her body] are broken down, the fourth very near gone; then with the wings of a dove will my soul fly and be at rest. Remember me, and if you love poor old Mother, pray for her.' Perceiving that her young friend was very much affected, she called her back, embraced her affectionately, and said: 'Not for ever do we part: a few short years, dearest, and we will be united, never, never to part. God bless you again.' These words display the whole spirit of Mother Seton during her illness. Peace, love, confidence, joy, — such were the sentiments that supported her in her last trial, and by which she administered comfort to those around her. When she perceived the anxiety of her sisters in regard to her situation, she would try to calm their apprehensions by saying, 'His will be done!' The peaceful quiet which she enjoyed was not the result of a presumptuous reliance upon her own merits: for she had a lively fear of the Divine judgments. But her soul was tranquillized by that filial confidence, which is inspired by the love of God and the consideration of his infinite mercy.* One of the sisters having expressed the wish that God would grant her the opportunity of entirely expiating her faults during life, that at the moment of death she might fly to the embraces of her heavenly Spouse, Mother Seton raised her eyes and

* "Mercy and judgment I will sing to thee, O Lord!" — Psalm c.

said : ' My blessed God ! how far from that thought am I, of going straight to heaven ! such a miserable creature as I am ! ' Another time the same sister inquired how she felt : ' I do not suffer,' she said ; ' I am weak, it is true, but how happy and quiet the day passes ! If this be the way of death, nothing can be more peaceful and happy ; and if I am to recover, still how sweet to rest in the arms of our Lord ! I never felt more sensibly the presence of our Dearest than since I have been sick ; it seems as if our Lord or his blessed Mother stood continually by me, in a corporeal form, to comfort, cheer, and encourage me, in the different weary and tedious hours of pain. But you will laugh at my imaginations ; still, our All has many ways of comforting his little atoms.' To the last, she gave an example of the most faithful submission to the Divine will, following as much as possible the spiritual exercises which the rule of the house prescribed. Obedience to the rules was a lesson which she most earnestly inculcated to the sisters, during her illness, as the surest means of sanctifying themselves and promoting the glory of God.

" To increase in her soul this holy disposition of entire abandonment into the hands of Providence, she prayed continually and fervently, and availed herself with the greatest avidity and thankfulness of every aid and blessing that her holy faith could impart. Mr. Bruté, her confessor and director, was constantly at her side, suggesting the most perfect sentiments of resignation, penance, love, confidence, and union with Jesus Christ. His ministry was a source of the most abundant graces to her soul. But the happiness of receiving our Lord in the sacrament of his love, was the chief object of her pious aspirations. This was her treasure and her support. The bread of angels was administered to her frequently during the week, and on one of these occasions she exhibited that ardor of faith which indicated the almost sensible presence of her God, and struck the beholders with astonishment. Such was her joy at the anticipation of the Holy Communion, that, when the priest entered her room and placed the consecrated species on the table, her countenance, before pale, began to glow with animation. No longer capable of suppressing the lively emotions of her soul, she burst into tears and sobbed aloud, covering her face with her hands. Supposing at first that she feared to communicate, the minister of God approached, and said to her : ' Peace, Mother, here is the Lord of peace. Have you any pain ? Do you wish to confess ? ' ' No, no, only give Him to me,' she replied, with a fervency of manner which showed the burning desire of her heart to be united to Jesus Christ.

" During her last illness, Mother Seton appeared to realize more than ever the happiness of dying in the bosom of the Catholic Church. Having been asked by one of her spiritual directors,

what she considered the greatest blessing ever bestowed upon her by the Almighty, she answered, 'That of being brought into the Catholic Church.' She now experienced all the consolation that this tender mother offers to her children in the most trying hour of existence, and she often spoke with a holy transport of the happiness of dying in her arms, saying, 'How few know the value of such a blessing!'

"Her symptoms having become very alarming, it was thought advisable to administer the last rites of religion. At that impressive moment, all her spiritual daughters were called into the room, and, as she was too feeble to address them herself, the Superior, Rev. Mr. Dubois, performed this office in her name, and thus delivered to the assembled community the last will of their dying Mother. 'Mother Seton, being too weak, charges me to recommend to you at this sacred moment, in her place, 1st, to be united together as true Sisters of Charity; 2d, to stand most faithfully by your rules; 3d, that I ask pardon for all the scandals she may have given you, that is, for indulgences prescribed during sickness by me or the physician.' She then lifted up her faint voice and said: 'I am thankful, sisters, for your kindness, to be present at this trial. Be children of the Church; be children of the Church,' she repeated with a lively sense of the consolation and grace she was about to receive in the Sacrament of Extreme Unction. With the same intense appreciation of the Divine blessings did she unite in the ceremony. Some of the sisters, with her only surviving daughter,* were always near her; but what were their feelings at the anticipation of the sad bereavement they were soon to experience may be more easily imagined than described. When, at length, the fearful conflict for their hearts arrived, they pressed around the couch of their dying and venerated Mother, in fervent prayer and deepest anguish. Mother Seton alone seemed to possess true fortitude in this eventful moment, and to enjoy the most profound peace. Though distress was depicted in every countenance; though she heard the heart-rending sobs of her beloved daughter, and saw her swooning away in an agony of grief at her side, she evinced no emotion; not the slightest agitation was visible in her appearance. All was peace, resignation, total abandon into the hands of God. Raising her hands and eyes to heaven in a spirit of the most humble submission to the decrees of Providence, she repeated the words, 'May the most just, the most high, and the most amiable will of God be accomplished for ever.' She then requested one of her attendants to recite for her the favorite

* "Her eldest son was absent on a cruise; the other arrived from Italy during his mother's illness, but the situation of his affairs hurrying him away, he took a final leave of her, and some time after died at sea."

prayer, 'Soul of Christ, sanctify me; Body of Christ, save me,' &c. ; but the sister, overpowered by her grief, not being able to proceed, Mother Seton continued the prayer herself. Her last words were the sacred names of Jesus, Mary, Joseph, to whom she yielded her heart, her spirit, her life; to whose care she committed her last agony, and in whose blessed company she hoped to repose for ever. After this she lost the power of speech, and it appeared to the sister who was nearest to her, that our Lord was in a special manner present at her side, as if waiting to bear away in triumph that precious soul. Thus did Mother Seton pass to her eternal rest, about two o'clock in the morning on the 4th of January, 1821, in the forty-seventh year of her age.

"The funeral obsequies took place on the following day, when, in union with the holy sacrifice of the altar, the many desolate hearts of St. Joseph's community ascended in fervent sighs to heaven for her happy repose. With overwhelming tears and regrets they bore her remains to their humble resting-place, where they planted the simple cross, the emblem of her virtue, and the rose-bush, the symbol of her immortal crown.

"Bend o'er this tomb, fond creature of a day,
And sad and pensive read the mournful lay;
Or round the spot, of flowers the fairest strew,
Flowers that bloom and fade like her and you.
Here lies — alas! not words nor mimic art
Can show this sainted soul, the seraph heart,
'The manner bland, the mind serene and clear,
Which once informed the clay that moulders here.
Here let the poor, the orphan, come to mourn;
Let Mercy weep, for this is Seton's urn.
Here let religion's sighs and tears be given;
Ah! no; she smiles again and points to heaven.'"*

— pp. 437 – 442.

One cannot rise from the perusal of such a life and death without a better appreciation of the beauty of heaven and the littleness of earth. Our Catholic literature is not very rich in works of imagination, but even were it richer, the finest portraiture of fancy could not equal such facts as are here recorded, and the finest creations of the closet are inferior to the actual Mother Seton.

The Life of Mother Seton is, as it ought to be, a history of the institution which she founded. With untiring industry and great ability, the learned author has interwoven with the thread of his narrative every fact that explains

* "These lines are supposed to have been written by Mr. Bruté."

and every name that adorns the origin and progress of St. Joseph's. It has been suggested that the volume is unwisely expanded by the accumulation of matter, and the interest of the main narrative impaired by digression. But though apparently of little importance, there is not a name or incident mentioned which is not endeared to many an humble, devout Catholic soul. The world's heroes, the world's battles, the world's politics, the solid unrealities that thunder, gleam, and vanish, have their thousand chroniclers, and we swallow folios without wincing. But we permit the ornaments of our Holy Church too often to pass away unrecorded, and deprive posterity of the edification which a proper biography would certainly inspire. It is true that Catholic saints shrink from praise: but we cannot therefore dispense with their lives. In rescuing from gradual oblivion the letters, the sayings, of Mother Seton, and incidents of her life, Dr. White has fairly earned the thanks of our Catholic community, and made a useful as well as a most interesting contribution to our Catholic literature. It is true that a volume, as we before suggested, which should omit much that relates to her experience prior to her conversion, and some of the theological discussions, might be prepared from it for circulation among a large class of readers, but there is nothing in the work as it is that we would for ourselves willingly have dispensed with, and we cordially commend it to our readers as a proof that the God who was born in the East embraces the West in his love, and that even in this land faith and love bear their usual fruits.

- ART. III.—1. *Études philosophiques sur le Christianisme.* Par AUGUSTE NICHOLAS, Ancien Magistrat. Nouvelle Édition, revue avec soin et augmentée. Paris. 1852. 12mo. 4 Tomes.
2. *Ensayo sobre el Catolicismo, el Liberalismo, y el Socialismo, considerados en sus Principios fundamentales.* Por D. JUAN DONOSO CORTÉS, Marqués de Valdegamas. Madrid. 1851. 8vo. pp. 414.
3. *Les Libres Penseurs.* Par LOUIS VEUILLOT. Seconde Édition, augmentée. Paris. 1850. 12mo. pp. 540.

WE have brought these works together, because, notwithstanding their very striking differences, they have certain points of resemblance, and are all three very properly ranged under the head of *Philosophical Studies on Christianity*. The author of the last-named work is Louis Veillot, the principal editor of the *Univers Catholique*, a Parisian journal on which we offered some strictures in our Review for April last. After our strictures were in type, we received through the papers the *mandement* of the Archbishop of Paris interdicting the *Univers* to the ecclesiastics and religious of his diocese. The Archbishop censured the *Univers*, as we understand it, not for any error of doctrine or opinion, but for its inopportune discussions, its violent and sarcastic manner towards its Catholic opponents, the ridicule and contempt it was in the habit of showering upon those ecclesiastics, whatever their rank or respectability, who ventured to question its opinions or statements, and its want of proper respect for the episcopal character and office. The judgment formed of the *Univers* by the Archbishop was the one we ourselves expressed in our strictures; but whether, in the actual state of things in France, it was expedient for him to pronounce it officially, is another question, but one of which, under the Pope, he was the proper judge, and on which we have no right to express any opinion.

The real matter in issue, as usually happens in similar cases, had become somewhat complicated, and is not, we apprehend, well understood by the public generally. The *Univers*, and the journals friendly to it, as well as some opposed to it, pretended that it was opposed by the Archbishop of Paris, and other prelates and ecclesiastics, because

it was a vigorous Ultramontane journal, and edited principally by laymen. We have seen no evidence that such was the fact, and we are unable to perceive any necessary connection between the principal questions on which it encountered opposition and Ultramontanism or Gallicanism. Certain it is, that among its opponents were found men as strong in their Papistical tendencies, and as energetically opposed to the so-called "Gallican Liberties," as M. Louis Veuillot and his colleagues.* Its opponents no doubt reminded its editors that they were laymen, but we suspect not precisely because they objected to journals conducted by laymen of a Catholic spirit and the requisite intellectual, theological, and literary qualifications, but because its editors often assumed in their discussions a tone and manner ill becoming laymen, who are neither judges of faith nor governors of the Church. It has seemed to us that the *Univers* occasionally confounded the sentiment of the half-infidel secular press which dreaded its influence, and evoked the old Gallican prejudices in the hope of crushing it, or at least of sowing divisions among the bishops and clergy of France, with that of the respectable body of Catholics who felt aggrieved by its course; and we cannot doubt that, with more prudence on its part, a gentler manner, and a sweeter temper in regard to persons, it might have maintained its Ultramontanism, lay journal as it was, with all the energy it possessed, without falling under episcopal censure, or encountering any very serious opposition from the Catholic public. Even its warm friends and admirers, as may be gathered from the complimentary communication to Louis Veuillot from the Secretary of Latin Letters, and the friendly criticisms of *La Civiltà Cattolica*, could not deny that its tone and manner towards the prelates and other ecclesiastics who differed from it were in no slight degree objectionable.

Louis Veuillot was in Rome when the Archbishop of Paris published his *mandement*, and he lost no time in appealing from it to the Holy See, and in petitioning for a suspension of the interdict till the final decision of the case. The journals tell us, or insinuate, that he succeeded, and obtained a complete triumph over his Metropolitan. But this must be a mistake. His petition does not appear to have been granted, and we have seen no evidence that his appeal was even entertained. There has been, if we may

judge from the documents published, no decision in the case, favorable or unfavorable to either party, and consequently for either party neither triumph nor defeat. If Rome has not confirmed the censure of the Archbishop, neither has she reversed it, or, so far as we can discover, pronounced it undeserved. Undoubtedly, Rome has done something on the occasion of the difficulty between the *Univers* and its Archbishop, but not precisely the thing that is pretended by those who through friendship or malice to the *Univers*, claim for it a complete triumph. It is well known, that on several questions agitated by the *Univers*, as on the subject of the *Univers* itself, the bishops of France were very nearly equally divided among themselves, and a violent controversy was threatened, which could hardly fail, without serving any good purpose, to be of serious disservice to the cause of religion. In view of this fact, the Holy Father, without touching the merits of the case as between the *Univers* and the Archbishop of Paris, addressed an Encyclical Letter to the cardinals, archbishops, and bishops of France, in which he exhorts them to restore and maintain peace and concord among themselves, to encourage laymen of distinguished abilities and literary attainments, when animated by a truly Catholic spirit, to devote themselves to writing books or editing journals in defence of religion, and to reprove them when necessary with great prudence, Christian charity, and paternal tenderness, incidentally decides against the *Univers* the question as to the use of the pagan classics as text-books for the study of Greek and Latin, and reminds the French prelates of the necessity of rallying to the Chair of Peter as the rock on which the Church is founded, and rests for its prosperity and well-being. Here is no judicial decision of the case, and what the Holy Father says affects at most merely the prudence of the Archbishop in pronouncing his censure, and not the justice of that censure itself; far less does it declare the *Univers* to have been blameless. The Archbishop of Paris, on receiving this Letter, anxious to contribute what was in his power to promote the peace and concord it urged, hastened, *spontaneously*, as he himself declares, that is, of his own accord, without any order to that effect, to publish a second *mandement* removing the interdict he had placed on the *Univers*, trusting, we presume, to the assurances recently given by Louis Veuillot in its columns,

that that journal would henceforth study to avoid the things he had felt it his duty to censure. The *Univers*, on finding the interdict removed, thanks the Archbishop for his generous conduct, and promises to amend its errors, and to labor to do nothing in future that may displease him. This is all that we can gather from the documents in the case, and this, if we have not lost our understanding, is victory or defeat for neither party. The matter between the Archbishop and the *Univers* has been disposed of much to the joy of all good Catholics, not by a decision condemning or approving one of the parties, but by an amicable settlement, in which neither triumphs over the other.

Thus much we have felt it necessary, in passing, to say, in order to correct the false impressions produced by the statements of partisan or ill-informed journals. For ourselves, we are not aware that we have said any thing in our strictures that needs to be retracted, excused, or defended, and whatever the judgment we have expressed in regard to the *Univers*, we could read a decision of the Holy See unequivocally in its favor without any pain or mortification; for in the decisions of the Holy See truth and justice are always sure to triumph, and the triumph of truth and justice is precisely what in all cases we most ardently desire. But justice to the Archbishop and those who have sustained him, as well as the truth of history, makes it necessary that the actual facts in the case should be truly represented. To represent either party in the case as triumphing over the other, is to do violence to the sense of justice, and to irritate the feelings of the party represented as defeated, and the unseemly exultation of some indiscreet friends of the *Univers* can only tend to revive the angry passions now happily by the voice of the common Father of the faithful hushed to sleep, and to defeat the very object of the Encyclical Letter. The *Univers* is, no doubt, an able and brilliant journal, and its *rédacteur en chef* a rare man, characterized by many noble qualities, and one of those men who stamp themselves upon their times; but better that every journal in the world should perish, than that the peace of the Church in a single country should be disturbed.

Journalism is a power in our modern society, but it is a power for evil as well as for good. Religious journalism has been instituted by the pastors of the Church to coun-

teract the evil effects of irreligious journalism, but as their servant, not as their master. As long as it is contented with its ancillary position and office, it will be of service to religion; but let it aspire to be a power in the bosom of the Church, let it once forget that its appropriate office is to circulate correct information among the faithful and to defend the Church against her enemies, and commence agitating, after the manner of the secular press, for particular measures or a particular line of ecclesiastical policy, which depend for adoption on the pastors of the Church, and it becomes, even if that policy or those measures are in themselves unexceptionable, dangerous, and can no longer be tolerated. The religious press must never aspire to exert a control over ecclesiastical administration, like that which the secular press exerts over political administration. The attempting to do it is the danger to which all religious journalism is exposed. In more than one Catholic journal, we think we have seen a disposition to meddle with ecclesiastical affairs, and to compel the divinely appointed pastors of the Church to act, even against their own judgment or wishes, under the pressure of a public opinion brought by a ceaseless agitation to bear upon them. We regret this. The Holy Father in his Encyclical Letter, it is true, has approved, under certain conditions, of lay journalism, and exhorted the bishops to encourage laymen who are qualified to write and publish in defence of religion; but his exhortations are addressed to the pastors of the Church, not to the laymen themselves, and he approves of lay journalism only as it approves itself to them. He has in nothing derogated from the canon, which prohibits laymen writing and publishing on religious and theological subjects without the permission of the Ordinary. We hold our right to edit our journal from the Holy See indeed, but only through our own bishop, and we have no right to continue it independently of his permission. We insist on this fact for the sake of religious journalism itself, no less than for the sake of order, which is always dear to every loyal heart.

But enough of this, and more than we intended. We return to the works before us. *Les Libres Penseurs*, or *The Free-Thinkers*, by Louis Veuillot, is a remarkable work, though somewhat local in its character, and such as cannot be fully appreciated out of France, except by persons who have more than an ordinary familiarity with French liter-

ature and philosophy. It is rather a series of leading articles in a daily journal, than a book properly so called. It is written in Louis Veuillot's strong, nervous, and brilliant, but not very refined style, and is sometimes vituperative, rather than witty. We should like it better if it had moreunction, more sweetness of temper, and were less sneering and flippant in its tone. But it is marked by real genius, by a high order of intellect, and a glowing zeal for Catholic morality. It is one of the most scathing works we have ever read, and nothing can more effectually expose and cover with ridicule and contempt the arrogance, vanity, ignorance, credulity, absurdities, blasphemies, and scientific inanity of modern free-thinkers. Its strong and rough expressions, and its severe judgments, in some instances perhaps too severe, we are disposed to treat with forbearance, for in a work of this sort they are, if faults, faults which lean to virtue's side. The tone of the French apologists during the last century has never pleased us much. They always treated their infidel opponents with too much tenderness, with too great personal consideration, and we seldom read them without growing impatient, and breaking out, Pray let us have a little less politeness, a little less regard to personal dignity and decorum, and a little more earnestness and energy of thought and expression! it is hard beating down mud-walls with bouquets of roses. The more recent apologists have assumed a bolder tone, and though in the finish and amenities of style they fall somewhat below their predecessors, they are far more effective in execution. They are men terribly in earnest, who are not afraid of discomposing their features when they speak, nor easily startled at the sound of their own voices. They are not over learned, but they know their age from having shared its passions, and though often men of "one idea," often inexact in their thought and in their language, seeing only a particular aspect of the subject they are treating, and sacrificing all to that one aspect, they are devoted heart and soul to the truth, and able to burn their words into the very hearts of their readers. Among these men, who have during the last thirty years done so much for religion in France, Louis Veuillot holds a distinguished rank, and the work before us is the best thing we have seen from his pen.

The second work on our list, by that eminent Spanish

statesman and devoted Catholic, the Marquis of Valdegamas, better known as Donoso Cortés, is the work we referred to in our last Review as accused by the Abbé Gaduel, Vicar-General of the Bishop of Orleans, of containing grave errors against Catholic doctrine. We had not then, as we stated, read the work, and expressed no opinion of it, save on the condition that its critic had correctly represented its contents. We have not yet seen the French translation, which the learned Abbé appears to have had under his eye, but we have read the Spanish original, and we must say, in justice to its illustrious author, that the Abbé Gaduel's criticisms seem to us unreasonably severe, and in several respects wholly uncalled for, if not wholly unfounded. The very just remarks of the Abbé Gaduel on the rashness and presumption of laymen, without previous study and discipline, in writing and publishing on religious and theological topics, and without, before publishing, submitting their lucubrations to the revision of a competent theologian, do not appear to have been required in the present case, and are not precisely applicable to Donoso Cortés. The Abbé complained that the noble author had published his work without having previously submitted it to the revision of a professional theologian; but his complaint seems to have been unfounded; for we read in front of the copy before us the following *Advertencia*: —

“Esta obra ha sido examinada en su parte dogmática por uno de los teólogos de más renombre de Paris, que pertenece á la gloriosa escuela de los Benedictinos de Solesmes. El autor se ha conformado en la redaccion definitiva de su obra con todas sus observaciones.”

The letter of the author to the *Univers*, on the occasion of the Abbé Gaduel's criticisms, we did not like, and it seemed to us to indicate an improper spirit; for surely an author, when his work is gravely accused, from a respectable quarter, of containing serious errors against sound doctrine, owes something more to the public than a general profession of obedience to the Church. We are happy to know that Donoso Cortés takes the same view himself, and acknowledges in a letter to the Abbé Gaduel that the note in the *Univers* was not all, and was never considered by him as all, he owed to the public, and assures him that he has submitted his work to the proper authorities for

examination. This proves that the author recognizes the true ethics of the case, and, if ever a shadow of a doubt of his loyalty as a Catholic flitted across our mind, it completely dissipates it. Certain it is, that the author is not to be accused of rashness, of presumption, or of an undue reliance on or attachment to his own judgment: that he is humble, simple, and as docile as a child, and that, if there are errors in his book, they are unintentional, and errors of his head, in no sense errors of his heart.

It is not our province, nor are we competent, to judge this remarkable book. We have read it with intense interest. It is very abstract, very profound, and withal decidedly the most eloquent book we have ever met with in any language. Nothing can surpass the sweetness and harmony, the beauty and strength of its periods, the clearness and terseness of its expressions, and never has the noble Castilian tongue been used by a more, if an equally, consummate master. It is well worth reading and re-reading time and again for the grace and elegance of its diction, and the artistic perfection of its style. As to the contents of the work, we certainly find in it all the passages extracted and commented on by the French critic, and those passages appear to have been faithfully translated; but we cannot persuade ourselves that the thought of the author, though perhaps not always expressed in the exact language of a professional theologian writing a dogmatical work, is deserving of grave censure, or really irreconcilable with Catholic doctrine. Unquestionably, if we should read the work with the presumption against it, and should take these passages without considering them in relation to their context and to the obvious intention of the author, we might easily convict the author of the very grave errors laid to his charge; but we know no reason for reading such a man as Donoso Cortés with the presumption against him, and the sense of the passages criticized seems to us to be materially modified and controlled by their context, and the general purpose and design of the author, of which the Abbé Gaduel does not appear to have made sufficient account.

The Abbé Gaduel is a learned theologian and an estimable man, for whom we entertain a very sincere respect, but we hope we may without offence suggest, that he perhaps is not the best fitted in the world to appreciate such a

work as this of the Marquis of Valdegamas. His mind by his studies has been cast in a scholastic mould, and the essay of the noble Marquis is constructed in a manner foreign to his habitual forms of thought. He, too, is one of the principal writers for that generally excellent periodical, *L'Ami de la Religion*, and shares its feelings towards the *Univers*, whose principal editor published and highly praised the book of Donoso Cortés. Its author, therefore, became in some sense associated in his mind with Louis Veuillot and the *Univers*. On several questions controverted between the two journals, especially on that of the pagan classics, we have for ourselves sympathized with the *Ami*, while on some, especially on those relating to philosophy, the natural law, and human rights, we have leaned to the side of the *Univers*. The *Univers* maintains that man, strictly speaking, has no rights, but duties only; and, as we gather from the *Ami*, cites in support of this doctrine Donoso Cortés. The *Ami* opposes this doctrine, and contends that it is contrary to the uniform teaching of Catholic theologians on the law of nature, and the origin and legitimacy of human governments. In an article on *Rights and Duties* in our Review for October, 1852, we discussed this subject at length, and defended the assertion of Donoso Cortés, that "right on human lips is a vicious expression," against the very learned and able periodical, the *Civiltà Cattolica*, conducted at Rome by members of the illustrious Society of Jesus. In that article we maintained that, strictly speaking, only God has rights, and that man has only duties, and duties only to God; and we think we showed that this doctrine is in harmony with the real sense of the great Doctors of the Church, however repugnant at first sight it may appear to their ordinary forms of expression. No doubt we should guard against profane novelties even in words, but we should also be on our guard against being so enslaved to the mere words of the theologians as to miss their sense. Every age has its own specific wants and mode of thinking. Principles are eternal and invariable, but the mode of expressing and applying them, in a world where all is mutable, must vary with the ever-varying wants and circumstances of time and place. The dominant tendency of our age is to atheism, — to exclude God, and to put humanity or nature in the place of God. It is this tendency which it is now especially necessary to resist

and guard against. If, with some of our modern writers, more attached, it would seem, to the letter than imbued with the sense of the great Doctors of the Church, we assign to nature a proper legislative power, and represent it as competent to found rights and impose duties, or contend that man has rights of his own, in the strict sense of the word, we here and now compromise the great truths of religion, and strengthen the atheistical tendency of the age. Never in reality did any of our great theologians teach that nature has a true and proper legislative power, for they all teach that what they call the law of nature is law only inasmuch as it is a transcript of the eternal law. They all teach, after St. Paul, that *non est potestas nisi a Deo*, that God is the absolute lord and proprietor of the universe, that he is the fountain of all law, or sole legislator, because all dominion belongs to him. Without law, neither right nor duty is conceivable, and without God as absolute and universal legislator, law is an unmeaning term. All legislative power is his, because he is the creator and final cause of all things, by whom and for whom all things exist; and no one can rightfully exercise any legislative authority, but as his delegate or vicar. In strictness, he only has rights, because he only can impose duties. Then what we call human rights, whether rights of government or of subjects, are his rights and our duties, and duties only to him, and payable only to his order. These rights, nay, all the rights which our theologians deduce from the law of nature, are no doubt real rights, and neither individuals nor governments can violate any one of them without wrong, — a fact which it may be that those whom the *Ami* opposes are not always careful to recognize, and which, if not recognized, renders the doctrine when applied to man in relation to human government favorable either to despotism or to anarchy; but though real rights, they are divine, not human, and their violation is not merely a crime against the individual, the state, or society, but, in the strict and proper sense of the word, a *sin* against God. This great truth, which underlies all Catholic teaching on the subject, but which the authorities do not always clearly and distinctly state, because in their time there was little danger of its being misapprehended, needs, it seems to us, to be now distinctly and prominently brought out, and earnestly insisted on as an elementary

truth of which our age has nearly lost sight, and as the precise contradictory of its dominant heresy. Some learned and estimable men in France, as well as elsewhere, who appear to have learned the errors they are to combat from their libraries rather than the world in which those errors obtain, apparently overlook this important fact, and in their writings address themselves to a bygone age, instead of the one in which they are called upon to take an active part. We love and honor these excellent men, but we think that, in their laudable devotion to the scholastic forms of thought, it is possible that they have failed to apprehend the principles and meaning of the great masters in the sense, and to present them in the form, in which our age can understand them, and in which they stand directly opposed to its prevailing errors. Their learned labors are therefore not always as valuable and as effective as they themselves suppose, or as we could wish.

Finding themselves opposed, on this and other questions, to the *Univers*, and its editors citing Donoso Cortés as an authority against them, nothing more natural than that the writers of the *Ami* should undertake to ascertain the intrinsic value of that authority. Hence, as one of these writers, it is very possible, and perhaps not improbable, that the Abbé Gaduel approached the *Essay on Catholicity, Liberalism, and Socialism* not indisposed to find it unsound, or at best disinclined to take sufficient pains to fully master and appreciate its thought. Certainly his criticisms give us no clew to the real purpose of the author, what he proposed to do, or the principles on which he relies for the solution of the great problems with which he grapples. We might infer from his criticisms, that the noble Marquis had attempted a dogmatic work on God, the Trinity, Creation, and Liberty; but it is no such thing. His *Essay* is designed as a refutation of Liberalism and Socialism, and a demonstration of the necessity and truth of Catholicity as the basis of the family, the state, and society, of private and public morality, of authority and liberty. It is the work of a Catholic statesman, rather than of a theologian, and its purpose is, not to teach theology, but to apply it to political and social life. It is very profound, as we have said, and it seeks to apply to the solution of the great political and social problems of the age the deepest and most abstruse principles of Christian Mysticism. That

in seizing, stating, or illustrating these principles he falls into no error, would, we think, be saying too much; but the errors into which he falls, so far as we are able to judge, are incidental, are never the direct object aimed at, and do not affect the substance or general doctrine of his work.

The author seeks to find in God the type and law of the family, society, and the state, on the principle that the type or the *idea* of all created things is in the Divine Mind, and that God is not simply the Creator, but in some sense the similitude of all things, *similitudo rerum omnium*, as says St. Thomas. The great law of the universe, which has its origin in God himself, is that of unity in diversity, and diversity [distinction] in unity. Thus God is unity in essence and diversity in the persons of the Godhead, and a similitude of this unity and diversity runs through all things. It was not in illustration of the Trinity, as the Abbé Gaduel seems to have supposed, but in illustration of this universal law of unity in diversity, that the author introduces the passage which his critic regarded as implying the error of the tritheists. If the author had been explaining the doctrine of the Trinity by the example of Adam and Eve and Abel, Adam as man father, Eve as man mother, and Abel as man son, three persons in one and the same human nature, he would certainly have favored tritheism; but as he was only illustrating the law of unity in diversity, which he calls the law *par excellence*, by which all things are explicable, and without which nothing can be explained, he cannot justly be accused of doing any thing of the sort. His illustration may be felicitous or infelicitous, but taken as an illustration of that law, it certainly cannot be cited as a proof that the author's views of the mystery of the Trinity are unorthodox, especially as he had just stated the doctrine with dogmatic precision.

Proceeding on this universal law, the author shows how Catholicity forms the basis of all true science, politics, and morals, and exposes the fundamental vice of both Liberalism and Socialism, inasmuch as each contravenes the law of unity in diversity, the former asserting diversity without unity, and necessarily ending in anarchy, and the latter asserting unity without diversity, and necessarily ending in despotism. Liberalism destroys all authority, Socialism all liberty; whereas Catholicity, based itself on the law of

unity in diversity, accepts and reconciles both. In treating the subject of liberty itself, the author seems to us now and then to pass unconsciously from liberty in one sense to liberty in another; and thus to fall into some confusion, if not error. He says that the views on the subject of liberty which have hitherto prevailed are false in every point; but he seems to have said this simply because he erred as to what is, and always has been, the general doctrine of Catholic theologians. He says the general doctrine is, that the essence of liberty or free will is in the faculty of choosing good and evil, which attract it with two contrary solicitations; but this is a mistake, for all concede that God is free, and that, in virtue of the perfection of his own nature, he cannot choose evil. Yet the author does not really deny that the liberty of choosing good or evil is essential to the free will of man in his present imperfect and probationary state, which is here the main point. Still, we are not quite satisfied with all the author says on this subject, nor are we quite sure that we always seize his exact meaning; but even the Abbé Gaduel does not go so far as to charge him with emitting on free will any absolutely heretical opinions.

This much we have felt it necessary to say, in justice to the distinguished author, who, we learn as we are writing these remarks, died at Paris on the evening of the 3d of May last. Few men could have died whose death would have affected us more painfully, or whose loss we should have more deeply deplored. In his youth and early manhood, we have been told, he, like so many of us of his generation, was affected by the modern liberal and irreligious doctrines which are even yet so widely prevalent. But his reflections and experience, aided by the grace of God, had revived in him the Catholic faith which he had received in his infancy, called him back to repose in peace on the bosom of the immaculate Spouse of the Lamb, and ranged him on the side of the friends of liberty and authority. He was among the ablest, the most learned, the most eloquent and unwearied of that noble band of laymen, who, beginning with De Maistre, have from the early years of the present century devoted their talents and learning, their genius and their acquirements, to the service of religion, and done so much honor to themselves and our age in their eminently successful labors to restore

European society, shaken by the French Revolution, to its ancient Catholic faith, and to save it alike from the horrors of anarchy and the nullity of despotism. He had, in the last few years of his life, done much, and done it nobly, and we had hoped that he would be permitted to do still more, for the battle has ever to be renewed day by day. But it has pleased the Great Disposer of all events to call him from his labors to his rest. Our loss, and it is great, we doubt not, is his gain, and we must acquiesce. Yet we feel that he could ill be spared, and we fear it will be long before the blank he has left will be filled. Honor to his memory, thanks to God for the good he has done, and may his mantle fall upon many a young disciple, who, stimulated by his example, will labor to console us for his loss. Not in vain do such men live, not in vain do such men die; alike in life and in death do they serve the cause of truth and love.

More we had intended to say of his masterly Essay on Catholicity, Liberalism, and Socialism, for what we have said can give our readers no adequate conception of its merits; but as we should also have to find some fault with it not precisely of the kind noticed by his French critic, we have no heart to do it. The work is before the public,—an original and profound work, on the loftiest themes which can occupy the human mind,—and if it has errors, they are of a sort that will do little harm, while its truths are such as need in our days an eloquent voice, such as are always necessary to the direction of human life, and such as can never grow obsolete. As the last word that has come to us from its illustrious and now lamented author, we treasure it in our heart, remembering in it only the true, the beautiful, and the good, and willingly forgetting whatever a nice critic might find in it defective or inexact. It is the earnest word of a brave man, of a loyal heart, and a sincere Catholic, who, we may hope, is now with the redeemed and the sanctified in heaven.

The first-named work on our list, *Études philosophiques sur le Christianisme*, is an able and interesting apology—in the old sense of the word—for the Christian religion. It has been flatteringly received in France, highly commended by the best judges, and obtained for its pious and learned author distinguished marks of approbation and encouragement from the Holy Father himself. The au-

thor was originally a lawyer, and subsequently a civil magistrate, or judge, of rare merit. He is evidently a good man, a man who prays at the foot of the cross, and whose heart and soul are thoroughly imbued with his religion. He has studied his subject conscientiously, and appears to have mastered all the philosophical, historical, and scientific knowledge necessary to its successful treatment. His style is lucid, manly, and unaffected, and occasionally rises into eloquence. His mind is of a high order, strong and healthy, well disciplined, and commendable for its modesty and sobriety. We find nothing ultra or exaggerated either in his opinions or his statements, and his arguments are as persuasive as convincing. He is naturally led to regard the moral aspect of his subject rather than its purely intellectual aspect, and though he loves truth, he is chiefly affected by it under the form of the good, as the object of the will. He has written his work to do good, not to gain a name for himself, though a name he has gained, and his work will do good for time and eternity, wherever honestly studied.

Yet, estimable as is this new apology, and as highly as we appreciate it, we do not think it entitled to rank with the *De Civitate Dei* of St. Augustine, or the *Contra Gentiles* of St. Thomas, the two great works against unbelievers, and which every one who would defend Christianity for this or any other age should begin by studying. We do not suppose that we are to take the approbation and encouragement the author has received as a sanction by the Church of every opinion or statement in his book, or as a guaranty of its absolute freedom from imperfection, or even error. Rome is exceedingly tolerant. She wishes, as we may learn from the recent Encyclical Letter to the Cardinals, Archbishops, and Bishops of France, that earnest-minded Catholics, of distinguished abilities and attainments, should be encouraged to devote their talents, their literary and scientific acquirements, and their enlightened zeal to the defence of religion; and that the pastors of the Church should treat their short-comings, and even their errors, with great indulgence and paternal tenderness. She knows that to err is human, and she exacts infallibility of no one. When the work written is not a purely dogmatic work, or a work expressly intended to teach the faith, and is fitted, upon the whole, to exert a salutary in-

fluence, to correct prevalent errors, or to commend religion to the intellect or the heart of those who are prone to treat it with indifference or contempt, she is never severe against the slight errors which it may contain, and which spring, not from bad faith, but from human infirmity, inadvertence, or the lack of exact information, and which are merely incidental, and do not affect its main purpose, doctrine, or argument. It is in this spirit of encouragement and tolerance that she uniformly treats able and distinguished authors, who in good faith devote themselves to the defence of religion. In this spirit, we presume, the Archbishop of Paris has removed the interdict from the *Univiers*, although far from being satisfied with the tone and manner of many of its discussions; in this spirit his Grace of New York generously encourages the *Freeman's Journal*, as, upon the whole, a good Catholic paper, without, however, approving or indorsing every thing to be found in its columns; in this same spirit, too, the venerable Archbishops and Bishops of the United States approve and encourage the publication of our Review. They approve and encourage it as serviceable to the cause of religion, but without holding themselves responsible for every thing, either in the manner or the matter, contained in its pages. We publish with their approbation, indeed, but not with their authority, or their indorsement of whatever we publish. Nobody but the Editor is responsible for the errors it may contain. We aim to comply with their wishes as far as we know them, but there is no doubt that we sometimes discuss topics which the venerable pastors of the Church, or at least many of them, would prefer that we should let alone, and all of them must regret that our merits are so few, and our faults, both of thought and expression, so many. But having confidence in our intentions, and regarding the general tendency of the Review worthy of encouragement, they generously encourage us, and charitably bear with our many faults and imperfections. In the same spirit, in the same wise and generous policy, we presume, we are to understand the approbation and encouragement the Holy Father has given to M. Nicholas, — an approbation and encouragement which demand our respect for him and his book, indeed, but which do not sanction every thing in it, or deny us the right freely, in a reverential spirit, to examine, and, if we see cause, to criticize it.

There are some opinions expressed by the author which are not approved by those from whom we have learned our theology, and we detect much looseness and inexactness in his language, — a looseness and inexactness which sometimes we find it difficult to excuse, and which we always regret. Exactness and precision of language do not detract from the popularity of a book, or render it less intelligible and interesting to the mass of readers. M. Nicholas is a man of broad and profound views, but is not remarkable for clearness and distinctness of thought. His style is very well, but his language is not precisely adapted to the present form of philosophic thought, as we have learned it; and he uses important terms in senses which obscure and render uncertain his own philosophy. He uses *subject* and *object* frequently as convertible terms, and commonly *subject* in the sense of *object*. He tells us in one place that both God and man are *made*, and asserts the illimitable progress of man, or that human nature is indefinitely progressive; and in such connection, too, that he leaves us doubtful whether he does or does not mean to assert the modern doctrine of progress, as advocated by the enemies of Catholicity. We choose, however, in these and all other cases to regard his thought as substantially orthodox, but we regret that he has not been more exact in his expressions.

We have rarely read a book of no greater size in which we have found more sound philosophy and various and valuable knowledge; but we do not think the author has sufficiently appreciated the advantages of a strictly logical and scientific method in setting forth his views. He began his work on a much smaller scale than that on which it is completed, — for the sake of consoling a dear friend suffering under a painful bereavement, and who wanted to be convinced of the immortality of the soul. Undertaken for a special object, from motives of charity and personal friendship, it seems to have expanded beyond the expectations of the author, and become too large for his original plan. Hence it lacks order and unity of design, and resembles a building which has grown into a huge pile by successive additions not contemplated by the original architect. But this as well as some other things is so well said by the Rev. Father Lacordaire in a letter addressed to the author, and prefixed to the first volume, that we beg leave to substitute

the criticisms of this eminent preacher and warm personal friend of M. Nicholas, for what we might ourselves say. In one or two particulars, the author in his notes replies to the criticisms of his reverend friend, but without, in our judgment, refuting them. Father Lucardaire has just spoken of the merits of the work in the warmest and most energetic terms, and he adds :—

“ Permit me now to tell you frankly the defects of your work. I call defects what appear to me to be such, which greatly lessens the importance of my criticism, by leaving you to judge for yourself of its justice.

“ You divide your demonstrations into three distinct classes. The first, under the head of *Philosophical Proofs*, comprises the arguments for the fundamental dogmas of God, the soul, and worship, — the necessity of a first and second revelation, and their union by Moses, who holds the middle place between Adam and Jesus Christ. The second class, under the head of *Intrinsic Proofs*, gives an exposition of the doctrine contained in the two revelations, and sets forth its power and beauty. The third, under the title of *Extrinsic Proofs*, stops at Jesus Christ, already presented as the foundation of what precedes, and more immediately proves his Divinity by the very character of his person and life, the nature of the Gospels, the prophecies, miracles, the establishment of Christianity, its action on the world, and its perpetuity. There results from this division a certain want of unity and continuous progress in the demonstration, which detracts from the monumental aspect of your work. You give us three treatises, rather than one uniform work, which as a living being moves forward in the course of its destiny, at each step vaster and more profound. After we have sufficiently seen the lofty figure of Moses so well placed between the past and future of truth, and after the advent of Jesus Christ has been presented in bold outlines, we are suddenly arrested by a halt in the interior of the doctrine, which suspends the historical development in an abrupt and unexpected manner. Unavoidable repetitions are the result of this method. I can just as little approve of the division of the chapters of your work into paragraphs, and the paragraphs into sections marked by numbers. These means, too frequently employed to aid the understanding, give to the work a scholastic cast, which injures art without profiting conception. It is proper to indicate to the reader by a series of chapters the principal points of the field he has to survey, but beyond this, clearness should result from the logical interlinking of the thoughts and their strict and precise expression. Any further division is merely a mechanical dissection, which severs the thread of the discourse, and produces in the read-

er a painful sensation, like that of a carriage which stops too often. You have evidently judged your book with the modesty of a lawyer drawing up a memoir; but in this you are wrong. A book in favor of Jesus Christ is a church, and yours is a cathedral. You are to him and at the same time to us the grand forms of art.

“ I have been surprised to find you treating, in the first part, of the soul before treating of God. Unless I deceive myself, this is not the traditional order. God always precedes the soul, God is the first philosophical and religious truth, not indeed in the abstract order of the Rationalist, who, a day after the fair, seeks the primitive in his own understanding, but in the order of real teaching, by which, since Adam, we receive the communication of the truths necessary to the life of the human race. The child has a clear idea of God before he has a clear idea of the soul; and not seldom do we find men incapable of denying the existence of God who yet most stoutly deny the immaterial being united to their body. Here is wherefore the denial of God is the most difficult of all errors, and the most complete, — that which always produces an inexpressible fear, as the last effort of an intelligence to unroot itself from order and truth. Let us not touch this place which God has made for himself; and if a specious ideology would claim the priority for the soul, let us maintain God at the head of all good and of all truth. Let us not suffer the abstract order to prevail against the concrete, ideology against ontology, the spirit of invention against the spirit of tradition. Let us not take our point of departure in ourselves, who are nothing, but in God, who is all and everywhere.

“ In the first pages of your chapter on the Trinity you seem to excuse yourself from entering on a subject so rebellious to moral considerations, and you lay down as a rule, that it is to be treated publicly only with infinite discretion. This is a singular idea, and one which your own chapter strikingly belies. Bossuet did not fear to preach sermons on the Trinity in the seventeenth century; St. Augustine and St. Thomas are never more admirable than in their works on this great Mystery. Far from shocking reason, it is of all the Mysteries the one which is best elucidated and confirmed by the analogies of the natural order. As every thing is made after the interior type which God saw in himself, it is impossible that the world, and especially the human soul, should not contain in their manner of being and their operations some traces of the supreme mode of the Divine existence. The Trinity, instead of obscuring the idea of God, renders us, to a certain extent, sensible of his interior respiration, of the eternal ebb and flow which constitute his immovable movement, and the inegoism of his felicity. It explains to us why God had no need of seeking occupation in the creation and government of the universe; why life and society are one and the same thing; why the family formed by genera-

tion and paternity is the principle of all social relations. It makes us penetrate even to the root of these mysterious combinations of unity and plurality, and equality and hierarchy, which meet us in all the plans of creation. Science has discovered and will continually discover new points of view in this obscure abyss of an immense clarity. You yourself have ended by avowing that every people ignorant of the Holy Trinity has known God only imperfectly, and has not touched the borders of true civilization. But it remains, and your book from one end to the other proves it, that you had taken your part against the illustrations which may be drawn from the higher religious metaphysics, not because you were incapable of this sort of speculation, but because you judged ~~ly~~ ^{it} ~~organized~~ ^{to} to impress the generality of readers. You have selected that ~~not~~ ^{the} light those rays which reach all eyes. It was the error. ~~It is to~~ ^{It is to} assuming and friendly piety. Still I regret it. It leaves painful gaps in your work for a large number of suffering souls.

“ Thus you have given no metaphysical explanations which relieve the Mystery of the Eucharist of its apparent impossibilities. These explanations, it is true, are only hypotheses, but the most positive science swarms with hypotheses, and it is already much to have conceived an assemblage of relations which clear up certain difficulties of things, without being contradicted by any law of nature or of reasoning. One of the dispositions the most hostile to Christianity is the persuasion that its doctrine is a tissue of physical and metaphysical absurdities; that is, ~~that~~ ^{that} it is unable to bear a discussion from the point of view of science as of logic. Now moral and social arguments do not reach this deplorable prejudice, any more than those drawn from history. Undoubtedly, we ought to conclude that the absurd cannot be the father of the beautiful, the good, the touching, the sublime. St. Vincent of Paul proves better than Bossuet the divinity of the doctrine which made them both, and an act of virtue is a metaphysical premise far stronger than a proposition of reason. But man is so constituted that he does not willingly pass in his conclusions from the order of the good to that of the true, and certain appearances of contradiction or of nullity will arrest, at the threshold of Christianity, for a hundred years, an honest man who sees clearly, and loudly acknowledges the moral superiority of the Gospel and the Church over every other institution. Wherefore refuse to these souls what St. Augustine and St. Thomas so freely dispensed to them? Wherefore not make known to them that the greatest metaphysicians of the world have sprung from the Catholic Church? Wherefore not, by opening to them on each dogma the wonderful horizon of Christian speculation, show them all the liberty left by God to the human mind, and all the resources it possesses to create even in mystery an empire which satisfied a Newton and a Leibnitz? What un-

derstanding in studying the *Summa* of St. Thomas ever remained insensible to that treasure of ideas which flows so naturally and so abundantly, and waters, from one end of positive theology to the other, the fields which it was thought were condemned by their very vastness to a majestic sterility? It is true, all are not capable of these gigantic labors; but the office of every age, by the mouth or the pen of contemporary apologists, is to bring them near to us, and to render them popular by force of clearness and eloquence. Not that conversion is the result promised to these triumphs of religious thought; God alone converts by the infusion of his grace: but it belongs to us to remove the obstacles which man places in the action of God, and the darkness of the understanding is necessary to lead among these obstacles, no less, perhaps, than the denial of God of the heart. It is not with the apologist as with the pastor of souls. The pastor of souls addresses the faithful, women and the poor, and starts with faith to entertain and increase faith. The apologist addresses, as says St. Paul, 'those without'; he stretches forth his hand beyond the ark, and endeavors, at all cost, save that of sin, to draw within these fugitives from God.

"I have noticed in your second part the entire absence of creation and original sin. You had, indeed, already treated of the Fall, but only in its relation to general tradition. We should be at a loss to conceive wherefore this forgetfulness, if it had been your intention to present the Catholic doctrine entire and complete, in which every dogma is linked to that which logically precedes it and to the dogma which logically follows it; but it is evident that such has not been your intention. I regret this also. What would it have cost you to place unity where it exists of itself?" — Vol. I. pp. 13 – 17.

This logical unity of Catholic doctrine, M. Nicholas appears either not to have seen, or to have undervalued. He seems to us to have never studied Catholic dogmas in their logical unity and connection, and never to have seen them in that relation of interior mutual dependence, which compels the logical mind either to admit or to deny them all, if he admits or denies any one of them; or perhaps he has felt that it would be impossible so to present that relation as to render it intelligible and profitable to the great mass of his readers. If the former is the case, he had not sufficiently mastered his subject; if the latter, we think he has erred in judgment; for the great difficulty with popular apologies is their attempting to prove Christianity as a collection of unrelated and mutually independent dogmas. Nothing contributes so much to clearness, or makes so

deep an impression on the mind of the reader, as to have a subject presented in the light of its real and substantial unity. Christianity is not a collection of isolated and unrelated dogmas; it is an organism in which, by virtue of an internal principle, all the parts are joined together and compacted into one indissoluble whole, as in a living being; and such is its internal consistency, such the living relation of the whole to each part, of each part to the whole, and of the several parts to each other, that no mind, embracing it at once in its unity and variety, can possibly doubt its complete and absolute truth. No nicely organized living being proclaims half so loud that the hand that made it is and can be none other than the hand of God. It is to be regretted that M. Nicholas was not more deeply impressed with the importance of this fact. Overlooking it, he has given to his work a disjointed and fragmentary character, and has failed, not only to present the several Christian dogmas in their proper internal relation to each other, but he has failed to construct the several parts of his book so that they mutually enlighten and support each other, and concentrate their several rays of evidence in a single focus.

The author appears to us to have copied, save in regard to particular doctrines, the models furnished by Protestant apologists, rather than those furnished by St. Augustine and St. Thomas. Protestantism loses the unity of Christian doctrine as well as the unity of Christian polity, and therefore its apologists can never prove Christianity as a real and living whole. The most they can prove is a sort of vague, unintelligible Christianity in general, not the Church, which is Christianity, and without which Christianity is a mere abstraction, a mere name, destitute of all real meaning. We think, also, he places, at least so far as regards those without, too high a value on the concessions of certain notorious infidel philosophers, as Voltaire, Rousseau, and D'Alembert. These concessions do not weigh with unbelievers themselves, for unbelievers never hold themselves bound by the utterances of their own philosophers, unless their utterances are favorable to unbelief. The only weight these concessions have, is that of the argument which may be in them; but that argument would, so far as we have known unbelievers, be better received and produce far more effect if presented by the Christian apologist as his own, and in his own words. But this is a

matter of opinion in which the author may be right and we wrong. Certainly he follows in this the general practice of all the French apologists we are acquainted with, and is borne out by the example of the excellent De Bonald, — to whom he is not a little indebted for some of the best parts of his book, which, by the way, is no disparagement, for it is a high merit to appreciate and borrow from the Viscount de Bonald, one of the soundest and most original philosophical heads France has ever produced.

M. Nicholas is what in France is called a Traditionalist, though not an exaggerated Traditionalist. He contends that man has in himself, in his own reason or intellect, no faculty to *invent* the moral and religious truths necessary to support the understanding and direct the conduct of life even in the natural order, and hence he infers the necessity of a primitive revelation. Yet he attempts, and not unsuccessfully, to establish by reason the existence of a God, the immortality of the soul, and the duty of worship. If human reason is as impotent as he contends in his argument for a primitive revelation, how has he been able from reason alone to establish his natural religion? The difficulty which is here suggested, and which is obvious to every logical reader of his book, has not escaped the observation of the author, and he attempts to solve it by maintaining that, though reason knows some things, it does not all, and, though it can go a little way, it cannot go the whole length of establishing natural religion. But this does not appear to us satisfactory; because the author himself has proved in his book that it not only can, but does, go the whole length of establishing the truths of natural religion, for he has rationally proved them all; because, if natural religion were not naturally evident to *natural* reason, it would not be natural, but supernatural; and because, if the author concedes that human reason can find out any natural religion, however little, he gives up the principle on which he founds his whole argument for a first revelation. The author has shut himself out from the right to give this answer. And yet we agree with him entirely in the doctrine, that man by reason never did and never could have found out God and natural religion without a primitive revelation, and that both are rationally demonstrable; we differ with him only in his mode of solving the apparent contradiction in the case. This apparent contradiction is solved, not by

distinguishing in reason different degrees of power, but by distinguishing between intuition and reflection, and between proving by reason a proposition presented to the reflective understanding, and originally inventing or finding it out by the operations of our own reason. When the Traditionalists tell us that man knows the great primal truths of natural religion and morality only by virtue of a primitive revelation to our first parents, preserved and handed down to us by tradition, they tell us, we hold, an important and undeniable truth; but when they assert in our knowing them the absolute nullity of reason, as some of them seem to us to do, at least in principle, after the suspicious example of Pascal, who demolishes reason to obtain a site for faith, we cannot agree with them, for they then deny all knowledge properly so called, and base science on faith, which is not admissible. In their laudable recoil from the exaggerated psychology of the non-Catholic schools, they seem to us to have lost sight of the real importance to the theologian, although recognizing authority, of rational investigations into the facts and conditions of the phenomenon we call knowledge.

M. Nicholas himself contends, and very properly, that we have immediate intuition of the intelligible, of God even, for he contends that we have immediate perception of necessary truth, and that necessary truth is God. But this intuition, that is, intuition of the intelligible as distinguishable from the sensible, is not a transitory act of the understanding, and is not, strictly speaking, an act of the understanding at all. It is an act of the understanding only in the sense that every living being necessarily acts in receiving an action. It is the result of the constant and permanent presence to our minds of the intelligible truth, and the unremitting action of that truth on them. On its objective side it is the constant and permanent affirmation of the intelligible object by itself to the intellectual subject; and on its subjective side it is the constant and permanent apprehension by the intellectual subject of the intelligible object. This permanent and invariable intuition is the basis of all science, of all demonstration, and of all certainty in the natural order.

Yet as man is not a pure intelligence, but an intelligence united to a body, intellect combined with sensibility, his reflective understanding cannot take its object immediately

from the intuition, and therefore, without something besides intuition, the intelligible truth could never be an object of distinct knowledge; we should be unconscious of it, could make no use of it, and it would remain to us, practically, as if it were not. To be known, that is, to be an object of conscious, reflex, or distinct knowledge, it must be represented — re-presented — or presented anew to the mind in a sensible form, or through a sensible sign, that is, language or speech. When thus represented, the mind, by virtue of the presence of its invariable and permanent intuition, seizes it, affirms it to be true, and reposes on it as intuitively evident.

Now, although the great truths of natural religion are intuitively evident when distinctly represented to the mind, they could never have been so represented, if God himself had not originally revealed or taught them to man. Hence the author is perfectly correct in asserting the necessity of a primitive revelation, and in contending that we know those truths only as we receive them from tradition. But as, though not originally discoverable in the reflective order by natural reason, they are, when discovered and represented to the mind, intuitively evident, he is equally right in asserting that they are rationally demonstrable. Rational demonstration does not consist in the original discovery of truth; it consists in proving a truth presented to the understanding, by bringing it to the test of invariable and permanent intuition. Revelation — we use the word in its proper sense — through the medium of tradition proposes the truths of natural religion to the understanding, and natural reason proves them by discovering in our invariable and permanent intuition their evidence. Both are necessary to all distinct knowledge in the intelligible order, and we could no more know the intelligible without the one than without the other. Revelation without the intuitive reason would be no better than a telescope to a man in the dark, or to a man without eyes, and human reason without revelation would be impotent through defect of matter on which to operate. This view of the case solves the difficulty the author acknowledges, and presents a ground of reconciliation between the French Rationalists and Traditionalists, who have so long been fighting each other, as it seems to us, with very little advantage to either party. It would relieve M. Bonnetty from his em-

barrassments, and save him from the paralogisms and subterfuges so frequent in those of his writings which we happen to have read. It would give him all he needs, and require him to sacrifice nothing he values; and we suspect, after all, that it is at bottom what he is really aiming at, but which he either does not clearly apprehend, or is unable clearly to express. M. Bonnetty's opponents, too, may find here a solid ground for the distinction, which they suppose the Traditionalists lose, between faith and science, and for the assertion of real knowledge in the natural order. Truths of the natural order are distinguishable from those of the supernatural order, not by the fact that the latter are revealed and the former are obtained without revelation, but by the fact that the truths of the supernatural order repose for their certainty on the extrinsic authority of him who reveals them, and therefore assent to them is the assent of faith; while the truths of the natural order, of philosophy if you will, repose for their certainty on natural evidence, and therefore assent to them is the assent, not of faith, but of knowledge. This is all that the opponents of the Traditionalists need to maintain, unless they wish, as some of them seem to imagine to be possible, to build up a system of philosophy and morality without God,—a wish no less vain than impious, as the experience of all ages fully proves. We see not why Father Chastel, the unwearied opponent of M. Bonnetty, cannot accept this view of the case, and thus spare himself the necessity of his long dissertations against the Traditionalists, and, as it seems to us, that of exaggerating the power and independence of simple human reason beyond all bounds. If he respected reason more, we think he would have more respect for tradition, and separate man less in his operations from his Creator. It does not require, it seems to us, any great depth of philosophy to show that nature is no lawgiver, and that it is impossible to suppose that any proper morality can be asserted if God is denied. Is it not possible that some of our modern professors have, in their devotion to the letter of the great philosophers of the Church, unconsciously lost sight of their real sense? We ask the question respectfully, not sneeringly, for we confess that we find philosophical doctrines put forth in the name of these philosophers which we cannot find in them. St. Thomas is frequently made in our days to stand god-

father for a rationalism which we cannot but think he would never have consented to hold at the font. St. Thomas as to the form of his doctrine follows Aristotle, as distinguished from Plato; but we have studied him to no purpose, if he is not, as in reality was Aristotle himself, at bottom an ontologist. Certainly he was no modern psychologist, and we see not wherefore Father Chastel imagines that he finds in him a sympathy with his exaggerated rationalism.

M. Nicholas offers us seven arguments in proof of the existence of God: — 1. Common sense, or *consensus hominum*. 2. The necessity of a first cause. 3. The existence of motion. 4. The harmony of the universe. 5. The existence of spirits. 6. The notion of the Infinite. 7. The existence of necessary truths. The argument from the *consensus hominum*, or common sense, is a good argument, after we have proved that the original conception of God is not possible without revelation, but its precise value, prior to having proved this, we do not understand. The author, we think, should have begun, not by attempting to prove the great truths of natural religion, but by drawing up an inventory of them as universally held, and then proceeded to show that the human mind, though after it has been taught them it can establish them, could never have originated them, or conceived them without revelation. By so doing he would have saved himself the necessity of constant repetition, and of reasoning from premises before arriving at that part of his work in which he proves them, and have given to his argument more compactness and practical force. His second argument is a paralogism. It simply begs the question; for cause and effect are correlatives, and connote each other. When you have asserted the world as an *effect*, you have asserted a first cause; for it is impossible to assert an effect without asserting a cause, or to assert a particular and finite cause without asserting a universal and infinite cause. With the atheist the point is, not to prove that there can be no effect without a first cause, but that the world is an effect, or that there is any proper effect at all, and that what we call effects are not merely different modes or aspects of the universe of things. It is only by inductive reasoning that we can from the world prove that it is an effect, and induction is never demonstration, and gives at best only

probability. It consists in drawing general conclusions from particular premises, which logicians, we believe, teach cannot be done. The third proof, drawn from the fact of motion, is only the second in another form. The fourth proof, drawn from the harmony of the universe, is liable to the same objection. When you have proved the world has been created, and therefore that there is a God, no doubt you can find in this harmony a corroborative proof of his existence; but before having done this, and on the supposition of a real doubt as to his existence, we confess we have never been able to appreciate the value of this argument. The fifth argument, drawn from the existence of spirits, does not strike us as any additional argument to that drawn from the existence of matter. A creator is no more necessary to give existence to spirits than to material bodies. A single spire of grass that grows by the way-side is as conclusive evidence to our mind that God is, as are the celestial bodies whose magnitudes and revolutions are described by astronomy, as is the loftiest human intellect or the tallest archangel. A grain of sand on the sea-shore implies God as much as any created spirit you can name.

The sixth and seventh arguments are in principle one and the same argument, which is the famous argument borrowed by Descartes from St. Anselm, and which was not unknown to St. Augustine. The argument has been objected to by many able theologians, and on the principles of the Cartesian philosophy it strikes us as of no value. Yet we hold it to be a good argument, and we have seen nothing in M. Nicholas's book that has given us so much satisfaction as his assertion and vindication of it. We have in our minds the idea of the infinite, therefore the infinite, that is, God, exists. This conclusion is valid, because the human mind cannot have an idea or notion of what has not its foundation in an objective reality, since what is without reality is non-existent, is not, and exists not at all, and what neither is nor exists is not intelligible. Thus far the author, and his reasoning is solid. But he might, perhaps, by analyzing the fact which we call thought, and which the French Eclectics call a fact of consciousness, have rendered it still more clear and conclusive. Whoever properly analyzes this fact will find that it is the result of two factors, subject and object, and never of sub-

ject alone. It is characteristic of every created being, that it can never act at all save in concurrence with some object which is distinct from itself. God alone is the direct object of his own intelligence, and he alone is capable of purely independent action. All creatures depend for their action, not only on the creative energy of God, which creates them from nothing and sustains them in existence, and to each its special form of existence, but also as an objective reality in immediate relation with which it is placed. Every reasonable creature requires for its proper activity an object for which, and an object with or by which, it acts. Hence there never are, and never can be, any purely subjective facts, or facts which are the pure effects of the mind's own proper activity; for if there were, each man would be God, and reproduce in himself the eternal and ever-blessed Trinity. Our activity can be reduced to act, be a proper *vis activa* as distinguished from the *potentia nuda* of the Schoolmen, only as it is met by an activity from without itself; or in other words, we can act only on condition that we are acted upon in concurrence with the activity acting on us, and our acts are always the joint product of the two activities or forces, — the one of which we ourselves are, and which acts from within outwards, the other of which is God or something created, which is independent of us, and acts upon us *ab extra*, or from without. When Descartes said, *Cogito, ergo sum*, he expressed a truth, but not the whole truth; for the whole conclusion is not only I exist, but, in addition, something besides me is or exists, since I cannot think my own existence but by virtue of thinking at the same time, and in the same mental act, something which is not myself, but is really objective to me and independent of my existence. In myself, according to St. Thomas, I am unintelligible, therefore I cannot apprehend myself in myself, but only in another, as reflected, as in a mirror, from some object which is not myself. Pure idealism is, therefore, an impossibility for any created being. Pure idealism can be predicated only of God, for he only is intelligible *per se*, and the direct object of his own intelligence, and in him it is the eternal generation of the Son, the Logos or Word, who is in the bosom of the Father and his exact image, consubstantial with him, and from whose mutual love eternally proceeds the Holy Ghost.

Now, as there are and can be no purely subjective facts of consciousness, it follows that nothing exists *in conceptu sine fundamenta in re*, that is, without an objective foundation in reality, or existing, as say the Schoolmen, *a parte rei*. We have not, then, after having established the fact of the mental idea or conception, to inquire whether there is or is not an objective reality that corresponds to it; for if there were no such reality, the idea itself could never have been formed, or have entered into our heads. A pure *ens rationis* is a figment of the Schoolmen. *Entia rationis* are the product of abstraction; but abstraction can never precede the intuition of the concrete. In abstraction the mind simply takes a special view of a subject, and puts all the rest aside, and what it considers has reality in the concrete subject only. I can conceive of a mountain of gold, but in doing so I operate on real elements, and imagine two real things, gold and mountain, to be united. This mountain of gold may not exist in reality, it may be, as the fabled Pegasus or Hippogriff, an *ens rationis*, but it is not a pure *ens rationis*, because the conceptions gold and mountain are conceptions of realities. Nobody denies to man the power of abstracting and combining his conceptions according to his imagination or his fancy, or that his combinations may be without any prototypes in the real world. But this power of abstraction can operate only on materials furnished by revelation or intuition, and is therefore subsequent to the apprehension of them. The question we are considering precedes all abstraction or imagination, and concerns the concrete ideas or conceptions which are abstracted or compounded by the judgment or the imagination, and these ideas or conceptions are impossible without the concurrent activity of both subject and object, and of course of an object which is not subject, and is placed over against it, and exists and acts independently of it. Without such object, our intellect would not be *intellectus in actu*, but at best only *intellectus in potentia*, because it cannot act without an object, and it can never be its own object. We cannot think without thinking something; we cannot see where there is nothing to be seen, — love where there is nothing to be loved, — think where there is nothing to be thought. The existence in our minds, then, of the idea or notion of the infinite, is full evidence that the infinite exists; for this concep-

tion cannot be formed by any abstraction or combination of finite things. This is evident, because the finite is the negation of the infinite, and therefore the conception of the finite must be subsequent to that of the infinite and impossible without it. The infinite then is, and therefore God.

There is no question that we have the perception of what are called necessary truths. Without them the reason could not operate at all. We could neither affirm nor deny any thing, if we had not in our minds, more or less distinctly noted, the conception of the necessary as opposed to the contingent, the immutable as opposed to the mutable, &c. We could in metaphysics prove nothing without the principle of contradiction, and our arguments would all be inconclusive without the conception of a necessary *nexus* between the premises and the conclusion. In every operation of the human understanding, there is a conception, not always clear and distinct indeed, of the real, the necessary, the eternal and immutable. This conception is not obtained by abstraction, for without it there could be no abstraction. It is not any more a mere subjective form of the understanding, as Kant pretends, but, according to the principles we have established, must be a real object of intuition, and therefore a reality. Then it must be being, and real being, since what is not is not intelligible, can be no object of thought or conception, as Descartes implies when he maintains that whatever the mind clearly and distinctly apprehends is true, and thus places certitude in the evidence of the object. The fact, then, that we have the idea of necessary truths, and could perform no intellectual operation if we had not, is a full proof that we have direct and immediate apprehension of real, necessary, eternal, and immutable being; therefore that such being really is or exists. But real, necessary, eternal, and immutable being is God, for all agree that God is *Ens reale et necessarium*. Therefore God is.

This is virtually the argument of the author, with one or two links supplied by ourselves; and we regard it as irrefutable, although the superficial and the captious may, no doubt, cavil at it. M. Nicholas is, as must be the case with a Traditionalist, an ontologist, who takes things in the concrete and the real order, not in the abstract and unreal order of modern psychologists. The only fault

which we are disposed to find with him under this head is, that he asserts his ontology too timidly, and does not bring it out clearly and distinctly. He hardly does justice to his own thought. He has the uncommon fault of being too modest, and we see throughout that his doctrine is far superior to his expression. In his excessive fear of saying too much, and his unnecessary distrust of himself, he leaves incomplete and obscure important views which he might easily develop and clear up. He never puts forth his real strength, and he perpetually provokes us by placing his weakest arguments in front, and his strongest in a form and position which to our understanding deprive them of half their force. He is himself far superior to his book, and might have done better if he had been bolder, and had had more confidence in his capacity to treat successfully the profounder problems of philosophy.

The author, as the Abbé Lacordaire hints, relies mainly on moral as distinguished from purely intellectual arguments, and aims to prove the truth of religion by proving its practical goodness and utility. He does not seem to be aware of the very general prejudice which unbelievers entertain against this line of argument. He does not in a work like his make sufficient account of their intellectual difficulties. His fault in this respect endears him to us as a man, but it is a fault which detracts from his merit as an author. These proud infidels who scoff at religion need first of all to have their pride of intellect humbled, — to be shown the truth of what the Psalmist says, *Dixit insipiens in corde suo, non est Deus*, and made to feel that reason on every point is against them, and laughs at their folly. It is necessary to prove to them, — what no man knows better than the author, — that it is only in abdicating their reason and in renouncing their manhood that they reject the Church of God. All these moral arguments, all these proofs of the beauty and utility of our religion, and all these evidences adduced from history, are all very well for the faithful, to help them to guard and preserve their faith, but they do not meet the great difficulties of the unbelievers of our times. The author has done well, but he had the ability and the learning to do better, and we can hardly forgive him for not having done as well as he could. He might have produced, what we want, a work which shall be to our age what the *Contra*

Gentiles was to the thirteenth, and the *De Civitate Dei* to the fifth century. But he has not done it, chiefly because he was afraid that he could not be original without being an innovator; which is an idle fear, for the Catholic apologist may be original without innovating. The materials for a new work and such as our times demand *Against the Gentiles* are collected and are at hand, and we only wait the man, the Christian artist, who shall take them and mould them into a complete and living whole.

In concluding our remarks on the three works before us, we may say, that the first named is the largest, and covers the most ground, but is the feeblest in execution. The last named aims at less, deals less with principles, has a more local object and character, but is the most practical and effective. It is not a monument which the author has erected to his memory, but it is a work for the moment in France, and fitted to produce an immediate and a great amount of good. The second, the Spanish work, is, however, the great book of the three, the boldest in its conception and the most vigorous in its execution. Aside from what may be considered a few incidental errors, and a little exaggeration on certain points, which do not, as far as we have been able to discover, affect the substance of the work, it is almost the book needed. It brings the deepest and broadest principles of the highest Christian theology to bear upon all the great practical questions of the day, with a depth and force of thought, with an eloquence and strength of expression, a noble and manly piety, a sweet and persuasive manner, that leave little to be desired. If the three works could be blended into one, by a man as learned as M. Nicholas, as practical and witty as Louis Veuillot, and as profound, as elevated, and as eloquent as Donoso Cortés, a death-blow would be struck to the incredulity, liberalism, and socialism of the age. But God raises up the man the world needs when it suits his purpose, and we need not doubt that in due time the man for the present age will be sent, and do his work.

Intellect throughout the civilized world has greatly declined since the sixteenth century, and was never lower than at the commencement of the nineteenth. The great schools and universities of earlier times had lost their grandeur, and no longer turned out scholars fitted to grapple with the new times. They seemed to have lost the

faculty of stimulating mental activity, and developing and directing the intellectual energies of their students. They taught to their passive pupils the old formulas, indeed, but as if they were dead formulas without any living soul in them, and apparently without ever suspecting that a living and breathing soul was needed. The apologists for religion fell into a dull routine, and the active intellect of the day left the Church, and, without the aid, the restraints, and the guidance of faith, undertook to create a new world for itself, with what success experience has proved. But happily this state of things is passing away, and there is in our day, not only a *renaissance* of Catholicity, but a most wonderful revival of mental activity among Catholics in every European country. Catholic history is reëxamined and rewritten. Catholic rights are asserted and vigorously defended, and a new Catholic literature is produced. Active intellect returns to the Church, and finds itself at home, and free only in her communion. The really intellectual men of England and Germany, reared outside the Church, can find their wants satisfied and a proper field for their exertions only in becoming Catholics. It is beginning to be the same in this country. The infidel world is attacked as it has not been before for centuries, and let us honor every scarred veteran and every new recruit in the constantly increasing army of Catholic apologists.

ART. IV.—*Spain: Her Institutions, Politics, and Public Men. A Sketch, by S. T. WALLIS, Author of "Glimpses of Spain."* Boston: Ticknor, Reed, & Fields. 1853. 12mo. pp. 399.

Any work professing to give an insight into the actual condition of Spain cannot fail to command public attention, and if it prove to be a reliable source of information, will be welcomed as a valuable contribution to our literature. After the long years of revolutionary strife that have distracted that noble country, and arrested her prosperity, it is interesting to examine what have been the consequences of this agitation, and what the influence it has

exerted in a political, social, and religious point of view. Under the last-mentioned aspect, especially, the Spanish Peninsula presents a most important subject of investigation. The land that gave birth to an Ignatius, a Francis Xavier, a Joseph Calasanctius, a John of God, a Peter of Alcantara, a Teresa, a Suarez, a Louis of Granada, a Cardinal Ximenes, cannot be devoid of profound interest for the Catholic, or even for the friends of humanity and civilization. But to enlighten public sentiment on such grave questions as those of politics and religion is not a task commonly expected from tourists, nor are they who undertake it generally successful. We have numerous publications, indeed, that refer to these subjects in their connection with Spain; but, with scarcely an exception, they are the productions of that superficial class of writers who view things only through the medium of their preconceived notions. A superstitious faith, an ignorant clergy, lazy monks, a priest-ridden and degraded people, combined with political despotism and all the social characteristics of a semi-barbarous age; — such are the facts that are taken for granted by most English and American sketch-writers on Spain, and introduced into their books by way of rendering them palatable to anti-Catholic readers, and thus securing a handsome compensation for their literary labors.

Under these circumstances, it is quite refreshing to meet with an author like Mr. Wallis, who dares to rise above the *profanum vulgus*, to disregard the contracted notions prevalent among his countrymen, to think for himself, and to form an honest and impartial judgment of Spanish character and society. Having visited the Peninsula twice, with a thorough knowledge of the language, Mr. Wallis enjoyed extensive facilities for obtaining correct information relative to the state of the country, and the two volumes which he has given to the public profess to be the result chiefly of his own personal observations. We are much pleased with the general style and spirit of the work before us. It is something more than a record of the commonplace incidents which fill up the ordinary book of travel; it touches upon the more important characteristics of the Spanish nation, the manners and customs of the people, their political organization and distinguished statesmen, the improvements that have taken place in agriculture, the state of the fine arts, of education, &c.; and in his

statements on these various subjects, the author indulges in judicious reflections, which are interspersed with an abundance of humor, and make up a very agreeable as well as instructive volume. As a sketch-writer, Mr. Wallis is entitled to a high rank. His descriptions are picturesque, and his language always appropriate and elegant. As an observer of the political and religious events which have transpired in the Peninsula within the last thirty years, we may also admit that he is often correct in his views; while he invariably manifests a just and honorable spirit in his appreciation of the national peculiarities. We cannot however concede to him the praise of having always exposed the real character of Spanish statesmanship, or exhibited the spirit which at times controlled the action of the government at Madrid. On this subject he seems to have derived his information from a very suspicious source.

That an American, born and bred under republican institutions, should be friendly to such legitimate reforms in the national policy of Spain as circumstances require, is natural and just; but our author has bestowed his commendations too freely upon the false liberalism, or rather destructive radicalism, which prevailed under the ascendancy of Espartero. Of this no one will doubt, who contrasts the eulogistic language in which the Duke of Victory is introduced to the reader, and the acts of that public functionary while he was in power. Mr. Wallis tells us, that "it is greatly to be lamented that the nation should be deprived of services so important as those which he [Espartero] has shown himself able to render," — that he belongs to "the number of good men exiled by national ingratitude," — and, alluding to the causes of his downfall, he mentions as one of the secrets of his overthrow, that

"He was unfortunate enough to have a conscience. He was at heart, and in all his heart's sincerity, a lover of constitutional freedom. He had fought to maintain the constitutional dynasty, and had sworn to support the constitution. Under no circumstances, therefore, could he be brought to violate what he felt that he owed to the liberal institutions which had made him — the son of a Manchegan peasant — Duke of Victory and Regent of Spain. He felt the obligation of his trust, and he kept it sacred. Being a ruler with but limited prerogatives, he would not go beyond them to

advance the interests of his party or consolidate or preserve his own power. Throughout his whole administration, history will recognize a faithful effort to obey and execute the laws, in the true spirit of a liberal, an enlightened, and a conscientious patriotism." — pp. 176, 177.

If these encomiums of Espartero had come from the pen of a Louis Blanc or a Palmerston, they would not surprise us, for we should know in that case how to interpret such language, which sounds much more like the pompous verbiage of radical enthusiasm or anti-Catholic bigotry, than the calm and deliberate expression of opinion by an honest and enlightened American. Mr. Wallis refers more than once to the *conscience* of Espartero ; but what sort of conscience was that which led him to abuse the high power which he possessed, for the very worst imaginable ends ? Was it conscience, in the proper sense of the word, that rendered him, during his civil administration, a sworn and bitter enemy of the national religion ? Was it conscience that prompted him to confiscate the property belonging to the Church, to pillage and desecrate her temples, to suppress her holy institutions, to persecute, banish, and even assassinate her clergy ; in short, was it conscience that inspired him with the design of bringing about a complete rupture between the Holy See and the Church in Spain, and of vesting all ecclesiastical supremacy in the state ? If all this was the result of Espartero's conscientious convictions, we can only infer that his conscience must have been regulated by the infernal Spirit, not by the Christian law or even by the dictates of reason itself. It would be a waste of time to show how utterly devoid of a right conscience was Espartero, the Regent of Spain. There is but one way of having a conscience that may serve as a legitimate and safe rule of action, and that is to form one's principles according to the divine law, of which the Church of God is the sole authoritative exponent. Whoso, therefore, places himself in opposition to the Church, much more he who assails and persecutes the Church, becomes *ipso facto* a transgressor of the laws of God, and leagued with his enemy, the Devil ; and to assert that such a man has a conscience is to be guilty, to say the least, of a gross perversion of language.

The Duke of Victory has no better claim to be considered "a lover of constitutional freedom." We would ask

Mr. Wallis, whether it was in virtue of a constitutional provision, that Espartero caused a popular outbreak at Barcelona, in 1840, leading to the forced abdication of the Queen Regent and his own very willing elevation to the helm of state? We would ask our author, whether it was by the observance of the Constitution that many of the most learned, exemplary, and venerated ecclesiastics of the Peninsula were so unceremoniously sent into exile, to suffer and often to perish amid the cruel hardships to which they were exposed? We ask whether it was an effect of *constitutional freedom*, that so many distinguished members of the clergy, who as Spanish citizens were entitled to the protection of the government as well as any other class of the people, were deprived of their personal liberty, and dismissed from their homes and occupations? Was it constitutional freedom that thus invaded, not only the precincts of the sanctuary, but the most cherished rights of the people, withdrawing their legitimate pastors, and forcing upon them the ministry of ambitious men, who had no lawful authority and no other commission to exercise the episcopal or sacerdotal functions than the worthless appointment of the civil power? In a word, we ask whether it was the spirit of freedom or of tyranny that banished the prelates, and produced other acts of persecution against the clergy, merely because they refused to recognize in a junta of the civil government a lawful ecclesiastical jurisdiction, or respectfully petitioned against the suppression of religious orders, or would not assent to the schismatical separation, contemplated by their temporal rulers, from the Holy See? There is but one answer to these questions, and it must stigmatize with everlasting infamy the sacrilegious despot who trampled upon every thing sacred in Spain. He was indeed a lover of constitutional freedom, not in the American sense of the term, not in the sense of a wise and just policy, which looks to the protection of all classes of citizens, and especially to the preservation of their religious liberty, but in the sense of the first French revolution, and of those radical movements which have still more recently disgraced humanity and threatened the dissolution of society. The only kind of liberty implied or shadowed forth in the policy of Espartero and his party is that which the Jacobins of France and the Red Republicans of Italy have so loudly proclaimed: a liberty for themselves to do as they

please, and to tyrannize over all who differ from their views ; a liberty to put down religion, to outrage her ministers, to rob them of their property, to banish Christian faith from the people, and to sow the seed of anarchy and infidelity, that there may be no obstacles to the gratification of their own ambition, their avarice, and their other wicked passions. This is but the translation into intelligible language of what Mr. Wallis is so graciously pleased to term the constitutional freedom, liberal institutions, and conscientious patriotism of the Duke of Victory.

We cannot share, therefore, in the sympathies of our author at the downfall of Espartero, or in his regrets that Spain is not actually benefited by his legislative or executive wisdom. When he held the reins of government, he proved himself to be the deadliest enemy of his country, by despising the time-honored and cherished traditions of the people, by an attempt to destroy the national religion, to make the Church a mere creature of the Cortes, and to subject the spiritual to the temporal order, — a shocking combination of impiety and tyranny ; and it was a happy day for Spain that hurled him from power, and arrested the progress of that unprincipled policy in which he was the prime mover. It was, in fact, the hateful character of his civil administration that precipitated his overthrow. Had he been really possessed of the conscientious patriotism, practical wisdom, and zeal for constitutional freedom which Mr. Wallis so liberally awards to him, it would be necessary to seek the causes of his downfall in something else than mere views of the tariff, a commercial treaty with England, the Carlist opposition, or the private jealousies of men in his own party. At the time of his accession to power, it may be said that there was a general desire in Spain among all classes of the people for the restoration of peace, for calming the agitation of the public mind, and placing the government of the realm on a solid basis ; and it was precisely a man of conscientious patriotism, of conciliatory views, of fidelity to the constitution and the laws, that would have been hailed at such a crisis as a political Saviour, and would have won for himself the abiding veneration of the Spanish people. But Espartero was not a man of this high character. It was his misfortune, not, as Mr. Wallis says, “to have a conscience,” but to have *no* conscience. He showed the utmost contempt for what

the Spaniards consider their most precious and inalienable birthright, the CATHOLIC RELIGION. He adopted a policy in regard to it, which could have been prompted only by a spirit of the rankest infidelity and the basest perfidy, and the great mass of the nation were looking in terror and anguish upon the desolation which he was spreading around them, when the Almighty rallied them to avenge his desecrated altars.

Undoubtedly there were secondary causes which concurred more immediately in the overthrow of the Duke of Victory; but we still remember how the extraordinary rapidity of their combination to produce this result took the world in general by surprise, while the eye of faith beheld in it a visible dispensation of Divine Providence for the protection of the Church and the humiliation of her enemies. The Regent Espartero had turned a deaf ear to all the remonstrances of the Sovereign Pontiff against his arbitrary rule and impious and persecuting policy, and in the conscious security of his power he only aimed at the consummation of his nefarious scheme, to degrade the Church and subject her to the civil authority. Finding that his repeated and urgent protestations were obstinately disregarded, Gregory the Sixteenth, in the plenitude of his apostolic power, proclaimed a general jubilee throughout the Christian world, opening the spiritual treasures of the Church to all who would offer up prayers to heaven in behalf of afflicted Spain. Calling upon all primates, archbishops, and bishops, he thus addresses them: "We will and command, that our venerable brothers have a care that public supplications be addressed to the Father of Mercies, that for the sake of the blood of his Son, which was shed for all, the days of temptation may be shortened in the kingdom of Spain. . . . We trust that the 'angels of peace, holding the golden vials and the thurible of gold in their hands,' will offer to the Lord on the 'altar of gold' our fervent and humble prayers, and those of the whole Church, for Spain; and that He who is rich in mercy will be pleased to condescend to our vows and the common vows of the faithful, and at the same time to effect, that by his right hand and the arm of his strength, all *adversities and errors being overthrown*, our holy Mother, the Church, may there at length breathe again from such calamities, and enjoy that peace and liberty with which

Christ endowed her." We all know the events that followed close upon this universal appeal to the Supreme Invisible Pastor of the Church. When, to all human appearances, Espartero was firmly established at the summit of human power and glory, the nation suddenly rose against him; he was compelled to seek safety in flight; and he left the country, to use Mr. Wallis's expressions, "stripped of his titles, and stigmatized in a ministerial decree as 'bearing the mark of public execration.'"

Our author's sympathy with the liberals of Spain has betrayed him still farther into a blind approval of one of the most iniquitous measures that ever disgraced a civil government; we allude to the suppression of the monastic orders and the confiscation of ecclesiastical property. He has not only attempted to justify these acts of oppression, but he has wandered altogether from his province as a sketch-writer, by denouncing the monastic profession in general.

"That there should, in a population of not more than twelve millions, have been forty thousand persons withdrawn from those practical and substantial duties, which, in the order of Providence, are a part of the destiny and obligation of every human creature, and from which no state can safely or consistently discharge its citizens, — is quite justification enough for the legislative action, which put an end to such a drain on the public industry, and such a check on production, population, and wealth. The '*descansadera*' of Fray Luis de Leon — a life of mystic reverie and contemplation — may not be inconsistent with the social uses of humanity, in the few whose genius or temperament, like his, suggests it. In them it may be but the nurse of lofty and poetic thought, the prompter of religious musings, which may delight and teach mankind. But for the most of men, the '*mundanal ruido*,' — the worldly noise, — the echo of the thoughts and feelings, the labors, hopes, and sufferings of other men, — is needful to prevent their hearkening only to the eternal whispering of self. Contemplation, pursued as a calling in life, is apt to degenerate into a trade. Its sphere in a Carthusian's cell cannot be a very wide one, nor its objects many or healthful. It would be but poor astronomy to have one's observatory in the bottom of a well, — poor philosophy to suppose truth was only to be found there!" — pp. 278, 279.

This doleful paragraph, it seems to us, does not speak much for Mr. Wallis's philosophy, and less for his Christianity. One might suppose it had been penned at the

bottom of a well, or in some other dark place, for its logic is certainly very obscure and its religion very false. Has it ever been contended by the monastic orders, that truth was to be found only in their midst? And does it follow, that, because truth may exist elsewhere, it is not to be found among them? Would it be good logic to say, justice and honesty are not to be found only among lawyers, therefore justice and honesty do not exist in the legal profession? It is impossible to assume false premises without being betrayed into blundering conclusions. What shadow of reason or truth can be discovered in the remark, that the monastic bodies are a drain upon public industry, and a check upon population, production, and wealth? This phrase either means nothing, or it signifies that it is the duty of every man and woman to marry, and to devote all the energies of their being, mental and physical, to the service of public industry, to the greatest possible accumulation of wealth, and to the utmost indulgence of their natural desires. Now, we ask Mr. Wallis by what precepts of the Divine law, either natural or revealed, these things are declared obligatory? and, if they are not obligatory, upon what principles of common sense and justice can the neglect of them and the choice of other pursuits be made a ground of accusation against the monks? Why should they be denounced as a drain upon industry or a check upon population, more than any other class of persons who choose to lead a single life or to live quietly on their incomes? They who are acquainted with the origin and history of monasticism, and with the general character and influence of the religious orders at the present day, will only smile at the unpardonable want of knowledge which couples with them the idea of indolence, uselessness, or sensualism. That there have been, and are now, lazy and useless monks, we are not disposed to deny; but to infer from this, as infidel and Protestant writers often do, that the monastic life is opposed to the legitimate objects of industry, or to social prosperity, or renders not the most important services to mankind, is a far greater absurdity than to conclude, from the dishonesty and rapacity of certain lawyers, that the entire legal profession is corrupt, or from the inactive habits of certain landlords, that all rich proprietors are a set of stupid drones.

No men, as a class, have conferred, or confer now, more

signal benefits upon their race than the religious orders. By the effort to sanctify their souls, by the sublime virtues which adorn their life, their disinterestedness, their charity, their aspiration after eternal things, they are a continual admonition and example to their fellow-beings, reminding them of the great end for which they have been created. How varied and extensive is their sphere of usefulness! What do they not accomplish in the exercise of the holy ministry, in the instruction of the ignorant, in the education of youth, in the advancement of science, in the civilization of barbarous tribes, in the relief of suffering humanity! Will Mr. Wallis deny that these are "practical and substantial duties"? But how are the great works for which we are indebted to the monks effected? Do they not owe their origin and success altogether to that *descansada vida*, that life of prayer and contemplation, which is so repulsive to the worldly man? Could the holy and beneficent labors of the religious orders be carried on, or result in any thing admirable and permanent, if their members courted the *mundanal ruido*, the worldly noise, against which the Gospel has so emphatically warned us, and which every body knows to be a fatal stumbling-block of virtue for the great mass of mankind? St. Simon Stylites would be laughed at by our modern moralists; yet Theodoret informs us that, mounted on his pillar, he converted many myriads of pagans; which, as Dr. Newman observed before his conversion to Catholicity, was good work for any man's lifetime, and more than will ever be accomplished by our rational religionists, one and all together. It would be endless to enumerate the various and wonderful blessings of which the monastic orders are the source; but there is a prominent fact in the history of nations which we would recall to the memory of Mr. Wallis, and which is quite sufficient to refute his whole theory about the monks being a drain on industry, or an obstacle to the production of wealth. He must know that, before the suppression of the religious orders in England, the poor always found a support in the disinterested charity of the monastic houses, and poor-laws were at that period unknown. Similar facts may be instanced in other countries. If their industry and wealth had this beneficial influence, it cannot be denied that they deserved well of the nations to which they belonged.

As to the religious orders in Spain, we have no reason to modify materially the opinion which we hold in regard to that profession in general. Our author would have us believe that the monks in that country "had lost public respect, and with it their usefulness," — a grave charge, which he should have supported by something better than mere assertion. As an authority that such was not the case, we will quote the statements of a writer who cannot be suspected of any partiality for Catholic institutions. Alison, in the third volume of his *History of Europe*, p. 43, says of the religious houses in Spain: "The charity and beneficence of the monks had set on foot, in every part of the country, extensive institutions, which were effecting more than any others in relieving the distresses of the poor. To the peasant they often served as banking establishments, where none other existed in the province, and as such essentially contributed to agricultural improvement. The friars acted as schoolmasters, advocates, physicians, and apothecaries. They were considerate landlords and indulgent masters; peacemakers in domestic broils, and the prop of support in family misfortune: they provided periodical amusements and festivities for the peasants, advanced them funds when assailed by misfortune, and furnished them with seed, if the harvest had failed. Most of the convents had *fundaciones*, or endowments for professors who taught rhetoric and philosophy, besides keeping schools open for the use of the poor. Superficial and free-thinking travellers, observing that the aged, the sick, and the destitute were always to be found in numbers round the convent gates, supposed that they created the suffering they were so instrumental in relieving: forgetting that the poor will ever be assembled round those establishments where their sufferings are relieved, and that to represent such beneficent institutions as the cause of this distress is just as absurd as it would be to decry fever-hospitals because their wards are generally filled with typhus patients." This testimony of the Scotch historian does not confirm Mr. Wallis's assertions about the obstructions thrown by the monks in the way of industry, agriculture, and social improvement in general. Other writers who have but recently visited the Peninsula tell us of the loud complaints, arising among all classes of the population, relative to the suppression of the monastic establishments;

because they were considered depots of the most enlarged beneficence, besides taking a most important part in education and in the direction of souls. Many of the most learned and pious ecclesiastics in the country were the superiors of the religious houses. We are not unwilling to admit that there existed abuses to a certain extent; but it must also be acknowledged that the inmates of the conventual institutions, upon the whole, were distinguished by their exemplary life, and enjoyed the respect of the people.

Were it even admitted that the monastic houses had not exhibited the perfection which they professed, and that their extensive lands had been in a great measure lying unproductive, these facts could not have formed a justifiable ground for their suppression by the civil government; for in every country these same reasons would apply to a large portion of the population, who, if they were made the objects of a similar legislation, would with reason look upon it as a most crying injustice, and most detestable tyranny. In no other light can we view the suppression of the monastic orders in Spain, and the alienation of their property from its rightful ends. It was the act of an irreligious faction, a radical minority, trampling upon every principle of justice in regard to individuals, and disregarding the gravest considerations of the national welfare. That such was the case, no stronger evidence could be desired than the fact, that, so soon as the impious rule of Espartero was overthrown, numberless petitions were immediately sent in to the government, for putting a stop to the further sale of ecclesiastical property, and for the restoration of certain religious institutions. The existence of abuses furnished no sufficient plea for the course pursued by the civil authorities; for it belongs to the Church, not to the temporal power, to take cognizance of, and to adjudicate upon, religious reforms. But, granting that the monastic orders should have been suppressed, how could their inmates, with any shadow of justice, be turned adrift upon the world, with an empty promise of a mere pittance for their support? If the government was actuated by honest motives in this affair, why was not the conventual property distributed among those to whom it lawfully belonged? Far from this having been the case, it is well known that in some instances ladies, although prevented

by the civil authorities from making their religious profession, were plundered of the dowries which they had already paid in to the institution.

They who side with the government in the seizure of the Church property, contend that it was a measure of state necessity. But nothing could be more unfounded in fact. The sale of ecclesiastical property has resulted in no benefit whatever to the state. In the first place, it was very difficult to find purchasers for property which was considered sacred, and the alienation of which from its original ends by the civil power was deemed a sacrilegious robbery. The convent lands were mostly acquired by foreigners, and paid for, not in money, but in government paper, which was worth only eighteen per cent. in the market. Moreover, eight years were allowed for these payments. Secondly, to provide for the support of the clergy, whose possessions had been confiscated, a tax was levied upon the people amounting to about ten per cent. on their property, and yielding in the aggregate a sum of eight millions of dollars; while the ecclesiastical property sold between the years 1835 and 1845 would alone have produced, at five per cent., an income of nine millions; one million more than what the government would have required. Thus, an enormous tax was laid upon the people, which was before unnecessary, while the public debt still remains, by the non-destruction of the paper funds which were received for the Church property. If it be said that the distribution of the convent lands among a large number of tenants will aid the industrial and agricultural interest, we answer, that this advantage is of no weight whatever, compared with the loss of the immense resources which the indigent classes always found in the monastic institutions. A late traveller in Spain informs us, that he heard from those poor people the significant remark, "that the convents which had not been destroyed or sold were converted into barracks for soldiers; but that a barrack consumes more and yields less than a monastery; one soldier costs more than two friars."

It is a fact, then, that the abolition of the monastic houses, with the confiscation of their property, was not only a most unjust measure, but a signal calamity for Spain. A numerous and eminently meritorious class of the population was thereby ruined, despoiled of its tempo-

ral possessions, and its usefulness arrested: the people were in consequence burdened with taxes, and the poor lost their chief resource and reliance in every emergency. But who can describe the magnitude of the evil as it affected the arts? Mr. Wallis himself could not but feel the sad effects of the devastation which the vandalism of a Mendizabal and an Espartero had produced.

"The traveller," he says, "who looks at Spain from the picturesque point of view, has certainly small cause to thank the political necessity [!] which has removed the cord and cowl from the dim cloisters where their shadows fell. Decay has commenced its work, already, upon many of the magnificent temples which the care of the friars kept perfect. Stately buildings, once wealthily endowed, where architecture and the kindred arts accumulated all their pomp, seem naked now, and are lonely and desolate, without them. Gardens and groves which they tended — plantations and vineyards which might have been the heritage of princes — have been parcelled out among small proprietors, until subdivision seems to have made them insignificant. Green patches of forest, rare in Spain, which their intelligence and taste had induced them to preserve untouched, through all their tribulations, have disappeared, in some places, before the axe of the lay proprietor. Ruined walls, dismantled towers and belfries, meet the eye of the wayfarer sadly, as he crosses the deserted plains or the wild mountains, — making the solitude and gloom of the landscape yet more impressive and severe. . . . But men live, now-a-days, for something more than pictures." — pp. 275, 276.

The concluding lines of this paragraph contain poor comfort amid the ruins of the monastic institutions, which in a religious and social point of view were the glory of Spain. The fine arts, according to the modern sensualistic school, are well worthy of patronage while they minister to the gratification of human pride and lust, and in this way men may be permitted to live for pictures now-a-days as well as at any other period. To labor for the present life only, to aspire after wealth, to indulge the animal instincts, to make gods of themselves and the objects around them, and to forget that they have been destined for another world, — such is the moral code of the socialists and infidels that infest society in our times; but, as Mr. Wallis has no ambition to be ranked in this category, he should abstain from adopting the language which belongs to it. He knows perfectly well, that the only end of man is the ser-

vice of God in this life, by which he may attain to the enjoyment of eternal happiness hereafter. He also knows that the evil passions of our heart are not to be curbed, nor the virtues inculcated in the Gospel reduced to practice, by the sensualistic philosophy of the day, which would direct all our thoughts and energies to the acquisition of a purely material good. It is worse than idle, therefore, to undertake the justification of the oppressors of God's Church, the robbers of monastic institutions, when it is as clear as the noon-day, that these religious bodies, in view of the example they display and the advantages they otherwise confer, should be cherished as among the most precious elements of a nation's prosperity. If Mr. Wallis had taken the pains to inform himself correctly on this subject, by consulting respectable ecclesiastical authority (which could not be dispensed with in such an inquiry), he would not have been betrayed into the gross misrepresentations which disfigure his book, and which smack only of the false liberalism of the times. We award him due credit for the commendations which he bestows upon the learning and virtue of the secular clergy in Spain, and we have no doubt that he would have formed a similar estimate of the monastic institutions, if he had not confined his sources of information on this head to one-sided authorities, or rather to the declared enemies of the religious orders.

ART. V.—*The Lives of the Fathers of the Eastern Deserts.*

By the REV. DR. CHALLONER. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co. 1852. 24mo. pp. 609.

This excellent work, we presume, was by the *Right Reverend* Dr. Challoner, Vicar Apostolic of the London District, to whom our literature is indebted for a large number of exceedingly valuable publications, and who was not an unworthy predecessor of Dr. Wiseman, now Archbishop of Westminster, the most learned and accomplished writer in the English language, and whose influence as a pastor and prince of the Church is felt and acknowledged wherever that language is spoken. To his Eminence Car-

dinal Wiseman, more than to any other one man now living, are we indebted for the wonderful progress of Catholicity in Great Britain since the passage of the Catholic Relief Bill; and to him, also, is more especially due the merit of moulding and disciplining the large number of new converts into that grand army of writers who are at the present moment waging in the land of our ancestors such vigorous and effective war against heresy and schism. His charity, his sweetness, his prudence, his delicacy, his mild and tolerant, yet firm and dignified policy, seem to have won their love and veneration, and, under the grace of God, to have had the most marked success in elevating the Church in the British Isles to her present commanding position. A journalist is often called upon, professed critic as he is, to treat novel theories and even slightly uncatholic tendencies, which he detects in the publications of the day, with very little mercy or forbearance; but the wise and prudent pastor is always characterized by his tender and forbearing disposition. Wherever he finds the right spirit, he cherishes it, bears with its infirmities, and leaves it to time and the grace of the Sacraments to neutralize or correct such errors or unwholesome tendencies, when not immediately dangerous to faith, as may, through inadvertence, unsound philosophy, or the want of exact information, be found in connection with it. Such is the wise and tolerant policy of Rome, which the Holy Father recommends to the French prelates in his late Encyclical Letter, referred to in a foregoing article, and which his Eminence appears to have uniformly followed with the most happy effect, as every day's experience in Great Britain and the United States is proving.

We are well aware that we have given his Eminence pain by the course we have felt it our duty to pursue with regard to the Theory of Development. But we found that theory used by non-Catholics to the prejudice of the Church, favored by some Catholics, and threatening to form a dangerous school within the fold, and we felt called upon to enter our feeble protest against it. We did not think the doctrine immediately dangerous enough to demand the official interposition of authority, especially in England, where we presume importance is attached only to the element of truth which all concede that it contains; but we did think, and so did a large number of our illus-

trious prelates, that some Catholic writer should undertake to refute it, and set the faithful on their guard against it, especially here, where its error was the only thing practically important, and favoring as it could not fail to do with us the dominant heresy of the age. Sure of our own good faith, and having the fullest confidence in the good faith of its advocates, we did not doubt for a moment, in the outset, that a single article simply exposing the unsound principles on which the theory was constructed, and drawing attention to the dangerous consequences that might be deduced from it, would settle the matter without any scandal, and without any ill-feeling on either side. Unhappily, however, the distinguished author of the theory and his friends, whether through our fault or their own we will not stop to inquire, mistook entirely our motives, and construed our attack on the doctrine to an attack on themselves personally, which was no justice to Dr. Newman, and gross injustice to us. This grave mistake naturally excited in our minds a distrust where before there had been none, and prevented them from meeting us with those frank and friendly explanations we had confidently expected. But as we have reason to think that the purpose for which we wrote has been effected, and that the theory in the sense we have opposed it will be silently dropped, we do not apprehend that any occasion will arise hereafter for renewing the discussion. At any rate, we feel that we have done all that can reasonably be asked of a lay journalist, and that, should the theory be reasserted, we are under no obligation to take any further notice of it. We shall therefore leave it in the hands of the pastors of the Church to take such action or no-action on the subject as they judge necessary or expedient. We trust, therefore, that we shall not have the unhappiness, hereafter, at least on this unpleasant subject, of giving pain to his Eminence, or to any of the respectable converts from Anglicanism.

We hardly know by what association of ideas we have been led to make these remarks. Certainly we had in commencing no thought or intention of making them, and they seem to have flowed of themselves from our pen. But "what is writ is writ," and it must stand. If those who have been offended or pained by us choose to take it as an overture of peace, we shall not be displeased, and shall suffer no mortification, for as much as in us lies we

wish to follow after peace with all men. We have seen no reason to retract any thing we have written against Developmentism; we do not feel that any overture of peace is due from us; but we do feel that we have done *all* our duty, and are free to drop the subject. We have been influenced by no personal motives; we have had no selfish ends to answer, no foolish pride to gratify, no rivals to humble, and at no time can we count any sacrifice for peace dear which involves no sacrifice of principle, of Catholic truth or virtue. Our last article on Developmentism, which seems to have given some offence, was written and printed before Dr. Newman had had his trial; otherwise, we may say, it would have been written somewhat differently, for it is not, we hope, in our disposition even to appear to bear hard on those whom an unjust world oppresses. Since we wrote that article, Dr. Newman has suffered for his faith, and stands now before the public as a venerable confessor, and honored as such by all Christendom. If we have withheld the expression of our admiration for his varied powers, and our love and veneration of his personal worth, and his deep devotion to the Catholic cause, it has not been because in these we have yielded to any of our Catholic brethren, but because we dared not express all we felt lest we should countenance the unreasonable claims set up for him by some of his indiscreet friends, and also the dangerous theory to which he had attached his name. But now that we have some reason to think that his theory will be suffered, at least in its objectionable form, to pass into forgetfulness, we have less occasion to be so reserved. We yield to no one in our regard for him and the great body of Anglican converts to our holy religion, and no one rejoices more than we, both for our sake and their own, over their happy conversion. We have, indeed, heretofore dwelt chiefly on the faults we detected in them, but we happen never to have been insensible to their virtues. A convert ourselves, we had learned by experience that it is no service to converts to be too loud in praise of their virtues, of which they are pretty sure to form a sufficiently high estimate without any help from their friends. They and we have a common cause; we speak a common language; and in spite of the fact that we belong to different states and are separated by the broad Atlantic, we address substantially the same pub-

lie; and we have no desire that there should be any cloud between them and us. We assure them it will be their fault if hereafter we speak of them as a school, or separate class in the Church, or distinguish them in thought or affection, save as they prove themselves more zealous, more energetic, and more worthy supporters of Catholic faith and morals, from any other class of Catholics.

After all, we are not sure that we could do better, in approaching such a work as the one before us, than to prepare ourselves to appreciate it by stretching forth the hand of brotherly love to those between whom and us there have been the beginnings of strife, making an overture of peace to those whom we may have troubled, though by no fault of our own, and leaving by the way the world and its vanities, self and its littlenesses, too apt to mingle with our best and most conscientious actions. It is in fact only thus we can prepare ourselves for communion with the Fathers of the Desert, whose aim through life was to rise to an intimate union with a God of love and peace, who is charity, and who for the love of sinners disdained not to take upon him the form of a slave, and to humble himself even to the ignominy of the cross. The book before us can be read with appreciating sympathy only by those whose hearts are weaned from the world, and whose conversation is in heaven. In it we see the meanness of pride and the greatness of humility, the emptiness of the world and the madness of all worldliness of mind, the inanity of self and the infinite fulness of God. It is a strange book, indeed, for the men and women of our material and luxurious age, which adores Mammon as God, and counts sensual pleasure heaven; yet it is the very book the age needs, and if it would but read, meditate, and inwardly digest it, it would find its reading most profitable.

We cannot better introduce the work than by copying the well-written Preface to the present edition by Mrs. Sadlier of Montreal, its accomplished editor, and who has done and is doing so much by her interesting original works and her excellent translations from the French for the promotion of American Catholic literature.

“ ‘The Saints of the Desert!’ what a subject to be brought before the minds of this worldly-wise and self-worshipping genera-

tion! — how can men and women who live but to indulge their tastes and fancies, and gratify their passions, understand or appreciate the antiquated custom of crucifying the flesh, and macerating the body by vigils and fasts, and giving up all the fascinations of this world to devote the whole being, heart, and soul to God from whom it came? — ‘And then it is only the Catholics who practise these things, or are at all influenced by such notions. It is only the Church of Rome that inculcates such unnatural doctrines, and teaches people to forget themselves and be as though they were not.’ Very true, and it is only for Catholics that these pages are expected to have any interest. We have no idea of penetrating the depths of the burning deserts, and entering the cavern or cell where the solitary abides in uninterrupted commune with his God, to lay bare the beautiful recesses — the calm, untroubled depths of his superhuman soul — merely to expose them to the derision of the unbeliever. The saints of the desert, the religious of the cloisters, all the monastic orders, whether active or contemplative, are the pride and glory of the Church; they are her richest treasures, her chosen children, who sit ever at her feet drinking in her divine precepts and literally putting them in practice; they are the blooming wreaths wherewith she crowns her beloved Spouse, because they are His faithful imitators, and her docile pupils. It is true — very true — that the children of this world who *are wiser in their generation than the children of light* have little or nothing in common with these saintly personages, and that in their eyes our Anthonys, our Anselms, our Teresas, nay, even our Jeromes, our Gregorys, and our Basils, bear but a sorry figure; nay, the divine Precursor himself — the first of our solitaries — must seem little better than a fool, because he practised, to the very letter, this spirit of self-denial which the world cannot understand, but which the Church of God has ever inculcated, and still does inculcate.

“This work of Dr. Challoner’s has long been familiar to the Catholic public, and it is a very fair collection of the eminent Saints of the Desert, but on looking over it recently, prior to its republication, it struck me that there were a few important omissions. I looked in vain for the lives of St. Jerome, St. Gregory Nazianzen, or his illustrious friend, St. Basil the Great, and knowing that some portion of the lives of each of those great saints was spent in solitude, I thought it would be an acceptable addition to the work to give the *monastic* lives of those three illustrious doctors, who have rendered and do still render such invaluable service to the Church. This portion of their lives I found in a French work entitled *Vies des Pères du Desert*, and it is with much pleasure that I now give their rightful place to these three great Fathers of the Oriental Church. As for the style of the translation, I shall say

nothing, for I had only to make the best of a bad bargain, as there was no style at all in the original. However, in a work of this kind, which is chiefly read by pious Christians, I have not much to dread from criticism, and with that conviction I proceeded in my task, being more anxious to do honor to the sainted memory of these great men — who may be truly called ‘pillars of the Church’ — than to produce a finished piece of composition.” — pp. v. – viii.

The work before us is not a work to be reviewed either favorably or unfavorably. It is a work to be read, not for its style or its literary graces, but for the edification the pious soul cannot fail to derive from communing with the saints whose lives it records. To our age, however, these Oriental saints, with their contemplations, their austerities, their mortifications, their fasts, and their macerations of the body for the sake of the soul, appear any thing but attractive, and even many comparatively good Catholics are disposed to speak of their conduct as a sublime folly. It is not and never was a doctrine of the Catholic Church, that all they did or suffered is necessary in the case of every one for salvation. Nor is every one recommended to aspire to imitate their austerities. All are not called to such things, although for all mortification in some degree is necessary. They are only for those who are enabled to endure them by the special grace of God. Yet though not, to the extent carried by these Oriental anchorets and Fathers, necessary for salvation in the case of all men, they are well pleasing to God, and are never wholly wanting in those who aspire to the highest degree of merit, and make it the business of their lives to live and labor only for Christian perfection. To inherit eternal life we have only to keep the commandments, but if we would be perfect we must sell what we have, and give to the poor, and follow Christ, and follow him, too, in the way of the cross, and share with him his passion.

Simple nature, no doubt, recoils from these austerities, for nature is unequal to them, save as elevated and assisted by grace, and can see in them only her own crucifixion. They cannot be performed unless inspired by the Holy Ghost, by a supernatural love; and they are supernatural in their principle and character. No man can endure them unless sustained by a supernatural strength, or

safely attempt them without a supernatural sympathy with the passion of our Lord, and a supernatural longing to bear with him his cross. This is wherefore the men and women of the world are unequal to them, wherefore they have no ability to appreciate them, and wherefore they are repelled and even disgusted by them. They have no vocation to them. They love their own ease, the ease of the body, the gratification of their tastes, the satisfaction of their appetites. In them the flesh predominates, and they deem its mortification a calamity, as something to be avoided and guarded against. Their minds are worldly and their hearts are set on vanities and lies. To them these old Fathers, these glorious old saints,—who lived only for heaven, and were ambitious only to immolate themselves with Christ, their dear Lord and Master, on his cross,—seem to have missed the purpose of life, and to have thrown away their lives. They almost regard them as criminal, as guilty of a sort of moral suicide, in refusing to enjoy the good things of this world, and in seeking to mortify all their senses. At least they esteem them to be fools, ignorant of the liberality and indulgence of our good Father, and ungrateful in turning their backs upon the riches with which he has filled the earth, and the profusion of beauty with which he has adorned it. See how the bird carols, the flower blooms, the butterfly expands its golden wings, and all nature decks herself in beautiful apparel, and steps forth blithesome and glad, as if enjoying one perennial holiday. Why not imitate her, and enjoy, with a glad heart, the good things a bountiful Father with a liberal hand provides us? Can he envy us our happiness? Can he send us joy, and be angry with us if we indulge it?

So think and so reason the men and women of this world, all in the dark as to the hidden joy of the saints amid their greatest austerities, and the secret fulness of their souls when suffering the greatest hunger and thirst. They know not, cannot conceive, that the life of these great servants of God is as happy a life as it is possible for us to live this side of heaven, away from our home. What were the sufferings of St. Mary of Egypt, during her long years of solitude and penance, compared with those she endured as the miserable daughter of pleasure, or what was the pleasure of her gay and sensual life com-

pared with the serene peace and pure joy she experienced in her sweet communion with her heavenly Spouse in the desert? But let us not speak of sinful pleasures. Take what is called an honest secular life, a life which brings with it no pain of neglected duties, no memory of wrongs done, no bitter remorse of conscience, but a life that consists in collecting and enjoying, in moderation, if you will, the good things of this world, and it is far enough from being a happy life. Our Lord said, that whoever forsakes all for him shall receive a hundred-fold in this world, and everlasting life in the world to come; and his words are true. There is nothing solid, nothing durable, even in innocent sensual enjoyment, and do our best we can only stifle, never satisfy, the deep spiritual wants of our souls with sensible goods, in whatever abundance we possess them, or with whatever prudence, moderation, or taste we may partake of them. They always leave us empty and unsatisfied. The people whom we generally regard as favored, and as leading a very happy and enviable life, are, for the most part, deserving of our commiseration. On the simple score of happiness or real enjoyment, there can be no doubt that the religious life is far preferable, and that the most austere and mortified monk or anchoret enjoys a hundred-fold more than the least unhappy of seculars, living a strictly secular life.

This, no doubt, sounds to our age like folly or enthusiasm, but the reason is, that we have to a great extent lost the sense of the supernatural, and have come to live as if a natural life, natural goods, and a natural beatitude were all that Christianity proposes, requires, or counsels. The tendency of our age, perhaps, in a greater or less degree, of every age, is to exclude God, and to fall back on nature. Man and nature take the place of God and heaven. The strength of man comes from himself, and the end of man is to produce, accumulate, and enjoy the good things of this world. We conceive of, we relish, none but sensible good. All labor *not* for the meat that perisheth is regarded as so much labor thrown away. We have given ourselves up, heart and soul, to this world. We have become immensely active, terribly energetic; we cover the ocean with our ships, we bring to light the treasures hid in the bowels of the earth; we make the winds our servants and the lightnings our messengers, and annihilate time and distance by

our inventions. The whole world is laid under contribution, and the sea and the land, the air and the light, are forced to own man for their master, and to wear his livery. The hammer of industry rings from morning till night, till far into the night. Every nerve is strung, every sinew is stretched, every wit is racked, to invent, to produce, to multiply and bring to our doors the arts and appliances of a worldly and luxurious life; and we boast of this as the evidence of the marvellous progressiveness of our race, in these our days. In the more advanced nations, at least those who call themselves the more advanced, like Great Britain and the United States, poverty is regarded, not as a blessing, not as endearing us to Him who for our sakes became poor, but as a crime, and is actually punished as such. Your Union Work-houses and your poor-houses are veritable prisons, where you punish men and women for the heinous crime of being poor, and in need of help from others to keep their soul and body together. Wealth is respectability, is virtue, and, if combined with polished manners, kind feelings, and good taste, is heroic sanctity. Christianity is effete, the Church is a rickety old building, which encumbers the site wanted for a cotton-mill, a woollen-factory, a warehouse, a ship-yard, a canal-basin, or a railroad-station, and if now and then propped up and preserved, it is only as affording a respectable shelter for gentlemen's younger sons, or such as lack the talent and energy to get on in the world; the Christian virtues are out of date, — are not compatible with the spirit of the age; hell is laughed at as are the bugbears with which our nurses frightened us in our infancy; the Devil is a philanthropic old gentleman, who has the real interests of mankind at heart, and has been greatly belied and traduced for his love to man, and his disinterested efforts to emancipate him from the spiritual bondage in which he is held by the priesthood, and to teach him to rely on himself, to be independent, a free man, abounding in lofty, manly virtue; heaven is the refuge of disappointed love, or of silly old women who take to piety instead of tea and gossip, and is worthy of the thought or aspiration of a wise man only as it comes in this world in the shape of a ball or a rout, an abundant crop of corn, cotton, or tobacco, a heavy freight, a rich cargo, a rapid sale at a high advance, or a fat dividend.

When our travellers visit Catholic countries, they are shocked at the number and splendor of the Churches, at the multitude of priests and religious, at the fondness for church-going, the idleness and want of thrift among the people. Compare England or the United States with Italy, what a difference! In the former all is life, energy, activity; every man is employed, is hard at work in some branch of profitable industry, changing the whole face of things; in the latter all is slow, listless, idle, unthrifty. Years roll round and bring no change, no advance in wealth. The peasant, give him his *polenta*, his church, and his Madonna, is contented to live and die a peasant, as did his father and his father's father. Mark the difference between the lazy Spaniard and the energetic Anglo-Saxon. For three hundred years had the former possessed California, and suffered its golden riches to lie concealed in the sands; the latter has hardly possession of it a single year before its mines are discovered, and a new spring is given to the commerce and industry of the world. Protestantism is the religion of thrift, the religion for men who will be men, and live and die men — of the world. You can tell by the very smell, so some enlightened non-Catholic travellers have said, when you have passed from a Protestant to a Catholic Canton. Industry, cleanliness, and thrift mark the Protestant Canton; idleness, shiftlessness, dirt, and filth characterize the Catholic. All praise to the glorious Reformers, therefore, who made war on the Beast, and down with the Pope! What a blight upon mankind must be the Popish religion! How must every philanthropic soul sympathize with the Leahys, the Sparrys, the Brownlees, the Dowlings, the Maria Monks, the Giustinianis, the Achillis, and the Gavazzis, who so generously step forward and labor to deliver mankind from its withering influence!

There is nothing strange in all this. If they have called the master of the house Beelzebub, how much more those of his household? What was the grand objection of the old carnal Jews to our Lord, and why did they reject him? They had become carnal, and understood the promise of a Messiah in a carnal sense. They expected a temporal prince, who would bring with him temporal prosperity; in other words, they held the kingdom he was to set up would be a worldly kingdom, and secure for its subjects all con-

ceivable worldly greatness, prosperity, and felicity. When, then, our Lord came, not in the pomp of an earth-born grandeur, not as a temporal prince, using his supernatural power to establish a universal temporal kingdom, and to secure to his subjects an abundance of all conceivable sensible goods, and enable them to enjoy them in peace, each sitting under his own vine and fig-tree, with none to molest or to make him afraid, but as the poor carpenter's son, in the form of a servant, pronouncing a woe upon the rich and a blessing upon the poor, denouncing pride and commanding humility, enjoining a life of self-denial, of detachment from the world, trampling upon all earthly greatness, and teaching men to live and labor, not for the temporal and the sensible, but for the eternal and the spiritual, to wean their affections from all that perisheth, and to aspire only to gain, through tribulation and sorrow, a heaven after death, — a reward glorious indeed, but distant and invisible, — they saw in him no beauty or comeliness that they should desire him, and they rejected him in their wrath, and in their fury cried out, "Crucify him! Crucify him!" So is it now. The men and women of the world ask for a temporal religion, a religion that gives them worldly respectability, that fills their coffers, that saves them from poverty and want, multiplies for them sensible goods, renders labor superfluous, and gives to every one a complete satisfaction for all his natural appetites and passions; in one word, that secures a sensible or material heaven on earth for all worldly and sensual men. Such a religion all the world knows the Catholic religion is not. She is spiritual, and esteems only spiritual goods. She pampers no appetite. She is complacent to no natural passion; and affords no encouragement to those who crave only a life of sensual enjoyment. She is true to the letter and the spirit of her heavenly Spouse, and bids us treat as matters unworthy of serious thought all those things after which the heathen seek. The poor are her jewels, and white-robed virgins, who have renounced the world and its pomps, her diadem. She enjoins what the world hates. She denounces what the world loves. She feels a thrill of maternal joy through her whole heart when her children give themselves up to the great work of laying up for themselves treasures in heaven, but looks sad and sorrowful when she sees them wedded to the world, and devoted

to the accumulation of mere earthly treasures, or simple material goods, which distract the mind, withdraw the heart from God and heaven, and are as empty and as desolating for the soul as the east wind. She is intent on the well-being and final salvation of the soul, and does not worship thrift as a god, or honor it as the first of virtues. Therefore carnal men and women cannot endure her; therefore they condemn her as a superstition, denounce her as unfriendly to the industry, prosperity, and wealth of nations, and seek with the fierce old carnal Jews to destroy her from the face of the earth.

This carnal Judaism which breaks out upon us in all the sects, and in all classes of modern reformers and philanthropists, is not without some influence even upon Catholics. Amongst ourselves there are not a few who dream of a heaven on earth, and think the kingdom of Christ ought to be, if it is not, a temporal kingdom set up for the temporal prosperity and enjoyment of mankind. These follow Christ for the loaves and fishes, and have very little sympathy with Oriental asceticism. They can see no use in the contemplative life, and are inclined to regard the contemplative orders as a nuisance. They think it was very wrong for Mary to sit at the feet of Jesus and feast her soul on the gracious words which fell from his lips, while she left to Martha all the cares of the household. She ought to have foregone that pleasure, and performed her share of the household duties. The only religious orders they can tolerate are the active orders. Martha, not Mary, is supposed to have chosen the better part. The Sisters of Charity they can endure, for these, in part at least, devote themselves to the corporal works of mercy; but the orders whose duty it is to pray, to give themselves up to contemplation, to intimate communion with God, they regard at best as only so many lazy drones, who contribute nothing to the general well-being of society, and are simply a burden upon its industry. We ourselves are more or less affected by the spirit of the age, and in our hearts, if not in our words, half consent to the non-Catholic horror of Catholic asceticism.

All this comes from forgetfulness of the fact that our destiny is supernatural, and our heaven is neither from this world nor in this world, and also from a forgetfulness of the fact that we live, not under the natural, but the super-

natural providence of God. We are apt to imagine, not only that our good lies in the natural order, but that it is attainable, when attainable at all, by the exertion of our own unassisted natural forces, — two capital mistakes. It is under the influence of these two mistakes that Mr. Wallis, in the work reviewed in the preceding article, applauds the Duke of Victory and his government for the suppression of the religious houses of Spain, and the confiscation of their goods. He could see no useful purpose answered by the religious of either sex, and their revenues seemed to him so much withdrawn from the revenues of the country. The whole monastic system seemed to him at war with sound notions of politics and political economy, and therefore wrong, and deserving to be abolished, without delay and without reserve. This conclusion evidently supposes, as its major term, that whatever is opposed to sound notions of politics and political economy is *ipso facto* wrong. Which, unless we choose to quibble on the word *sound*, assumes the state and political economy to be the highest law, or that to which all must conform under pain of being condemned as vicious. But this is not admissible, for the end of man is not the state, nor the production, distribution, and consumption of wealth. Mr. Wallis is a lawyer, and will therefore understand us if we simply demur to his charge; for, if true, it alleges no offence, since it is in violation of no law. His whole reasoning is from a false major, the grossest fault, we need hardly tell him, of which a logician can be guilty. Religion is not under law, bound to conform to any law, for it is itself law, and the supreme law, to which all else is bound to conform. Asceticism or monasticism is not amenable to politics or political economy, but they are themselves amenable to the law which it seeks to fulfil.

In the preceding article, however, we have shown that, even under an economical point of view, monasticism is not unprofitable, and that the state suffers whenever it is abolished; for the monks were not, as commonly taken for granted, idle drones, consuming without producing, but were, even in the sense of the economists, an eminently productive class. The grants made by states and individuals to monasteries and religious houses from time to time never, in any age or country, bore any proportion to the amount drawn from them for the support of the poor,



and to supply the wants or the demands of government. They created their own wealth, and their former rich possessions, so coveted by seculars, were the produce of the labor of their own hands. They were active, industrious, and they produced much and consumed little. But this view of the subject has been sufficiently presented by able modern authors, and it is now admitted by all, except a few who are behind the learning of the times, and who call their darkness light, and their gyrations around the same centre progress. There is another point of view, which, even conceding, as we do not, Mr. Wallis's major, shows his conclusion is untenable, and a point of view from which, we presume, it has never occurred to him to consider it.

In all the reasoning of our politicians and economists, we may remark, no account is made of God's gracious providence. States and empires have arisen, have become wealthy and powerful without Christianity, but they have all fallen; not one of the great civilized states and empires that flourished when our Lord tabernacled in the flesh is now standing, and the world knows them now only from the massive ruins they have left behind them, the page of the chronicler, or the song of the bard. Wherefore have they fell? Simply because they forgot God, and put their trust in their own wisdom and strength. It is idle to attempt to explain, with Volney, the rise and fall of empires on natural principles alone. 'The wicked flourisheth like a green bay-tree, for a time, but he passes away, and his place is not to be found. Yet you can assign no strictly natural reason which alone explains why he flourished for so long a time, or why he ceased to flourish at the moment he did. There are times when a nation is invincible, and times when, although its natural resources are greater, its armies more numerous and better disciplined, nothing can save it. All experience proves that the race is not always to the swift, nor the battle to the strong. "There is a Divinity that shapes our ends, rough-hew them how we will." There is, therefore, no greater mistake conceivable, than to make, in our philosophizing on the temporal as well as spiritual well-being of nations or of individuals, no account of the action of Divine Providence, and to seek to explain all by simple natural causes. God raises up whom he will, and whom he will he casts down.

What *natural* relation of cause and effect was there between the prayers, the fasting, and the penance in sackcloth and ashes of the Ninevites, and their deliverance from the awful judgments denounced against them by the prophet Jonas? Yet they were its condition. Could they have been its condition if God, as a free providence, that is, as a supernatural providence, did not interfere in the affairs of men and nations? "Elias was a man passible like unto us; and with prayer he prayed that it might not rain upon the earth; and it rained not for three years and six months. And he prayed again, and heaven gave rain, and the earth yielded her fruit." Surely, then, God intervenes supernaturally even in temporals, and that, too, which is directly to our purpose, in answer to prayer; and in vain, then, would we explain the ruin or the prosperity of nations without taking into the account his supernatural providence, and the prayers of the saints which ascend as sweet incense before his throne.

He, then, who prays is no idle drone in the state, and may be regarded as contributing more to its prosperity and defence than he who ploughs or he who fights. If, then, we consider the contemplative orders in their relation with the gracious providence of God, we shall find that, so far from weakening the state, from lessening its resources, and consuming the fruits of its industry in idleness and sloth, they constitute its main support, and are the best pledge we can have of its strength and prosperity. God governs the world in reference to his saints, whom he loves and delights to honor, — his saints whom he has redeemed, and who are members, through his sacred flesh, taken from the womb of the Virgin, of his body, and intimately united with him, their Head, by a living union. Remember Sodom, and the intercession of Abraham for its preservation. If there had been ten just persons found among her inhabitants, for the sake of them she had been spared. We despise the contemplative orders, and count all lost not engaged in active industry, because we forget that God counts for something in human affairs; because we forget that he loves and honors his saints, and that he is flexible to their prayers. A cold and stern fatalism, or a lax and enervating Epicureanism, has taken possession of our minds. Many use the word Providence only as a respectable name for fate, and fancy that God, because im-

mutable, is not free; that he is so bound by the laws of nature that he cannot interpose in human affairs, except through and in virtue of those laws, — the real fatalism of the old Stoics. Others, again, run away with the notion, that God has created the world, launched it into space, and left it to go ahead on its own hook, taking no further care of it, — the foolish imagination of the old Epicureans. There is nothing new under the sun, and error, in all her endless variety, does but repeat herself. God holds the reins of empire in his own hands, and is as free to interpose for a creature as he was to create him from nothing, according to the type he saw in his own mind. He has never abandoned any thing he has made. He loveth all the things he hath created, and his tender mercies are over all the works of his hand. Even when we sinned, transgressed his law, forsook him to follow the devices of our own hearts, he did not forsake us, nor leave us to perish of our own folly. He sent his Son to redeem us. His care extendeth over all. Not a sparrow falls to the ground without his notice, and the very hairs of our head are numbered. In vain, then, would we pretend either that he cannot or will not interpose in our affairs, or that we depend on nature and not on his free gracious providence for whatever good we do or can receive.

With this view of the subject, these old saints who retired to the deserts to pray, to fast, and to spend their lives in penitential works, did not abandon their country, or fail to perform their duty to their brethren. Even in view of this world, the contemplative orders should rank as the very best public servants, and perhaps we should regard it as one of the heaviest calamities of our times that they find, now-a-days, so little encouragement, and that so few have vocations to enter them. Nothing better evinces the healthy state of Christianity in a community than the number of religious vocations, and the most discouraging thing we discover in our own country is the comparatively small number of vocations, not only to a religious life, but even to the priesthood. Catholicity owes its principal increase here to the immense emigration, for the last few years, from foreign countries, chiefly from Ireland and Germany. The emigrants mostly leave home for the sake of bettering their temporal condition, and come here rather to provide a home for themselves and children than to diffuse or to en-

joy their faith. Religion is not the moving cause of their emigration, and it is perfectly natural that, on entering this New World, the temporal rather than the spiritual should have the ascendancy in their thoughts. The spirit of the country is also worldly, unspiritual, material, if we may so speak, and the inducements to worldly enterprise are, in general, too strong and too advantageous to be withstood. Hence the world gains too great an empire over the great mass of our Catholics, and our children grow up with their minds and hearts bent on distinction in secular life, which is a grave obstacle to the operations of Divine grace. The laity emigrate without their clergy, and it is impossible for our bishops to provide for all their spiritual wants, and hence, again, many become cold and indifferent, and almost forget their religion. Many neglect the practice of their religion, and some few apostatize, while large numbers of the children grow up without any religion. These are discouragements, for when the time has come for the conversion of a people, and God visits them to reconcile them to himself, we may always count on numerous vocations to the priesthood, and also to the monastic life. The fields here are white already to the harvest, but the laborers are few, and we must pray that the Lord will multiply their numbers. If we were less worldly, if we had more of the spirit which led St. Anthony into the desert of Thebais, we should thus pray, and our prayers would be answered.

We find it hard to believe in the reconversion of England, and yet we cannot but hope for her return to Catholic unity, for we see in her numerous vocations to the religious life. We are struck with the wonderful increase of monastic institutions and religious congregations throughout her borders. These institutions and congregations are a good sign. These devout men and women who join prayer to labor must draw down a blessing upon the land, and perhaps avert the curse that hangs over it. Happy is it for every country when its sons and daughters turn their backs upon the world, and consecrate their youth, their beauty, their virgin souls, to God, and live and labor only to commend themselves to their heavenly Spouse! The day of redemption for that country draweth nigh. A monastery or convent in it is a strong garrison in the heart of the enemy's country, which Satan cannot easily expel. In our own country religious houses, indeed, increase, but

they are comparatively few. O, how we long to see these pious retreats, these houses of prayer and praise, multiply, till every town and village in the land is blest with one of them, so that in every neighborhood holy men and women shall unceasingly offer up their prayers for the salvation of our countrymen!

ART. VI. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *The Life of General Pierce.* By NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE. Boston : Ticknor, Reed, & Fields. 1852. 12mo. pp. 144.

LIKE every thing from Hawthorne's pen, this work is beautiful, and its value is enhanced by its being a tribute of affection from an old friend to a college companion. It was doubtless intended to aid the election of General Pierce to the Presidency, but it is free from the cant, the vulgar appeals, and, in a great measure, from the exaggerations, common to most electioneering documents, and may be read without disgust, even with pleasure, now that the election is over.

We had some years since, when he was in the Senate of the United States, the honor of General Pierce's acquaintance, and we have no need to say that we had personally a high regard for him. His disposition was genial and affectionate; his manners frank, cordial, and winning; and we looked upon him as an honest and straightforward politician, at least as much so as in these times can be reasonably expected. Since then, he has grown older as well as we, and he has doubtless changed some, and we have certainly changed much. We were then in most respects of his political party, and on most political and economical questions agreed with him. How far we agree or do not agree with him now, we are unable to say; but certainly we shall always think of him with affection, for the sake of old associations, and speak of him with respect, for the sake of the high office he now fills.

We did not in the late election vote against General Pierce, nor did we vote for him. We did not like the party opposed to him, and we lacked confidence in the party of which he was the candidate. Personally, and as a journalist, we take little part in politics, save so far as they have a bearing on the great questions of religion and morality. There are individuals in both the Whig party and the Democratic with whom we perfectly sympathize, but the controlling body of each party is infected with political doctrines which we regard as unsound and dangerous. There is no party in the country which we find ourselves able to approve, and whenever we vote we feel that it is only a choice between evils. No party adheres to the Constitution, and if any one professes some little respect for it, it is only as it for the moment favors its purposes, or as it understands it. We heartily approve the form of government established for us by our

fathers, but we most heartily disapprove of the wild and anarchical doctrines which are held by the great mass of all our parties, and in the light, or rather darkness, of which our institutions are interpreted. We are a republican, but no democrat; we want no king, and we detest the rule of the mob. We cannot worship the people as God, nor recognize their simple will as law. We are, and as long as we live we will be, a free man, and therefore do and must oppose all government of mere will, whether the will of the democracy, of the aristocracy, or of the monarch. We have studied the science of government too long, and love freedom too much, to confound the liberty of the people, taken collectively, to govern, with the liberty of the people, as individuals, to possess. The worst of all tyrannies, in our judgment, is that which sacrifices individual dignity, freedom, and independence to the arbitrary will of the majority, whether the sacrifice be enforced by positive law, or only by fear of standing alone, or of suffering in purse, station, or reputation, if we act from principle, according to our own convictions. There is no doubt a tendency amongst us to push individual liberty to a dangerous extreme, to absolute no-governmentism; but this tendency is confined to the few, and the real danger is that of merging the individual in the mass, and losing all personal freedom, independence, and dignity, in the despotism of society. Any one who comprehends the movements of our fanatics, philanthropists, and "Maine Liquor Law" men, wants no argument to prove that this danger is near at hand. The people are the highest power our countrymen acknowledge, and the will of the majority they hold to be supreme law. Nothing is sacred, nothing is above the popular will, and the majority may do whatever they please. We hold all at the mercy of the people, and they, if they choose, can divest us of every right, deny us the freedom of speech, and prohibit the free profession and practice of our religion. Such is the popular democratic doctrine of the country, — a doctrine which claims for the people, as the state, all the arbitrary power claimed by his courtiers for the Oriental despot, and we have no occasion to say that, under the prevalence of such a doctrine, liberty, save for the governing power, is but an empty name.

This purely despotic doctrine, foolishly imagined to be the doctrine of liberty, is adopted by the controlling portion of each of our great political parties, and perhaps by one as fully as by the other. Hence we find it hard to decide which of the two is the less evil. In some respects, and at one time, perhaps the one; in other respects, and at another time, perhaps the other. High-minded and enlightened statesmanship is rarely to be expected from either. The name *Democrat* we do not like, because it misleads the mass of the people as to the true nature of our form of government; we dislike the name *Whig*, for it recalls the canting Covenanters of Scotland, has no meaning for American politicians, and is hallowed by no honorable associations. True, the patriots of seventy-six were sometimes called Whigs, but only accidentally, and we have a sincere respect for the loyalty of those who adhered to the British crown, although, of course, we reserve our gratitude for those who won our independence, and gave us a place — we wish they had given us a name — among the nations of the earth.

The last administration was Whig, and employed no small share of what was revered as the best talent of the country. General Taylor was honest and disposed to do right, but he fell into bad hands. Mr. Fillmore, it is said, was a fair-minded and upright man, but nothing can be said in

favor of his administration. The proper business of the executive was either neglected or grossly mismanaged. The piratical invasions of Cuba, feebly suppressed, and the criminals in all cases suffered, so far as our government was concerned, to escape with impunity; the failure to execute our own laws and to fulfil our treaty obligations to Spain; Austria grossly insulted by sending an agent to treat with her rebellious subjects; Kosuth and suite invited and brought hither, or part of the way hither, in a national vessel, at the national expense; Mr. Webster's famous Hülse-mann Letter, and the probably contemplated "Anglo-Saxon alliance" in favor of Continental conspirators and cut-throats, — stand recorded against the late Whig administration, and cover it with disgrace in the minds of all honorable and fair-minded men. Bad as our present administration may turn out to be, it can hardly be worse, in regard to our foreign relations, than was its predecessor.

Our great objection to the success of the Democratic party and the election of General Pierce was the fear that it would prove to be the success of Young America and the Filibusters. These from the moment of the nomination claimed General Pierce as their candidate, and throughout the whole Presidential canvass his election was advocated, on the ground of his being favorable to "expansive democracy," to the acquisition of new territory from our neighbors, to the annexation of Cuba to the Union, and to the encouragement of the party struggling for liberty throughout the Old World, that is, the radicals, Red Republicans, and assassins, everywhere conspiring against their legitimate sovereigns. So argued in substance Douglas, Soulé, Weller, Clemens, and the whole gang of inferior stump orators, unrebuked and uncontradicted by a single Democratic journal, or prominent Democratic politician in the country. We therefore felt it our duty not to commit ourselves in favor of General Pierce, till we should see in the actual development of his policy justifiable reasons for supporting his administration.

As we expected, General Pierce was elected by a small majority on the popular vote, and by an overwhelming majority in the electoral colleges. In due time came his inauguration and his Inaugural Address, and our worst fears were confirmed. The Inaugural Address was a flimsy production, and hardly rose to the level of the Inaugural Address of James K. Polk, and in doctrine and solid sense fell even below that of General Harrison. It was declamatory, frothy, and lacked dignity and condensation. It was composed after the model of a Fourth of July oration, abounding in unmeaning professions, and breathing the spirit of a demagogue of the first water. It proved very clearly to us that the Filibusters and Young America had got their President, and that "expansive democracy" was solemnly inaugurated as the avowed policy of the government. We tried to be pleased with it, but could not succeed. Its avowed policy, so far as it avowed any peculiar policy, was on almost every point objectionable, and precisely the policy our only formidable commercial and manufacturing rival, we mean Great Britain, must wish us to pursue, and which no American statesman desirous of gaining the commercial and manufacturing preëminence for his own country could for a moment recommend. The essential points of its policy are free trade, insults to Spain and Mexico, and sympathy with the European revolutionists. What else could Great Britain ask of us? A restrictive policy by our government would help ruin her, for we are her largest customers, and she must have our cotton. Unfriendly relations between us and Spain, compelling her to

seek protection of England against our threatened acquisition of Cuba, would enable the English government to keep up its influence in Spanish affairs : and the dread of our aggressions on her territory would keep Mexico alienated from us, and give to our great rival the monopoly of her trade. As far as we can understand the subject, the President's proposed policy, unintentionally on his part, we doubt not, would make us the tool of England, and prolong our colonial dependence, which, notwithstanding our boasts, we have never yet wholly shaken off.

The principal appointments by the President seem to us to confirm our fears as to his policy. The ablest members of his Cabinet are Expansive Democrats, and Annexationists. His first choice of Minister for the important mission to Central America was the very objectionable Mr. Slidel, the partner of Sigour, the owner of the *Pampero*, which landed Lopez and his piratical crew in Cuba. The Minister selected for the very delicate Spanish mission is Pierre Soulé, a radical, a revolutionist, banished from France for his revolutionary practices, the confidant of the American Filibusters and the leaders of the revolutionary party in both Spain and Cuba, and who seems to have been selected solely on the ground of his peculiar fitness to pick a quarrel with the Spanish government, and to gain us a pretext for seizing and holding possession of the Queen of the Antilles. Even in domestic matters, where we had no distrust of him, his appointments only excite our apprehensions. His Cabinet contains at least one Woolly-head, and complaints are heard, that to have been an active Free-Soil Democrat is no bar to executive favor.

We do not suppose the President will adopt Kossuth's doctrine of non-intervention, that is, of intervention, and grant "material aid" to the foreign conspirators and cut-throats; but, if we understand his address, all the moral and diplomatic force of the government is to be exerted in their favor, and full liberty is to be granted them to concert their measures here, and to collect from the voluntary contributions of our citizens the means of carrying them out. It is not probable that any direct encouragement will be given to piratical expeditions like that of Lopez against Cuba, but no stone is likely to be left unturned by the administration to get possession in some way of that beautiful island. The President openly avows himself in favor of the policy of annexation, and declares that the interests or the destinies of this country may require the acquisition of territory not now within its jurisdiction. True, he says such territory must not be acquired by any means incompatible with national honor, but this does not reassure us, because we have reason to believe that in his estimation national honor gives ample latitude for the adoption of measures which we should regard as absolutely dishonorable and unjust. Does the President hold that the means by which we acquired Texas, California, and New Mexico were incompatible with national honor? Nobody acquainted with his antecedents will pretend it. It was his own party that acquired them, and he himself performed a part in their acquisition. His disclaimer, therefore, can amount only to this, that he does not propose to acquire the coveted territory by any worse means than purchase, conquest, or theft.

According to the precedents in the case, there are three ways by which we may acquire the territory of our neighbors compatibly with national honor. The first is the way in which we acquired Texas. We may, for instance, stir up the Creoles of Cuba to rebel against their sovereign, induce them to declare themselves an independent state, connive at our citizens giving them aid to maintain their independence, persuade them

to petition for annexation, and then obtain a law of Congress annexing them. This is the way heretofore tried with regard to Cuba, and is what we call getting possession of our neighbors' territory by theft. This method, we presume, will not be tried again just yet. The second way is that in which we acquired California and New Mexico. It is by a series of insults and aggressions to irritate Spain, and force her to acts in maintenance of her rights and dignity which we choose to call a breach of the law of nations, and to make a pretext for sending an armament to take possession of her American colonies. The third method is by purchase. This has been attempted and steadily pursued in regard to Cuba by our government for the last thirty years, and we understand that Mr. Soulé is sent to Spain with the expectation that he will be able to induce Spain to sell it. To acquire territory that is in the market by fair purchase is nothing dishonorable to the purchaser, and if Cuba was offered by Spain for sale, we should think our government very silly not to purchase it, even at a high price. But Cuba is not in the market; Spain has no desire to sell it, and has indignantly refused to listen to any overtures of ours for its purchase. The only condition on which we can hope to induce her to sell it, is that of convincing her that its possession is worthless to her, and must cost her more to defend it against those who are coveting it, and determined to have it, than she can afford in the present state of her finances. Spain, we all know, values highly the island of Cuba, and would on no condition part with it, if suffered to retain peaceable possession of it. But the obstacles to her retaining such possession come solely from us. She has nothing to apprehend from Russia or Austria, and France and Great Britain are ready to enter into a treaty guarantying to her the perpetual possession of the island. None of these powers will attempt to oust her at the expense of a war, not only with her, but with us, which would be inevitable, for we cannot consent that Cuba, if she passes from the hands of Spain, should pass into any other hands than our own. Evidently, then, we are the only power whose aggression she has to fear. In order to induce her to sell the island, we must tell her virtually, Our people have a strong desire to possess Cuba, which leads them to contrive various means for getting possession of it, and it will cost your Catholic Majesty more than it is really worth, and more than you can afford to expend, to defend it against their machinations and piratical invasions. You had better, therefore, sell it to us for a liberal price, for we are willing to buy it and to pay you liberally for it. This is what our government must say, and what it actually is saying, by its proposition to Spain to sell us Cuba, and this, it strikes us, is about as dishonorable as any thing a government can easily be guilty of.

Mr. Soulé, we presume, will not by any reasoning of this sort induce her Catholic Majesty to part with one of the richest jewels of her crown. Honorable persons do not like to trade with a purchaser who begins his negotiation by declaring his determination to render the property he would purchase worthless to its owner if he will not part with it, and that, if he will not sell it, he must expect him to steal it. Mr. Soulé will be obliged, then, to resort to the second way we have indicated. He is, we understand, leagued with the chiefs of the radical party in Spain, and his house at Madrid will be a convenient rendezvous for them, where, under shelter of his rights as foreign minister, they may concoct, out of reach of the police, their measures for reënacting the revolutionary horrors of the last thirty years, from which noble old Spain has suffered so much, and from

the disastrous effects of which she is but just beginning to recover. The Spanish government will not of course put up with this, and may resort to measures to protect herself which we shall hold to be breaches of international law, and which we shall seize upon as a pretext for taking possession of Cuba by force. This, we presume, is the second hope of Mr. Soulé. In addition to this, much with a view to the same result may be done by the journals publishing false and exaggerated accounts of the conduct of the Spanish authorities at Havana, — accounts which, however false and exaggerated they may be, our government will be but too ready to believe, even against all internal probability. It shall go hard, if, with such a Minister as Mr. Soulé in Spain, and such proprietors of steamers touching at Havana as Mr. George Law, aided by the popular sentiment of the country, and by a venal press directed in fact by foreign refugees, we cannot find or make a pretext for attempting to take Cuba by force, and hold it as a conquest.

It is possible, however, that this method will not be successful. Spain herself is far from being as weak as we commonly imagine, and we should have not only her to contend with, but also both England and France. In a just war, on our own territory, we should have no reason to fear all the forces that Europe combined could bring against us ; but in an aggressive war, carried on by sea or at a distance from our own coasts, we should find these three powers rather more than our match. If this method, therefore, fails, it is very likely that the Filibusters, who appear to be quiet just now, waiting the result of Mr. Soulé's mission to Spain, will be suffered to renew their attempts, and, failing to get Cuba by purchase or by conquest, we shall renew our attempts to get it by theft.

It is singular that we cannot respect the property of our neighbors. We have land enough and to spare, more territory than we can fill up in twenty generations, and yet we covet more, and are unwilling that our neighbor should own and cultivate even a garden-patch adjoining our huge farm in peace and tranquillity. What madness possesses us, that we cannot deal even generously with Mexico, and, after having stripped her of two thirds of her territory, leave her in quiet occupancy of the remainder ? Why need we violate our good faith, and get up a new quarrel with her about the Mecilla Valley, — a strip of land which we do not need ? Can we never rest till we have blotted out the very existence of our sister republic ? Why can we not respect the rights of Spain to her property, and leave her in quiet possession of Cuba, the small remains of her once vast possessions in the New World, which she was the first to discover and colonize ? We will not defend all in the history of Spain, and we are as sensible to her former faults as are any of our countrymen, but terribly has she suffered for them, and bitter penance is she still doing for them. But Spain is guilty of no fault towards us ; she has made no aggression upon our rights, has offered no insult to our feelings. She respects with a noble loyalty all our rights, and wishes to maintain the most friendly relations with us. She only asks to enjoy her own in peace, and why can we not suffer her to do so ? Why should we even ask her to sell a part of her national domain, and constantly importune her to do so against her known wishes ? We know that she does not wish to sell Cuba, that she wishes to keep it, and that she has a perfect right to keep it. Why not respect her wishes, at least her right ? Must all things needs be venal in this world ? Is there nothing that cannot be bought and sold ? Can we not understand that a nation may have something which it holds too precious to sell, and that it would be in the last degree dishonorable to sell ?

Are all things venal even with us? Would we sell or hold it honorable to sell California to the emperor of Japan, or New York, New Hampshire, or Maryland to the queen of England? And should we not regard a proposition from either to purchase any one of the States of our Union, or any portion of our national domain, and withdraw it from our jurisdiction, as a gross insult? And what would be our resentment against any administration that should dare entertain a proposition to alienate any part of our national territory? And why would a similar proposition made by us to Spain be less an insult to her? And why should the Spanish people feel less resentment to their government for entertaining it?

In our case we should hold it a sufficient answer, that our territory is not in the market, and that our government has no constitutional power to alienate any part of it. Why is not the same answer sufficient in the case of Spain? She has thrown no part of her territory into the market, and her constitution expressly forbids the government to alienate any portion of the national domain. Our twopenny, and even our fourpenny politicians seem to be wonderfully behind the times. They speak of Spain as if they were ignorant that her government is not an absolute, but a constitutional monarchy. Let them know that Spain is a constitutional state, and in her constitution approaches far nearer our model than does that of Great Britain. The government consists of an hereditary monarch, a Senate, and a Congress of Deputies. The Deputies are chosen by popular vote for a term of years, and the Senators are appointed for life. The defect of the Spanish government is that it is too democratic, and the power of the crown too circumscribed. Yet our politicians talk of Spain as if she were the same absolute monarchy she was under Philip the Fifth and Charles the Third, and cry out against her as if her government were a mere despotism. All this would be amusing, if it were not calculated to justify in the minds of our people their hostility towards her. She is a constitutional state, and she cannot sell us Cuba, if she were disposed, without violating her constitution. Does it become us to attempt to force the Spanish government to violate the constitution of the state? What sort of constitutionalists are we, in asking other states to treat their constitutions as so much waste paper?

Nothing is more painful to the enlightened and really patriotic American, than the constant efforts of our demagogues and journalists to excite an ill feeling in our people against Spain. We may say what we will of Spain, and find as much fault as we will with her in the palmy days of her pride and her power, when the sun never set on her empire; but she is still a noble and chivalric nation, and in speaking of her with contempt, we do but betray our own ignorance or our own littleness. If we were wise we should cultivate her friendship, for she is a power with whom we might have honorable and profitable relations. We might save her from her dependence on Great Britain, and make her our fast friend, and, if we did but know it, the true policy of our government is to do so. We should assiduously cultivate the friendship of all those European states and empires which by religion, character, and interest are indisposed to submit to the commercial supremacy claimed by the haughty Island Queen, our own immediate and most formidable rival. Personally, we are neither the enemies nor the special friends of England. We would advocate strict justice in all our intercourse with her, as we would with all other nations, but our natural alliances as a state are with Continental and Southern, no less than Northern Europe. We wish to obliterate the last

vestige of our colonial dependence, and transfer the commercial centre of the world from London to New York; which might easily be done, if we could once feel as we should towards the Southern nations of the Continent, and meet them half-way in our friendship. Spain is a country, though stripped of many of her former possessions, fallen from her former grandeur, and distracted by internal dissensions and revolutions, — encouraged, and to some extent fomented, by England, — of great resources, and retains in her constitution a marvellous recuperative energy. But we see her only through English eyes, and judge of her only with English prejudices. We want no hostility excited against the land of our ancestors, but we do want our countrymen to feel that they have a character, interests, tastes, and an existence of their own. We want to see an end put to the commercial thralldom in which England now holds our own and other nations, by being the centre of the great credit system of the modern world, and to that power which she now has of convulsing when she pleases the Continental nations of Europe, and it is in the power of our government, if it would dare be independent, to do it peaceably and honorably.

The first step towards this, in our judgment, is a good understanding with Spain, and which nothing prevents but our insane desire to possess ourselves of Cuba, and our inability to treat her rights of property with respect. We do wrong to indulge this desire, for nations as well as individuals are forbidden to covet their neighbor's property. We do well enough without the possession of that island, and which, if we insist on obtaining it in any of the ways contemplated, we may be sure will turn out a barren possession, or something worse. But we can bide our time, and ultimately, without any aggressive act on our part, or any thing incompatible with the most delicate national honor, it will, no doubt, fall into our hands. The second step is a wise and generous policy towards Mexico and Central America, and the interposition of our good offices to knit closer the bands of affection between them and Old Spain. These states are not strong enough to excite our fears, and there is no danger of their becoming formidable rivals to us. They have great national resources, and once suffered to organize and maintain such forms of government as they prefer, without any interference on our part, they would become most valuable markets for our manufactures. We have only to give up the silly notion, that nothing is worth any thing unless fashioned after our model, and that all national customs and usages are necessarily bad in proportion as they differ from ours, or those of Great Britain. It should be our study to preserve and assist in their own way those states who have suffered so much from foolishly undertaking to follow our example; not to seize their territory and merge their national existence in our own. We have only to prove ourselves good and obliging neighbors, to find in return good neighbors in them. We have only to cease to covet what is theirs, to be contented with what is our own, and consent to be just, in order to have no cause of complaint against them.

But after all, we fear all remarks of this sort are thrown away. We have gone so far as a people in a wrong direction, we have become so grasping, are so truly Anglo-Saxon in our character, or rather retain in so great vigor all the bad elements of the Anglo-Saxon character, with so few of its better elements, its redeeming traits, that it is hoping against hope to expect much amendment. We are in such a hurry, that we cannot pause to consider the route we are travelling, and we live in the midst of so much bustle and excitement, that the still, small voice of reason can-

not make itself heard. We have ceased to be a thinking people. We have ceased to be a reading people, except of newspapers and railroad literature. He who writes good sense, in sedate language, or addresses himself to reason and conscience, stands no chance of being read, and we are perishing day by day for lack of knowledge. We know no way to arrest the evil. Our only hope is in God and our Catholic community. Even our Catholic population are unsound enough on these matters, but they have a conscience; they have serious and honest intentions, and they are impressible, open to the truth, and ready to seek it and to obey it when they find it. To them we speak with confidence, for they will read and can understand.

2. *Discourses addressed to Mixed Congregations.* By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, Priest of the Oratory of St. Philip Neri. Boston: Donahoe. 1853. 12mo. pp. 283.

IN a foregoing article we have explained ourselves in regard to the subject of Developmentism, and we have nothing to say on it here. Though we hold Dr. Newman's theory of Development as he originally set it forth, and, for aught that appears, still adheres to it, to be unsound and dangerous, we have never doubted the good faith of the author, or his filial love and submissiveness to the Church. Some of his friends, in their blind enthusiasm, cited him when he had hardly crossed the threshold of the Church, and while only a layman, as if he were to be placed above St. Thomas, or St. Augustine, and almost on a par with the Supreme Pontiff himself. This necessarily compelled us to be reserved in our commendation of his virtue and talents; but we have ever regarded him as a man of various and extensive erudition, and, in his way, of extraordinary ability. His mind is analytic rather than synthetic, acute rather than comprehensive, but it is strong and original, and he is unquestionably a man of rare force of character, for he has the power to master and bind to himself almost every individual who comes within the sphere of his personal influence. Such a man is always sure to leave his mark on his age, and in the case of Dr. Newman it will after all be such a mark as no good Catholic will wish time to obliterate.

The *Discourses* here published we are not called upon to commend. The author's name is a higher recommendation with the public than would be the most flattering notice we could write. They are able, eloquent, affectionate, and remarkable for their freshness and originality. They have already been widely circulated and read amongst us, and we hope that the very neat and convenient form in which Mr. Donahoe has republished them will secure them a yet more general circulation and diligent reading. The volume should be in every family library, and is one of those books which a Catholic may safely lend to his candid and inquiring Protestant neighbor. It was the first contribution of its distinguished author to Catholic literature, after he became a Priest of the Oratory, and its superiority over his productions written when his vision was dim, and he was groping his uncertain way, seeking after truth indeed, but seeing it only at intervals and under special aspects, marks well the difference between the splendor of that light which shines within the Church, and the darkness, relieved only here and there by a few scattered rays which she darts beyond her walls, in which even the wisest and best of those who are out

of her pale are enveloped. Great reason has Dr. Newman, as well as the rest of us converts, to thank God, whose mercy has proved rich enough to call him and us within his Church.

3. *Das Primat des Apostolischen Stuhls, vertheidigt und gerechtfertigt von FRANCISKUS PATRITIUS KENRICK, Erzbischofe von Baltimore. Dritte Auflage mit Verbesserungen des Verfassers. Uebersetzt von N. STEINBACHER, S. J. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1853. 8vo. pp. 534.*

WE have not had time to compare this translation with the original, to ascertain its fidelity, or to mark the improvements made in the text by the Archbishop himself; but from our knowledge of the translator, we cannot doubt that it is faithful, and reproduces worthily in German the English work. We are most happy to see this excellent work in a German dress, and trust it will have a wide circulation among our German brethren, not only in the New World, but also in the Old.

4. — Messrs. Dunigan and Brother continue their splendid edition of *The Holy Bible with Haydock's Notes*. We have received the numbers to No. 14, and we wish again to call the attention of our readers to its merits. All who wish the most splendid and valuable edition of the Holy Scriptures ever published in this country, and that too at comparatively a moderate price, should procure this edition. The enterprise of these publishers deserves the liberal patronage of the public.

- 5.—1. *The History of the Life of Our Lord Jesus Christ, from his Incarnation to his Ascension, denoting and incorporating the Words of the Sacred Text from the Vulgate. Also, The History of the Acts of the Apostles, connected, explained, and blended with Reflections.* Translated from the French of FATHER FRANCIS DE LIGNY, S. J., by Mrs. J. SADLIER. 1851. 4to. pp. 749. — 2. *New Lights: or Life in Galway. A Tale.* By Mrs. J. SADLIER. 1853. 32mo. pp. 443. — 3. *The Following of Christ. In Four Books.* By THOMAS A KEMPIS. A new Translation from the original Latin. To which are added Practical Reflections and a Prayer at the end of each Chapter. 1852. 32mo. pp. 607. — 4. *The Graces of Mary: or Instructions and Devotions for the Month of Mary. With Examples, chiefly of Graces recently obtained through Mary's Intercession.* 1853. pp. 504. — 5. *The Life of the Blessed Virgin Mary: or the Lily of Israel.* From the French of the ABBÉ GERBERT. To which is added the Veneration of the Blessed Virgin Mary. 1852. 32mo. pp. 385.

THESE publications are from the enterprising publishers D. & J. Sadlier & Co., New York, Boston, and Montreal, and, whether for their intrinsic excellence or the good taste with which they are got up, are quite creditable to them as Catholic booksellers. The first is a standard work, and above our praise. The translation of the *Life of Our Lord* has been amended, and that of the *History of the Acts of the Apostles* has been made, by Mrs. Sadlier, whose excellent translations from the French are

highly appreciated by the Catholic public. The work is now well translated, and the edition is on good paper, in large and fair type, and handsomely illustrated.

The second work, *New Lights, or Life in Galway*, is an original tale by Mrs. Sadlier, and upon the whole the best and most finished of her powerful and most interesting tales in illustration of Irish history and Irish character. The New Lights are the converts to Protestantism obtained by soup and stir-about, and the story is intended to illustrate what is called the New Reformation in the West of Ireland. The characters are well drawn and clearly marked, and never, save in her rich and varied, and wholly unpretending conversation, have we ever seen Mrs. Sadlier to so great advantage as in the whole plan and conduct of this story. The work is marked by genuine Irish simplicity and archness, love of fun and touching pathos, violent passion and melting tenderness of heart, sweetness of temper, supernatural patience and resignation, strong faith, and ardent piety. Mrs. Sadlier is a true Irishwoman, and has a most wonderful faculty of compelling us, even in spite of ourselves, to love and honor her countrymen and countrywomen. We recommend her book most warmly to all classes of readers, but especially to those who are pretending that Ireland is about to apostatize from the faith. An Irishman is no Irishman when not a Catholic.

The third work, *The Following of Christ*, is a very beautiful edition of a new and really improved translation of a work which is all but inspired writing. The Practical Reflections and Prayer added to each chapter, to many readers will greatly enhance its value.

The fourth work, *The Graces of Mary*, comes highly recommended, and is an excellent work for the devotions of the Month of Mary.

The fifth work, *The Lily of Israel*, is a specimen of that half-romantic and half-sentimental style of writing, which has had, since Chateaubriand, a large number of admirers, especially in France, but which is not much to our taste. Yet they who like it have as good a right to their taste as we have to ours. The book is highly esteemed by many, and we have no doubt that it will win thousands to the love and veneration of Our Lady. We therefore are glad to see an American edition of it, for nothing is more wanted among us than an ardent love and true devotion to Mary, our sweet mother, in heaven.

Messrs. Sadlier & Co. have sent us *Rome and the Abbey*, a book written with a good intent, and by a most excellent lady, but which we have found rather dull reading. So far as it is likely to encourage a tendency to the contemplative life, we esteem it; but we think the author is too restless and has too much romance in her temperament to make a good contemplative herself, without an extraordinary grace. Nevertheless, we see nothing hurtful in her work, and there are, no doubt, many who will find it edifying.

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6. — 1. *Official Report of the United States Expedition to explore the Dead Sea and the River Jordan.* By Lieut. W. F. LYNCH, U. S. N. Published at the National Observatory, Lieut. M. F. MAURY, U. S. N., Superintendent, by Authority of Wm. A. GRAHAM, Secretary of the Navy. Baltimore: Murphy & Co., Printers 4to. pp. 235. With Maps and Geological Plates. — 2. *Catholic Interests in the Nineteenth Century.* By the COUNT DE MONTALEMBERT, Member of the French

Academy. London: Dolman. 1852. 8vo. pp. 136. — 3. *Library of Translations from Select Foreign Literature*. Volume the First. *The power of the Pope during the Middle Ages*. By M. GESSIEN, Director in the Seminary of St. Sulpice, Paris. Translated by the Rev. MATTHEW KELLY, St. Patrick's College, Maynooth. Vol. I. London: Dolman. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1853. 8vo. pp. 312 and xxxvi. — 4. *Die Heilichkeiten Maria's von dem heiligen ALPHONS M. v. LIGUORI, Bischof von St. Agatha und Stifter der Versammlung des Allerheiligsten Erlösers. Aus dem Italienischen übersetzt. Herausgegeben von der Versammlung des Allerheiligsten Erlösers. Erste Amerikanische Ausgabe. Mit Approbation geistlicher Obrigkeit*. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1852. 32mo. pp. 754. — 5. *The Real Presence of the Body and Blood of our Lord Jesus Christ in the Blessed Eucharist, proved from Scripture*. In Eight Lectures, delivered in the English College, Rome, by CARDINAL WISEMAN. From the last London Edition. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1852. 12mo. pp. 312. — 6. *Four Lectures on the Offices and Ceremonies of Holy Week, as performed in the Papal Chapels*. Delivered in Rome in the Lent of 1837. By CARDINAL WISEMAN. First American, from the last London Edition. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1852. 12mo. pp. 204. — 7. *Twelve Lectures on the Connection between Science and Revealed Religion*. Delivered in Rome. By CARDINAL WISEMAN. Fourth Edition. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. London: Dolman. 1852. 2 vols. 16mo. — 8. *Ceremonial: for the Use of the Churches in the United States of America*. Published by Order of the First Council of Baltimore, with the Approbation of the Holy See. To which is prefixed an Explanation of the Ceremonies, extracted from the Works of the late Right Reverend John England, Bishop of Charleston. Second Edition, revised. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1852. 12mo. pp. 350. — 9. *Rituale Romanum Pauli V. Pontificis Maximi jussu editum, atque a felicis Recordationis Benedicto XIV. auctum et castigatum, in quo, quæ parochis ad Administrationem Sacramentorum, Benedictiones, et Corporationes necessaria censentur, accurate sunt posita*. Mechlinæ, P. J. Hanicq. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1851. 32mo. pp. 464.

Messrs. MURPHY & Co. have sent us copies of these works, with some few others, the titles of which we have not room to cite; but we have received them at too late a moment to be able to give them an adequate notice. It is true several of them have long been before the public, and are regarded as standard works, but we wish not only to do what we can to encourage authors, but also booksellers. Lieutenant LYNCH's *Report of the Expedition to explore the Dead Sea and the River Jordan*, will be of great interest to our scientific friends, but we have not had time to examine it, and to ascertain how much it has contributed to our knowledge of the Holy Land, or to science in general. Lieutenant LYNCH, and the officers and men who accompanied him, deserve our gratitude for their noble expedition, and we owe thanks, where we seldom have a chance to give them, to the government for having authorized it.

The second work, *Catholic Interests in the Nineteenth Century*, is a very fair translation of the admirable brochure of M. Montalembert, already noticed with high commendation in our pages, and which we wish everybody would read, not only for its own sake, but for the sake of its noble author. By the way, there are some very good remarks on this pamphlet in the last *Dublin Review*, but we cannot agree with our esteemed contem-

porary in its censure of M. Montalembert for not making common cause with the Legitimists. He has never identified himself with either the elder or the younger branch of the Bourbons, and we can see no reason why he should do it now. France is certainly not republican; she certainly is monarchical, but she is far enough from being Bourbonist, and the fusion of the Legitimists and Orleanists will only make so much more apparent her settled determination to have no more to do with her élite royal family. We must learn not to identify the cause of the Church with that of royalty any more than with that of democracy. The Legitimists of France have not yet learned this salutary lesson, and therefore are not the men for our times. Louis Napoleon does not command all our confidence, but we should be sorry to see him obliged to give way either to the Legitimists or to the Democrats. We wish his government to be stable and permanent. We only wish that the imperial constitution recognized estates, and gave them, not a preponderating, yet a real influence in the government. But as it is we prefer for France the Bonapartists to the Bourbonists, and the imperial to the republican *régence*. We have no sympathy with those who denounce Napoleon the Third, and whatever he does hereafter, we shall continue to defend the *compétence*, as necessary for the salvation of France and the preservation of Europe in society. We are not aware that in this we differ at all from M. Montalembert. He does not oppose the actual government of his country, and he has written his book, not against the empire, but against those Catholics in France and elsewhere, who, having demanded, for the last twenty years, liberty for the sake of the Church, now suddenly desert their colors, and chant the praises of absolute power. In the position he thus assumes, we should feel ourselves dishonored if we did not agree with him. We believe the Church flourishes best where public liberty is maintained, that she is always the first victim of despotism, whether of the one or the many, and therefore we demand freedom, now from the mob, and now from the absolute government, and are satisfied with no government that is above law.

The third work, *The Power of the Pope during the Middle Ages*, by M. Gosselin, makes the first volume of *The Library of Translations of Select Foreign Literature* now in course of publication by Dolman, 61 New Bond Street, London, the English publisher of our Review, and by Murphy & Co., Baltimore. The project of such a library is a good one, and if the works are selected with judgment, and translated with taste and fidelity, it will be of great service to our Catholic literature. The selection of the works is intrusted to a committee, whose names should be a guaranty that it will be made with judgment; but the English translations of Balme's and of Audin's *Life of Henry the Eighth*, offered in the prospectus as specimens, are not, we grant, as good a guaranty of the fidelity and taste with which the translations will be made as we could wish. Still, we commend the project most heartily to our Catholic public, and trust the liberal and enterprising publishers will meet with ample encouragement.

Of Mr. Gosselin's work before us we cannot speak from our own knowledge, for we have not yet read it. The original work is conceded on all hands to be marked by great and profound erudition, and it has been highly commended by admirable judges. It enjoys a very high reputation, and from the little we have dipped into the volume before us we should think not undeservedly. We have seen only the first volume of the work,

and we must await the appearance of the other volume before offering any criticism on it. The theory which the author defends, as to the titles by which the Popes held and exercised their power over temporal sovereigns in the Middle Ages, is neither the Gallican, nor the so-called Ultramontane, but the one broached by Fénelon. It is not precisely the one we have defended, but it is not necessarily incompatible with it. We contend that the Popes held and exercised the power in question by divine right, and yet this does not deny that they also exercised it *juri humano*, because this divine right of the Popes may have been recognized by and incorporated into the public law of the epoch. We are chary in these times of stopping with mere human right, for human right is so exaggerated as to obscure or deny divine right, and because we do not feel that human right, so called, is an adequate basis on which to defend any government whatever, for the law of nature itself is law only by virtue of the eternal law, which is nothing but the will or reason of God commanding the order of nature to be observed and forbidding it to be disturbed. Man has only a delegated sovereignty, and therefore no rights which he holds in his own name. We wish this great truth in our age, when nature and humanity are put in the place of God, to be distinctly brought out and earnestly insisted on, otherwise we see no way of directly combating the grand heresy of the times. What it seems to us most important to insist on now is, not that the Popes held their power by the concessions of kings and the assent of the people, but by divine right. It is not the human right, which in itself alone can command no respect, but the divine right, which all who have any religion must respect, that it is necessary to assert; for it is necessary to strengthen, not to weaken, the Papacy in the face of the temporal power, if we mean to maintain civil freedom and secure the blessings of social order. For ourselves, we are far less intent on vindicating the Papacy from the charges preferred against it by infidels, heretics, and schismatics, than we are on securing for it the deep love and veneration of the faithful, to a terrible extent alienated from it by the prevalence of an ultra-Gallicanism. We hold that all society, properly so called, rests on the Church, and the Church on Peter, and that both are endangered just in proportion as we weaken the power or diminish the splendor of the Papacy in the minds or hearts of the faithful. M. Gosselin's theory, as we understand it, is objectionable mainly in the sense that it is defective, and does not rise high enough, — not so much in what it asserts, as in what it does not assert. However, his work is, we presume, undeniably a great work, and as such deserving of very high respect.

The German work, *Die Herrlichkeiten Maria's*, is the well-known work of St. Alphonsus, *The Glories of Maria*, translated from the Italian into German. The translation, as far as we have examined it, appears to be exceedingly well made, and to preserve all the unction of the original.

The works of Cardinal Wiseman need no commendation from us. There is no writer in our language whose productions we read with so much pleasure and satisfaction as those of this eminent prince of the Church. We can find writers of greater metaphysical depth, and of more scholastic precision and exactness of expression, but none whose learning is more exhaustive, or whose pages are more luminous. His language is rich and flowing, his illustrations are numerous and felicitous, and his arguments clear, convincing, and persuasive. He glides into our hearts, and carries us along with him without any power or will on our part to resist him; while his piety, his devotion, his unction, which remind us of Fénelon,

and a greater than Fénelon, St. Francis of Sales, calm our passions, and enable us to rise from his pages, not only enlightened, but cheered in all our better feelings, as when we rise from the perusal of one of the old Fathers. He seems to us to be the man for England in our times, and his appeal to the English public in defence of the action of the Holy Father in reëstablishing the Catholic hierarchy in England was one of the most noble, dignified, and manly documents that we ever read from an English prelate, and proved that, however mild and conciliatory his manners or his policy, he could, if need were, follow with joy the example of the great St. Thomas of Canterbury in the assertion and vindication of the rights of the Church.

The *Lectures on the Real Presence, proved from Scripture*, are one of the best Scriptural arguments we have ever read, and leave nothing to be desired. We read them before we were a Catholic, and found them persuasive and unanswerable. The *Lectures on the Offices and Ceremonies of Holy Week*, as performed in the Papal chapels at Rome, although they have been republished in several of our Catholic journals, we have not yet read. We have only hastily glanced through them, but they bear the marks of the originality, freshness, and power so visible in all the productions of their illustrious author. The *Lectures on the Connection between Science and Revealed Religion*, we have read with great care. They are learned, elegant, and clearly and convincingly prove that the results obtained by modern science, instead of militating against revealed religion, as our *armis-fidei* allege, tend, as far as they go, to confirm it. This is much, and even more, than the modern apologist for Christianity is obliged to do. Still, having ourselves so little confidence in the "Inductive Sciences," as they are called, and regarding them as at best only probable hypotheses, we do not place so high a value on this work as we do on the other works of his Eminence. We have a great fondness for the study of philology, but we do not think any thing has as yet been established by our philologists with sufficient certainty to form the basis of an induction favorable or unfavorable to revealed religion. In natural history most assuredly nothing has been established, and never will be, incompatible with revealed religion, but the various hypotheses invented to explain its observed phenomena we look upon as worth very little, and many of these phenomena which science attempts to explain, and assumes as the basis of its inductions, we do not believe to be explicable on any natural principles. We greatly believe God has made of one blood all the nations of men, but we do not believe that there are any known or even unknown natural principles on which the varieties of race and color which we now discover can be explained. We do not believe that white men ever naturally develop into negroes, or negroes into white men. In our judgment, the supernatural interposition of God counts for more than our modern savants are willing to allow. We live under a supernatural providence, and why should we seek to explain all on the principles of a natural providence, and thus to deprive ourselves of the evidences of a supernatural providence? Geologists attempt to prove from their pretended science, that the Mosaic account of the creation cannot be true, but Fournier proves that, conceding all they have established, they have rather confirmed that account. In this he is certainly right, but we have very little respect for the so-called science of geology, which in our judgment is no science, but a mass of hypotheses piled upon hypotheses. We do not dispute the facts the geologists adduce, but we do not acknowledge

our obligation to accept any one of their thousand and one hypotheses using even to account for them, although we do not deny them. In a word, what is called modern science seems to us the most unreal of all the unrealities of our most unreal age, and we have little patience to follow it in its perpetual changes. We deny, in the very outset, that it is possible to found science on induction, for induction at best can give only probability. We recognize science only where the reasoning rests upon apodictic principles. Hence we answer those who attempt to controvert our religion from their pretended science, Gentlemen, your science is quite too uncertain an affair to warrant any conclusion from it against revelation, and therefore we refuse to entertain any objections founded on it which you may take it into your heads to adduce; our faith reposes on a higher certainty than your science. Yet let it not be inferred that we think little of these admirable Lectures of Cardinal Wiseman. They are well adapted to remove the obstacles to belief in revelation, which are felt by a large class of minds. And though they touch no difficulty we ever felt, even in the dark days of our unbelief, we hold them very important under more than one point of view, and highly serviceable in our day and generation to the cause of truth. This is enough. It is time to provide for the wants of to-day; God will raise up men to provide for the wants of to-morrow.

The other works cited need no comment. Along with them Messrs. Murphy & Co. have sent us a *Catechism of Scripture History*, revised by Dr. McKim, lately of Maynooth, for the use of schools; a translation of St. Ignace's work on *The Religious State*, a treatise on *General Confession*, *The Rosary*, and that excellent little prayer-book, the best of its size we are acquainted with, called *Hymns of Devotion*. They have also sent us another copy of *The Sparrow*, perhaps in the hope of inducing us to modify the judgment we expressed of it in our last Review. But we have seen no reason to change our view of that work, and those who admire it would perhaps be less pleased with any second notice we might write of it if in the y were with the first. For the author of *The Sparrow* we have a high personal esteem and affection, and we would not wantonly wound his feelings, but a critical study to be impartial and just. We may of course err in our critical judgments, but can never knowingly be wilfully unjust. We will say, however, that though we indicated in the mildest manner in our power the faults we detected in *The Sparrow*, we might have added that it has also very considerable merits, contains some scenes and passages of great beauty and power, and that upon the whole it has a tendency to encourage Catholics to an open and manly profession of their religion. It was never our intention to deny it all merit, or to discourage those who find it to their taste from reading it. Compared with works of fiction as they go, it is no doubt commendable, but compared with what to our judgment a historical novel should be, we find it very defective, and such as we cannot rank very high.

7. *The Touchstone of Character*. Translated from the French of the Abbe F. F. Chassigny. New York, Cozans, 1853. 12mo. pp 357.

This is decidedly one of the best books that has recently issued from the American press, and we thank the author, the translator, and the

publisher for giving us so excellent a work. The only fear we have in regard to it is that people will not read it as generally as we wish. It is written with great eloquence and brilliancy of style, is exceedingly interesting, and withal truly profound. Those who would measure the value of the sentimental morality of Rousseau and George Sand should procure and study it; and so should all who would understand the conditions of love and marriage and the enjoyment of real freedom of the affections.

8. *Alban, or the History of a Young Puritan.* By J. V. HUNTINGTON. A New and Revised Edition. New York: Redfield. 1853. 2 vols. 18mo.

Dr. HUNTINGTON has omitted several of the passages which in his first edition had been objected to as offensive to modesty, and otherwise revised the work, but without detracting any thing from its raciness or its interest. There is no question that *Alban* is a work of ability, perhaps we should say genius, and it has many beautiful and touching scenes, and much fine description. We wish we could commend it without reserve, but, after all, the present edition is no great improvement of the first. It is not that any of the scenes, descriptions, or expressions are in themselves offensive to modesty, and very few persons would be so fastidious as to object to them, if the author did not pause to defend them, or suggest the very thoughts they would not suggest, by telling us that they are modest, and no reasonable person can find fault with them. The author sins by his bad taste and lack of judgment, not by any want of heart. He forgets that nature has been so often as well as her seemly parts, and that not all that is natural is fit for public exhibition. The moralist has a perfect right to appeal to nature to give interest to his work, but I should be honest, not dishonest, with him. There is no doubt that a nude figure may be chaste, and that a nude figure may be immodest, though draped to the heels and the throat. All depends on how and what the artist breathes into his creation, and the expression he gives it, and we apprehend that the objection to the author is not that his figures are rude, for that they are not, but that he fails to animate them with a perfectly chaste spirit, and to clothe them with a perfectly chaste expression. But even the most chaste figure ever produced by an artist may be on the occasion of immodest thoughts, if the artist invites you to pause before it, and convince yourself that it is modest, and not immodest. The author, we are sure, means well, but he is a little fussy where women are concerned, and is too fond of adjusting their corsets, tying on their slippers, or smoothing the folds of their petticoats, and not contented with indulging his fussy disposition, he looks you very innocently in the face, and tells you there is nothing improper in all this, for he means nothing. Perhaps there is not, but he would do better not to challenge us to discuss it.

9. *Lady-Bird: A Tale.* By LADY GEORGINA FULLERTON. New York: Appleton & Co. 1853. Three volumes in one. 12mo. pp. 328

We much prefer *Lady-Bird* to *Grantley Manor*, in a religious and moral point of view, although, intellectually and artistically considered, some

may think it inferior. We cannot say that it is a positively good book, for that is more than we can say of any novel we ever read; but it is, with all its improbabilities and unnaturalness, a very interesting book, and as harmless as any novel we ever expect to see written. If people will read novels, and we suppose they will, we know none that we can more unreservedly recommend than *Lady-Bird*. It is a work of great power, and proves that the author is a woman of keen insight, careful observation, a vivid but chastened imagination, and a strong and well-cultivated mind. The general tone of the work is subdued, and there is a calmness, a serenity, a repose about it, that is as rare as refreshing in a modern writer. We like the author personally much better, as we see her here, than as we saw her immediately after her conversion, in *Granthly Manor*. We then gave her a round scolding, as she deserved; we here give her a civil, indeed, a rather cordial greeting, and assure her that we can now love and honor her. As long as she writes no worse novels than *Lady-Bird* we will not complain, and will relax somewhat our general rules touching female literature in her favor.

10. *Considerations on some Recent Social Theories.* Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 1853. 12mo. pp. 168.

We do not know who is the author of this exceedingly well-written publication, but be he who he will, we thank him for a sincere and honest effort in a right direction. The general conclusions at which he arrives are sound, but, unhappily for the logic of his work, he starts with all the premises required by the authors of the theories he combats. He has good sense on the side of his conclusions, but they have no logical basis on the side of theirs. This is always the misfortune of a Protestant conservative. In order to be a Protestant, he must concede the premises of his opponent, and then he can oppose them only by sacrificing his common sense, as they can oppose him only by sacrificing common sense to logic. It is only the Catholic who can always find logic at a common sense convenient, and it is only he who can consistently or effectively defend conservatism or oppose radicalism, and it is only he who can defend authority without defending despotism, or liberty without defending anarchy. The author of the book before us, however, does not see this, and consequently his logic is not equal to his practical good sense, and he is far superior to the doctrine which he has intended to express. Nevertheless, we find many things in his book that we like, and the good intentions of the author should be met with respect and encouragement.

11. *Socialism in America. An Address delivered before the Philodemic Society of Georgetown College, D. C., at the Annual Commencement, held July 20, 1852.* By RICHARD H. CLARKE, A. M., of Washington City. To which is appended a Catalogue of the Members of the Philodemic Society. Washington: Towers. 1852. 8vo. pp. 48.

A MULTITUDE of pamphlets are sent to us during the year from various parts of the country, the great part of which, we must confess, we never open, and this Address probably would have shared the fate of so many oth-

ere, if we had not since receiving it formed a very pleasant acquaintance with its author, — a brilliant young Catholic lawyer of Washington, and one of that noble army of young men rising up amongst us prepared to adorn the various walks of civil life, and who are not afraid nor ashamed to attach themselves to sound principles, and to profess and to practise their religion. These are the "Young America" in whom we have hope. They love God, honor the law, and with the Divine blessing will save the country. We love and honor these young men, and never shall they lack our sympathy or encouragement.

We have read this Address with real pleasure, not only for its intrinsic merits, which are very considerable, but because we have occasionally read addresses delivered before the young men of Georgetown College which seemed to us fitted only to encourage the worst tendencies of the country, and which we could commend only as evidence of the individual freedom left by the good fathers to their pupils. Mr. Clarke's Address is spirited and eloquent, marked by vigorous thought and sound doctrine. The author has done well to call attention to the socialistic tendencies of the country. These tendencies are stronger than most of us imagine, — than even intelligent and patriotic men can be made to believe. They are fostered by the prevailing Calvinism and Puritanism of a large portion of our people. The Maine Liquor Law movement is only a reproduction of what Calvin attempted in Geneva, and the Puritans in the early colonial days of Massachusetts, and it is decidedly socialistic in its character, inasmuch as it sacrifices the individual to society, the liberty of the individual to the despotism of the state. Abolitionism, Woman's-Rights-ism, and all other ~~isms~~ ^{isms} advocated by our modern philanthropists, are of the same character, are Calvinistic and Socialistic. The leading political doctrine of the day, democracy itself as now generally understood, is only the political phase of Calvinism, and it wants little of being pure socialism, for it excludes God, and renders society supreme. In fact socialism is nothing but Protestantism gone to seed, and no man can be a consistent Protestant without holding all the principles necessary to serve as the logical basis of socialism. None, therefore, but a Catholic, as we so often repeat, can either consistently or successfully attack the socialistic tendencies of the country.

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12. *Histoire de la Papauté, pendant le XIV^e. Siècle, avec des Notes et des Pièces justificatives.* Par L'Abbé J. B. CHRISTOPHE, Curé du Diocèse de Lyon, et Membre du Cercle littéraire de Lyon. Ouvrage dédié à son Eminence le Cardinal de Bonald, et approuvé par elle. Paris. 1853. 3 Tomes. 8vo.

This is a very interesting and valuable work on an important epoch of ecclesiastical history, embracing the residence of the Popes at Avignon, the great schism of the West, and the Council of Constance. The author seems to have performed his task conscientiously, and generally in a very satisfactory manner. The Introduction comprises a sketch of the civil constitution of Rome in the Middle Ages, the best we have seen. The author is modest, sober, and really learned. In general, we go along with him, but he does not appear to have investigated the history of the Papacy in the tenth century with the care he has given to that of the Papacy in the

fourteenth, and to the rapid sketch he gives he repeats what we regard as the mistakes of Baronius. We do not precisely like the manner in which he speaks of St. Gregory the Seventh. St. Gregory was no innovator, and he was inspired by his faith as a Catholic, not by his more human genius, to assert the supremacy of the Papal power. In writing of this great Pontiff, the author seems half to forget that he is writing of the Vicar of Jesus Christ, and ascribes too much to the man, not enough to the Pontiff. He is not a Galileo, though a Frenchman, but he is not as warm and thorough-going a Papist as we wish he was. We shall probably return to this work, which with some little reserve we can recommend as a most admirable work.

13. — 1. *Histoire du Pontificat de Clément XIV. D'après des Documents inédits des Archives Secrètes du Vatican.* Par AUGUSTIN THIERMANN, Prêtre de l'Oratoire. Traduite de l'Allemand sous les Yeux de l'Auteur, par PAUL DE CASLES, Missionnaire Apostolique. Paris. 1852. 2 tomes. 8vo.

2. *Clement XIV Pont. Max. Epistolæ et Brevia Selectiora, ac nonnulla alia Acta Pontificatum ejus illustrantia quæ ex Secretioribus Tabularum Vaticanarum excerpta et nunc primum edita.* AUGUSTINUS THIEMANN, Congregationis Oratorum Romanorum Presbyter. Romæ. 1852. 8vo. pp. 403.

THE last of these volumes is very valuable, the costliness of Mr. Thiermann has disappointed us. We do not like Clément XIV's work for it sacrifices Clément the Fourteenth to save the Society of Jesus, and work sacrifices the Society to save the Pope, or rather the name of the Bourbon family. We think it better, if a sacrifice must be made, to sacrifice the crown and save both the Pope and the Society. We are not in admiration of the Pope from the changes of Clément XIV's work, and so far as Mr. Thiermann's work is useful to that extent it is so, and gives us an excellent work; but it attacks the Society, and gets out of his way for the vindication of the Society, and the Society does not care to reply that the Society was guilty of only one thing, in the eyes of the Pope, the good of the Church, required its suppression. It was a question of expediency, of which the Pope was the legitimate judge. And it does not become us to accuse his judgment. We honor his memory, and we honor also the Society.

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OCTOBER, 1853.

ART. I. — *The Eclipse of Faith; or, A Visit to a Religious Sceptic.* Fourth Edition. Boston: Crosby, Nichols, & Co. 1853. 12mo. pp. 452.

THIS is an American reprint of an English work, attributed to Mr. Henry Rogers, of whom, we must confess, we know nothing except that he is the author of several very striking articles in *The Edinburgh Review*. The work itself, however, is one of the most remarkable works on religious topics, that has recently issued from the Protestant press, whether in England or in this country. It is directed chiefly against modern spiritualism, or what Mr. Andrews Norton of Cambridge, some few years since, very happily denominated "the latest form of Infidelity," and which we have often treated in these pages under the name of Transcendentalism, of which Mr. Morell in Scotland, Theodore Parker and Horace Bushnell in this country, and Francis William Newman in England, are the representatives best known to our readers. Its design is to prove that this modern spiritualism, which professes to be Christian, and more Christian than Christianity itself, and which rejects all external authoritative revelation and falls back on a spiritual faculty of man's own nature as the source of all religious truth, is in a religious point of view a mere illusion, and that there is no medium between rejecting the Bible as an external authoritative revelation and the rejection of all religion; and therefore that the modern spiritualists, whatever they may pretend to the contrary, are really infidels, — as much so as the old English

Dousters of the French Philosophers of the last century. He proves this, we think, in a masterly manner, with great acuteness and force of reasoning, and with still greater wit and pleasantry.

The work has a slight thread of fiction running through it, on which the author strings his arguments and discussions. It professes to be addressed by the writer to his brother, represented as a missionary among the heathen. It opens with a letter to the brother, giving him a rapid sketch of religious affairs in England, and communicates to him the sad intelligence that a beloved nephew, a remarkably promising young man, has become a religious sceptic during a residence in Germany. The writer proposes to visit him, and if possible recall him to belief in Christianity. The main body of the work consists of an imaginary journal of conversations held with his nephew, by the writer and others, during this visit. The whole artistic management is of a high order, and the general literary execution may be warmly commended. The several topics are skilfully introduced, and the conversations are easy, natural, sprightly, and well sustained. Our limits will not permit us to make many extracts, but the following from the introductory letter will place the general subject of the work before our readers, and give them a fair specimen of the author's style and manner. It is only necessary to bear in mind, that the author has been endeavoring to remove his brother's apprehensions of danger to Protestantism from the Puseyite or Tractarian movement:—

"No, it is not from this quarter that England must look for the chief danger which menaced her; no, except, indeed, as those dangers are the inevitable and uniform result of every attempt to revive the obsold to past. The principal peril is from a subtle and subtle, which, in various forms, is sapping the foundation of our people, and which, if not checked, will by and by give the Roman bishops a better title to be called bishops *in partibus infidelium* than has always been the case. The attempt to make men believe too much naturally provokes them to believe too little, and much has been and will be the result from too movement towards Rome. It is only one, however, of the causes of that widely diffused indecency which is perhaps the most remarkable phenomenon of our day. Other and more potent causes are to be sought in the philosophic tendencies of the age, and especially in sympathy, in very many minds, with the worst features of Continental

speculation. 'Infidelity!' you will say. 'Do you mean such infidelity as that of Collins and Bolingbroke, Chubb and Tindal?' Why, we have plenty of those sorts too, and — worse; but the most charming infidelity of the day, a bastard deism in fact, often assumes a different form, — a form, you will be surprised to hear it, which embodies (as many say) the *essence* of genuine Christianity! Yes; be it known to you, that when you have ceased to believe all that is specially characteristic of the New Testament, — its history, its miracles, its peculiar doctrines, — you may still be a genuine Christian. Christianity is sublimed into an exquisite thing called modern 'spiritualism.' The amount and quality of the infidel 'faith' are, indeed, pleasingly diversified when you come to examine individual professors thereof; but it is always based upon the principle that man is a sufficient light to himself; that his oracle is within; so clear as either to supersede the necessity — some say even the *possibility* — of all external revelation in any ordinary sense of that term; or, when such revelation is in some sense allowed, to constitute man the absolute arbiter of how much or how little of it is worthy to be received.

"This theory we all perceive, of course, cannot fail to recommend itself by the well-known *uniformity* and distinctness of man's religious notions and the reasonableness of his religious practices! We all know there has never been any want of a revelation; — of which you have doubtless had full proof among the idolatrous barbarians you foolishly went to enlighten and reclaim. I wish, however, you had known it fifteen years ago; I might have had my brother with me still. It is certainly a pity that this internal revelation — the 'absolute religion,' *hidden*, as Mr. Theodore Parker felicitously phrases it, in *all* religions of all ages and nations, and so strikingly avouched by the entire history of the world — should render itself suspicious by little discrepancies in its own utterances among those who believe in it. Yet it is so. Compared with the rest of the world, few at the best can be got to believe in the sufficiency of the internal light and the superfluity of all external revelation; and yet hardly two of the 'little flock' agree. It is the rarest little oracle! Apollo himself might envy its adroitness in the utterance of ambiguities. One man says that the doctrine of a 'future life' is undoubtedly a dictate of the 'religious sentiment,' — one of the few universal characteristics of *all* religion; another declares his 'insight' tells him nothing of the matter; one affirms that the supposed chief 'intuitions' of the 'religious faculty' — belief in the efficacy of prayer, the free will of man, and the immortality of the soul — are at hopeless variance with intellect and logic; others exclaim, and surely not without reason, that this casts upon our faculties the opprobrium of irretrievable contradictions! As for those 'spiritualists' — and they are, perhaps, at present the greater part — who profess, in

some sense, to pay homage to the New Testament, they are at infinite variance as to *how much* — whether $7\frac{1}{2}$, 30, or 50 *per cent.* of its records — is to be received. Very few get so far as the last. One man is resolved to be a Christian, — none more so, — only he will reject all the peculiar doctrines and all the supernatural narratives of the New Testament; another declares that miracles are impossible and ‘incredible, *per se*’; a third thinks they are neither the one nor the other, though it is true that probably a comparatively small portion of those narrated in the ‘book’ are established by such evidence as to be worthy of credit. Pray use your pleasure in the selection; and the more freely, as a fourth is of opinion that, however true, they are really of little consequence. While many extol in vague terms of admiration the deep ‘spiritual insight’ of the founders of Christianity, they do not trouble themselves to explain how it is that this exquisite illumination left them to concoct that huge mass of legendary fables and mystical doctrines which constitute, according to the modern ‘spiritualism,’ the bulk of the records of the New Testament, and by which our authors have managed to mislead the world; nor how we are to avoid regarding them either as superstitious and fanatical fools or nefarious and designing knaves, if a *million* tenths, or *seven tenths*, of what they record is a *million* times repeated; nor, if it be affirmed that they never *did* record it, but that some body else has put these matters into their mouths, how we can be sure that any thing whatever of the small remainder ever came out of their mouths. All this, however, is of the less consequence, as these gentlemen condescend to tell us how we are to separate the ‘spiritual’ gold which faintly streaks the huge mass of impure ore of fable, legend, and mysticism. Each man, it seems, has his own particular spade and mattock in his ‘spiritual faculty’; so off with you to the diggings in these spiritual mines of Utopia. You will say, Why not stay at home, and be content at once, with the advocates of the absolute sufficiency of the internal organ, to listen to its responses exclusively? Ask these men — for I am sure I do not know; I only know that the results are very different — whether the possessor of ‘insight’ listens to its own rare voice, or puts on its spectacles and reads aloud from the New Testament. Generally, as I say, these good folks are resolved that all that is supernatural and specially inspired in the sacred volume is to be rejected, and as to the rest, which by the way might be conveniently published as the ‘Sectarians’ Bible’ (in two or three sheets, I think may), that would well require a careful winnowing; for, while one man tells us that the Apostle Paul, in his intense appreciation of the ‘spiritual element,’ made light even of the ‘resurrection of Christ,’ and everywhere shows his superiority to the beggary elements of his story, cogna, and ritual, another declares that he was so misled by his Jewish prejudices and the trumpery he had picked up at the

feet of Gamaliel, that he knew but little or next to nothing of the real mystery of the very Gospel he preached; that while he proclaims that it 'is revealed, after having been hidden from ages and generations,' he himself manages to hide it afresh. This you will be told is a perpetual process, going on even now; that as all the 'earlier prophets' were unconscious instruments of a purpose beyond their immediate range of thought, so the Apostles themselves similarly illustrated the shallowness of *their* range of thought; that, in fact, the true significance of the Gospel lay beyond them, and doubtless also, for the very same reasons, lies beyond us. In other words, this class of spiritualists tell us that Christianity is a 'development,' as the Papists also assert, and the New Testament its first imperfect and rudimentary product; only, unhappily, as the development, it seems, may be things so very different as Popery and Infidelity, we are as far as ever from any *criterium* as to which, out of the ten thousand possible developments, is the true; but it is a matter of the less consequence, since it will, on such reasoning, be always something future.

" 'Unhappy Paul!' you will say. Yes, it is no better with him than it was in our youth some five-and-twenty years ago. Do you not remember the astute old German Professor in his lecture-room introducing the Apostle as examining with ever-increasing wonder the various contradictory systems which the perverseness of exegesis had extracted from his Epistles, and at length, as he saw one from which every feature of Christianity had been erased, exclaiming in a fright, 'Was ist das?' But I will not detain you on the vagaries of the new school of spiritualists. I shall hear enough of them, I have no doubt, from Harrington; he will riot in their extravagances and contradictions as a justification of his own scepticism. In very truth their authors are fit for nothing else than to be recruiting officers for undisguised infidelity; and this has been the consistent termination with very many of their converts. Yet many of them tell us, after putting men on this inclined plane of smooth ice, that it is the only place where they can be secure against tumbling into Infidelity, Atheism, Pantheism, Scepticism. Some of the Oxford Tractarians informed us, a little before crossing the border, that their system was the surest bulwark against Romanism; and in the same way is this exquisite 'spiritualism' a safeguard against infidelity.

" Between many of our modern 'spiritualists' and the Romanists there is a parallelism of movement absolutely ludicrous. You may chance to hear both declaiming, with equal fervor, against 'intellect' and 'logic' as totally incompetent to decide on 'religious' or 'spiritual' truth, and in favor of a 'faith' which disclaims all alliance with them. You may chance to hear them both insisting on an absolute submission to an 'infallible authority' other than the Bible; the one external, — that is, the Pope; the

other internal, — that is, 'Spiritual Insight'; both exacting absolute submission, the one to the outward oracle, the Church, the other to the inward oracle, himself; both insisting that the Bible is but the first imperfect product of genuine Christianity, which is perfected by a 'development,' though as to the direction of that development they certainly do not agree. Both, if I may judge by some recent speculations, reced from the Bible even more than they do from one another; and both would get rid of it, — one by locking it up, and the other by tearing it to tatters. Thus receding in opposite directions round the circle, they are found placed side by side at the same extremity of a diameter, at the *other* extremity of which is the — Bible. The resemblances in some instances are so striking, that one is reminded of that little animal, the first-water polype, whose external structure is so absolutely a mere prolongation of the internal, that you may turn him inside out, and all the functions of life go on just as well as before." — pp. 9-14.

It will be manifest to our readers, that the author, as Anglican writers both at home and abroad have been in the habit of doing ever since its publication in 1845, treats Dr. Newman's 'Theory of Development' as a Catholic theory, and speaks of it as if it were adopted by our Church. If this were the fact, if we were obliged as a Catholic to accept that theory, we frankly confess that we should not know how to reply to the paradox in the author here asserts, and the very grave objections fit and other draw from it against our holy religion. Others may find themselves able to reply satisfactorily to these objections, but if that theory is to be accepted as Catholic doctrine, we cannot open our mouth. It was the fact that writers like our author were treating that theory as Catholic doctrine, and the embarrassment we foresaw that it must occasion us in our attempts to defend Catholicity, that induced us, soon after its publication, though very reluctantly, to write our first essay against it, and to attempt to show, that, however natural it might be that Mr Newman, while out of the Church, but on his way to it, should adopt such a theory, and however sincere and well disposed he might be in maintaining it, it is wholly incompatible with Catholicity. All we ask of those who think we did wrong, is to reply to the author before us, without denying his assumption that the theory is accepted by Papists, that is, in his sense, by our Church.

For ourselves, it is well known that we have never adopted Dr. Newman's theory, although we have uniformly expressed a high esteem for the man himself, and we have no hesitation in asserting that it is not a Catholic doctrine: the theory, as far as we are aware, is accepted in this country by no bishop, priest, or layman, and we think we are safe in saying that it is universally rejected by Catholics here, at least in the sense our author assumes it, and we have opposed it. Some of our more distinguished Prelates, indeed, have looked upon the matter as of too slight importance to warrant our further discussion of it, and for this, as well as for some other reasons, we have come to the conclusion not to continue its discussion, and as far as we are concerned to let it drop; but the only question that has ever been seriously raised here since the publication of our first article on the subject has been simply, whether we have or have not rightly represented the theory; and even this question is very generally settled in our favor, for it is well argued that, if we had misapprehended or misrepresented it, Dr. Newman or some of his friends would have publicly set us right, and given a clear, precise, and true statement of it as they themselves understand it. The authorities in England and Ireland have not indeed censured the theory, nor have they publicly approved it; and we have no evidence that it is accepted by a single individual out of the circle of the converts from Anglicanism. Without the least hesitation, then, we say, that Development in the sense of Dr. Newman's theory is no Catholic doctrine. Development, if you are tenacious of the word, in the sense of rendering from time to time propositions distinct which were originally indistinctly, though explicitly, revealed, of opposing novel statements of old doctrines to the condemnation of novel errors, and of further explications of the faith *contra errores insurgentes*, as St. Thomas says, undoubtedly all Catholics admit, but in no other sense, in so far as regards matters strictly of Catholic faith. In this sense, but in no other, has there been a growth or development of the *depositum*, which we must believe was transmitted complete in all its parts, and has been preserved by the Church of Rome, from the Apostles down to us, in its integrity, without addition or diminution, change or alteration. At least so we have been taught, and so all the Catholic authorities we are aware of, with

one voice, assert. The Anglican writers, therefore, we must needs believe, consult what they wish rather than what they have any authority for believing, when they gravely assert that "Rome has been driven to adopt the theory of development as her only possible method of meeting the historical difficulties in the way of her communion, suggested by Protestant scholars, and of defending her manifest and undeniable corruptions of the faith."

Protestants have no right to assert that the theory is adopted by the Church, or accepted as Catholic doctrine, on the authority of a book, written not even by a Catholic layman, but by a Protestant, or at least by an author *in transitu* from Protestantism to Catholicity, even though that book may have remained uncensored. The fact that no one has or can have any right to regard Dr. Newman's Essay as authority for Catholic doctrine is probably the reason why the authorities in England have not censured it; and perhaps the reason why no particular notice has been taken of the fact that some retain the theory since their admission into the Church is, that full confidence is felt in their Catholic simplicity and intentions, and that in time they will outgrow it, and drop it of themselves. Rome does not usually interfere in questions of this sort till they are formally presented for her adjudication, and we are not aware that this question has ever been so presented. That the author of this theory has been honored by his superiors, and apparently enjoys their full confidence, is no indication that his theory is approved, because the honor and confidence may well be bestowed upon him for his learning, ability, zeal, and devotedness, or his merits in other respects; since, though he has not indeed publicly retracted the theory, he does not seem disposed to maintain it with obstinacy, does not put it prominently forth, and is not engaged in any attempt to propagate it, or to persuade others to adopt it.

But the point to which we more particularly wish to direct the attention of our readers is not the parallelism which our author attempts to run between Catholicity and modern spiritualism, — a parallelism which, we repeat, we should not know how to deny, if Dr. Newman's theory of development were Catholic doctrine; but the distinct admission that there is a subtle infidelity sapping the religious belief of the people of England, that an eclipse has come over the faith of the Protestant world, and that the

great battle is now to be fought for Christianity itself. All this is unquestionably true, and we are glad to find that it is beginning to attract the attention of Protestants themselves, and that grave and learned men like our author see and confess that there is serious cause for alarm. To such Protestants as really desire to be Protestants without rejecting all Christian belief and giving up all religion, the present aspect of the Protestant world is very far from encouraging. That world is rent asunder by two formidable parties moving in opposite directions, and each alike hostile to the Christian or religious pretensions of Protestantism. Between Tractarianism on the one hand, and modern spiritualism on the other, what is called "Protestant Christianity" threatens to disappear, and the author has sounded his note of warning none too soon, — most likely not soon enough.

The Protestant world, as it presents itself to the philosophical spectator, is distinguishable into three classes, — the Catholicizing class, the infidelizing class, and the unthinking, unreasoning, or inert class. These three classes have their origin and foundation in Protestantism itself. Protestantism, as we often have occasion to repeat, strictly taken, is purely negative in its character, but loosely taken, as it is by Protestants generally, it is a mixture of certain half-truths, or mutilated dogmas, retained by the Reformers from the Catholic Church, and certain infidel principles and denials which the Reformers opposed to Catholicity. As embodied in the formulas or symbolical books of the several sects, the Catholic elements retained are incomplete and insufficient, and the infidel elements remain undeveloped. The unthinking, unreasoning, or inert Protestants, who are a very numerous body, see nothing of all this, and never once suspect that Protestantism is not all of a piece, or that it is made up of heterogeneous elements, and is in itself incoherent, incomplete, and insufficient, — uncertain, self-contradictory, and unsatisfactory to the mind that really thinks and reasons. Pressed by no logical wants, feeling no necessity of unity, consistency, and completeness of doctrine, they are content to receive passively, without a thought or a question, the formulas of their respective sects, and find scope for whatever of mental activity they may have in matters unconnected with religion. In a religious sense, these are simply dead, and of no account. But the

other two classes are aware of the incomplete and contradictory character of Protestantism as it came from the Reformers, and as it is still vaguely and nominally held. They both see that it is heterogeneous and incomplete, and they feel deeply and strongly the necessity of clearing it of its inconsistencies, of reducing it to doctrinal unity, and of developing and completing it. The first class seize upon its Catholic elements, that is, on the Christian doctrines, which, in a form more or less mutilated, it still professes, and seek to develop and complete them in a Christian sense; the second class seize upon the distinctively Protestant elements, and seek to develop and complete them in a Protestant sense. Thus the tendency of the former is necessarily to Catholicity, and of the latter, to infidelity. These two classes are all in the Protestant world that it is necessary to consider. They divide between them all the intellectual life and activity in regard to religious subjects that Protestants can lay claim to. The other class, under the religious point of view, are nobodies, at best only an inert mass.

The Catholicizing and the infidelizing classes of Protestants have been very well represented in England by two brothers, John Henry and Francis William Newman, — both remarkable men in their way, and very nearly equally distinguished for their ability, their acquirements, and their earnestness. Both were brought up Protestants in the Anglican Church; both early felt the incompleteness and insufficiency of the Protestantism of the Reformation, and both wished to be Christians without ceasing to be Protestant or breaking with the Reformers. But from this point they began to diverge. The elder brother, now a Catholic priest and Superior of the English Oratorians, assuming that the real sense of the Reformation lay in the elements of Christian truth it retained, seized upon these, disengaged them from the negative principles connected with them in the minds of the Reformers, and labored to develop and complete them in a Catholic sense. He thus originated the Tractarian or Puseyite party, whose aim is to be Catholic, without being Roman. But he soon found that he could not develop and complete Protestantism in the sense of the Catholic truths it professed to retain, without going to Rome, because only in her communion can Catholic doctrine be found or held in its unity, integrity,

and completeness. The younger brother, a more genuine Protestant from the beginning, assuming that the essence of Protestantism must lie, not in what it professes to hold in common with the Church, but in the principles and denials which it opposed to her, seized upon these principles and denials, the infidel elements of Protestantism, and sought to disengage them from the Popish elements still retained, and to develop and complete them in a distinctively Protestant sense. But he soon found that he could not accomplish this purpose without pushing the Protestant denial of the authority of the Church, and its rejection of the sacraments and the priesthood, to their legitimate consequences, and that he could not do this without rejecting all external authority, all external revelation, and falling back on his own spiritual nature, as his only authority in religious matters, and the only revelation of the will of God to man. Both seem to us to have been equally sincere in the outset, and both, considering the respective assumptions with which they started, to have been equally logical, and to have arrived at conclusions equally inevitable. Neither foresaw where he must end. The elder brother, resolved to be a Christian let come what might, found himself obliged to seek admission into the communion of the Catholic Church; the younger, resolved at all hazards to be a Protestant, has found himself obliged to give up every thing distinctively Christian, and to fall back on mere Naturalism.

It is chiefly against the conclusion to which, in his endeavor to be a consistent Protestant, Francis Newman has been forced to come, that the work before us is directed. The author does not directly attack the conclusion itself; his main endeavor is to show that it is unchristian, and that the school which accepts it, however it may deceive itself, whatever use it may make of the New Testament, or whatever the praises it may affect to bestow upon the Author and Finisher of our faith, is really as infidel as that of Voltaire or D'Holbach, and far more absurd. In this, certainly, as our readers well know, we agree with him, for we have maintained the same over and over again in our writings against Theodore Parker and the Transcendentalists; but is the author aware that, in proving this, though he proves much to our purpose as Catholics, he proves nothing to his own as a Protestant? The real point he has

to prove is, not that there is no medium between infidelity and rejecting the Bible as an authoritative external revelation, but that a logically minded Protestant can consistently with the distinctive principles of Protestantism hold the Bible to be such a revelation, or admit any external authoritative revelation at all. This is the question he has to answer as a Protestant, and to this question he gives no answer.

The author must allow us to protest against the severe manner in which he treats his infidelizing brethren. These men deserve his respect, not his censure. As long as he chooses to remain a Protestant, and to maintain the justice of the Reformation, he has no right to complain of them. On his premises they are manifestly right, and he is manifestly wrong. These men have had no more wish than he to reject Christianity; they have only wished to maintain the Reformation, for which as a Protestant he should be grateful to them. They have all been brought up in his Bible Protestantism, whatever that is; they have all been bred to regard the Bible as the word of God, as an external, authoritative revelation of the Divine will, and as able, as interpreted by the private judgment of each, to make them wise unto salvation. Many of them commenced their career with great piety and fervor, after the Protestant fashion, and it must not be supposed that it has been without a long and painful internal struggle that they have rejected all authoritative external revelation, and fallen back on the "oracle within," and sought to satisfy the religious wants of their souls with modern spiritualism. *The Phases of Faith*, by Francis Newman, one of the most truthful and instructive books that has been published in our day, to those who know how to read it, although the most erroneous and false in its conclusions, unanswerably proves this. It is in no spirit of wantonness, of irreverence, or of unbelief, that the earnest-minded Protestant inquirer, feeling himself bound at all hazards to be a Protestant, and holding, as all Protestants are bound to hold, that Catholicity is a gross and debasing superstition, gives up the Bible, gives up all external revelation, and seeks to derive a religion adequate to his wants from his own spiritual nature. He does so, not because he would get rid of the Bible, not because he would throw away all religion, but because Protestantism leaves him no other alternative, and he can

on no other condition retain even a shadow of religion, without ceasing to be a Protestant. Never shall we forget the joy with which our own heart bounded, when we fancied that Benjamin Constant had proved that religion has a firm and solid foundation in a law of human nature, universal, permanent, and indestructible as that nature itself, — not indeed because it saved us from the necessity of believing the Bible or of submitting to an external authoritative revelation, but because for the moment it seemed to restore us to communion with the religious world. It was indeed but the straw to which the drowning man clings, but it seemed to us something more, and to give us the right to say, I too am a believer; I too can look up to heaven and say, My Father; around upon mankind and say, My brothers. We dare here take our own experience as a Protestant as the key to that of the modern spiritualists. We had a horror of infidelity, and we were utterly unable, without renouncing the Reformation and becoming a Catholic, to maintain belief in the Bible as an authoritative external revelation. Unless, then, we could find a medium between believing it as such revelation and absolute infidelity, we must either go to Rome or give up all religion. No such medium save that of the modern spiritualists was even conceivable, and we adopted it as the only alternative between Catholicity and infidelity.

It is not strange that the other two classes of Protestants should fail to appreciate the infidelizing class; — the dead, unthinking class, because it is dead and unthinking, and has no suspicion of the inconsistency, incompleteness, and insufficiency of the Protestantism they passively receive from their sects. They perceive and feel none of its difficulties, and therefore draw the most unfavorable conclusions against those who are laboring in any direction to remove them. The Catholicizing party can hardly feel the difficulties felt by the infidelizing party, because they take it for granted that Protestantism lies essentially in the Christian doctrines it professes to hold, and that all one has to do to be a good Christian, and at the same time a good Protestant, is to develop and complete these doctrines in a Christian sense. They regard the tendency of their infidelizing brethren as alike hostile to Christianity and to the real sense of the Reformers, and hence undertake to recall them by the authority of the Catholic truths still

nominally held in their communion, without considering whether they have or have not any right to use it. John Henry Newman never seems to have been aware of the real difficulties of his younger brother, and he sought to retain him by alleging the authority of the Church, which he might well have done, if he had been a Catholic priest, but which in a Protestant minister was only intolerable arrogance. If we credit his brother's account of the matter, Francis told him, and as long ago as 1824, that to be consistent he ought to go to Rome, and would ultimately go there, if he did not renounce his High-Church pretensions. Francis, being a better Protestant than his brother, saw far more clearly the logical result of attempting to develop and complete Protestantism in a Catholic sense, and he seems early to have been convinced that he must either abandon all the positive doctrines professed by Protestants, and place Christianity solely in its negative elements, or go to Rome, unless he chose to reject all religion. Go to Rome he would not, because, as against Rome, he took it for granted that the Reformation was right. Whatever else might be true, Popery, he felt certain, was false, and whatever else might be false, Protestantism, he held, must be true. It was of no use, therefore, to prove to him that he was false to Anglicanism; what he wanted was to be shown how he could consistently hold the positive Christian doctrines Anglicans professed, without being false to the Reformation. Here was his difficulty, and this difficulty was not met.

How to be a Christian without renouncing the Reformation, is the great problem for every thinking Protestant. This was the problem with which we ourselves struggled from 1830 to 1844, and which we tried in vain every possible way of solving. It was the necessity we were under of rejecting each solution as soon as tried, that gave rise to the charge of fickleness and of constantly changing our opinions, which an unscrupulous newspaper press is so fond of urging against us. We fell back, as we have said, on modern spiritualism, as the only alternative we could find between Catholicity and infidelity. But we finally succeeded in discovering, what our author proves, that this modern spiritualism is only another name for the rejection of all religion. Then there was for us no alternative but Catholicity or infidelity, and we chose Catholicity, though we should have retained to a far greater degree the sympathies

of our Protestant friends, if we had taken the other alternative. The issue, however much Protestants may dread it, or try to evade it, must come to this at last. The old Protestant controversies are obsolete. Protestantism, as laid down in the formularies of the sects, has gone to seed; its stalk is withered and dry, and its root is dead. It has exhausted itself, and now only cumbers the ground where it grew. It is what Carlyle very justly calls a sham. All living and active intellect deserts it, and ranges itself either on the side of the Catholicizing party, or on that of the infidelizing party, and the only real question now anywhere seriously debated is, whether we shall be Catholics or infidels. All who have any tolerable understanding of the movements going on in the Protestant world see this, and in vain do the Old Hunkers or the Old Fogies that gather round the broken shrine of their idol seek to make up another issue. Their lamentations only excite ridicule, and their arguments will only hasten the terrible issue they are so anxious to escape. Neither party can be recalled to the dead formulas of the sects, for both have thought too much, and have become too clear-sighted, to be content with what has neither life nor sense.

The author is well aware of the existence of the two parties in the Protestant world, and of the danger they threaten to Protestantism as a religion; but he thinks the principal peril is from the infidelizing party. We are not quite sure of this. The Catholicizing party may not be the most formidable in Great Britain and the United States, for, unhappily, the people of these two countries are fearfully engrossed with purely material interests, and pay comparatively little attention to the wants of the soul. Their thought, so to speak, is materialized, and their studies are chiefly of the physical sciences and their application to the industrial arts. Money is their idol, the exchange is their temple, merchants and bankers are their clergy, and trade their *cultus*, or external service. Nevertheless, even in these countries, the Catholicizing party is powerful. It gains strength every day, and constantly are fresh, warm, ingenuous hearts calling upon Protestantism to answer whether she be really a religion or not. Every hour is she reminded of her incompleteness and insufficiency, alike for the intellect and the heart. Everywhere are her famishing children begging her for the food she has not

to give. Can she hope to retain their love and obedience, if, when they ask her for a fish, she gives them a serpent; for bread, she gives them a stone?

If we pass into Protestant Germany, we find the Catholicizing party still more powerful, and gaining every day on the infidelizing party. Germany is not at all what she was a few years ago. A powerful reaction has taken place there against Rationalism and Transcendentalism. Whatever is respectable in more recent German thought and German scholarship is on the side of the Catholicizing party. To be sure of this, we need only study the later German theology, so ably and faithfully represented in this country by Drs. Nevin and Schaff, of the so-called Mercersburg school. Perhaps still better evidence of it is furnished by the later German historians, whether they write general or particular, secular or ecclesiastical history. Neander himself furnishes ample materials for refuting the Centuriators of Magdeburg, and Leo leaves the Catholic student little to desire. The taste for solid studies still survives in Germany, and the German mind still retains its freshness, its energy, and its earnestness. It is freer than the mind of any other modern nation from that *frivolezza* which Gioberti so justly represents as the principal characteristic of our age. It has a straightforwardness, a downrightness, a heartiness, from which, in spite of its tendency to theorize, great good may well be expected. The seriousness and erudition with which German scholars have vindicated Catholic ages and Catholic characters cannot fail to have a powerful influence on the course of German thought, and must tend not a little to strengthen the Catholic reaction now everywhere so visible. Nobody, in Germany, who is any body, would risk his reputation in repeating the old Protestant versions of Church history, or the old Protestant sneers at the Middle Ages. Such a man would be looked upon as a new Rip van Winkle. We confess we hope much from the Catholicizing Protestants of Germany,—more indeed than from the Tractarians of England and this country; and it seems to us not unlikely that Protestantism will find itself before many years, not only tried and condemned, but executed, in the very place of its birth. Our author may sneer, may speak of the madness and folly of expecting to revive the faith of the past; but he would do well to remember that what he calls the faith

of the past has never itself fallen into the past ; it has been always a living faith, and to revive it in the Protestant world is only to turn that world from the dead to the living.

But be this as it may, there is no question that the danger from the infidelizing party is great. In the author's own country that party is becoming numerous, strong, and active, and Protestants have nothing but a certain *vis inertiae* to oppose to it. To oppose to it the Catholicizing party is only to call in the Saxons to expel the Picts and Scots. The Catholicizing party may indeed expel the infidelizing party, but to the advantage of Catholicity, not to that of Protestantism ; for the Catholicizing party need only the courage to be consistent, and follow out their dominant principles to their legitimate conclusions, in order to embrace the Catholic Church, as is conceded or maintained by all not of the party itself. It is of no use to oppose to them the dead and putrid carcass of the Protestantism of the symbolical books, nominally retained by the sects, for it is the living and active they seek, not the dead and rotten. Our author, indeed, attempts to oppose to them a sort of Bible Protestantism ; but it is precisely Bible Protestantism that they have for sufficient reasons rejected, and which as Protestants they find it impossible to hold. He tells them that they have no medium, as Protestants, between accepting the Bible as an authoritative external revelation, and rejecting all religion. Be it so. But tell us, say they, how we can accept that, and not be logically required to go farther, and make our peace with Rome. You require us to be Protestants, to anathematize Popery, and pull the Pope's nose. All very good. We are ready to do all this, and more too if you require it. But tell us how we can be free to do all this, and yet assert the Bible as an authoritative external revelation ? Here is a question the author does not and cannot answer.

We as Catholics, unquestionably, hold the Bible to be the word of God, and an external authoritative revelation of his will ; but no Protestant can consistently hold this, and whenever Protestants assert it they abandon the distinctive principles of the Reformation, and take their stand on Catholic ground. Here is the fact which our author overlooks. What does he gain, then, by proving that the rejection of the Bible as such revelation is the rejection of

all religion? He proves nothing to his purpose, and relieves his infidelizing brethren from no difficulty. All he proves, if he proves any thing, is that there is no medium between Catholicity and infidelity. With all his ability and acuteness, the author, when he has no longer our principles to reason from, and has something positive of his own to establish, falls into the ordinary cant of his party. He talks of the Bible as an external authoritative revelation, and asserts that there is no medium between accepting it as such and absolute unbelief. All very well. So far we sustain him. But what does he mean by the Bible? Is the Bible any thing save in its true and genuine sense? What is that sense, the only sense in which it is or can be an external *authoritative* revelation from God? Who shall tell us? Shall each one determine it for himself, by his own private judgment? So he maintains, and so he must maintain, or cease to be a Protestant. Then the Bible is to each one just what he interprets it to be, and may teach as many different doctrines as there are interpreters. It is a contradiction in terms, then, to call it an external authoritative revelation; for then the authority is not in it, but in the private judgment of the interpreter. These various interpretations, these different and contradictory doctrines which the sects deduce from the Bible, cannot all be true; yet what means or what right have you to distinguish between them, since all stand on the same footing? Each has the Bible interpreted by private judgment in its favor, and no one has any thing more. The Bible and private judgment must be always equal to the Bible and private judgment, and therefore as respectable and as authoritative in the case of one as in that of another, and therefore respectable and authoritative in the case of none.

The author very happily refutes Parker's "Absolute Religion," and Newman's "spiritual faculty," by showing that neither is or gives a determinate system of religious doctrine and practice, but may coexist in the same mind with the grossest errors, the most debasing superstition, the foulest crimes, and the most disgusting immorality. He shows that either is a mere abstraction, at best a mere susceptibility to religion; and he further concludes against the authority of each from the fact, that scarcely any two of the modern spiritualists are agreed as to what are its specific teachings or requirements. 'This is just reasoning;

but does not the author see that it may be retorted upon him with murderous effect? By the very same process by which he refutes Parker's "Absolute Religion," and Newman's "spiritual faculty," they may refute the Protestant rule of the Bible interpreted by private judgment. The Bible interpreted by each one for himself is in precisely the same predicament with the "Absolute Religion" and the "spiritual faculty," with which he makes himself so merry. Who needs to be told that, so taken, it is no specific or determinate religion; that the assertion of the Bible so interpreted may coexist in the same mind with the most shocking errors; or that the doctrines which Protestants derive from it, or hold with it, are as various as the sects into which the Protestant world is divided, and almost equal in number to that of individual Protestants themselves? If he has a right to conclude against modern spiritualism from the fact that it does not secure to its adherents pure, unmixed truth and uniformity of belief, why not the modern spiritualists for the same reason conclude against the Bible interpreted by private judgment?

The author refutes the modern spiritualists so far as they make any pretensions to Christianity, and seeks to recall them to Bible Protestantism. But what in the world is Bible Protestantism? Will all Bible Protestants give us the same answer? Shall we not receive from the sects different, and even contradictory answers? Our author himself appears to be a Church-of-England man. But what is Church-of-Englandism? Who can tell? Ask Dr. Pusey and the Tractarians, and you have one answer; ask Dr. Whately, or the Archbishop of Canterbury, and you have another, and a very different answer. To talk of Protestantism as something specific, definite, fixed, and determinate, betrays a want of common information or of common honesty, and the author's Bible Protestantism must be conceded to be as vague and as indeterminate as Parker's "Absolute Religion," which is, as he himself attempts to define it, Be good and do good, and then — you will be good and do good. No doubt of it; but what is it to be good and to do good? What is good? And how are we to be good and to do good? All see that this "Absolute Religion" is a mere abstraction, and therefore a nullity. What else is Bible Protestantism, which may mean any thing or nothing, and has no meaning except that which the individual or sectarian Protestant mind gives it?

Protestants fall uniformly into the mistake of confounding belief that the Bible is inspired and contains an external revelation, with a belief of the revelation itself, — two very different things. To believe that God has made such revelation, and that the Bible contains it, of itself implies no belief of what God has revealed. The revelation, although contained in the Bible, is not the Bible as a mere book, but is the sense of the Bible, and is and can be believed only as that sense is intellectually apprehended and assented to. Before you can claim to have believed that, you must know what it is. This you cannot know without an interpreter of some sort, — either an external authoritative interpreter, as we hold, or an internal interpreter, as you maintain. As a Protestant, you cannot assert an external authoritative interpreter, because that would require you to recognize the authority of the Catholic Church, and to abjure your Protestantism, a fact we beg you to remember when reasoning against the spiritualists, as well as when reasoning against us. You must then fall back on the internal interpreter, that is, private judgment, or a spiritual faculty of the soul. Here you have only your own private judgment, or your own spiritual faculty, to determine what is the revelation God has made, and this is not adequate for faith, because it determines differently with almost every different individual. This not being able to determine with sufficient certainty for faith what the sense of the Bible is, it follows that the Protestant may believe that the Bible contains an external authoritative revelation, and yet not believe that revelation itself.

Protestants sometimes reply to this, that God, when he made his revelation, intended it to be believed, and therefore he must have so made it that all who are required to believe it can ascertain with sufficient certainty for faith what it is. He made his revelation in the Bible, and therefore private judgment must be able to determine what it is from the Bible alone, without any external authoritative interpreter. The conclusion does not happen to follow. Unquestionably, the revelation which God has made must be ascertainable by all who are commanded to believe it. But it is not ascertainable from the Bible interpreted by private judgment. Therefore that is not the way by which God has made it ascertainable. This conclusion is evident on the very face of the Bible itself.

God could never have intended that men should learn the faith from the Bible alone, or from the Bible privately interpreted, because it is obvious, from the face of the book itself, that it was addressed to believers, whom it everywhere presupposes to have been already instructed at least in the rudiments of the faith. There is no getting over this fact. The Gospels were manifestly written for the instruction and edification of believers; the Epistles are all addressed to the faithful, and are nearly all simply pastoral letters designed to correct particular errors into which the faithful had, here or there, fallen, or were in danger of falling, and to give them in particular localities fuller instructions on certain points of doctrine or practice in regard to which they had been but imperfectly taught. It is very absurd to pretend that a book of this sort, which was addressed to those who had already received the faith, which everywhere presupposes the greater part of the faith to be already known, and refers to its principal dogmas only as matters already believed, was intended by the Holy Ghost to be the medium, and only medium, of teaching the faith to those ignorant of it, and to be, as interpreted by private judgment, the rule for determining the revelation of God. God is infinitely wise, and the characteristic of wisdom is to adapt the means to the end. But here were no such adaptation. Common sense is sufficient, if exercised, to satisfy every one that God never designed the Bible without the intervention of the living teacher as the fountain from which his revealed word was to be drawn. Deny the divinely commissioned living teacher, and you can make nothing of the Bible. It is to you without significance, or at least a mere dumb idol, or a temptation and a snare.

It is hardly worth while to notice the pretence of some Protestants, that the Bible interprets itself. It does no such thing. No book interprets itself. If the Bible interpreted itself, it would have the same meaning for all, and none who read it could dispute as to its sense. But such is not the case; for the diversity of opinions as to what the book teaches among Bible readers is notorious and proverbial. The book itself being invariable, the same to all and to each, it is certain that diversity of opinions as to its sense can originate only in diversity of interpretation, which there could not be if it interpreted itself. We

repeat, therefore, the dilemma in which the Protestant necessarily finds himself. The Bible must have an interpreter, either external or internal. If you assert the former, you must renounce your Protestantism, and return to the Church; if the latter, you must abandon the Bible as an authoritative external revelation, because you have no means of ascertaining with sufficient certainty for faith, that is, a certainty that excludes doubt, what is the revelation, and therefore it cannot be alleged as authority for determining that revelation. Moreover, if God has not so made his revelation in the Bible as to be ascertainable from it, he has not intended that we should ascertain it from the Bible. Therefore the Bible is not an *authoritative* external revelation. Therefore it is to be placed in the category of all well-intentioned books, and accepted so far as its teachings are confirmed by the "oracle within," and no farther,—the precise conclusion of Parker and Newman, which our author justly resolves into the rejection of all religion.

We assure the author that he has no logic by which he can set aside this conclusion. The great difficulty is here in Protestantism itself. It has always betrayed, and will betray, its friends; for if you take it on its professedly religious side, and seek to develop and complete it in a Christian sense, it conducts you to Rome; if you take it on its purely Protestant side, on the side of its denials of Catholicity, and seek to develop and complete it in a purely Protestant sense, it conducts you to infidelity. There is no help for it, for Protestantism cannot stand on its own feet, or subsist as a form of Christianity. Whatever it has that even the great body of Protestants call Christian, are the doctrines, more or less mutilated, which it retained from the Catholic Church, and which find their complement, their unity and integrity, only in her teaching. Every intelligent, thinking, and reasoning Protestant must therefore, in spite of himself, either Catholicize or infidelize. The author in the work before us wishes to do neither, but the Catholic reader perceives at once that he has nothing of his own to oppose to either party, and is as weak, as vague, and as absurd as the modern spiritualist the moment he has no longer the authority of our Church to back him. He asserts the Bible as the word of God, for we do and have always done the same, and he can

sustain his assertion by our authority; he insists on an external authoritative revelation as essential to Christian faith, and in this too he is backed up by us. In these matters he is strong with our strength. But when he has to maintain something for which he cannot plead the Catholic Church or Catholic tradition, which as a Protestant he is bound to reject, something in which he separates from us, he cannot stand a moment before his infidelizing opponents. Assuming our Church to be true, and Christianity to be identically what she teaches, he proves very clearly that he who rejects the Bible and all external authoritative revelation is an infidel; but deny our Church, assume the justice of the Reformation in its attacks on Catholicity, and the truth of the Protestant denials, can he then say this? By what authority, then, can he say that the principles of these denials which the infidelizing Protestants seize upon and call Christian, and assert as the very essence of Christianity, are not so? Who gave him authority to say for others what is or is not Christian? Wherefore has he any more right to insist that his notions are Christian, than they have that theirs are?

But it is unnecessary to pursue this line of remark any farther. Protestants no doubt sometimes forget their Protestantism, throw themselves unconsciously back on Catholic principles, and produce some able and learned works in defence of the Christian religion. But these works have on Protestant principles no value, because whatever tends to prove Christianity or to refute infidelity tends to prove the Catholic Church, without which Christianity is a mere abstraction, or an unmeaning word. 'There are no abstractions in nature; no abstraction exists *a parte rei*; and whatever exists at all, exists in a concrete form. 'There is no Christianity existing in the abstract, and not in the concrete; and they who talk of "our common Christianity," or Christianity common to the Church and the sects, talk nonsense, if they do not talk blasphemy. A partial or an abstract view, which shall be a true view as far as it goes, may no doubt be taken of Christianity, and such a view the sects very possibly may and sometimes do take; but that view is simply a mental fact, and is in no sense Christianity itself, as an objective reality. Christianity is a concrete existence, and, like every concrete existence, has

one form and one only. It is Catholicity or it is nothing. So, then, whatever Protestants may on our principles prove that is coincident with Christianity, it is idle to suppose that on their own principles they ever do or ever can advance a single step, either in proving the Christian religion or in refuting infidelity.

To the hard things the author says here and there in his work against our religion, only a brief reply is required. We have already disposed of the charge that the Church accepts the 'Theory of Development, and with it the parallelism he absurdly enough asserts between Catholicity and modern spiritualism. He would have us believe that Catholics deny the authority of the Bible, because they assert a divinely commissioned and assisted authority for declaring its true sense. Does the lawyer deny the authority of the law because he asserts that the court has power to declare and apply it? The Bible, we have seen, must have an interpreter. We assert for interpreter the Church of God, appointed and aided by our Lord himself to declare infallibly its true and genuine sense; the author asserts for interpreter each reader's own private judgment, that is, asserts for each reader the same authority that we assert for the Catholic Church. If we supersede the Bible, pray, what does he do? If he does not, pray, by what right does he say we do? Which is most respectful to the Bible, subjecting it to an infallible interpreter who cannot err as to its sense, or to an interpreter who can err and confessedly does err? After all, our author does not rise above mere vulgar Protestantism. Undoubtedly we take the Bible as interpreted by our Church, who has authority to determine its sense; but it is only the true and genuine sense of the Bible that is God's word, and that sense once determined is law for all Catholics, — for the Pope and bishop, as well as for the humblest layman. And from it there is no dispensation.

The author considers, also, that to be required to believe on the authority of the Church is spiritual despotism; but he himself asserts that to deny an external *authoritative* revelation is tantamount to infidelity, and maintains, and requires all to maintain, that the Bible is such authoritative revelation. He then requires all to believe on the authority of the Bible, and, we presume, recognizes no one's moral right to believe any thing contrary to its teachings. God

in the Bible says so, is for him a final answer to all questions. If God in his Church says so, which is final for us in all cases, is spiritual despotism, how does he escape the charge of asserting a like despotism? What in relation to mental freedom is the difference in principle in saying that we are to believe what the Church teaches, or that we are bound to believe what the Bible teaches? The rule is as absolute in the one case as in the other, and the only difference is, that in the one case we have a living teacher, with regard to whose teaching there is no obscurity or uncertainty, while in the other we have a dead book, whose teachings after our best efforts remain dark and doubtful. In the one case we may have certain truth, in the other we can have only uncertain opinions or mere guesses; but the submission demanded to authority is precisely the same in both cases. It is singular that Protestants, who are continually asserting the authority of the Bible, and at the same time denouncing the Catholic Church as a spiritual despotism, never appear to be aware of this! The probability with the majority of Protestants is, that the assertion of the authority of the Bible is only an indirect way of denying all authority; for the Bible is authority with them only so far as they fancy it is in their favor. When it is against them, they deny or explain it away.

But it is time to draw our remarks to a close. There is no doubt that a crisis is forming in the Protestant world, rent as it is by the two contrary movements we have described. The author is right in calling his work *The Eclipse of Faith*. All who are living and active among Protestants feel that for them faith is at least eclipsed. We have but to study with some little care the movements in regard to religion among them, to be assured that they are well aware that thus far, as to what it has established, Protestantism has proved a failure, and the Reformation has belied its promises. They see and feel that they cannot stay where they are; that they must either recede or push on farther. Their Protestantism, as it has been and is, does not satisfy them, and their movements are all directed to obtaining a religious form and faith which they have not. The most staunch Protestant feels that Protestantism is not, though he trusts it will speedily become, the truth. The later German theologians, the Catholicizing school, are looking for something more than they have, and

the infidelizing school is not contented with the position it has taken up. All feel that something is wanting, that as yet their Protestantism is incomplete and insufficient. They are seeking, not practising, religion. Hence on all hands is the effort going on to complete Protestantism in one sense or another. We have no disposition to treat with unkindness these efforts, and indeed we are pleased to see them, for they must soon bring about, if they have not already in fact brought about, a crisis in the fate of Protestantism, since on the one hand they will lead from Protestantism to the Church, and on the other will make it clear to all that Christianity cannot be retained without renouncing for ever the Protestant Reformation. They will force all to acknowledge that the real issue of our age, as we asserted some nine years ago, is between Catholicity and infidelity. This is the real issue, let who will deny it. Out of the Catholic Church faith is not merely eclipsed, it is extinct.

We cannot look upon the Protestant world, whose hopes, fears, and passions we so long and so deeply shared, without being ourselves more or less moved. The little of life they retained from the Church has been exhausted; the few rays of light which were reflected upon them from the truth which for them had sunk below the horizon are gone out. God and heaven recede from their view. For them the bright stars are extinguished, the sun is darkened, and the moon turned to blood. The earth quakes beneath their feet, and the universe seems on the brink of dissolution. Fear seizes their hearts, and the poor Protestant seems to himself to stand alone on a mere point in space, with a universal blank around him. He sees no Father in heaven, no kindred on earth. The frightful abyss yawns on all sides of him, and he is unable to endure it. He would fain fill it up even with "spirits and goblins damned." He feels that it would be a consolation to believe even in the Devil, for the Devil is something, and something is better than nothing. What shall the poor man do? Return to the Church of God, draw new life from her breasts, and rest his weary head upon her maternal bosom? No, he will not yet do that. Absolute denial he recoils from with horror. What then shall he do? Alas! we see what he will do, nay, what he has done and is doing. He revives long-forgotten necromancy, invokes the spirits of the dead,

and reëstablishes in the nineteenth century the worship of demons. The fact stares us in the face. Here, then, proud and loud-boasting Protestantism, is what you have come to at last. You can go no farther. You can sink no lower, for a lower deep there is not. You have sunk to the lowest depths of ancient heathenism, and in our very midst, in our own city, called not inaptly the Athens of America, you revive and practise the grossest superstitions of the old Gentiles, from which two thousand years ago Catholicity had redeemed the world. It is not a thing pleasant to think of.

Is the darkness of heathenism to gather once more over the world, and are the devils to have again their temples and their worship, and again to deceive the nations by their ambiguous oracles and their lying wonders? We do not believe it. But Protestants, it seems to us, must soon see that the only salvation of the race from this terrible catastrophe is in a return to the Catholic Church. She alone has power to put the demons to flight, to dispel the darkness of error, and dissipate the clouds of superstition. She has done it once for the nations, and she can and will do it again, when they shall have learned enough from their apostasy to feel that apostasy from the Church involves sooner or later a relapse into demonism, or the worship of devils. Have they not already learned this? We think they have, or well-nigh learned it, and therefore we regard the fall of Islamism and Protestantism as an event by no means distant. Events march in our day with fearful rapidity, and as God is now evidently intervening in a special manner in behalf of his Spouse, his Beloved, for whom he gave his life, and whom he hath purchased with his own blood, there is no saying how soon such an event may take place.

Turkey is only propped up by the rivalries of the Christian powers of Europe, but must fall at farthest within a very few years, in spite of those rivalries. And her fall will involve that of Islamism. Russia, a schismatic power, may indeed come down to the Bosphorus, which for a time may be disastrous; but if she does, she must, in order to continue there, cease to be schismatic. England will ere long lose her colonies, for she is adopting the system of allowing them to govern themselves, and, once accustomed to govern themselves, they will not long consent to remain

in the condition of colonies; and once reduced to her island home, she ceases to be able to uphold Protestantism, and must herself return to Catholic unity, which she broke only in a pet and for political reasons. 'This country, of course, will follow in the footsteps of England. China must soon openly tolerate our missionaries, and Japan be opened to them, and then the whole world will acknowledge the successor of the Fisherman as the Vicar of Christ on earth. The child may be now born that will live to see this glorious consummation, which sooner or later is sure to be effected. The powers of darkness have had their day, and though the Church in this world will always be the Church Militant, yet not always shall we look back upon the Middle Ages, and regret them as the Ages of Faith.

ART. II. — *Histoire du Canada depuis sa Decouverte jusqu'à nos Jours*. Par F. X. GARNEAU. Seconde Edition corrigée et augmentée. Quebec. 1852. 3 tomes. 8vo.

It is but a short time since this second edition of M. Garneau's valuable History of Canada came to our knowledge. We had for some years been acquainted with the first edition, but we did not review it, because we seemed to discover certain objectionable doctrines advanced in it, which we had been given to understand would be corrected in a second impression, as well as some few trifling inaccuracies into which the author had unconsciously fallen, and which he would be enabled to rectify by consulting some highly important state papers not previously accessible to him.

This History appears at a very seasonable time; and truly and earnestly would we desire to have it well and extensively read by all our American friends. These are the days of progress and manifest destiny; we are again encroaching on Mexico, and long and wistful are the glances we cast on Central America: the present administration will not quit office until Cuba is annexed, if annexation be possible. The natural limits of our glorious republic are vast oceans, the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the

ice-bound polar seas. If our people rest satisfied with these limits, and do not annex the Sandwich Islands, or fit out Japan expeditions to more effect than our energetic government; if they do not excite new revolutions in China, and, awaking in the gold-hunters of Australia old reminiscences of a common origin, language, and system of laws, kindle in them longings after independence and union with the greatest of republics, — we shall consider them as quite moderate, although they will be held by many to be false and recreant to their professions, and to the principles of democracy and manifest destiny. Nevertheless, if not the whole boundless world, at least the entire North American continent must be ours, must grow prosperous and become opulent and renowned under the stars and stripes.

Not the most insignificant portion of this continent is one which Nature, we are told, doubtless intended to have included in the American Union, a country more extensive than have been many empires of the Old World, whose lakes are as oceans, whose rivulets are swifter, deeper, and broader than the famed rivers of European history, and whose population is counted almost by millions, and yet is scarcely noted in our wild enthusiasm for territorial aggrandizement and the spread of democratic principles. Canada, we are assured, must soon come. England cannot long hold her North American provinces in subjection; she has already abandoned almost the entire administration of their internal affairs to the local Parliaments, and has given them more than one broad hint that she shall not hold herself responsible for them if they become embroiled with foreign powers. As a matter of course, therefore, they must seek admission to our all-engrossing republic. Such may be the case; we do not dispute it, neither do we accord it. Yet before it is taken for granted that such will be the case, it would be well to inquire somewhat into the nature of this country, its resources, its past history, the character of its people, and their institutions. We know of no work better adapted to satisfy such inquiries than this History by M. Garneau. Unlike the generality of history-makers in our days, he writes *history*, not dissertations upon history or its so-called philosophy. He advances few opinions of his own, and those few, as it were, only casually; he does not assume to be the pedagogue as well as the recorder of facts, but leaves the reader to draw his own in-

ferences. He neither writes in the support of a hobby, nor in the interests of a party to whose support he must sacrifice truth and principle. So far as we have been able to judge, it seems to have been his conviction that a good history of Canada was needed: he loved his country and sincerely desired to see her occupy a position among the nations of the earth. A vast amount of pious letters, it is true, had been written by holy missionaries, memoirs, incomplete and mangled sketches to any amount, but none, unless we except Charlevoix's, worthy to be called a history, none which a Canadian could peruse without blushing for the patience which allowed ignorance or prejudice thus to confound the whole interests of a people with the toils of a poor missionary among the savages or the experience of an *attaché* of the government. M. Garneau may have been indignant to hear it announced, as we ourselves heard it somewhat pompously announced, that a noted ecclesiastic, who a few years since came from Paris to visit this country, whence he went to Canada, and spent an entire winter and spring at Montreal, at one time, however, going as far as the Lake of the Two Mountains, where he passed several days studying the character, habits, and manners of the aborigines, was to enrich Canada with a history such as no Canadian could prepare. Our author may not have thought the quiet solitudes of Issy the best fitted for the historian of a country more than a thousand leagues distant, nor the famous grot where Bossuet and Fénelon disputed on Madame de Guyon's sanctity, however many souvenirs it might awaken of Louis the Fourteenth's age, the best calculated to inspire the recorder of Indian cruelties, any more than the well-trimmed walks around, and prettily cropped lawns, are calculated to convey an adequate idea of the deep and sombre shades of our primeval forests. Whatever may have been his motives in writing his History, he certainly seems to have undertaken it for no selfish ends, but with a conscientious resolution to give a succinct and faithful narrative of the dangers and vicissitudes through which his country has come to be what it is. We have examined his work thoroughly, and although we have here and there detected certain inaccuracies, and met some expressions which we could well wish had been omitted, since, even if true, they have the air of having been dictated by bitterness of feeling and private wrong,

and are not called for by the general tenor of the facts he narrates, we must bear witness to the very superior manner in which he has accomplished his laborious task, to the high artistic merit of his History, and to the purity and grace of his style, which many a celebrated Parisian *littéraire* might vainly strive to equal.

But apart from the peculiar interest which a History of Canada is calculated to excite at the present moment, it will not be found unworthy of a diligent perusal for its own sake, nor will it prove uninteresting. In many, but not in all respects, the early settlement of Canada resembled that of our own country. The two countries were, it is true, settled by very different classes of men, actuated by very different motives, and aiming at very different results; but both had long and sanguinary wars to wage with the savages, and to contend against the jealousy, apathy, and short-sighted policy of a home government, the rigors of a northern climate, and their own mutual hostilities. Of the character of our own Puritan fathers we have not now to speak; it is too well known and established, with all its vices and many of its good qualities. It would be as idle to deny that they possessed the elements of a great people, as it would be to question their personal courage and enterprise. But it is with Canada and the Canadians that we have now to do.

'The old Quirites, in the palmiest days of ancient Rome, vaunted their origin and descent from the Trojans, the establishment of their nation in Italy by Æneas and the few who escaped the vengeance of the cruel Achilles and the flames of Troy; and they were proud to regard the dangers and difficulties they had been obliged to encounter and overcome, as a certain augury of the eminence to which their race, founded in despite of such obstacles, was destined. Their greatest epic poet rehearses them all, the wrath of Juno, storm and shipwreck, seas crossed and re-crossed *multos per annos*, then proudly exclaims:—

“Tantæ molis erat Romanam condere gentem.”

Such was the dauntless and persevering Roman's idea of hardship and difficulty. A battle or two dispersed the armies of Turnus, and Æneas became the heir of the Latian throne. How would Æneas and his companions have fared, had they embarked upon the boisterous Atlan-

tic, and once got fairly out of sight of land? The skilful Palinurus would hardly have found his way through the heavy fogs on and about the Banks of Newfoundland, and worse than Scylla and Charybdis would have proved those vast icebergs the Atlantic navigator so often meets. No armies drawn up in battle array would have thrown every thing upon the issue of one engagement, no fair Lavinia, heiress of a kingdom, would here have welcomed his alliance. Now that the ocean is almost bridged with noble packets and steam-ships, we scarcely think of its perils, nor of what they were to its first navigators; and now that the forests have been cleared, and the red men driven far from our peaceful homes, we forget how fearful was their war-whoop when it burst upon the scattered frontiersmen. But let whoever will consider the difficulties the settlers of these regions had to encounter, and all the epic trials, the fabulous achievements of mythological times, and the world-renowned perseverance of the old Romans sink into mean insignificance.

The French nation seems to have been the first to avail itself of Cabot's discoveries. Early in the sixteenth century, a number of French vessels were engaged in the cod-fishery upon the Banks of Newfoundland; and it is certain that in the year 1506 one Jean Denys had already drawn up a chart of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and that two years afterwards a Dieppe shipmaster, Aubert by name, carried several natives of Canada over to France as specimens. Indeed, if we admit the authority of the well-known legal work entitled *Us et Coutumes de la Mer*, we must tear the laurels from the brow of Columbus, and maintain that the whalers of Guienne and Cape Breton, near Bayonne, in their search after the monsters of the deep, became so hazardous as to venture into all latitudes and longitudes; that they thus discovered Newfoundland, Cape Breton, and Canada, a hundred years before Columbus set sail from Palos; and that if the Castilians were as anxious for the truth as they have been ardent to rob the French of their glory, they would acknowledge with Christopher Witfliet, Anthony Magin, and Anthony of St. Roman, a Benedictine religious, that the pilot who first told Columbus of the existence of the New World was one of *nos Basques Terreneuviers*.*

* *Jugemens d'Oléron*, Art. 44, N. 30 et seq.

We do not vouch for the truth of this, but would refer the reader to Humboldt's *Cosmos*, Vol. II. Part II. § 6, and to the Bull of Pope Victor the Second, dated the 29th of October in the year 1056, in which he confirms to Adalbert, Archbishop of Hamburg and Bremen, all his ancient privileges; among others, his right to be the legate of the Holy See in all the countries of the North, expressly in Denmark, Sweden, *Iceland*, and *Greenland*.

Francis the First sent Verrazzani, a Florentine, in the year 1523, on a voyage of discovery to the New World. Of this voyage we have no account. In a second, he coasted along our shores from Florida to Newfoundland. He afterwards sailed on a third voyage, but nothing was ever after heard either of him or his companions. The fate of this celebrated navigator considerably damped the ardor of Francis the First for Transatlantic expeditions, and it was not until after the peace of Cambrai that Philippe de Chabot, Admiral of France, could again excite it, and induce him to send Jacques Cartier, a shipmaster of St. Maloes, to lay claim in his behalf to some portion of the lately discovered continent; and when the kings of Spain and Portugal protested against his project, he exclaimed, "Why may not I, as well as my brothers, share in this new discovery? I would like to see the clause in Adam's will that devises to them alone this vast heritage!"

Cartier sailed in the year 1534 from St. Maloes, but only explored the Gulf of St. Lawrence, already well known, and penetrated as far as the fifty-first degree of latitude, in search of a northwest passage to China; but in this project, which no wise man can now regard as other than chimerical, he, like so many others down to Sir John Franklin, signally failed. In the following year he sailed on a second voyage, and ascended the river St. Lawrence as high as the Isle of Orleans, and then, as the season was far advanced, took the *audacious resolution*, as our author terms it, of passing the winter in that inhospitable land. He put his small fleet into winter quarters in the river St. Charles, near the Indian village Stadaconé, now Quebec, and then continued his explorations. Cartier, like so many of his countrymen, who, after the establishment of the French colonies in Canada, were at the head of the government, knew very well how to acquire and maintain an influence over the savages, which enabled them, with-

out absolutely expelling the prior occupants of the soil, to reclaim and civilize it, and to create dissensions among the different tribes, by which they succeeded in seriously weakening, if not in entirely breaking, the power of their opponents, and in destroying at the same time their own allies not less effectually than their more open-dealing southern neighbors destroyed their enemies, and that too without incurring the like odium. He certainly had the tact to acquire the friendship of the savages he encountered; and under this point of view, if under no other, the winter he spent in Canada was highly advantageous to French interests. On his return to France in the spring, he found it torn by internal dissensions, and involved in a sanguinary war with the Emperor Charles the Fifth. It was then no time to talk of sending out colonies, or to make provision for their maintenance, and no new expedition was undertaken until several years after, when De la Roque, Lord of Roberval, was made governor of the lately explored regions. He at once chose Cartier to command a fleet of five vessels destined to transport colonists to the new country, and he himself followed during the next year, 1542, with three vessels and two hundred more colonists. But this expedition failed through the apathy of the French government; and after eighteen months passed in Canada, the attempt at colonization was abandoned. In the year 1549, under the reign of Henry the Second, De la Roque set out on a new expedition, but neither he nor his associates ever reached their destination, nor was any thing ever known of their fate.

The Marquis de la Roche, in the year 1598, next obtained from Henry the Third the charge of lieutenant-generalship over all Canada, Acadia, and the circumjacent country, with extraordinary powers, and set out to colonize his territory; but he very foolishly left his colonists, forty in number, on the Isle of Sable, and then managed to get driven off the coast. It was five years before any relief was sent to the unfortunate colonists abandoned on a desert island, where the thermometer often sinks in winter to more than forty degrees below zero, and then all but twelve had perished.

In the year 1600, Chauvin, a French naval officer, made a very successful trading voyage to Canada; and three years after, Pontgravé, a wealthy merchant of St. Maloes,

accompanied by the celebrated Champlain, then a captain in the French navy, sailed on an exploring expedition, and ascended the St. Lawrence as high as the Sault St. Louis. Henry the Fourth was so much pleased with the charts they showed him of the new country, and with their description of it, that he at once conferred great powers upon Pierre Dugua Sieur de Monts and Governor of Pons, and commissioned him to found a colony in New France. De Monts organized a trading-company, and sailed from Havre de Grace in the year 1604, accompanied by Champlain and the Baron de Poutrincourt, with a number of colonists. Pontgravé afterwards joined them with more colonists, and they laid the foundations of Port Royal in Acadia, now Annapolis, which, after having been several times abandoned, and having undergone the greatest vicissitudes, — the intrigues and hostility of the Marchioness of Guercheville, who purchased the rights of De Monts in Acadia, and distinguished herself by her support of the Jesuits, ruining Poutrincourt and reducing the poor inhabitants to the hard necessity of subsisting an entire winter on *roots* and *acorns*, — finally passed into the hands of the English.

Champlain, acting as the lieutenant of M. de Monts, whose powers, after having been for a short time revoked, were now restored for twelve months, set sail in the year 1608, with two vessels, the one for the purposes of trade, the other for the transportation of colonists. He disembarked at Quebec, the 3d of July, on the site of the present Lower City, beneath the rocky promontory which Nature seemed to have formed to be the cradle and seat of a new empire, and the magnificent situation of which had struck all who ascended the river, even from the days of Jacques Cartier. Here Champlain determined to fix his establishment, and he set all his people at work, some to clear the land, others to construct a large fortified building. Then bustle and confusion took the place of the deep silence which had hitherto reigned almost supreme upon those solitary banks, and announced to the passing savages that European activity had laid the foundations of a great city, to be famous long after in the history of the New World.

The French settlement in Canada was now fairly commenced. Its fate was often uncertain; it shifted with the enterprise or folly of the various trading-companies under whose auspices it was long placed, — with the prudence and

energy of the different governors and lieutenants-general, such as the Comte de Soissons, the Prince de Condé, the Duc de Ventadour, and Cardinal Richelieu, and of their deputies, — but nevertheless slowly gained strength, and saw its frontiers gradually extended until Quebec, in the year 1629, reduced by famine, surrendered to Sir David Keith, acting under the orders of the Earl of Stirling, English governor of Acadia. It was however restored a few years after by the treaty of St. Germain, and the old *ré-gime*, perfectly arbitrary and despotic as it was, was reëstablished. Thirty years afterwards the last of the great trading-companies was dissolved, and Canada passed directly under the control of the king, and the governors he chose to appoint. An effort was made to establish a council as a check upon the governor, and it was not entirely unsuccessful. It was first called the *sovereign council*, on the principle, we presume, of *lucus a non lucendo*, for its powers were extremely limited. But even this could not escape the all-searching jealousy of Louis the Fourteenth. "What have they to do in Canada with sovereignty?" asked he. "Let the council be called *superior*, but not *sovereign*." The administration of justice was at the same time placed under the Intendant, and subjected to certain reforms.

From the restoration of Quebec until the year 1690, Canada remained in a state of comparative tranquillity so far as the English and their colonies were concerned; but she had at all times the hostility of various Indian tribes to contend with.

Stadaconé and Hochelaga, on whose site Montreal was built, had been abandoned, and those savages who peopled the country at the date of Cartier's first visit to it had disappeared long before Champlain laid the foundations of his colony of Quebec. The country was now peopled by still more barbarous tribes of the Huron family, deadly enemies of the Iroquois, with whom they had long been at war. Champlain regarded it as his best policy to form an alliance with his nearest neighbors; he espoused their quarrel, and found himself involved in a war with the Iroquois, which lasted longer than the French domination on the banks of the St. Lawrence. He had unwittingly taken the side of the weak; but neither he nor his successors could save them from utter ruin. Soon after the establish-

ment of Montreal, which was founded by M. de Maisonneuve, in the year 1642, the war between the Hurons and the Iroquois broke out with redoubled fury. Every day the superiority of the Iroquois became more and more apparent, their victories more and more decisive. A peace was indeed effected by the exertions of the governor, M. de Montmagny, which lasted nearly two years; but a fatal epidemic broke out among the Iroquois, and their harvests were destroyed by worms. These misfortunes they attributed to the sorceries of F. Jogues; in their fury they seized him and a young Frenchman, killed them, cut off their heads and paraded them about on poles, and threw their bodies into the river. This outrage they well knew broke the peace, and they resolved to follow up the rupture; they collected all their forces, and first surprised the Huron village of St. Joseph in the absence of the fighting men, and butchered old men, women, and children, to the number of seven hundred. This was one of the many villages where the Indians converted to Christianity lived under the direction of the missionaries. F. Daniel was the pastor of St. Joseph, and he perished nobly with his neophytes. The next expedition of the Iroquois was against the village of St. Ignatius, where they slaughtered about four hundred persons, and took prisoners FF. Brébœuf and Lalemant, whom they afterwards tortured and killed.

After these massacres the success of the contending parties was for a time nearly equally balanced; but the superiority of the Iroquois finally triumphed in a great battle in which the principal Huron warriors perished. In less than eight days every Huron village, excepting that of St. Mary, was deserted: the unfortunate wretches sought refuge in the Isle of St. Joseph, but here also misfortune pursued them.

“ They depended on fishing and the chase; but both chase and fishery failed, and even before the close of autumn they were out of provisions. What a prospect for a long winter! They were soon reduced to all the horrors of famine: they violated the graves of their fathers, and fed on their rotten flesh; infants died in the arms of their mothers, and the mothers devoured their dead infants. These were scenes which shocked even barbarism. But they had not long to await the ordinary consequences of famine. Contagious diseases soon broke out, and carried off many of those whom famine had spared. The missionaries here, amid these scenes of

desolation, as everywhere else, acted like true men of God. The wretched Hurons knew not in their despair whom to blame, and they attributed to these apostles themselves their present situation. 'Our mortal foes, the Iroquois,' they said, 'believe not in God, nor love prayer; their iniquities are without bounds, and yet they prosper. Our fathers, since we have abandoned their customs, slay and massacre us, burn us, and totally destroy our villages. What avails it to us that we have listened to the Gospel, if faith and death march hand in hand? We see no *white heads* among us, now that we have learned to pray: we all die before our time.'

"Tribes which had numbered eight hundred fighting men were now reduced to thirty, and these old men and women."—Vol. I. pp. 132, 133.

Some of the Hurons sought an asylum among the French; others mingled with the neighboring nations, and drew upon them also the deadly hatred of the Iroquois; others found a home in Pennsylvania; others fled far beyond Lake Superior; and a few finally became incorporated with the victors; and their country all along the banks of the Ottawa, but lately so thickly peopled, became a wild and uninhabited waste.

Not long afterwards a peace was concluded between the French and the Iroquois, which, although interrupted at times, as well by the Iroquois scalping-parties as by the French expeditions against them, did, nevertheless, afford the Canadians much tranquillity, and enable them to establish a great number of forts and settlements, to extend their frontiers, and to push their discoveries all through the Western country as far as the Rocky Mountains, and to the South as far as the Gulf of Mexico, where the colony of Louisiana was shortly after established.

The French emigrants to Canada may be divided into three classes. The missionaries, like the Franciscans, and more especially the Jesuits, who made new missions and the conversion of whole peoples their object, but who nevertheless founded a college at Quebec, or like the Sulpitians, who bought the island of Montreal, and seignorial rights over it, soon after its first colonization, and laid the foundations of a great and noble establishment there, which is to-day what it was two hundred years ago. A second class comprised the colonists, properly so called, persons who from motives of piety, poverty, or to escape the sword of justice bared against them at home, were content to

take up their abode in the cold regions of the North. The emigration of this class was never patronized by the French government, and was naturally enough strenuously opposed by the directors of the fur-trading companies; they knew very well that wild beasts and civilized men could not dwell together, and, looking only to their own material interests, they preferred to have the country reserved for the wild beasts. The third class consisted of traders, merchants, whose only business was to carry on the fur trade with the savages, and bold adventurers, gentlemen for the most part, who came hither to escape the restraints of a civilized life, or the restrictions Henry the Fourth and his successors laid on their order, but who yet had no aristocratical scruples as to turning a penny in a close bargain with a drunken Indian; officers also of the army and navy, who, wearied of fighting in the old style, sought new adventures here, new explorations, new discoveries, a new El Dorado, such as Cortez and Pizarro found in Mexico and Peru.

Singular as it may seem, the first and last of these classes were ever the most closely allied. The missionaries and the reckless adventurers who, whether they were without reproach or not, were most undeniably without fear, travelled together; together they traversed for thousands of leagues a country never before trodden by a European. The missionary with his cross and his breviary, the reckless trader intent on gain, were not men likely to be balked by any ordinary perils or obstacles; for the latter found a rich harvest ready reaped to his hands by the far distant Indian tribes, and it cost him but a mere trifle, a necklace or a string of beads, a handsomely mounted rifle or a jug of fire-water, to load his canoes with furs afterwards to adorn prince and prelate at the gay French court. The former had the glory of his order and the service of his Divine Master in view, and never did the Jesuit appear so worthy of the Society founded by a St. Ignatius as when announcing the truths of the Christian religion to the wild, uncivilized barbarian. When he met assembled nations, — as did F. Allouez, at a great village of the Chippewas, savages from the farthest banks of Lake Michigan, the Sacs, who inhabited all the wild country between the same lake and the Mississippi, the Knisteneaux from the swampy forests of the North, the Illinois, who roamed over those vast prairies

which now wave with rich harvests, and the Sioux Indians from the very base of the Rocky Mountains, — he became eloquent, and announced the glad tidings of eternal salvation in words which burned into the very hearts of the untamed children of the forest. They penetrated far beyond the *Laurentides*, even to Hudson's Bay, roamed through all the country of the Sioux, and sailed down the great Mississippi until the wide ocean burst upon their enraptured gaze.

Champlain, Perrot, Joliet, and La Salle were first and foremost among the adventurers: the names of FF. Allouez, Marquette, Brébœuf, Jogues, Druillettes, Mesnard, and Hennepin are among the names civilization and Christianity ought ever to honor for their zeal, devotion, and intrepidity.

It was fortunate for Canada that she enjoyed this period of comparative tranquillity, for the time was fast approaching when she was to encounter a foe of a far different character from that of her savage neighbors.

In order to quiet the Iroquois, a convention of their chiefs and those of several other nations was proposed in the year 1687. It met, and a treaty of peace was solemnly concluded; but a Huron forest-born Machiavelli, the Rat, as he was called by the French, had the tact to induce the Iroquois to break the peace. It was not, however, until the year 1689 that the storm long gathering burst. In the language of our author: —

“Nothing announced any extraordinary event, when, on the night of the 5th of August, fourteen hundred Iroquois crossed Lake St. Louis under cover of a hail-storm, and silently landed on the upper part of the Island of Montreal. Before morning they had placed their sentinels in squads upon every house for leagues around. The inhabitants were all plunged in sleep, — to many an eternal sleep. The savages awaited the signal, which was finally given: then rose the frightful death-cry: the houses were broken open, and the massacre everywhere commenced at the same moment: they slaughtered men, women, and children: they fired the houses of those who resisted, and these, as they rushed out, fell into the hands of the assailants, who exhausted upon them all that fury could inspire to barbarians.” — Vol. I. p. 274.

Other barbarities also were they guilty of, too shocking for belief, were they not familiar to all acquainted with the early history of the North American colonies. Mothers forced to roast their own infants put living on the spit, and

two hundred persons of every age and sex burnt to death, the whole island ravaged and inundated with blood as far as the gates of Montreal, was not enough to cloy their insatiable appetite: from La Chine they crossed the river and burnt the entire parish of La Chenaie, and massacred all the inhabitants.

The governor, Denonville, then at Montreal, knew not what to do. He abandoned the poor colonists to their fate, and obliged all the soldiery to remain within the walls of the city. After this, his masterpiece of pusillanimity, Denonville was superseded in the government by the Count of Frontenac.

James the Second had just been succeeded by William the Third on the English throne, and hostilities had again broken out between France and England. Frontenac was not the man to remain idle when blood could be spilt or butchery done; and he at once made every possible preparation for the promotion of French interests within his own sphere of command.

During the administration of Denonville, the Chevalier de Callières had formed a plan for taking the city of New York, and of thus subjecting the entire province of that name. So anxious was he to put it into execution, that he went to France and proposed it to Louis the Fourteenth. "Give me," he said, "fourteen hundred regular troops and six hundred chosen Canadians, and I will advance by the river Richelieu and Lake Champlain. Albany is not walled, has only three hundred inhabitants, and is defended by only one hundred and fifty soldiers; New York has no other fortifications than a stone fort, and has only two hundred infantry and the same number of cavalry. This conquest will render you master of one of the finest ports in America, and of a fertile country in a superb climate." Louis *the Great*, as some affect to call him, saw nothing very great in such a plan, and with his wonted apathy let it pass. But Frontenac thought better of it, and finally succeeded in awakening Louis the Fourteenth. They then laid their plans for the total subversion of the English domination on this continent. The plans had much about them that was good; they went into details and provided for all and several the contingencies which would be likely to arise after their execution; but the chief difficulty was, after all, the execution of them. The

English were to be chased from Hudson's Bay and all the North; inroads were to be made all along the frontiers; New York was to be attacked both by land and water, and the Chevalier de Callières was to govern the new conquest. His instructions were to leave the Catholic population unmolested, *provided* he could depend upon their fidelity, and to take prisoners all the officers and principal citizens, and hold them to heavy ransoms. New York once taken, New England, it was supposed, and the more southern colonies, would become more easily assailable. Moreover, a line of forts was to be established from Lake Ontario to the Mississippi, which were gradually to be drawn closer and closer to the English colonies, until they — drove us overboard.

Certainly all this looked very well on paper, and it was no fault either of the French government or of its representatives in Canada if it was not put into execution. It was not abandoned so long as France retained a foothold upon the banks of the St. Lawrence, and even in times of peace she never ceased to push her preparations, make alliances for herself among the Indian tribes, and create enemies to the English colonies, so that upon the breaking out of hostilities she could well congratulate herself that in peace she had verily prepared for war.

The expedition to Hudson's Bay was deemed successful; three English ships were captured. That against New York, however, amounted to nothing. But some of the Indian expeditions got up under Frontenac's auspices and headed by French officers were more terrible in their consequences. The first of these was directed against Pemaquid, a small settlement in Maine, which they burnt, together with a dozen or more forts in that region, and renewed all the horrors of which Montreal had but lately been the theatre; that is, according to our author, the Indians and their French or Canadian leaders committed barbarities which would shock barbarity itself, and availed themselves of all the tortures which the Iroquois had passed day after day in devising. We beg to refer our readers to M. Garneau's account of the massacre at Montreal (Vol. I. pp. 274, 275), of which we have just spoken. Simultaneously with this expedition, another under the command of Aillebout de Mantet and Lemoine de Ste. Helene, of which *many gentlemen* formed a part, was set on

foot against Schenectady, the frightful success of which will long fill a bloody page in the annals of Indian cruelties.

The English colonies on their part were not idle; they made great preparations, but accomplished little. Sir William Phipps appeared before Quebec with a moderate armament, but, finding the place too well fortified, retired, after having made a slight demonstration, and abandoned some of his munitions of war.

The peace of Ryswick put an end to hostilities, in the year 1697, and it remained unbroken until the question of the Spanish succession again kindled the flames of war, only to be extinguished by the treaty of Utrecht, which left France shorn of a great portion of her American possessions, and Louis the Fourteenth humbled and in disgrace, as every king deserves to be who rules his kingdom from the cabinets of his mistresses.

A long period of repose was now given to the governors of Canada, to execute the plan long before formed, of gradually encroaching on the English provinces by drawing their line of forts closer and closer upon them, all the way from the great lakes to the Mississippi. It was with this intention that M. de la Galissonière and the Marquises de la Jonquière, Duquesne, and Vaudreuil, who succeeded him in the government, established forts at Detroit, Toronto, Ogdensburg, and those of Machaux, Presqu'Isle, and Duquesne. When, then, the war of the Austrian succession broke out, Canada, although somewhat neglected by the home government, was nevertheless in an excellent condition to carry on offensive operations. Through the influence of the missionaries, she had acquired a vast influence over the savages far and near; many of them were indeed converted to Christianity, but they had not therefore lost the cruel and bloodthirsty nature, treacherous and barbarous, of the North American aborigines. Sunk almost to the lowest level of humanity, hardly possessing one virtue save those of endurance and personal courage, they were only still more sanguinary, more ferocious, and more implacable, when acting under French officers. It mattered little that France sent to their assistance but moderate numbers of regular troops, for these were not adapted to warfare in the woods, where forced marches, surprise, and rapid butchery were the elements of victory.

Truly Canada owed much to the missionaries, — more than any historian of our acquaintance is willing to accord. Witness the sack of Deerfield, a single instance. The savages refused to accompany Hertel de Rouville unless their *pastor* would join them. Join them he did, and often when they were on the point of refusing to proceed, he encouraged and cheered them on; he shared with them all the fatigues of a journey for a hundred leagues in the depth of winter, and dishonored the ministry of his God and the Society of which he was a member by his presence at the slaughter of old men, defenceless women, and children. Oftentimes, it is true, they were only tools in the hands of designing men. Such was F. de Lamberville, who was sent with rich presents to the Onondagas by M. de Denonville, and commissioned to invite their chiefs to a great conference at Catarocoui. His influence alone induced them to go: they went, and were immediately seized and sent to France, loaded with irons.

This influence which the Canadian government had acquired now served them admirably; through it they were enabled to make inroads and depredations wherever they were least expected.

The war, interrupted for a moment by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, by which Louisburg, lately taken by New England militia-men under Pepperell, was restored to its old masters, soon broke out anew, and was waged with redoubled animosity. It lasted seven years, and was, especially on this continent, distinguished as well for the fierceness and cruelty with which it was carried on, as for its many cold-blooded massacres; such as took place, for example, after the capitulation of Fort Oswego, where the Indian allies of the French slaughtered a great number of prisoners and scalped all the inmates of the hospitals; and at Fort William Henry, where two thousand three hundred soldiers surrendered with the honors of war, and yet only thirteen hundred escaped the tomahawk of the savages. It is only justice to the Canadians to add, that both these expeditions were commanded by the much admired Montcalm, the ablest and most active general the French ever sent to their country, but who, nevertheless, availed not to oppose successfully the perseverance and steady courage arrayed against him: he lived long enough to see the banners of Wolfe floating in triumph over the Heights of Abra-

ham, and to die assured that the star of French domination had for ever gone down upon the western world. Quebec was taken in the year 1759; the whole country soon followed its fate, and in 1763 her conquest was confirmed to England by solemn treaty.

It was full time for the country to pass into other hands. The population, then numbering nearly sixty thousand, was at the mercy of a government which, emulating Louis the Fifteenth's court, had become utterly corrupt, venal, and unprincipled. No government officials were prohibited from engaging in commercial pursuits, and oftentimes the governor was himself the most extensive trader. Upon their return to France, the principal members of the last administration were subjected to criminal prosecutions. M. de Vaudreuil, the late governor, was acquitted, but Bigot, the Intendant, was for ever banished from the kingdom, and all his goods were confiscated. Thirty or forty others were banished, or fined to the amount of over eleven millions of francs. No doubt the French minister, M. Berryer, had a motive in diverting the public indignation at seeing sixty thousand of their own people, practising the same religion, living under the same laws, and speaking the same language, pass under a foreign yoke, and was not unwilling to conjure down the storm which he knew to be about to burst over his own guilty head by sacrificing those who had long and strenuously, though vainly, striven to avert the long foreseen and fatal event. Some idea may be formed of the efforts made to save Canada when we learn that from the year 1749 to 1760 the expenses of the war amounted to one hundred and twenty-three millions of livres.

We do not regard the government established in Canada after the conquest as by any means perfect, but it never has been, so far as we are informed, guilty of those gross abuses which disgraced the old *régime*. The policy of England in her administration of Canadian affairs seems to have been far more liberal than is usual in a colonial government; and it certainly has proved more advantageous to religion and the healthy growth of the country than could have been a French government. Our author gives a narrative of all the principal events of our Revolutionary war so far as they regard his country, and it may not be found uninteresting to those, who

have read American history only in the writings of Americans, to study some phases of that history as seen by a stranger. Our offensive operations as well in that war as in the war of 1812 were mainly directed to the conquest of Canada; and our own country was more than once assailed from that direction.

If they proved nothing else, these wars at the least proved that no number of troops can ever suffice to defend the long line of Canadian and American frontiers. Should there be another war with England, of which indeed we see no prospect, Canada must be abandoned; for it would, in the present state of things, be totally indefensible. Quebec, it is true, is accounted a second Gibraltar, and utterly impregnable. We have our doubts as to the truth of this; but even granting it to be true, Quebec does not by any means overlook the whole country, nor rule its destiny. It commands the navigation of the St. Lawrence, but with the present facilities for railroad communication between the Atlantic sea-board and all parts of Canada, it could very well be dispensed with. Except as a depot for troops and munitions of war, the citadel of Quebec with all its fortifications seems to us of little more utility than would be a castle built on the very summit of the Jungfrau. England's position in Canada is, however, an excellent one for her to hold, even as she now holds it, as a check upon us, at an annual expense of more than a million pounds sterling.

We could have desired fuller details upon several points of ecclesiastical history than we find in the volumes before us. Very little is said of the part acted by the Sulpitians in public affairs, and yet they must have had a potent voice in council. It is, however, related (Vol. I. pp. 216, et seq.) that when Frontenac, during his administration, committed Perrot, governor of Montreal, to await his trial for insubordination, the clergy generally sided with Perrot, and several Messieurs of the seminary of St. Sulpice, and especially their Superior, Salignac Fénelon, Curé of Montreal, openly espoused his cause.

"The Abbé Fénelon in his sermon for Easter Sunday," our author says, "loudly blamed the conduct of the governor, and denounced it as violent and tyrannical; and, passing from words to acts, went through the city collecting signatures to a remonstrance to the king. This bold

ness appeared a second outrage at a time when all liberty was extinguished. Frontenac sent the audacious Abbé to explain his conduct to the council, and ordered a number of ecclesiastics to appear against him. The Abbé Fénelon acted with the greatest boldness. He demanded the right enjoyed by ecclesiastics in France to speak seated and covered in the presence of sovereign councils; and suiting the action to the word, he advanced towards the members, and put on his cap with a haughty gesture, as if to brave the Count of Frontenac, who was then presiding. But Frontenac told him his conduct was quite improper, and sent him into an adjacent apartment under charge of a guard, in order to give the council time to determine what was to be done." They unanimously decided against his pretensions; and as he persisted in refusing to recognize their jurisdiction, they committed him for contempt of court. He was afterwards released, and suffered to return to his curacy of Montreal.

We are assured that the number of persons, especially of young men, assisted by the institution of the Sulpitians at Montreal, is altogether incredible; young lawyers who never saw a brief, and physicians who never made a professional call.

We certainly cannot accuse the Canadians of a neglect of education, if we may judge by the number of their colleges, of which, if we mistake not, there are ten in Lower Canada alone. Ten collegiate institutions for a population scarcely numbering seven hundred thousand most undoubtedly show a general fondness for study, and an ardent desire to diffuse the advantages of education. But are so many colleges really an advantage to a country such as Canada? Upon this point, we must confess, we have our doubts. It seems to us that the standard of excellence is fixed altogether too low; but how can it be otherwise when it is adapted to the capabilities of every thick-headed, overgrown farmer's boy, instead of the really able and intelligent? Moreover, in an agricultural country, in a comparatively poor country, all but a very few must be engaged in manual labor. But one year or two years spent in one of these colleges, no less than a complete course of study, entirely unfits one for the station the great mass must occupy in life. Who that can conjugate a regular Latin verb or recite the Greek alphabet

will willingly condescend to toil and delve for his daily bread? Comparatively few of the graduates in the Canadian colleges have capital enough to go into business; few speak English sufficiently well to seek employment either in this country or in England, even were they willing to quit their native land, and there are only three professions open to them at home. The ranks of the clergy, thanks to these institutions, are kept well filled; but the country is overrun, so to speak, with lawyers and physicians. The Canadians are an extremely healthy people, and if a little unwell are far more likely to go without their breakfast, and dinner too if necessary, than to call in a physician; and being chiefly engaged in agricultural pursuits, law-suits and litigation do by no means abound. Neither lawyers nor physicians are therefore much in demand. What is to be done? A smattering of Latin and geometry, and perhaps also of psychology, is very far from sufficing to fit the young man for the rank he ought to hold in society. No wonder that an *Avenir* party started up a few years since, no wonder there were complaints, dissatisfaction, and longings for a change; the wonder is that they made no change.

We make these remarks with no feelings of harshness or ill-will towards the Canadians, nor are we ignorant that our own country lies greatly exposed to a retortion of the argument; but we have written this article resolved not to make comparisons, "for comparisons," as *Dogberry* says, "are odorous." So far different are our sentiments, that we love Canada and honor the Canadians. We often point with pride to Canada, and rejoice to tread its soil, for there we feel that we are in a Catholic country, — a country first explored by Catholics and by them reclaimed and civilized, — where our holy religion is still venerated, and still flourishes. We love to see the cross by the way-side, and the people respecting, honoring, and keeping the faith. It cannot be without some design of Providence that the Church has found a foothold in the North, and has stood firm and immovable upon it for more than two hundred years. From the North, it was said of old, the conquerors come. Thus in Asia, when the carnal Jews hardened their hearts and grew stubborn in their sins, from the North came the nations called by the Almighty to smite them, and carry them away captives; from the North, again,

came the hordes of barbarians who overthrew the old Roman empire, and made Europe what it has since been ; and it may yet happen in America that the *faith* of the North shall prevail over all our hemisphere.

ART. III. *The Errors and Superstitions of the Church of Rome. Being the Dudleian Lecture delivered in the Chapel of Harvard College, on Wednesday, May 11, 1853.* By GEORGE W. BURNAP, D. D., of Baltimore, Md. Published in the Christian Examiner. Boston : Crosby, Nichols, & Co. July, 1853.

A MAN by the name of Paul Dudley, we know not how many years since, left a fund to Harvard College, for the establishment of a Lecture, to be delivered annually, we believe, in support of natural and revealed religion, and against infidelity, prelacy, and papacy. Consequently, once in four years we are treated to a lecture against the Church of Rome. This year the lecturer was Dr. Burnap, of Baltimore, a literary man of some pretensions, a passable scholar, and, as far as we have heard, a very respectable gentleman, belonging to the extreme Right, as Mr. Parker belongs to the extreme Left, of the American Unitarians.

We have read Dr. Burnap's Lecture with some attention, but we do not find that it rises above the level of mediocrity. It contains nothing novel or striking, and is remarkable neither for the depth of its views nor the clearness, force, and relevancy of its reasoning. It is an hour's public talk of a polished gentile, of very moderate abilities, on a subject of which he knows nothing, not even so much as to suspect his own ignorance, and is as entertaining and as instructive as we can reasonably expect such talk to be. The author's self-complacency is, upon the whole, rather amusing, and his *naïveté* is charming. Many a man has lectured against the Catholic Church, who has shown himself as weak, and far less polite and good-natured, and the ablest of those who have sought to immortalize themselves like him of old who fired the temple of Ephesus, have seldom done much better. He is free from the nastiness of

Leahy and Giustiniani, and the vulgarity and malignity of Achilli and Gavazzi, and not much inferior to those anti-popery celebrities and pets of Evangelical saints in the appositeness and cogency of his reasoning.

After an introduction of some length, in which he manifests considerable alarm at the rapid spread of Catholicity in this country, the lecturer proceeds to his subject, and says:—

"It is my purpose to-day to address you on three fundamental errors of the Church of Rome;—in the first place, its ultra-conservatism; in the second place, its corporate spirit; and in the third place, its unfriendliness to the diffusion of the Sacred Scriptures.

"Let it be understood, however, that in handling these topics I shall abstain from every thing sectarian and personal. Accustomed to associate in the daily intercourse of life, for more than a quarter of a century, with the members of the Catholic communion, I should be false to truth and to the courtesies of Christian charity, were I to indulge in any disparagement of the personal or Christian character of the disciples of that faith. A descendant of the Pilgrims has much to learn in this respect, when he leaves the keen atmosphere of Protestant New England. He will be surprised to find that all good men possess a common Christianity; that dogmas which he has been taught to denounce as pernicious and deride as absurd may abide for a lifetime in the mind quiescent and innoxious; that in the Catholic mind, more perhaps than any other, dogmas are laid aside to slumber, and really pervert the mind less than in some Protestant denominations, and the man is left to the guidance of the good impulses and rational principles of human nature. At any rate, in the spirit of reverence and a warm and active benevolence he will find some of the brightest examples in the Catholic Church. Having made these concessions, demanded by truth and experience, I proceed with the greater freedom to discuss what I deem the errors of our brethren of the Christian household in that communion."—pp. 49, 50.

We must leave the author to define, when he finds himself at leisure, what he means by this "common Christianity" of which he speaks with so much unction, and which we suppose is every thing in general and nothing in particular, and pass to the consideration of his proofs and illustrations of the three fundamental errors which he lays to the charge of our Church.

1. The first fundamental error is ultra-conservatism. Dr. Burnap regards it as a fundamental error, not that the

Church is conservative, but that she is *ultra*-conservative, that is, more than conservative, or conservative overmuch. A Unitarian of the right could not denounce conservatism altogether, for if he should, how could he complain of Theodore Parker? and he cannot commend conservatism without some qualification, for if he should, how could he vindicate his Unitarianism? Up to a certain point he can be conservative, but beyond that point he must be a radical, and favor the rejection of the old and the introduction of the new. The error of the Church, then, is not conservatism, but ultraism. The first thing to be settled is, therefore, the limits of conservatism, or the point up to which conservatism is conservatism, and beyond which it is ultraism, or an excess of conservatism; for before you can say what is the error on a given subject, you must know what on that subject is the truth. Now where is this point? Or where does the conservatism end and the ultraism begin? By what authority does Dr. Burnap determine this point? His own? But, *salva reverentia sua*, that does not suffice. Mr. Parker may differ with him, and contend that it should be placed much farther forward; and why is the authority of Dr. Burnap, the Unitarian minister of Baltimore, to be taken as paramount to that of Mr. Theodore Parker, a Unitarian minister of Boston? “Mr. Parker is an infidel, and goes too far.” So you say. But he denies it, and says you are an old fogie, and do not go far enough. Dr. Pusey, again, says that you yourself are an infidel, and go too far; you deny it, and say he is an old fogie, and does not go far enough. Why are you good authority against Mr. Parker, and Dr. Pusey not so against you? Or why is Mr. Parker’s authority less against you, than yours against Dr. Pusey? You tell us that the doctrine of the Trinity is an error, “one of the first aberrations of the Church in point of time,” and therefore must hold that to preserve it is ultra-conservatism. But here the whole Trinitarian world rises up and flatly contradicts you. Who is to decide between you? You say our Church is ultra-conservative. This is your assertion. She denies it, and you must be aware that, at the very lowest, her denial is as good as your assertion. The Catholic, man to man, is, at worst, the equal of the Protestant. You, an individual Protestant, say the Catholic Church is excessively conservative; I, an individual Catholic, say she is not. I am equal to you, and therefore

my denial reduces your assertion to zero, and you are just as far advanced as you were before you opened your mouth, and no farther.

Here is a grave difficulty. Before Dr. Burnap can charge the Church with being *ultra*-conservative, he must determine what is the point at which the conservatism ends and the ultraism begins. This must be a fixed point, for if it be not, he alleges nothing against the Church but his own opinion, which is of no moment. But we cannot see how he can determine this point. We are willing to grant that ultra-conservatism, if the thing is conceivable, is an error, for there may be error of excess as well as of defect; we concede, also, that if the Church has pushed her conservatism to excess, she has erred even fundamentally, and should be rejected; but the author should recollect that it is his business to prove that she has done so, and that he cannot possibly prove this before having settled the question as to the point at which conservatism must stop, — the point at which he may say, Thus far and no farther; for till he has done that, he cannot say what is *ultra* or what is not, and has no fixed criterion by which to distinguish between conservatism and ultraism. But the difficulty is, he has nothing but his private opinion by which to settle that point, and his private opinion is neutralized, not only by the teaching of the Church, which even as her private opinion is worth as much as his, but by the private opinion of his Protestant brother Parker on the one hand, and of his Protestant brother Pusey on the other. The only way he could possibly settle it would be by an appeal to a catholic authority, admitted alike by Catholics and non-Catholics; but such an authority he does not appeal to, and cannot, because there is for him no such authority.

We suppose that it must be conceded on all hands that the Church, since the author fully grants that she was the Church of Christ and for long ages the only Church of Christ, had from the beginning the right and the duty to preserve her own existence and the truth committed to her charge. To do this, we may suppose, it will be granted is only legitimate conservatism, and if the Church has done this, and only this, she cannot justly be accused of ultraism. To sustain his charge, then, the author must prove that she has done something more. But how will he do

it? To do it, he must know what she was as to her own existence in the beginning, and what, and precisely what, was the deposit of truth which she received. Does he know this? Has he any authority by which he can say infallibly what she was and what she received? Of course not. He has only his conjectures and opinions, and the conjectures and private opinions of others as liable to err, perhaps, as himself. Does he say the Church has become changed, and is no longer what she was? Then his charge is not, that she is ultra-conservative, but that she has not been conservative enough. Does he say, as in fact he does, that she has deviated from the truth, and in her progress through ages of ignorance and barbarism has fallen into many aberrations? The charge, again, is not that of being ultra-conservative, but that of not having been even conservative. If he says she remains what she was, and carefully preserves without change or alteration, addition or diminution, the deposit which she received, then he must concede that she is simply conservative, and not ultra, unless he would have her abdicate herself, abandon the truth, and become the patroness of error.

The trouble we have with Dr. Burnap is, that he does not keep to his thesis, that he lays down one thesis and speaks to several others. The whole subject is confused in his head, and equally confused in his speech. We had the right to expect, when he announced his subject to be “the errors and superstitions of the Church of Rome,” that he would specify those errors and superstitions, and proceed to prove them. When he charged her with these fundamental errors, of which the first is ultra-conservatism, what more reasonable than to suppose that he would undertake to establish them? But he does no such thing. He includes all her supposed errors and superstitions under the three heads, and then undertakes to show how she came to fall into them, to excuse her for having patronized them for fifteen hundred years, and to condemn her for holding them now, or not taking sides with the Reformation, as he develops it. In other words, he takes for granted the errors and superstitions which he should have proved, and then undertakes to say how far the Church should or should not be blamed for them. He takes for his text the words of St. Paul, Acts xvii. 30: “And the times of this ignorance God winked at, but now commandeth all men

everywhere to repent” ; or, rather, “ And God indeed having overlooked the times of this ignorance, now declareth to men, that all should everywhere do penance.” From this text he proceeds to argue that the Church, down to the end of the Middle Ages, to the revival of Greek literature, and the holding of the Council of Trent in the sixteenth century, when she was the only Church, and contained all the Christianity there was in the world, should not be blamed for her errors and superstitions, for they belonged to the times, and not to her. She did what she could to avoid them, and to train up the world in the principles of the Gospel ; but the times were too hard for her. ‘The Jews could hardly be expected to pass over to her “ without carrying their old opinions, usages, and prejudices with them into a religion cognate and analogous to their own,” and much more difficult was it for the Pagan, on becoming Christian, to “ abandon his old religion at once, with all its opinions, usages, and associations.” (p. 51.) “ Accustomed to worship a variety of deities, the Pagans felt no incongruity in exalting Christ and the Holy Ghost into the rank of divinities, and making them participants in the glories of the Godhead. Accustomed to an iron rule and a rigid subordination in the civil organization of the Roman Empire, the Church, when it grew up as an outward institution, was formed by the Roman spirit upon the same model, and the same tendency to centralization, to conquest, and domination, which had placed the Cæsars on the throne of universal empire, afterwards stretched the sceptre of the Pope over the civilized world.” (*ib.*) The confessional grew out of the necessities of the times, “ but that it was adopted with dishonest purposes is highly improbable.” (p. 52.) So of asceticism, “ originating in the philosophical doctrine of the impurity of matter, it found some countenance in the Jewish tradition of the Fall.”

“ The influence of all these causes upon Christianity, its doctrines, its outward form and its mode of administration, was inevitable. Nothing but a perpetual miracle could have prevented it. ‘ The light shone in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not.’ And they exonerate in equal measure the Catholic Church, that is, the Christian Church, the only Church which then existed, from the charge of intentional and deliberate wrong.” — p. 53.

All this is no doubt very ingenious and very liberal, and yet is nothing to the purpose. Before the author under-

took to write an apology for the errors and superstitions of the Church from the Apostles down to the sixteenth century, he should have specified them, and proved that they really are errors and superstitions, and that she adopted them. We do not thank him for his apology; for if our Church is what she professes to be, she needs no apology; if she is not, she deserves none. It may be very Protestant to apologize for an erroneous and superstitious Church, but it is not very Catholic. If the Church can fall into error and superstition, she is an imposition upon mankind, a temptation, and a snare, the synagogue of Satan, not the Church of God, and whoever undertakes to defend her only condemns himself. The whole theory of the author is a baseless fabric, and, instead of saying any thing for the Church of the Dark Ages, only exposes him to ridicule for his ignorance of facts, and to grave censure for the loose and immoral principles he assumes. Let him without going any further prove that the Church has at any period of her existence taught or countenanced error or superstition, and he may be assured that no Catholic will any longer uphold her. But he must prove this, not take it for granted, or imagine that the attempt to account for her errors and superstitions will be accepted as proof that she has errors and superstitions. In Paul Dudley's day this might have passed, but will not pass in ours. Then a Protestant could have it all his own way in New England, and could say what he pleased against the Catholic Church, without any fear of being called to an account or required to substantiate his charges. The law had taken care that the Papist should remain silent. But it is not so now. The Catholic is here to speak for himself, and he will not suffer his religion to be calumniated without at least contradicting the calumniator.

But though the Church is excusable for her errors and superstitions during the ages of ignorance and barbarism which preceded the Reformation, she is not now. Thus the author continues: —

“ After the darkness of the Middle Ages was passed, after the revival of learning, the invention of printing, and the general diffusion of knowledge over Europe, a totally different state of things took place. That advancing light revealed great errors in doctrines which had long been innocently held, great abuses of administration, which a more sensitive conscience could no longer tol-

erate ; and a ritual adapted to a rude and sensuous age was no longer edifying to an intellectual and refined one. The whole world became clamorous for reform. Beginning with a few brave and clear-sighted spirits, the voice of remonstrance spread among the multitude, it rose and swelled, till it became as the sound of many waters. And the burden of their cry was, Reform. 'The times of this ignorance God winked at, but now commandeth all men everywhere to repent.'

"The Church was at length aroused, and assembled to take order on the altered condition of the world. At the Council of Trent, commenced in the year 1545, the Catholic Church took her final ground and decided her destiny. She had arrived at the parting of the ways, and her path was to choose once and for ever. The question was distinctly put to her, Would she belong to the future or to the past? Would she join the march of progress, or throw her whole weight against the cause of human advancement? She deliberately chose the latter alternative. She cast in her lot with the past, and made it henceforth to be her interest, and, as she conceived, her duty, to arrest and war against the progress of the human race. From that hour her relation to mankind was completely reversed, and every thing with her has gone wrong. Up to that hour she had been the best friend that humanity had ever had. She had renovated the whole face of the civilized world. She had been the conservator of every thing valuable in the ancient civilization, which had survived the wreck of the Roman Empire. She had been the pioneer in all generous enterprises for the amelioration of the condition of the human race. She had been a patient laborer in the great field of human improvement. But when she had contributed to reform every thing else, she refused to reform herself. As a church, an association of fallible men, she was human, and of course liable to err ; but she chose to assume the attribute of infallibility. Religion and the Bible are divine and unchangeable. But theology is human, a science deduced by fallible human reason from the Bible, the phenomena of man and the universe. It is a human production, and therefore capable of revision, and requiring amendment from age to age. But the Church of Rome claims for her theology an absolute infallibility. She demands, therefore, that it should be held immutable, and be placed on the same level with the Sacred Scriptures themselves." — pp. 53, 54.

The argument here, if argument there be, is that the Church, though excusable, when the world knew no better, for her errors and superstitions, is inexcusable now, when the age of light has come, for still holding on to them, and not allowing them to be put away. She is determined to

remain, and in the Council of Trent obliged herself to remain, through all coming time, what she was through the Middle Ages, and therefore she is *ultra-conservative*. But suppose she did in the Council of Trent bind herself to remain unchanged, to wear the same form she had always worn, to teach the same doctrines she had always taught, and to observe the same ritual she had always observed, how does that prove that she is *ultra-conservative*? The author has not proved, he has only assumed, that prior to that Council she had erred in doctrine or practice. And if she had not erred, the obligation she then took — although every body knows that it was no new obligation — only bound her to be conservative, which the author concedes she ought to be. In 1545 the Church, according to the author, “had arrived at the parting of the ways, and her path was to choose once and for ever. The question was distinctly put to her, Would she belong to the future or to the past? Would she join the march of progress, or throw her whole weight against the cause of human advancement? She deliberately chose the latter alternative.” (p. 53.) If she did, and it was something she had not done before, she innovated, and the author’s charge of ultra-conservatism is ill laid. But is this certain? Is it certain the Church waited till 1545 to choose her path once and for ever? Is it certain, again, the side she took was against progress, against the cause of human advancement? This needs to be proved, not simply assumed. The author concedes that prior to 1545 the Church had been on the side of progress, and “the best friend that humanity had ever had. She had renovated the whole face of the civilized world. She had been the conservator of every thing valuable in the ancient civilization, which had survived the wreck of the Roman Empire. She had been the pioneer in all generous enterprises for the amelioration of the condition of the human race. She had been a patient laborer in the great field of human improvement.” The Church is always the same. It is certain that she chose in 1545 no new path, underwent no change, and the precise complaint the author brings against her is that she did not, would not change. It would seem, then, even according to his own showing, that she did not deliberately take her stand against progress, and throw her whole weight against the cause of human advancement; but continued on the

course she had always pursued, and which for fifteen hundred years had proved so eminently successful in their favor. May it not be that the Reformers were the party in the wrong, and that the Church condemned them, and refused to accept the path they indicated, because it was the path, not of progress, but of destruction, because it would conduct away from God and heaven, and undo all that she, with so much labor, patience, and suffering, at the cost of so many sacrifices, for fifteen hundred years, had effected for the human race? This view of the case is very conceivable, and is the more natural inference from the important concessions which the force of truth has wrung from the author. What has the author to oppose to it? His opinion? But what is that worth? His opinion is at least contradicted by our opinion, and we should like to know why his opinion on the subject is of more weight than ours?

"But when she had contributed to reform every thing else, she refused to reform herself." If the Church had done, and was doing up to that hour, all the author asserts, what need had she of reforming herself? How does the author know that she needed reforming? or how can he say that she was not right in refusing to reform herself, and that, if she contributed to reform every thing else, she did not contribute to all the reformation that was required? "As a Church, as an association of fallible men, she was human, and of course liable to err; but she chose to assume the attribute of infallibility." But certainly not then for the first time, dear Doctor. She assumed that attribute in the sixteenth century no more than she had assumed it in the fourteenth, the twelfth, the ninth, the sixth, the fourth, the second, or the first century. Rightly or wrongly, she had always claimed that attribute, and claimed it just as distinctly, and acted on the assumption that she possessed it just as decidedly, when she was aiding, according to the author, progress and the cause of human advancement, as now, when he accuses her of opposing them. The Church is, if you will, an association of fallible men, but by what authority do you assert that she is only that? She claims to be more than such association; she claims to be human and at the same time divine, as is her heavenly Spouse,—to be a divinely organized, protected, and assisted institution, for teaching the Divine word, and administering the Di-

vine law, and therefore in these respects not fallible, but infallible, by virtue of the Holy Ghost who dwells in her. Allow us to say, that to invalidate this claim you must adduce something of graver authority than your own opinion, even were that more respectable than it is.

“Theology is human, a science capable of revision, and requiring amendment from age to age. But the Church of Rome claims for her theology an absolute infallibility.” A poor quibble. In the sense in which theology is a human science, it is false to say that the Church claims for her theology, or any theology, absolute infallibility. She does no such thing. In the sense of revealed truth, as the faith, or what God has revealed and commanded us to believe, she asserts, indeed, that it is infallible, and before you accuse her of error, you must prove that she proposes as revealed truth something which God has not revealed. “Jesus Christ prescribed no specific or immutable form to his Church.” (p. 54.) So you say; but how know you that? You think so? Well, I think differently. Jesus Christ established a Church, for you speak of “*his Church.*” If he established a Church at all, he gave it a specific form, for nothing does or can exist without a specific form, as you must know, if you have ever made and remember your philosophy. If he established his Church to endure unto the end of the world, he gave it an *immutable* form; for to change the specific form of a thing is to destroy its existence, and either to annihilate it or to convert it into some other existence. The author says, though “Jesus Christ prescribed no specific or immutable form to his Church, or to that organization which naturally and necessarily took place among those who received his religion, this much he did ordain, that it should not be hierarchical.” (*ib.*) And he quotes several texts from the Gospels to prove it. But how will he assure us that he rightly understands those texts? Is he not a fallible man, and liable to err? How then shall we hold his application of these texts to be conclusive? Dr. Pusey will tell him they mean no such thing, and will cite texts equally strong to prove that our Lord did give to his Church the hierarchical form. Why shall Dr. Burnap be credited in preference to Dr. Pusey? “The Christian Church was left to take that [organization] which circumstances might render expedient.” (p. 55.) How does the author know that? Very respectable men main-

tain the contrary, and it is very evident from history that the Church set out from the Apostles with the precise specific form she now has. But suppose it was so, who was to judge of the expediency? Each individual believer? That were disorganization, sheer individualism, and would make the author contradict himself in terms. The minority? Whence the evidence? The majority? Then the case, we fear, must go against our author, for he is in a decided minority, and the great majority of believers of all times have adhered to the hierarchical and papal forms of the Church?

“ The error lay in ultra-conservatism, in imagining that there was not the same freedom in laying aside as there had been in adopting the forms of outward administration.” (p. 55.) So this, after all, is ultra-conservatism,—not asserting the same freedom in laying aside as in adopting the forms of outward administration. Will the author tell us any form which the Church has ever held herself free to adopt, that she does not hold herself equally free to lay aside when she judges it expedient? Every canonist will tell him, that what the Church of her own legislative authority has enacted, she can and often does abrogate. Wherever there was freedom in adopting, there is freedom in laying aside. What the Church says she cannot abrogate is the Divine legislation, what has been expressly enacted and ordained by God himself. Would Dr. Burnap have her do that? “ The mistake consisted in imagining that there was no difference between the tenth century and the sixteenth.” (*ib.*) Pray, who was it that committed that mistake? But is there any difference between truth in one century and truth in another? If so, what is that difference? if not, what is it you complain of? “ That because the Church might be kept stationary, the world would remain so too.” (*ib.*) So you would have a movable and moving Church, here to-day and there to-morrow, one thing in this age and another thing in another,—not a Church teaching the world the truth and directing it in the way of salvation, but a Church tossed to and fro and carried about by every wind of doctrine, conforming to the world, following it, whatever crotchet it may get into its head for the time, and, if it chooses to go to the Devil, going there along with it. It is very certain that on this subject you and we do not think alike.

The trouble, according to the author, is, that the Church as she ceases to be a child, does not put away childish things.

“But the error lay in ultra-conservatism, in imagining that there was not the same freedom in laying aside, as there had been in adopting, the forms of outward administration. The mistake consisted in imagining that there was no difference between the tenth century and the sixteenth; that because the Church might be kept stationary, the world would remain so too; that because the human mind had had its infancy, it never could have its maturity and manhood. The Church overlooked the wisdom of the Apostle. ‘When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child; but when I became a man, I put away childish things.’ The manhood has come, but, contrary to the law of nature, the childish things are not put away.” — p. 55.

How does the author know that there was any error or mistake in the case? He asserts there was, but he does not happen to prove it. How does he know that the Church ever had any childish thing to put away, or that she ever thought or spake as a child? The law which he alleges is not universal. It is not applicable to the Divinity, and Adam was created, not a baby, but in the perfection of a full-grown man. By what authority, then, does he assume that such was not the case with the Church? It might have been, and how does he know that it was not? By what authority does he assume that the Church, on her first going forth, was a child, subject to the law of development and growth as a human being? If she has her human side, and on that side a growth which can be only extension in space and time, she has also her divine side, or is held to have it, and on her divine side, the only side now in question, she has and can have no childhood or old age, no development or growth; for the Divinity, we suppose it will be conceded us, does not grow, and is never young, never old, and therefore she not only might, but must have begun, not as an infant, not as a child, thinking as a child and speaking as a child, but in the full possession and exercise of all her divine faculties, complete and perfect in all her parts, and able to discharge all her functions. The author is not at liberty, therefore, to say she must have been a child, and have had childish things, or declare her ultra-conservative because she refuses to put away childish things. He must first prove

that she has childish things to put away, and it will be time enough to reply when he has brought in his bill of items, and the evidence by which he proposes to sustain them.

But after all, what does all that the worthy Doctor advances in proof of the ultra-conservatism of the Church amount to? At the very best, it amounts only to this,—that his theory of Christian doctrine and practice is different from that asserted by the Church, and she requires all her children to believe hers and to reject his. Here is the whole. Dr. Burnap does not agree with the Church, and the Church does not agree with Dr. Burnap, and since she does not agree with him, she is, in his opinion, ultra-conservative, opposed to “progress, and throws her whole weight against the cause of human advancement”! He will pardon her all her alleged errors and superstitions during the Dark Ages, her having taught the doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, Original Sin, Redemption, &c., established the Confessional, and favored asceticism, if she will now only abandon her old pretensions, place herself in harmony with the new times, adopt modern ideas, encourage modern innovators and innovations, and conform to Unitarianism *à la* Burnap, of Baltimore, and not *à la* Parker, of Boston. He is not, after all, particular as to what doctrines she teaches, or what practices she approves, if she will not put her doctrines forth as divine truths necessary to be believed, and insist on her practices as necessary to be observed, and will leave her children free to speculate as they please, and adopt any notions or observe any practices which they happen for the time being to fancy. Very liberal and condescending indeed! And what an obstinate, bigoted, and stupid old woman the Church must be, to refuse to gratify him and his friends in so small an affair! Why can she not be as liberal to him as he is to her? If she would be, she would have him her friend, at least till some new light broke in upon his mind, or he got a new kink in his head, and—nobody else! This is really the sum of all he says, and this he has judged worthy to be written in this nineteenth century by a Unitarian Doctor of Divinity, to be delivered in the Chapel of Harvard College, the oldest and most illustrious literary institution of the United States, and to be printed in *The Christian Examiner*, the first literary, philosophical, and theological organ of the American Unitarians! Perhaps he has judged rightly.

The *gravamen* of the author's objection against the Church is, that since 1545 she has refused to “join the march of progress, and has thrown her whole weight against the cause of human advancement.” We shall not stop to dispute the false and absurd theory of progress which the author assumes, and which underlies his whole thought, but we will simply ask him to specify a single truth, known by him or any one else to be a truth, which she does not teach, or which she forbids us as Catholics to hold. We ask him also to specify a single virtue which she forbids or does not enjoin, a single discovery of modern science, not a mere hypothesis, which she does not accept, or a single movement or enterprise of modern philanthropy which it is certain tends to the amelioration of the individual or of society, that she refuses to encourage, or does not sanction. Let us have no more vague generalities, which mean every thing or nothing, no more noisy declamations, no more unsupported assertions. Let the matter be brought to a test. Show us some truth which, but for the ultra-conservatism of the Church, we might have had that we have not, or which we might hold, if we renounced her authority, that we cannot hold now. Show us, we beg you, some good which can be done for mankind, either in relation to this world or to the next, which, as genuine Catholics, we are forbidden or not commanded to labor for, and which she has prevented from being obtained. Show us, finally, what genuine progress the Church opposes, in what respect she throws her weight against the cause of human advancement. Give us facts, dear Doctor, not speculations, — facts, not mere opinions, — certainties which cannot be gainsaid, not mere conjectures, or vague dreams. If you can do this, do it, and we are no longer Catholics; if you cannot, as you well know you cannot, then cease your perpetual clamor about the Church being opposed to progress or human advancement, for your clamor can only mean that the Church opposes progress and human advancement simply because she opposes you and your insane speculations and ridiculous projects of reform, in which case, to say the least, you are as likely as she to be the party in the wrong.

That the Church opposed the Reformers in the sixteenth century, the Puritans and kindred sectaries in the seventeenth, the Philosophers and Jacobins in the eighteenth,

and opposes the Socialists and Communists in the nineteenth, is very true, and well is it for the world that it is true; for these have all, the author himself being judge, deserved to be opposed. If the Church had sanctioned Luther's doctrine of the serf-will, Calvin's of election and reprobation, the common doctrine of all the Reformers, that man by the transgression of Adam lost his spiritual faculties and became totally corrupted in his whole nature, or the doctrine of justification by faith alone without works, the author himself would have denounced her, for he, no less than she, rejects all these doctrines. Excepting those relating to the Sacraments and the Papacy, there is scarcely a point of doctrine on which she has condemned the Reformers, on which he does not also condemn them. Why, then, blame her for not approving the Reformers? He, like ourselves, is, we believe, a descendant of the old English Puritans, but he has hardly departed less from them than we have, and in several respects he departs even farther. He rejects as error or superstition, bigotry or fanaticism, all that they called Christian, and will he pretend that the Church proved herself hostile to the interests of progress, and threw her whole weight against the cause of human advancement, because she condemned them? The author claims to be a Christian; will he, then, maintain that the Church was ultra-conservative because she refused to make common cause with such Free-Thinkers as Collins, Tindall, Toland, Morgan, Mandeville, Voltaire, Rousseau, Helvetius, Diderot, D'Alembert, and D'Holbach, and to encourage the old French Jacobins in their terrible war on religion and society? Does he say that it would be for the interests of progress, and would favor the cause of human advancement, for her to approve and encourage your Saint-Simonians, your Owenites, your Fourierists, your Icarians, your Women's-Rights men, and your Bloomers? In the non-Catholic world, there no doubt is a constant succession of reformers, projectors, schemers, visionaries, dreamers, following one another as wave follows wave. Each has his panacea, his "Morrison's Pill" for all the ills flesh is heir to, and is always just on the point of recovering the terrestrial paradise; but what wise man can place confidence in any one of their nostrums? These would-be reformers are but children amusing themselves with blowing soap-bubbles with a pipe-stem in a tin

porringer. Is the Church to be condemned as the enemy of human advancement, because she refuses to take these bubble-blowers to her bosom, and cherish them as the sages, seers, and philosophers of mankind? Is she to be denounced as ultra-conservative, because she takes their bubbles for what they are, and refuses to commend them as new worlds, no less solid than brilliant?

Perhaps what you demand is, not that the Church should indorse each individual bubble-blower, or attempt to construct the whole world after the pattern of each particular bubble blown, but that she should herself become a bubble-blower, encourage all bubble-blowers, and declare bubble-blowing the noblest employment man can make of his faculties. Her precise error is, that she will neither blow bubbles herself, nor suffer those that would to blow them. Therefore is she opposed to the interests of progress, and throws her whole weight against the cause of human advancement. This is probably your real objection. But can you refer us to any good that has ever come from your favorite employment of bubble-blowing? What has been gained for humanity by that reckless spirit of speculation and inquiry, which treats all subjects as uncertain and doubtful, and requires all our faculties to be employed in devising and refuting schemes of improvement? Nothing as yet, perhaps you will reply; but then it is just about to gain something. Moreover, it keeps us employed, our minds active, constantly on the stretch, and that itself is worth something, and is infinitely better than the intellectual death produced by your Church. Alas! poor bubble-blowers! do you not see that in all this you assume that the truth is unknown, that God has made no certain revelation of his will, that the possession of truth kills the mind, and that there can be life only in seeking and not finding? Much of this may be true of non-Catholics, but is it their advantage, or is it their misfortune or their shame? In your actual state, free inquiry assuredly is your right and your duty, but only because you have not the truth, and are bound to seek it. But to assume that the great business of life is to be seeking after the truth, is to assume that we are to be always seeking, without ever finding, and to make the apology of those whom the Apostle condemns as "always learning, and never attaining to the knowledge of the truth." The real business of life can-

not be in seeking the truth, because the commencement and conduct of that business demand the knowledge of the truth, and no one till he has that knowledge can be said properly to live, for it is through it that we are spiritually begotten. God reveals to us the truth, and the business of life is to accept and apply it. The truth is not to be sought for the sake of the seeking, but for the sake of the end to be obtained by its possession and application. Mental activity, like all activity, is good or bad, according to the end to which it is subordinated; but for its own sake alone, that is, without any end, it is the activity of a fool, not the activity of a wise man. Free mental activity, or freedom of mind, is certainly desirable, and is always to be encouraged; but it is found in truth only, never in falsehood or error. *Veritas liberabit vos.* It is the truth that makes free, and without it you are in the bonds of ignorance, exposed to every fatal error, and the slave of every illusion. The three hundred years of experience which Protestants have had of the operations of the spirit you condemn the Church for anathematizing, ought to suffice to shut your mouth for ever. What has that spirit done for you? It has filled your minds with doubt and your hearts with bitterness; it has led you to reject all certain revealed truth, and to fall back on the insufficient light of reason, to deal with familiar spirits, to revive ancient necromancy, to reëstablish in this very city — not inaptly called the Athens of America, since ancient Athens was noted for its superstitions — the worship of demons, to substitute for the word of God the instincts of man, and to deify the passions, pride, lust, and revenge. This is solemn fact; it stares you in the face, and you cannot deny it, however you may try to disguise it, or to explain it away. There stands the fact, and with what face, or want of face, can you clamor for that spirit, and declare the Church ultra-conservative because she anathematizes it, and bids you beware of it?

2. But it is time to proceed to the consideration of the second fundamental error which the author alleges against the Church, namely, her “corporate spirit.” We will here let the author speak for himself.

“I now come to the second fundamental error of the Roman Catholic Church, — its corporate spirit. This, I am aware, is an awkward phrase, and perhaps needs definition. I mean by it, a

disposition to sacrifice every thing to the interests of a gigantic and perpetual corporation. This was first manifested in the establishment of a hierarchy, in the continual elevation of the clergy and the depression of the laity, in the association of church with church, the subordination of provincials to metropolitans, and, finally, the subjugation of the whole Western Church to the Bishop of Rome; the establishment of religious orders, the vows of celibacy, obedience, poverty, and seclusion, the prohibition of marriage to the clergy, and the unreserved consignment of the priesthood, body and soul, as bondslaves of the Church; the submission of the individual conscience at the confessional, and the denial of the right of individual judgment in matters of faith,—all these things constitute a mass of sacrifices of the individual to the interests and ambition of a corporation, such as finds no parallel in the records of the human race. It is wonderful that this was ever submitted to at all, and still more wonderful that it has continued so long.”—p. 56.

This definition needs defining, as do most Protestant definitions. The fundamental error consists, he tells us, in “a disposition to sacrifice every thing to the interests of a gigantic and perpetual corporation.” *A disposition* on the part of whom or of what? Of the Church? Of the Church in her corporate capacity, or on the part of her individual members? Is it a disposition enjoined by the Church, or simply counselled by her, and voluntarily entertained and complied with by individuals? Is this disposition an error, because the corporation is *gigantic*, or because it is *perpetual*, or because it is at once both *gigantic and perpetual*? Would it cease to be a fundamental error if the corporation were small and temporary? In a word, is it an error because the corporation is a corporation, or because it is a corporation of a particular sort? Is it an error because the corporation is human, or would it be also an error if the corporation were divine? These are questions not answered by the definition itself, and yet they are not without grave importance. This disposition “was first manifested in the establishment of a hierarchy, in the continual elevation of the clergy and the depression of the laity, in the association of church with church, the subordination of provincials [suffragans?] to metropolitans, and, finally, the subjugation of the whole Western [why not say also the whole Eastern?] Church to the Bishop of Rome”; that is, in the establishment of the hierarchical and papal constitution of the Church. But if God himself ordained

or established this hierarchical and papal constitution, and imposed it upon the Church as a law from which she could no more depart than an individual can take his own life without ceasing to exist, would our author say, then, that it is a fundamental error? He would not dare say it, for then the corporation would be a divine corporation, and its interests would be divine interests, and the disposition to sacrifice every thing to them would be just and proper. That disposition can be an error only on the supposition that it is a purely human corporation, with only human rights and interests. The objection, then, is not well laid. It should have been, not that the Church is a corporation, gigantic and perpetual or otherwise, but that she is a merely human corporation, and therefore with no authority to demand, and with no right to receive, the sacrifice of every thing to her interests, for God is above every thing human, and we must obey him rather than men. This is the only form in which the author could legitimately bring his objection, unless he was prepared to deny the right of God himself to give his Church the hierarchical and papal constitution, and therefore affirm that God can err and do wrong; and having brought it in this form, he should have proceeded to prove, not that she requires every thing to be sacrificed to her interests, but that she is a purely human corporation, holding her charter only from men, and possessing only human rights and interests. If he had done this, he could have legitimately concluded that the corporate spirit he objects to is a fundamental error; but then there would have been no need of drawing such a conclusion, for the proof that the Church is a purely human corporation would of itself have been sufficient to induce all Catholics to abandon her. But it so happens that he has not proved this; he has only quietly assumed it, and from it concluded that the corporate spirit is an error, when, for aught that he shows to the contrary, it may be the true and proper spirit for a Christian.

The establishment of a hierarchy, if done by men on their own authority, is an error, a wrong, for men have of themselves no right to do any thing of the sort; but if done by God, or by men under his authority, it is not an error, and no man who believes in God and recognizes his universal dominion dare say it is. The elevation of the clergy above the laity as to their office, which is all that can be alleged,

if by divine appointment, is no error, and can no more be objected to than the elevation of magistrates above simple citizens. The associating of church with church, the subordination of suffragans to metropolitans (if a fact), and the subordination — there is no *subjugation* in the case — to the Bishop of Rome as chief pastor, if done by the ordination of God, cannot be complained of, and is absolutely necessary if the Church is to be one, to be a kingdom, a true spiritual polity, for the government of all men and nations. None of these things can be objected to without blasphemy, if the Church holds her charter of incorporation, as she alleges, from Almighty God himself, who is King of kings and Lord of lords, who has absolute dominion over all creatures, and may do according to his will in both heaven and earth. The sacrifice they demand or authorize would then be to God, to whom belongs all that we are or have. Plainly, then, the author should, in the outset, have proved that the Church is simply human; for only on the supposition that she is, and that she is not divinely instituted, can any of the things he alleges be objections to her. But not having done this, he has only blundered in logic, history, and moral theology.

The other things immediately added in the passage cited may prove the corporate spirit of the Church, if the author pleases; but what if they do? He has not yet proved that the corporate spirit is an error. He had to prove the fact of the corporate spirit, and its erroneousness. The first he proves, but unnecessarily, for nobody denies it, and all Catholics will concede it. The second, the only contested point, he assumes, takes for granted, and simply argues that the Church is in a fundamental error because she has a corporate spirit! The vows he enumerates prove nothing to his purpose, unless they are wrong in themselves, and can on no supposition be lawful. But that they can in no case be lawful he assumes, but does not even attempt to prove. The fact that the Church has established religious orders proves nothing against her, unless such orders are repugnant to the law of God, which from the very nature of the case he cannot prove. Religious orders, and the vows of chastity, obedience, and poverty, are all in the supernatural order, both as to their origin and end, and can neither be defended nor condemned, except by an authority competent to decide on supernatural matters. That a

man may justly neglect the duties of one state for the sake of applying himself to those of a higher state, all are obliged to concede, for the thing takes place every day, and society could not go on if it did not. Reason can say nothing against the principle of the religious orders, which is, that it is lawful under certain circumstances for a man to leave a less perfect, and consecrate himself by solemn vows to the duties of a more perfect state. No man is bound to marry against his will, and therefore, if free, one may, for the sake of God and the attainment of Christian perfection, vow to preserve his chastity, and to live unmarried. So of the other vows. But the individual in these matters must act under authority, and be guided not by his own will or judgment alone. The whole question, therefore, of religious orders must depend for its solution on the fact whether the Church is or is not a divinely constituted corporation, with authority to say when one is free to take the religious vows, and to what rule, if he does take them, he must or must not, may or may not, be subjected. Supposing the Church to be what she professes to be, religious orders are defensible, the vows are proper; but if she is not what she professes to be, we have nothing to say in their defence, because confessedly all are not free to take these vows, and aside from the Church we have no authority to say who are or are not free to take them, or to say what is or is not a higher state. All we say here is, that the vows which are taken are taken voluntarily, and the Church never commands or urges any one to take them, though she often prohibits persons desirous of taking them from taking them. All vows must be voluntary; the Church simply decides when and on what conditions they may be taken, and requires them when lawfully taken to be kept inviolate. The right of a man, supposing him to have contracted no obligations except those imposed by the law of nature, to consecrate himself to God in a religious order approved by a competent authority, cannot be questioned, and it is only such as these that the Church ever permits to enter into a religious order.

The prohibition of the clergy to marry proves nothing to the author's purpose, because the Church compels no one to be a priest. She has the right to prescribe the conditions on which she will admit a candidate to the priesthood, as much so as the state has to prescribe the conditions on

which its offices may be held; and if she judges it wise and proper to prescribe the vow of chastity as one of these conditions, nothing forbids her to do so. She violates in so doing no right of the priest, for no one can claim admission to the priesthood as a right, and she compels no one to be a priest. She says to him before ordaining him, You are free to remain in society, and to marry, if such be your wish, and you are under no obligation to bind yourself by the vow of celibacy, unless you choose; but if it is your free choice to become a priest, you must take that vow, and will be compelled to keep it. All this is fair. If he takes the vow, he takes it freely, with his eyes open; and as it is a lawful vow, and as he takes it voluntarily, there is no hardship in requiring him to keep it. As for the clergy being bondslaves to the Church, what the author says is simply nonsense. The priest is simply bound to conform to the canons, or to the law of his office, and we suppose every officer in church or state is bound in like manner. The office of a priest has certain well-known and prescribed duties, and these he is bound to perform, in subordination to the supreme authority. You may call him a bonds slave, if you please, and so you may call the deputy-sheriff or the sheriff himself a bonds slave. Every man, in that he is a man, has certain duties which he is bound to perform, and in this sense is a bonds slave, and just as much so as the priest. St. Paul calls himself the slave of Jesus Christ, and subjection to the Church, whether of clergy or laity, is only subjection to Jesus Christ, who teaches and governs through her, and subjection to him is the most perfect freedom conceivable.

The right of the individual judgment in matters of faith being only an imaginary right, we need not stop to defend the Church for denying it. That she denies it in the author's sense is true, and when he adduces any evidence that in this she does wrong, we will consider what is to be said. Individual judgment in matters of faith has unsettled every thing in the Protestant world, and resulted in general unbelief or demon-worship, and therefore it has no great attraction for us. We would rather rely on an infallible teacher, and instead of finding it a hardship, we find it a blessed privilege. Do not ask us to abandon an infallible Church for an exceedingly fallible private judgment in matters so important as those of faith, on which depends our

eternal salvation. We know from forty years' experience as a Protestant what private judgment is worth, and, thank God, we know too, by experience, the freedom of mind and joy of heart there are in feeling that we have a teacher on whom we can rely, who cannot deceive us, and who will lead us in the way we should go.

The author says, that "nothing can be more certain than that no such corporation was contemplated by Christ in the establishment of his Church." (p. 56.) That is possibly his opinion, but it is not ours. "Not only was freedom of action broken down under the colossal organization of the Romish Church, but freedom of mind and thought was crushed under the same overpowering weight." (p. 57.) Indeed! where did you learn that? Nevertheless, as this is no more true of the Church now than when, according to you, she was "the best friend humanity ever had"; when she "renovated the whole face of the civilized world," was "the pioneer in all generous enterprises for the amelioration of the condition of the human race," and "a patient laborer in the great field of human improvement," — we will endeavor to console ourselves as well as we can, till you bring forward some better friend, a more generous pioneer, or a more patient laborer. "Had a creed been necessary, it is to be supposed that Christ would have prescribed one to his Church." (*ib.*) How do you know that he did not? If a creed is not necessary, why did the Unitarians in our goodly city of Boston last May draw up and vote one? It was a very meagre creed, it is true, "a very little one," as said Jack Easy's wet nurse, but nevertheless it was a creed, designed to define, if not all that one is required to believe, at least what one cannot deny and be a Christian. If no creed is necessary, nothing is necessary to be believed, and then you either deny that our Lord revealed any thing, or else hold that you may, without ceasing to be his followers, deny his revelation. Why then complain of Parker, to cut off whom you drew up your little creed?

"By thus adopting a stringent and unchangeable organization, the Catholic Church has numbered itself among the things which are destined to be outgrown." (p. 58.) Do you happen to know, dear Doctor, when that will happen? Will you not tell us what will outgrow her? "It has allied itself with the monarchies and despotisms of

the old world, and is bound to share their fate.” (*ib.*) And pray what is that fate to be? But when did the Church form the alliance you speak of? What proof have you of it? Will you favor us with a sight of the documents? But all this is nonsense. The Church forms no alliance with monarchy or with republicanism; she leaves to each nation the political constitution which God in his providence gives it, and requires all her children to submit to it in all things not repugnant to the law of God. Where monarchy is the historical right, she sustains it, where republicanism is the historical right, she sustains republicanism, as we have told you till we are weary of repeating it. “The tendency of this age is to freedom and individualism, and whatever will not go along with it is destined to be left behind.” (*ib.*) All cant, my dear Doctor. The tendency of this age seems to us to be to socialism and despotism. Are you not yourself a little behind the age? But be it the tendency is to freedom and individualism, that is, to license and anarchy, is it not possible that the Church may resist that tendency, and recall the age to law and order? It is not certain that in the long run the age will prove stronger than the Church. If again the age happens to be wrong, as it does, whether its tendency is as you think or as we think, would you have the Church go on with it? Or do you deny that the tendency of an age can be wrong, and therefore claim for each age the infallibility we claim for the Church? But enough of this. The author may think that he means well and talks good sense, but he should remember that it is possible for people in esteeming themselves wise to become fools; and, without positively classing him with these, we cannot forbear telling him that he says he knows not what, and implies principles the baseness of which, could he see them in their nakedness, would shock even himself.

3. The third and last fundamental error alleged against the Church is her “unfriendliness to the diffusion of the Sacred Scriptures.” “This is the crowning error—may I not say, sin?—of the Roman polity. He who shuts up the Bible from the masses puts out the moral light of the world.” (*ib.*)

That last sentence, Doctor, would do to deliver at an Anniversary Meeting of the American Bible Society. It is upon the whole rather a good sentence, and well.

sounding. But that word *masses*, however, is not well chosen, because it conveys the notion of brute matter, and one is a little troubled to understand what moral light could be derived from the Bible or any other book by human beings so little elevated as to be designated after brute matter. Nineteen twentieths of the human race, it is estimated, and therefore of "the masses," are unable to read. Now will the good Doctor explain what moral light would be put out for them by shutting up the Bible? Does the Bible operate upon "the masses" as a charm or amulet, and of itself enlighten such as cannot read it, and who, if they could read it, could not understand it? "The Bible is the mightiest moral agent that has ever wrought upon our earth." (p. 59.) What does this mean? Is it the Bible as a book that is such a moral agent? Or is it the doctrine the Bible contains and the grace of God which operates with it? If you say the book as a book, and nothing else, you utter an absurd falsehood. If you say the doctrine, you condemn yourself, for you hold that it makes no difference what doctrines a man believes if he lives a good life, and he can, you hold, lead a good life in any belief, and besides say nothing to your purpose, for then the shutting the Bible from the masses would put out no light, unless the doctrine was shut also.

"The Bible is the best theological manual for the busy, toiling masses of mankind." (*ib.*) Do you really believe so? What will your brother Parker or your brother Pusey say to that? What do you conceive to be the object of a theological manual? Is it not to give a clear, distinct, and brief summary of what men are to believe respecting God, his providence, and his works, and of our relations to God, the duties we owe him, the way and manner of performing them, and the consequences of performing or not performing them? Do you really mean that this object is better accomplished for the busy, toiling multitude by the Bible than by any other manual? If so, you are a very strange man, and past the reach of argument. We speak not lightly of the Bible, for it has been written, though you doubt it, by the inspiration of Almighty God, dictated by the Holy Ghost himself, and we hold its words in a veneration wholly foreign from the Protestant heart; but we do not believe, by any means, that it is the best theological manual that can be put into the hands of "the busy, toiling masses,"

for the great bulk of them cannot read it, a large portion of those who can read it will not, and few of those who can and do read it, unless they have previously been taught the faith, can understand it, or draw any consistent meaning from it. You know this is the literal fact, and therefore you must consult, in what you say, what has a fine sound, rather than what is true. The learned themselves, applying their whole lives to the study of the Bible, cannot agree at all among themselves as to its meaning; how much less, then, the unlearned, who have no time and none of the necessary aids for its study!

"The Bible is the grand educator of the conscience." (p. 60.) "The Bible is the true confessional." (*ib.*) "The Bible is the chief source of that purity of sentiment and refinement of manners, which distinguish modern society from the coarseness and sensuality of heathen antiquity." (p. 61.) How the Bible can be the true confessional is to us a puzzle. That it should, when properly understood, convict us of sin and send us to the confessional, we can very well understand; but how it can be itself the confessional, is too transcendental for our comprehension. In what else the author here says of the Bible he must be understood as using a figure of rhetoric, such as taking the vase for the liquor, and as really meaning, not the Bible, as a book and nothing else, but the contents of the Bible, that is, the Christian faith. In simple justice to him, we must presume this to be his meaning, and then all he says amounts to nothing against us.

"The Church of Rome, then, as it seems to me, cannot commit a greater error, than to permit her conflict with Protestantism to engender any real hostility to the circulation of the Sacred Scriptures." (*ib.*) That is to say, an error in policy. The Bible is such a good book, and has rendered such important services to the human race, that any unfriendliness on the part of the Church to its circulation will give Protestants a great advantage over her. So the Church is not so worldly-wise as sometimes represented, and her crowning error, perhaps her sin, is a blunder in mere human policy! Really, the old Church comes off pretty well after all, and we are quite willing to concede that she is rather a sad politician, and has never been remarkable for her worldly wisdom, any more than her Master was.

"The time has been when the Catholic Church was friendly to the circulation of the Scriptures. But it was when she reigned alone, when her unity was unbroken, and the whole Christian world was of one language and one speech. She was put in a false position in relation to the Scriptures, by the breaking out of the Reformation. The Bible was the magazine from which the Reformers drew their most effective weapons," and "it was natural that the Church should feel a hostility to a book which gave it so much annoyance." (p. 58.) Were these weapons really in the Bible, and were they honestly drawn from it by the Reformers against the Church? If so, how do you account for the fact that she had not discovered them, or foreseen the mischief they might do, and guarded against them by prohibiting the circulation of the Scriptures. The author deviates very materially from the common Protestant story. He concludes that prior to the Reformation the Church was friendly to the circulation of the Scriptures; Protestants generally maintain the contrary, and that she had been able to corrupt the faith only through concealing the Bible, and it was only by accidentally discovering one day in the library of his convent at Erfurt a stray copy of the Bible, that Luther learned her gross impositions. It was, however, not so, and her present unfriendliness to the circulation of the Scriptures began with the Reformation, and was caused by it. This is some advance towards the truth, and perhaps ere long our Protestant friends will learn and confess the whole truth. The fact that the Church down to the Reformation was friendly to the circulation of the Scriptures proves at least this much, — that in her estimation there is no discrepancy between her teaching and the Scriptures; and furthermore, that if she is not equally friendly to their circulation now, it is not because she dreads any testimony they may bear against her, but because she would guard against their being abused. The author is mistaken in supposing that the Church became hostile to the Bible in consequence of the annoyance she received from its use or abuse by the Reformers, and equally so in saying that Balmes concedes it. The fact that the Reformers abused the Scriptures to attack the faith and pervert the minds of the faithful induced her to place some restrictions on the promiscuous reading of the Scriptures, in the vernacular tongues and unauthorized versions, but

did not of course alter her feelings or her position in regard to the Scriptures themselves.

The author says, the Church “was put into a false position in relation to the Scriptures, by the breaking out of the Reformation.” The Church by that event was forced to change in some respects her discipline in regard to the reading of them, but to say that she was put into a *false* position in regard to them is a mere begging of the question. The Church is the guardian of the Scriptures and of the faith of her children, and it is her right and her duty to protect the faithful from the dangers to which they are exposed. If in order to protect them she is obliged to restrict the reading of the Scriptures in the vulgar tongues to those who are not likely to wrest them to their own destruction, she assumes no false position in regard to them, and the falsity is on the part of those who force her to take such a step. If the pastor is obliged for their protection to restrict the range of the sheep when wolves abound, and to allow them less freedom than when no wolves are to be feared, the fault is not his, but that of the wolves, and the blame, if blame there be in the case, attaches not to him, who only does his duty, but to those who render the restriction necessary.

But after all, is the fact alleged true, or is it a fact that the Church is unfriendly to the diffusion of the Sacred Scriptures? Of course not. The author asserts it, says it can be proved, but, as usual with him, offers no proof of it. There is not, so far as we are aware, and never has been, any restriction placed by the Church on the circulation or reading of the Scriptures in the learned languages, especially, the authorized version in the Latin language, commonly called the Vulgate. In all Catholic countries, at least until quite recently, when the knowledge of Latin is less general than it was prior to modern revolutionism, this brought the Scriptures within the reach of nearly all who could read them with much profit, and gave the learned free access to them, — the very class from whom the Church would be the most anxious to conceal them, if she regarded them as teaching any thing at variance with her doctrines and practices. The restrictions she has placed on the circulation of the Scriptures in the vulgar tongues have been directed solely against unauthorized and corrupt versions, such as Luther’s version in German, Diodati’s in

Italian, and King James's in English. The circulation and reading of such versions is strictly prohibited to all Catholics, and it is because the Bible Society circulates only such versions that its publications are prohibited. But there is no prohibition in any Catholic country, or among the faithful in any country, to circulate the Scriptures in an approved version, even in the vernacular language. There is then no unfriendliness on the part of the Church to the diffusion of the Sacred Scriptures; there is only unfriendliness to their circulation in a corrupt form. The reading of the Scriptures in the vernacular tongue, if the version be approved, is free to all Catholics, and we are aware of no canon prohibiting it to any one. The pastors, indeed, advise such, if such there be, who give reason to fear that they will wrest them to their own destruction, not to read them, and in some cases it is possible the confessor may forbid the reading to his penitent. This is the very course every prudent father pursues, that of advising his children not to read, and in some instances positively forbidding them to read, that from which it is evident that they can only receive harm. The Church goes no farther than this, and if she goes thus far, we shall not undertake to defend her, for she does only her duty, and needs no defence.

Every body knows, or might know, that Protestants generally, and Unitarians particularly, have no genuine belief in the Scriptures, or respect for them, although they may sometimes believe that they believe and respect them, and that their great zeal for the Bible and its circulation is all affected, for the purpose of decrying and injuring the Church. It is proverbial among them, that the Bible is like a fiddle, on which a skilful performer may play any tune he pleases. And we have never yet met the decided Protestant who respected the Bible enough to bow to its authority, when its authority was shown to be clearly against him. Here is Dr. Burnap, a Unitarian minister, praising the Bible, and greatly scandalized, as he would have us believe, because the Church, as he alleges, is unfriendly to its circulation, yet he himself by no means believes in its plenary inspiration, and he would shrink from calling it the word of God. He has very little respect for the Old Testament, and he will tell you that St. Paul was far from having a correct understanding of the Gospel, and that he even began the

corruption of the simple religion of Jesus; and if, in the parts to which he accords a *quasi*-inspiration, he finds a passage which he cannot explain in accordance with his notions, he will term it an Eastern hyperbole, or suggest that the sacred writer was most likely warped by his Jewish prejudices. And yet he has the effrontery to come forward and read us Catholics a lecture on our pretended hostility to the Bible! This is a little too bad, since, of all who are called Christians, we alone retain, believe, and venerate the whole Bible as the word of God.

The clamor Protestants set up about the Scriptures, there can be no doubt, arises not from friendliness to the Bible, but from hostility to the Church. They know that Catholics believe the Bible to be the word of God, and reverence it as such. They know that to Catholics the whole Bible is inspired and authoritative, and that they believe whatever is really repugnant to it to be false; hence they seek to induce Catholics to read *Protestant versions* of the Scriptures, hoping through the corrupt rendering of certain passages and the adroit insinuations of Bible readers, trained to insinuate a Protestant sense, to excite suspicions in the minds of simple Catholics that there is a discrepancy between the Bible, the word of God, and the teaching of their Church, and thus prepare the way for their perversion. Their object is to make the simple faithful believe that the Church is opposed to the circulation of the Scriptures, and opposed to them because the Scriptures are opposed to her, and convict her of departing from the truth, corrupting the faith, and practising gross imposition upon the ignorant and confiding. They seek to do this for the purpose of inducing them to abandon the Church, and to join the ranks of non-Catholics.

Now this whole course of proceeding is based on the supposition that Catholics really believe the Bible to be the word of God, and hold themselves bound to receive its authority as final. Such, unquestionably, is the fact, and a man who has been brought up a Protestant on coming among Catholics is perfectly astonished at their high veneration for the Bible, and their profound deference to its authority. But whence have Catholics derived this firm belief that the Bible is the word of God, this profound respect for its authority, and this high veneration for all its words? Most assuredly from the teaching of their Church,

and from no other source. Now here is a fact worth looking at. Nobody can deny that the Church knows as well as Protestants do or can whether there be or be not any discrepancy between her teaching and the Bible. If, then, as Protestants pretend, the Bible condemns the Church, how is it that she teaches her children to believe the Bible to be the word of God, and inspires them with this profound reverence for it? If such were the fact, she would have gradually taught them differently, and little by little have induced them to regard the Bible very much as Protestants, especially Unitarians, regard it. This very fact that she has not done so is a full and triumphant answer to the Protestant slander that the Church supersedes the word of God, and that Catholics place the Church above the Bible. It proves that the Church holds the Bible to be the word of God, and teaches her children to reverence and obey it as such, and therefore neither dreads it nor is hostile to it. Let us then hear no more about the Church setting aside the Bible, and making naught of the word of God; the very charge, as addressed to Catholics, refutes itself, because if it were a fact, the argument would have no force or meaning to a Catholic.

But we have said enough. Dr. Burnap in some instances has shown more candor than is usual with an American Protestant, and is misled, when misled, more by his ignorance of Catholicity and his own absurd theories, than by his passions, which do not seem to be very strong or violent, or his malignant feelings towards the Church. His ignorance is sometimes marvellous, as for instance in regard to the confessional, where he mistakes certain accessories of the sacrament for the sacrament itself. A visit once, as an humble penitent, to the confessional, would teach him that

"There are more things in heaven and earth,
Than are dreamt of in his philosophy."

But we will part with him in civility. We only regret that he has not treated the subject from a higher point of view and with more learning and ability, so that we could have gained some honor for our religion in refuting him. But Protestantism no longer produces any worthy champions, with whom it is an honor to contend. She has no longer any confidence in herself, and no longer dares engage in a regular battle with the Catholic. She carries on

only a partisan warfare, which, though it may enable her to annoy Catholics, can never win for her any real advantage over them. But it is idle to complain. We must take such opponents as present themselves, and if they are unworthy, let the disgrace rest on those who send them, and have no better to send.

ART. IV. *Brownson's Review and the Idea of Right*. By J. V. H. New York. *Truth-Teller*. July 16, 1853.

WE ought, perhaps, to apologize to our readers for introducing to them an article which appeared last July in a New York journal, commenting with some severity on what is assumed to be the metaphysics and moral theology of our Review; but we do so for the sake of the writer and the interest of the questions raised, not for the gravity of the article itself, or the importance of the medium through which it was communicated to the public. The writer, though he signs only the initials of his name, cannot be considered as unknown. He is one, unless we are greatly at fault, for whom we have a warm personal esteem, and who for his fine descriptive powers, lively and brilliant imagination, extensive acquaintance with society, and manly avowal of his religion when it can only endanger his literary success, deserves to stand in the first rank of American popular authors. It is true, that the principal works which he has published are not entirely free from faults of taste and even of judgment; but we look to him for many and most valuable contributions to our popular Catholic literature.

The Catholic journals of the country have very generally criticized with great severity, — greater, in our judgment, than was deserved, — *Alban, or the History of a Young Puritan*; and the author seems to have felt it more deeply than he needs to have done, and to be resolved to turn upon his critics, and give them blow for blow. In this we honor his pluck, but we doubt his judgment. Some of these critics are too slender to be hit, some are too solid to be moved, and some are too well inured even to harder blows than he is

able to strike, to feel them. No man is ever written down, says Dr. Johnson, unless by himself, and, as a general rule, when what is written against him affects only the author's personal taste or judgment, the wisest way is to receive it in silence, profit by whatever truth may be suggested, and leave it to time to dispose of what is unfounded or unjust. But there is, we believe, no law, but that of prudence, which forbids an author to criticize his critics, if he chooses. The critic is not more inviolable than the author, and sometimes deserves, even more than his author, a severe castigation. J. V. H. seems to think this is the case with the Catholic journals for their treatment of *Alban*, and he appears to be resolved to administer it as effectually as in his power.

We are somewhat surprised that he should select us as the principal object of this castigation, for we have been the least severe and the most indulgent of his Catholic critics. It is true, we could not commend *Alban* without some important qualifications, but our remarks on that work were intended less to censure it than to moderate the censures bestowed upon it by others. He has not a more admiring or a warmer friend among American journalists than ourselves, one more disposed to appreciate highly his motives, his literary talent, or the value of his publications. We cannot understand why, therefore, he should feel it necessary to begin by making an onslaught upon us. However, we trust we can bear it with patience and equanimity, and we are sure that it will not sour our feelings towards him, or make us less ready or willing to appreciate his literary labors.

The *Freeman's Journal*, and one or two other Catholic newspapers, having very unnecessarily and very foolishly attempted to get up a cry against our Review, J. V. H. thinks, he tells us, that it is a good time for him to join in and have his say, as "he has a bone to pick with" us on his "own account." This may be prudent, but it says not much for his generosity or nobility of sentiment. A generous enemy would scorn to attack us when we were beset on every side by others. But we do not complain of it, for we can excuse much to an author smarting under a sense of real or imaginary injustice, and we do not allow ourselves to judge a man's real character by what he does or says in a moment of irritation.

J. V. H. commences "picking a bone" with us by denying us philosophical talent of the first order, in which he is right, and by allowing us "philosophical talent of the second order," in which he is wrong, for even that is more than we regard ourselves as entitled to. The newspapers, it is true, have awarded us more than this, but the judgments of newspapers are far from being irreformable, and we often wonder how even they can be so extravagant as to speak of us as a man of talent and learning. Having fixed, as he supposes, our rank as to philosophical talent, J. V. H. proceeds to reproduce and criticize our philosophy, to point out wherein it is sound, and wherein it is unsound.

"Talent of the first order *originates* ; talent of the second order expresses and popularizes. Nothing in metaphysics can be more clearly and perfectly expressed than Mr. Brownson's writings. He says what is necessary to make himself understood, and he says no more. Then he apprehends each idea (of his own) with almost absolute clearness. Many men in writing are searching after the idea they would fain express. Mr. Brownson is an experimentalist who holds it in the nippers of his logic, and describes it with leisurely accuracy. This vivid perception is the first prerequisite of a clear style. It is the same in artistic writing, where the power of description depends first on the power of conceiving what you would describe. We admire Mr. Brownson, then, when he states so clearly that reason in man is equivalent to the power of perceiving necessary truths. These truths, which, as perceived by us, are called *ideas* of reason, (an ancient, approved, and convenient phrase, which we see no cause for discarding,) are presupposed as the light of all our knowledge ; they are the *necessary air* of intellectual life, without which the operations of that life could not be continued for a single instant. They constitute reason ; they *are* reason. M. Bonnetty maintains 'that reason is an *innate, natural* faculty to *know* the truth' : but even this definition supposes that the idea of the *true* and the *not-true* is already in the reason. All the clearest traditions in the world could never communicate that idea, for without it they would be unintelligible. The same may be said, and in the like manner proved, respecting *all* the ideas with which the traditions of moral science are conversant, — such as the just and the unjust, the right and the wrong, the eternal and necessary and the contingent, the substance and the phenomenon, the cause and the effect. The tradition which preserves these ideas in the world, and which is the aliment of reason, would be useless as food to the dead, unless the ideas themselves were the native powers of reason itself, its light, proceeding directly from God, its breath, inspired by him. This is the light

of all our seeing. If the traditionalists, in their ontological zeal, go to deny this psychological truth, they either reduce man to a brute by depriving him of reason altogether, (but man is not a brute,) or else they *deify* his intelligence by resolving it directly into the divine. Reason, with its definite ideas, is an attribute of the finite intelligence. So far, Mr. Brownson is magnificent in his demonstration, though he borrows it from those whom he stigmatizes as psychologists."

The secondary merit of clearness of expression, which is so freely awarded us, we can hardly claim; for if we understand J. V. H., he does not understand us, and reproduces and commends as ours, not the philosophy we have endeavored to set forth, but the very philosophy we reject, and labor especially to refute. He represents us as holding that "reason in man," that is, if we understand it, reason as a human faculty, "is equivalent to the power of perceiving necessary truths," and that these truths, which may be "called ideas of reason," "constitute reason," in fact, "*are* reason" itself; that is, the power to perceive necessary truths, or at least the perceiving of necessary truths, and the truths themselves, are one and the same, or that the faculty, or the exercise of the faculty, and its object, are identical. Does he call this sound philosophy? Whether he does or not, we must assure him that it is not ours. He may well say this is borrowed from those whom we "stigmatize as psychologists," for it is without any doubt sheer psychologism; but we have not borrowed it from them, for it is precisely what we reject, and in all our writings touching the point, since 1841, we have uniformly labored to refute.

"M. Bonnetty maintains that 'reason is an innate, natural faculty to know the truth'; but even this definition supposes that the idea of the true and the *not*-true is already in the reason." We do not say this, and we cannot accept it, for it is not true. It implies that there cannot be knowledge unless there is knowledge prior to all knowledge, which, if it means any thing, means that all knowledge is impossible, for to have the idea of the true is to apprehend, that is, to know truth. "All the clearest traditions in the world could never communicate that idea, for without it they would be unintelligible." That is, intelligibility is in the subjective reason, not in the object. The reverse of this is what we hold. Moreover, the idea of the true

and the not-true, in the mind of J. V. H., is not the truth itself, but some *a priori* possession of the reason, which must precede all knowledge of truth, and all power to know it. It can at best, then, be only an abstract idea, and therefore he would represent us as holding, and, what is more singular still, commend us for holding, that the apprehension of the abstract precedes all knowledge of the concrete, — a doctrine which we deny indeed, but which we do not hold, for the abstract is intelligible only in the concrete. Then, again, what does our learned and philosophical critic mean by the idea of the *not-true*? The *not-true* is pure negation, and does he hold that negation is an idea, that is, an intelligible object, or an object which the mind can apprehend or form an idea of? We have been in the habit of supposing that only that which is or exists is intelligible, and therefore that no negation or denial is conceivable, but by the assertion of truth. Falsehood can be denied only by opposing to it the truth. Hence universal scepticism or denial is absolutely impossible.

“The same may be said, and in like manner proved, respecting *all* the ideas with which the traditions of moral science are conversant, — such as the just and the unjust, the right and the wrong, the eternal and necessary and the contingent, the substance and the phenomenon, the cause and the effect. The tradition which preserves these ideas in the world would be as useless as food to the dead, unless they were themselves the native powers of the reason itself.” The mind, then, can know only what is native to itself, only the native powers of human reason; that is to say, only its own innate ideas! This, we know, is maintained by some Transcendentalists, but we never suspected any body would regard us as holding it, much less commend us for holding it. But these ideas, according to J. V. H., are native powers of “reason in man,” that is, of reason as a faculty of the human soul, and are “necessary truths.” Then the human reason is a necessary truth, and man is God. Then the contingent, the phenomenon, the effect, is necessary; then creation is necessary; then there is no free creation; then no creation at all; then the universe is only a divine emanation, and pantheism must be accepted. If this is our critic’s philosophy, it certainly is not ours.

J. V. H. misapprehends entirely what we mean by ne-

cessary truths, if he imagines that they can be properly "called ideas of reason." *Idea* may be taken either objectively or subjectively, that is, either as simple mental apprehension, or as the intelligible object apprehended. If we take ideas in the sense of simple mental apprehensions, it is obvious that necessary truths cannot be called *ideas*; if we take them objectively, as the object of the apprehensions, it is equally obvious that they cannot be called ideas of *reason in man*, that is, of reason as a human faculty; for that would imply that reason in us, our reason, is God, and certainly so if we say "they constitute reason; they are reason." J. V. H. probably takes ideas in neither of these senses, neither as simple apprehensions or simple perceptions, nor as the intelligible object apprehended or perceived, and therefore not as ideas in any sense at all. He makes them the "native powers" of the reason, but of reason in man, reason therefore as a subjective faculty, as does Cousin, not of reason as distinct from man, and as the object of our intellective faculty. As they are neither the apprehension nor the object apprehended, they must be either what Descartes calls innate ideas, which are not ideas, or what Kant with more justness denominates the *necessary forms* of the understanding, preceding all actual knowledge as the antecedent and necessary conditions of all knowing. But if pure forms of the understanding, they cannot be necessary truths, unless man himself is necessary, and therefore God. Moreover, being pure forms of the understanding, they are subjective, and can have no objective value; and are neither apprehensions of something, nor something apprehended or apprehensible. This surely is not our doctrine, nor does it come within our order of philosophical thought, and is above or below it.

J. V. H., in reproducing what he supposes to be our doctrine, has overlooked the distinction which we always keep in mind, between reason as subject and reason as object. We do not think that he understands this distinction. He says we hold "reason in man to be equivalent to the power of perceiving necessary truths." This is not exact. We hold it to be that power itself. Reason in man, or reason as a faculty of the soul, is, among other things, the power to perceive necessary truths. This is the subjective reason, the same with the intellective faculty of man; for we do not, with some Germans, distinguish between reason as

subject and the understanding. But reason may also be taken objectively, as the object of reason as subject, that is, as the necessary truths or ideas themselves. J. V. H. fails to keep these two senses of reason distinct, and confounds reason as object with reason as subject, — the characteristic of psychologism, which confines it for ever to the sphere of the subject, without ever attaining to real objective knowledge, and leads either, with Fichte, to the identification of God with man, or, with Hegel, to the identification of man with God, — to the absolute Egoism of the former, or to the absolute Pantheism, or rather Nihilism, of the latter. The characteristic of ontology, under the present point of view, is to keep distinct these two senses in which the word reason is and may be used, and to assert reason as necessary idea or necessary truth, as the object really and immediately perceived or apprehended by reason as subject or intellective faculty of the soul. This is what we always insist on, and therefore we are surprised to hear ourselves commended for holding the opposite doctrine.

Our objection to M. Bonnetty and the Traditionalists is not, as J. V. H. supposes, that something more is required on the part of the subject, in order to know the truth, than reason as an innate, natural faculty to know it; and it never could have entered into our head to maintain, that this faculty is not enough unless there be already in the reason the idea of the true and the not-true, or that without that idea truth is unintelligible. The innate, natural faculty to know the truth is all that is required on the part of the subject to be able to know it, and if M. Bonnetty showed us how with his doctrine of tradition he could consistently hold reason to be such a faculty, we should have no quarrel with him. But this is precisely what he does not show, and which we undertake to show for him. We maintain, indeed, that without intuition of the intelligible, the idea, the necessary, there can be no knowledge; not, however, on account of any defect in the intellective faculty, but because there is nothing objective to be known. The mind apprehends truth in its intuition or perception of the true, but without the intuition of the true it cannot know truth, for without it there is no truth, either necessary or contingent. It is not the idea of the true in the mind that renders truth intelligible, but the idea as object

of the mind or necessary truth existing *a parte rei* that renders things intelligible, because without that things do not exist, and things are intelligible only in that they exist. Things can be known only in the respect that they are, and as they are only in the necessary truth, they can be known only in intuition of that, for as they are only in that, so only in that are they intelligible. We assert that the intuition of the true, the necessary, the idea, objectively considered, must be logically our first intuition, for an ontological reason, because without it there is and can be no object to be known, and therefore nothing intelligible; J. V. H. asserts that the idea must be in the reason for a psychological reason, because without it, the truth, though really existent, is unintelligible. According to him, the intelligibility of truth is in the subjective reason; according to us, it is in the truth itself, and hence the object is known because it is intelligible, not intelligible because it is known.

The misfortune of J. V. H., as of all psychologists, is in his attempt to assert ideas which are neither the object apprehended, nor the mental apprehension of an object existing *a parte rei*. But what is *idea* in this sense? What, for instance, is the idea of the true, as distinguished from truth on the one hand, and the mental perceptions, apprehension, or intuition of truth on the other? Three things we can understand, the object apprehended, the subject apprehending, and the apprehension; but something to be termed *idea*, which is distinguished from all these, passes our understanding. Is it truth? Then it pertains to the object apprehended. Is it the power of apprehending truth? Then it belongs to the subject apprehending. Is it the mental representation of the object? Then it is the apprehension or intuition. Is it something else? Then what? Nobody can tell, for nobody can tell what nothing is. The old scholastic doctrine of ideas as something intermediary between subject and object, neither one nor the other, yet something by means of which subject and object are brought into relation, is in the commonly received interpretation thoroughly exploded, and among all real philosophers the direct perception or intuition of the object itself by the perceiving subject is now asserted, which is only the revival of the sound part of Plato's doctrine, of what St. Augustine held, and of what, till the abuse of Aristotle in

the latter part of the Middle Ages, prepared the way for the decline of philosophy, had always been the doctrine of the great Fathers and Doctors of the Church.

“But when he proceeds to say that this intuition of necessary truths (without which reason is extinguished like a lamp) is the intuition of God himself, as the real, necessary, eternal, and immutable being, we must distinguish. *God hath no man seen at any time*, and His existence is not a matter of sight, not even of rational sight, but of faith. God is a Tradition. He is the God of *Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob*, the God of our *fathers* : — this is His name unto all generations. It is a simple and old demonstration indeed, to reason from our perception of necessary truths to the existence of God, who is the real and necessary BEING ; but this is only a proof, not an intuition. In fine, if human reason be not pure *Maia* ; if the Pantheistic doctrine that God simply becomes conscious in man, and that man consequently *is* God, be a heresy, and the negation of God and man alike ; then both tradition is necessary, and also a reason furnished with ideas, constituted by ideas, in order to understand the teaching of tradition concerning God. Moral science, then, has an objective, historical basis, and a subjective, rational basis too. The shield has a gold and silver side. The Traditionalists are right, and the Catholic Rationalists are right ; and they are both wrong, too, in what they exclude, as Mr. Brownson observes ; but a theory *which is scarcely one step divided from Pantheism*, is not the ‘solution’ of their difficulties.”

J. V. H. concedes here that we have intuition of necessary truth, and if he does not it matters nothing, for we have heretofore sufficiently proved it. We have, then, intuition of necessary truth. This necessary truth is either something or nothing. Not nothing, because it is *truth*, and truth is in being, not in not-being. Universal being is universal truth, and universal not-being is universal falsehood. Then it is something, and if something, it is either created or uncreate, for besides created and uncreate there is nothing. Not created, because it is *necessary*, and whatever is created is contingent, therefore not necessary. Then it is uncreate ; then it is God, for whatever is and yet is not created is God, and can be no other. If something, it is real ; if real and uncreate, it is real and necessary being ; if real and necessary being, it is eternal and immutable being. Therefore either we have no intuition of necessary truth, or our intuition of it is intuition of real, necessary, eternal, and immutable being, that is, of God. The former

cannot be said, therefore the latter must be conceded, and J. V. H. would never have denied it, if he had understood that abstractions do not exist *a parte rei*, and that we can have intuition only of the real.

But "we must distinguish." As much as you please. "God hath no man seen at any time." With the eye of the body or with the eye of the mind, as God, as he is in himself, conceded; with the eye of reason, as the necessary, the eternal, and the immutable, denied; for we have just proved that intuition of these is intuition of real, necessary, eternal, and immutable being, which is God, and can be no other. No knowledge is possible without intuition of necessary truth. Then either we know and can know nothing, or we have intuition of God, — although it is very true that we do not take note in the intuition that that of which we have intuition is God. We know this only subsequently, by reflection operating on the representations furnished by tradition, and some, like our New York critic, have never yet learned it.

"His existence is not a matter of sight, not even of rational sight, but of faith." Then his existence is not demonstrable, and J. V. H. differs with St. Anselm, St. Thomas, and the great body of Catholic theologians, who all maintain that the existence of God can be demonstrated, and therefore that it is a matter of science as well as of faith, and, as St. Thomas says, the preamble to faith. If it be not a matter of science as well as of faith, we should like to see the author of *Alban* undertake to prove his faith as a Catholic, or assign any motives of credibility for the Christian religion. If the Divine existence be a matter of science, it is of course a matter of rational sight, for reason cannot demonstrate what it cannot apprehend. "God is a tradition." The writer does not mean what he says. "He is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the God of our fathers." Would he assert that there was no God before Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, or our fathers? Does he mean to say there would be no God if there were no creatures, and thus maintain the doctrine, not unknown in the history of the aberrations of the human mind, that God is realized only in creating, becomes real God only in creation, and therefore self-conscious first in man, — the Hegelian doctrine, which he singularly enough half, or more than half, insinuates is our

own? We do not believe it. But he ought to know that God, as the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the God of our fathers, is the God of the covenant, the Author of grace, God in the supernatural order, in which sense nobody pretends that his existence is other than a matter of faith.

“ It is a simple and old demonstration indeed, to reason from our perception of necessary truth to the existence of God, who is real and necessary Being; but this is only a proof, not an intuition.” The reasoning is not an intuition, but the perception of necessary truth is, and if the perception of that truth be not an intuition of God, how from it conclude that God is? or what is the process or value of the proof? God can be concluded from the perception of necessary truth only on condition that it either is God or contains him as the particular in the general; for there can be nothing in the conclusion not contained in the premises. God cannot be contained in the necessary truth perceived as the particular in the general, for that would imply that there is something more general than God, which is not admissible. Then he is concluded only on condition that the necessary truth perceived is God, and the proof is not, strictly speaking, that God is, but that the necessary truth of which we have intuition is God. As this is demonstrable, we say the existence of God can be demonstrated. The argument, which is older than we know, but which usually bears the name of St. Anselm, is a good one, though not in the sense sometimes explained, and certainly not on the principles of psychologism; for its conclusiveness rests on the identity of the necessary truth perceived with God, and therefore on the fact that intuition of it is intuition of him. It is only the ontologist who can use this argument, and hence many psychologists reject it as worthless.

The writer of the article under review intimates that the theory which we proposed as the solution of the mutual difficulties of the Traditionalists and the Catholic Rationalists is scarcely one step divided from Pantheism, and therefore is insufficient to solve them. We do not see that this conclusion follows. If the theory is divided at all from Pantheism, it is not Pantheism, and therefore may be true, and if true, it must be sufficient. We apprehend that on certain points the truth runs very close to Pantheism, though of course without touching it. It takes a nice metaphysical

eye, unless specially illuminated, to distinguish the dividing line between some parts of mystic theology and Pantheism, and J. V. H. might find himself scandalized were he to read the Christian mystics. Pantheism is the error which lies nearest to truth, and therefore we regard it as the first error into which the Gentiles fell, on their apostasy from the patriarchal religion. Yet because the theory may, as every true theory must, on certain points, run close to Pantheism, and our learned critic may be unable to distinguish the line of demarcation, it does not follow that, if divided from it at all, it is to be rejected. If, however, he wishes to be understood as meaning more than he says, that the theory is not divided at all from Pantheism, we must tell him he labors under a slight mistake, that of taking his own theory for ours, which is not Pantheism solely because he is too good a Christian or too poor a logician to push his principles to their legitimate conclusions. Besides, the *Freeman's Journal* says that the solution we suggested we borrowed from M. Bonnetty, through his friend M. Nicholas, and, though this does not happen by any means to be the fact, as we suggested it in our Review before ever we heard of M. Nicholas or his books, it claims it as M. Bonnetty's. If J. V. H. chooses to call it Pantheism, we must turn him over to the tender mercies of that Journal, which will hear nothing said unfavorable to that distinguished French publicist.

But J. V. H. does not stop with our general metaphysics; he pushes his objections even to the doctrine we maintain on Rights and Duties, or the origin and ground of Law.

“This tendency of Mr Brownson to omnify God to the utter absorption of the creature, is yet more strikingly manifest in another part of the same article, where he reiterates his approbation of the saying of Donoso Cortés, that ‘right on human lips is a vicious expression,’ and argues at length in its defence. The *Civiltà Cattolica*, a learned journal conducted at Rome by members of the illustrious Society of Jesus, corrected this expression of Donoso Cortés as exaggerated, and as leading to the Pantheistic notion that man is a pure illusion. What God communicates to man (such was their argument), that he really has, although not in the same perfect and absolute sense as it is possessed by the Creator. Thus God is the only wise, the only good, the only fair, yet wisdom, goodness, and beauty, in an imperfect sense, are really participated by man. And so of *right*. It belongs in an absolute sense to God alone, as the Creator and Lord of the universe; but

in an imperfect sense it belongs to man, as God's *gift* to man. He has bestowed rights upon us, to Whom all rights belong. Mr. Brownson flatly denies this. Following the *Univers* and Donoso Cortés, in order to combat what he calls the *atheistic* tendency of the age, he maintains that 'only God has rights, and that man has only *duties*, and duties only to God.' Mr. Brownson confesses that this is repugnant to 'the ordinary forms of expression used by the great Doctors of the Church,' who have always maintained that man has rights; but he contends that it is not opposed to their meaning. We contend that it is opposed to their forms of expression, and to their meaning too, to common sense, and to sound theology."

Whether our doctrine be true or false, no objection more ridiculous can possibly be imagined against it than this, that it leads "to the Pantheistic notion that man is a pure illusion"; for it is impossible by any form of words to mark more intelligibly man's distinction from God, or to assert his substantiality as second cause more decidedly, than to declare that he has duties, and duties to God. An illusion can be under no obligation, and God cannot have duties to himself, or to any one else; for we must say with St. Anselm, whom we before cited, "*Deum esse omnino liberum a lege, et ideo quod vult, justum, conveniens esse; id autem injustum, et indecens non cadere in ejus voluntatem, non propter legem, sed quia non pertinet ad ejus libertatem.*" *Deus est omnino liber a lege.* If in every sense free from law, God can have no duties, for duties are imposed and defined by law only. Then only second causes can have duties, and, as pure illusions can have no duties, second causes can have them only in that they are second causes, and *substantially* distinct from God the First Cause. We were not a little surprised at the objection when brought by *La Civiltà Cattolica*, and we replied to it, and showed very clearly, that, if there was any Pantheistic tendency in the case, it was not in our doctrine, but in that which was opposed to it.

J. V. H. states correctly, however, neither our doctrine nor that of the *Civiltà Cattolica*. He supposes that we maintain that *right* on human lips is *always, in every sense*, a vicious expression, and that the *Civiltà Cattolica* maintains that man has rights, though in an imperfect sense, *because God communicates them to man, and what he communicates to man, man really has.* This is true of neither, and our New York critic fails to seize the real point of the ques-

tion. We do not deny human rights in the sense of God's direct gifts to man, nor does our Roman contemporary restrict itself to the assertion of them in that sense. Furthermore, we do not confess that our doctrine is repugnant to the forms of expression ordinarily used by the great Doctors of the Church, but at most only that it may *appear so at first sight*. All we confess is, not a real repugnance even to the forms of expression ordinarily adopted by the Doctors, but only an apparent repugnance, and even this only *at first sight*, disappearing on a closer view, while we maintain that it is in perfect accordance with their sense, and our critic brings forward, and, so far as we can discover, attempts to bring forward, nothing to prove the contrary.

The following passage from our article on *Rights and Duties* will show that we do not deny in every sense that man has rights : —

“ Nevertheless, we do not object, with proper explanations, to the application ordinarily made of the terms *right* and *natural law*. In the sense in which Donoso Cortés condemns, and his critic defends them, we cannot accept them, till otherwise instructed than at present ; yet we may call right *our* right, in the sense that it is a real right against our neighbor, and is made payable by the Divine order to us. Strictly speaking, the right is God's right, not ours, and is ours only as we are its trustees, or his ministers ; yet if we bear in mind that we hold it only from God, and mean by calling it ours only that it is a real right, and good in our favor against our neighbor, it is lawful as well as convenient for us to speak of our rights. So of the law of nature. We may speak of the law of nature, and insist on it as law, if we only bear in mind that it is law not by simple force of nature, regarded as *natura naturata*, but by the will of God our sovereign. It is also necessary to use the term when we wish to distinguish between nature and grace, or between the law by conformity to which we fulfil the purposes of our natural creation and the law by which we attain to the end of our supernatural creation. With these qualifications and explanations well understood, the terms can do no harm, are convenient, and sanctioned by a usage upon which we have as little right as disposition to innovate. All we insist on is, that we shall always, when strictness of language is necessary, assert all right as belonging to God, and for man only duties ; and in this, after all, we doubt not, our highly esteemed contemporary will fully agree with us.” — *Review for October*, 1852, p. 548.

We should suppose that any man of plain common sense and an ordinary command of the English tongue,

who had read this, might have understood that we defended the saying that "right on human lips is a vicious expression," only in a particular, not in a universal sense, and that that particular sense is the one in which we supposed Donoso Cortés denied, and *La Civiltà Cattolica* asserted, that man has rights. It is only for that particular sense we are responsible, and it is only by proving that man has rights in that particular sense that we are or can be refuted. What is that particular sense?

The real subject discussed in our article was the origin and ground of natural law, or the law of nature, and our purpose was not the defence of the sentence in the Letter of the lamented Donoso Cortés, to which his Italian translator took exceptions, and which occasioned the discussion, but to deny that the natural law derives its character as law, or its binding force, from nature, and to assert that it derives that character or that force solely and directly from the command or will of God, in accordance with what we supposed to be the plain sense of the Apostle in the text, *Non est potestas nisi a Deo*. The question of *right* came up only in the sense of *jus*, in the sense in which right is legislative, makes the law, and imposes and defines duty. The question of right we showed to be a question of law, because my right is law for all but myself, and imposes and defines their duty to me; and the question, therefore, whether man, strictly speaking, has rights, is simply the question whether he has in and of himself true legislative power, and can make the law, that is, impose and define duties. But this question resolves itself into a more general question, namely, whether nature, as second cause, has in any degree proper legislative authority; that is, whether what we call the law of nature derives its character or binding force as law from nature as second cause. If it does, then man has rights, in the true and proper sense of the word, and Donoso Cortés is wrong, for then there is no sense in which it can be true to say, "Right on human lips is a vicious expression"; if it does not, then man has no proper rights, and what we called *his* rights are grants, trusts, or privileges. We maintained the latter, as we had done before the Marques de Valdegamas had ever been heard of in connection with questions of this sort, or the existence of the *Univers* was known to us. What we maintain is, not that man in no sense has rights,

but that he has no inherent, indefeasible, natural rights, deriving their character of rights, that is, their binding force as law, from man himself, because nature or second causes have and can have in themselves no proper legislative authority.

The doctrine which *La Civiltà Cattolica* asserted against Donoso Cortés, and which we opposed, was not, as we understood it, that God gives man rights *extra naturam suam*, and therefore man has rights, since whatever God gives him is really his; but that he has, though in subordination to God as Supreme Legislator, proper legislative authority, or right in the sense that it imposes and defines duty, therefore right in the sense that it makes the law, not indeed in a perfect sense, but in an imperfect or participated sense. In like manner as man participates beauty, greatness, wisdom, power, and being, which are perfect only in God, it contended that man participates *right*, that is, in his nature, and therefore makes right a participated power, therefore man's own, as his beauty, wisdom, or being, and derived from God in no sense save as God is the author of his nature, or has created him. But as all right is legislative, this assumes for man, if not supreme legislative power, at least real legislative power in subordination to the Supreme Legislator. Man owns his right, as the farmer in a free state owns his farm, subject merely to the right of eminent domain in the prince, and subject to the eminent right of God he may found law, or be a lawgiver. This is what we denied. We denied that right in the sense asserted is participable. Right is legislative, and makes the law. But to make the law is, as all concede, the prerogative of sovereignty; sovereignty rests on dominion; dominion rests on ownership, and all ownership on creation; and God is sole Creator. Therefore, God is sole Legislator. He is not merely Supreme Legislator with subordinate legislators under him, each a proper legislator within a given sphere, but sole and universal Legislator, not in the sense of *eminent* legislator only, as he is the *eminent* cause of all that is done by second causes, but in the sense of direct Legislator, so that all legality, all the binding force of law, all law as law, emanates directly from his will. Therefore, strictly speaking, only God has rights, that is, in the sense in which right is legislative, which, we take it, is the strict and proper sense

of right. The law of nature is, we grant, true law, but it derives its character of law directly from the will of God, not from nature as second cause; and what we call our rights, whether public or private, are real rights, but they derive their character of right from the Divine will, not our own, as we before stated.

“It must be clear enough to the reader, that we do not deny our obligation to conform to the order of nature; on the contrary, we establish that obligation by establishing the obligation to obey God. We are not bound to obey the order of nature precisely because it is the order of *nature*; we are bound to obey it because it is created and established by God our sovereign, and because he by his law commands us to obey it. The eternal law, as St. Augustine says, commands the natural order to be preserved, and forbids it to be violated, — *ordinem naturalem conservari jubens, perturbari vetans*. Whatever is necessary to the preservation of this order is of course authorized, and when we have ascertained that this or that is necessary to its preservation, we may know without further inquiry that God commands it. All we contend for is that the reason of the obligation is not the necessity, but the Divine will. The practical duties or offices of life as set forth in the current teaching of the schools are all affirmed, and declared obligatory, only they are referred immediately, not mediately, to the law of God for their obligatory character. Rights and duties remain, only they are held to be rights of God and duties to God; and what are called duties to ourselves and duties to our neighbor remain real duties, only they derive their character of duties from the command of God, and are strictly duties to him, merely payable by his order respectively to ourselves and to our neighbor.” — *Review for October*, 1852, pp. 539, 540.

The difference between us and the school so ably represented by *La Civiltà Cattolica*, and so feebly defended by J. V. H., arises most likely from the different manner in which we respectively consider law. We consider law only in its obligatory character, and ask simply what it is that makes it law; it considers law rather in its contents, and asks what it is that makes the law right (*recta*) or reasonable. In this latter sense law has its seat in the Divine Reason, or Wisdom, and is undoubtedly participable, and possessed by us in an imperfect sense, as it asserts; but in this sense it is not properly law, for law is not *actus rationis*, but *actus imperii*, — is a command, and command proceeds only from will. Law considered in its obligatory character, in that it commands, or, as we say, imposes and defines duties,

has its seat, not in reason, but will, which is not participable. Man may conform to the will of God, but even God himself cannot make his will our will in a perfect or in a participated sense. Right as predicable of the will is personal, and not communicable. Assuming that the reason of the obligation is will, it is clear that no will but the will of God can impose it. No will but the will of God is in itself sufficient to place us or any one under obligation, and therefore we say very properly that he only has rights in the strict and proper sense of the word. His will alone is law, for we are not permitted to go behind the fact that it is his will to inquire whether it be right or reasonable; and this again is proof that the seat of law as law is the Divine will, not the Divine reason, and therefore, as will is incommunicable, that creatures can have no power to make the law except as his delegates.

Having said this much by way of presenting the real subject of the controversy and the true state of the question before our readers, we proceed to consider the proofs adduced that our doctrine is repugnant to the meaning of the great Doctors of the Church, to common sense, and to sound theology: —

“To simplify matters, the notion of right in creatures, that is, in man, which we assert, is the following, viz.: That God, who is the Lord and Creator of all men, and of the universe, in whom, consequently, all rights originally are, to whom, in an absolute sense, all right appertains, has, in his sovereign bounty, by an act which cannot fail of its full effect, GIVEN men rights. Consequently, they really possess them, in the strictest sense. Absolute right, like absolute truth, beauty, justice, wisdom, *being*, belongs only to God; but as creatures, that is, men, really *are*, in the strictest sense of *being*, and are (that is, the saints) wise, true, beautiful, and just, in the strict sense, though imperfectly; so they have *rights*, in the strict sense, and that because God has given them rights.”

We cannot detect here any remarkable simplification of the matter. We say, “Strictly speaking, only God has rights, and man has only duties, and duties only to God.” Our energetic opponent says men have rights because God has *given* them rights. Have we denied that God gives men rights? What is the difference between saying, “All rights are originally in God, to whom, in an absolute sense, all right appertains,” and saying, “Strictly speaking, only

God has rights"? "In his sovereign bounty [God] has given men rights." Be it so. Rights which God gives us in his bounty are not rights which man participates by his own nature, the only rights we deny to man; and such rights are not binding against God, for they are of bounty, not of justice; therefore, though favors, exceedingly great and precious favors, they are not rights in the strict sense of the word, for they derive their force of rights from the will of God who gives, not from the will of man who receives them. "They really possess them in the strictest sense." As the gifts of God's bounty, or as trusts, conceded; as the inherent and indefeasible rights of their nature, denied; for that begs the question.

J. V. H. perhaps is not aware of the error into which he falls, when he says, "Creatures, that is, men, really *are*, in the strictest sense of being." Being in the strictest sense of being is absolute being, and absolute being is God, and beside him there is and can be no absolute being. To say that men *are*, in the strictest sense of being, is only saying in other words that they are God. God alone is *ens simpliciter*, as say the schoolmen, and creature is only *ens secundum quid*. If we wish to speak strictly, we must say creatures, that is, men, *exist*, not that they *are*, unless we add *in God*, for the being of creatures is in God, not in themselves, since they are only participated beings; hence the Apostle says, *In ipso vivimus, et movemur, et sumus*, — In him we live, and move, and are, or have our being. God alone can, strictly speaking, say with truth, I AM, and hence he gives as his name to Moses, *Ego sum qui sum*, I am who Am. It is no sin in our New York critic not to be a metaphysician, but he should take care to keep clear of Pantheism himself before accusing his brother of Pantheistic tendencies.

"The error is analogous to that of the Calvinists, who denied the reality of human merit, and indeed, as we shall presently show, involves it. The creature, they argued, cannot lay the Creator under an obligation; when man has done all, he has done simply his duty; therefore he merits nothing; which, in the absolute sense, is true; but is false in fact, because God by his promise has obliged himself to reward the just man, and so by his sovereign will has made his justice meritorious. Indeed, it is demonstrable that man possesses real, proper, strict rights in the natural order, (by the gift of God,) because he possesses them in the

supernatural order. The human being who dies in a state of grace has a *right* to eternal life, by virtue of the promise and covenant of God. *That they may have a RIGHT to the tree of life, says the Scripture.* What is more common among Catholic theologians than to say that, if man corresponds to the ordinary graces of God, God is *bound* to give him the necessary light to discern the true Church, *subauditur*, by his Divine promise, otherwise not, and how does that differ from saying that such a man has a *right* to that further illumination? But if he who corresponds to grace given has (by God's promise) a right to more, if he who dies a saint has a right (which is incontestable) to eternal glory, if, consequently, men may have, if all men may acquire, in the supernatural and eternal order, *rights* which they may plead against God himself, (could the essential Justice extenuate, or the everlasting Veracity deny his promise, or the Immutable Goodness repent of it,) *how much more* may men have rights, by the same bounty, in the things of this life?"

Merit is gained in fulfilling the law, or in the performance of duty, not in the possession of rights. If the merit acquired be said to be our right, our right to the reward, it is only in a qualified sense, for J. V. H. himself concedes that, absolutely speaking, "the creature cannot lay the Creator under an obligation"; that, "when man has done all, he has done simply his duty, and therefore merits nothing." Merit, then, is not in the order of justice, but in the order of grace or bounty, and man merits only "because God by his promise has obliged himself to reward the just man, and so by his sovereign will has made his justice meritorious." Then it is his own promise, not man's right, that binds God, and therefore nothing is said to prove that man has in his own nature power to impose any obligation on any one, much less on God, his Creator, whose he is, body and soul, with all his faculties, and all he can acquire by their exercise. "The human being who dies in a state of grace has a *right* to eternal life, by virtue of the promise and covenant of God." No doubt of it, but not therefore by virtue of his own nature. The right is not in his nature, but in the promise and covenant of God, and it is God that binds himself, so to speak, not man who binds God. "What is more common among Catholic theologians than to say that, if man corresponds to the ordinary graces of God, God is bound to give him the necessary light to discern the true Church, *subauditur*, by his

Divine promise, otherwise not?" We are not accustomed to hear Catholic theologians say this, and we do not know that the assertion is true; but if they do, it amounts to nothing, if they add that he is bound "by his promise, otherwise not"; for then, again, it is God who binds himself, and not man's right that binds God. "And how does this differ from saying that such a man has a *right* to that further illumination?" It differs precisely as a promise of God differs from a human right. Man has no natural right, that is, no right in the order of justice to any grace at all, neither to the first grace nor to the augmentation of grace, for only grace can merit grace, since *gratia est omnino gratis*. What J. V. H. calls our *rights* are the gracious promises of God, and he is mistaken in supposing that we can plead them as our *rights* against him. We can only plead them as his promises, for it is his own perfection, not our right, that binds him to keep his promise, and should he, *per impossibile*, not keep his promise, he would do us no injustice. His promises to us are gratuities, made for our benefit solely, not in consideration of benefits derived or to be derived from us by him, and therefore do not fall under the ordinary law of contracts. Therefore, though they may give us a title to eternal life, they do not confer on us a right which binds God to give it, so that he could not withhold it without doing us wrong. Our friend in his horror of Calvinism must take care not to fall into Pelagianism, and set up a claim to heaven as his right, as something due him in justice.

Having failed to establish our strict and proper right to things of the supernatural order, the *a fortiori* by which J. V. H. concludes it to things of this life, or of the natural order, falls of itself. Men have no natural right to any thing, for they had and could have no natural right to be created. God was under no obligation to them to create them, and he is under just as little to preserve them in existence, for the act of creation and preservation is one and the same act.

We argue, in our article on *Rights and Duties*, that right is a power to legislate, that to legislate is the prerogative of sovereignty, that sovereignty belongs to God alone, because it rests on dominion, dominion on ownership, ownership on creation, and God alone can create; therefore God alone, strictly speaking, has right; therefore right,

strictly speaking, on human lips, is a vicious expression. J. V. H. replies, "Mr. Brownson might as well argue that property on human lips is a vicious expression, because all property rests on ownership, and all ownership on creation." Undoubtedly, and we do so argue, and therefore deny to man property in the same sense in which we deny to him rights, but in no other. Is our good friend shocked at this? Has he yet to learn that all property is God's, and that man is only his steward for its management? Has man any thing which God may not rightfully take from him whenever he pleases, — any thing which man may justly withhold when God immediately or by the voice of his Supreme Vicar demands it, — any thing he can hold up to God, and say, This is mine, touch it not without my consent? If God asks my life for his service, his honor, or his glory, am I free to withhold it? and in asking it does he ask any thing which is not by every title already his to dispose of as he pleases? If my life is his, how much more what I call my goods? J. V. H. would perhaps not do amiss to read St. Bonaventura on this subject, and the Homilies of St. John Chrysostom.

But J. V. H. argues that, if we have no proper right to our goods, we are not wronged when deprived of them against our will without a just cause. Are not wronged as God's stewards, his trustees, or his beneficiaries, denied; are not wronged in any other sense, we sub-distinguish: in the sense of being deprived of a natural *right*, we concede it, in the sense of being deprived of a *good*, we deny it. The wrong as opposed to right in the sense of law is done to God, and to us only as his trustees; as opposed to good, is done to us, for whose advantage the trust was created. He who deprives us of them does *evil* to us, but does not wrong us in the sense that wrong is the violation of law. The evil is a wrong in that sense, or in an ethical sense, only because it is a violation of the right of God; and is therefore simply evil as against us, and a moral wrong only as against God. So of the maiden who is robbed by violence of her honor, the innocent whose life is taken, and all the other instances adduced by J. V. H. in his magnificent declamation. The evil is to the sufferer, the moral wrong is to God, whose property is injured, and whose law is broken. Is our friend dissatisfied with this? Does wrong lose its horror because it violates the rights of

God instead of the rights of man? Is an act less wrong because it is a wrong done to God, than it would be if a wrong done to a creature? And should we hold our own rights dearer than the rights of God, or feel more deeply outraged at a wrong to ourselves, or to our fellow-men, than at a wrong done to our Creator, our Sovereign, our Redeemer, our Benefactor, and our Father? We do not think so.

“Does not every prince say, ‘I will defend the rights which *God gave me*’? Is it not the sentiment of free nations, ‘Our rights were given us by God, and we will defend them to the last drop of our blood’?” We should like to believe so. The universal sentiment to which J. V. H. appeals against us, if rightly represented by him, is in our favor; for mark, the prince does not say, My rights *are my own*, and I will defend them; free nations do not say, Our rights *are our own*, and therefore we will defend them to the last drop of our blood. Both refer the rights to God, as rights held from him, and it is in his name, not in their own, that they take their heroic resolution to defend them. But surely our friend does not mean here to assert that those rights which God gives become the proper and indefeasible rights of princes and nations, for that would be to assert a doctrine which every Catholic theologian, of any authority, denies, — the doctrine of the inamissibility of power, or the divine right of kings, as contended for by James the First of England, and refuted by Bellarmine, Cardinal Duperron, and above all by Suarez, the great authority on this subject. J. V. H. is unfortunate. In almost every instance in which he attempts to oppose our doctrine, he falls into the precise error he seeks to establish against us, and in the one or two cases in which he does not, he falls into an error of the opposite description. Here he is trying to make us appear as the advocate of despotism, and his own doctrine, if understood in a sense opposed to ours, offers the firmest basis to despotism that it is possible to conceive. The rights of princes and nations, according to us, are trusts from God, and are held and can be exercised only in his name and by his authority, under responsibility to him, according to the conditions which it has pleased him to establish. Held as trusts, they are forfeited by abuse, and the power is lost, and may be transferred to other hands, as the Sovereign Pontiffs in the deposition of secular princes

have always asserted; but if held as indefeasible rights, they could not be forfeited, and under no circumstances could resistance to tyranny and oppression be lawful.

“It is the unanimous sense of mankind that the validity of rights springs from God, who gave them.” We are glad to hear it. But then why tell us that our doctrine is opposed to the meaning of the great Doctors of the Church, to common sense, and to sound theology? “His perfect and absolute right as the Creator, Lord, and Sovereign Owner of all things, is *the very thing which imparts validity to his grant, and makes the right he gives a real, strict, proper right, a right which it is in itself unjust to violate.*” Very well said, and it expresses our own thought almost as well as we ourselves expressed it, except the last clause, the meaning of which in this connection we do not understand. That which gives validity to a right is that which gives it its character of right, and which gives to the correlative duty its obligation or its character of duty. So, just avoid the confusion between *rights* in the sense of grants or privileges, and rights in the strict sense of the word, and this will be substantially our own doctrine.

Here we might close, but our New York critic makes a few points more which we suppose he will expect us to notice; and if we should not, some might be rash enough to conclude that we found them too hard for us. He expresses surprise that we object to *La Civiltà Cattolica's* definition of right, that it leaves out the essential element of right. It defines right to be “a moral force which one has to subdue another to his will, and which, though it may be violated by material force, whether our own or that of others, is always subsisting, living, and speaking.” We objected to this, that it does not define this force to be one that *ought*, or has the right, to subdue. J. V. H. says that, in being defined to be a *moral* force which survives though violated, it is defined to be “a force that *ought* to subdue, and has the right to subdue.” This is not evident to us. Moral force is contrasted by *La Civiltà* with material force, and when so contrasted it does by no means imply that it is a force that *ought*, or that has the right, to subdue. The force of reason is a moral force, but not therefore does it make or impose the law. But we founded our objection not so much on the words of the definition as on *La Civiltà's* development of it; for we did not ask in

what sense or senses it might be taken, but in what sense it really was taken by its author. This was in accordance with a habit we have of always seeking to get at and speak to the exact sense of an author, instead of seeking what sense may be extracted from his words. In his own understanding of it, the author did not include what we regard as the essential element of right, unless in developing it he did great injustice to his thought.

J. V. H. pronounces us incredibly sophistical in our reasoning from this definition against the existence of strict human right. If we allowed ourselves to bandy epithets with a writer whom with all his peccadilloes we love and honor, we should say the incredible sophistry is exhibited in his effort to refute our reasoning. "This force, *La Civiltà Cattolica* says, 'is based on a practical truth.' No, Mr. Brownson says, 'for if the right were *mine*, it would need nothing beyond my will to establish it, but since truth is neither mine nor myself, what you call my right is only the right of the truth or of the law to prevail, and therefore is not my right.' A gross paralogism, for so it might be shown that God has no right, since the moral force of his will to subdue ours is equally the force of truth, the truth that he is our Creator and Sovereign, and as such has a right to our obedience." Not unless God can say of that truth, "It is neither mine nor myself"; for if the truth is himself, or is his, dependent on his will, the right founded on it must be also his. The writer has reproduced our objection only in a mutilated form, but has failed to perceive its point even as he has reproduced it. The point of the objection is, not that the right is based on a practical truth, but on a practical truth independent of my will, and which is neither mine nor myself. My right, if mine, is the right of my will to prevail. When you base that right on a truth, you affirm it to be the right of that truth. Then, if that truth be independent of my will, and be neither mine nor myself, you deny the right based on it to be my right. But you cannot retort the argument, for the truth on which the right of God is founded is his truth, entirely dependent on his will; for he is perfectly free to create, or not to create, and being his, whatever is founded on it is also his. Even the author of *Alban*, we should suppose, might understand this, and see that the sophistry was his, not ours.

Our New York friend, who not obscurely hints that he possesses philosophical talent of the first order, — that talent which originates, — tells us that right is indefinable, and then proceeds to describe it. "It is," he says, "an idea *eternal* as God, *necessary* as his essence (in which it subsists), the *mirror* of his justice, the legislator of the universe." Right then must be God, for what subsists in the essence of God is that essence, and the essence of God is God, and an idea subsisting in God, eternal and necessary as his own being, is also God, since, as St. Thomas teaches, *Idea in Deo nihil est aliud, quam essentia Dei*. But all the ideas with which the traditions of moral science are conversant, we were told some time ago, are native powers of reason, constitute reason, are reason, as reason in man, that is to say, human reason. So human reason is not only God, but more than God! Right, we are told, is the *mirror* of God's justice. A mirror is distinct from that which it reflects, therefore justice is distinct from God and right! But what is justice distinct from right? Or God deprived of justice? Right is eternal as God, and necessary as his essence. Yet right is the legislator of the universe. Therefore the legislator of the universe is a necessary, not a free legislator. Therefore no free government of the world, no free providence, but all are subjected to stern and invincible necessity!

The writer of the article we are reviewing is, he must permit us with all respect to say, more practised in rhetoric than in logic, and is more of a poet than a philosopher. We do not question his talent of the first order, but he must allow us to believe that he is not much accustomed to the investigation of the higher philosophical questions, and has not paid sufficient attention to them to be able to acquit himself creditably in their discussion. He does not appear to understand the importance to a philosopher of the categories, and of keeping different though kindred matters distinct. He does not seem to be aware that right is used in our language in two distinct senses, and that law itself may be considered under a twofold aspect, either as it is right (*recta*), reasonable, fit, proper, or convenient, or as it is obligatory (*jus*), as the command or precept of the sovereign, and he treats the question before us as if these two aspects or senses were one and the same. In his description of right, where he says it is an idea eternal as God

and necessary as his essence, in which it subsists, he uses the word *right* in the sense of rectitude (*rectum*), and asserts that it is the eternal reason or wisdom of God. This is an admissible sense of the word, and in this sense men participate it as they participate reason, and they would not be capable of receiving a moral law if they did not. But when he adds that right is the legislator of the universe, he either changes the sense of the word, or else he declares reason to be legislative, and law in its essential character as law an *actus intellectus*. We know very well that many ethical writers represent reason as legislative, and regard will as only executive; but this can be maintained only when the law is considered in relation to what is commanded, or the reason why the sovereign commands it, not when considered as to its obligation, or the reason why it binds the subject. Properly speaking, reason is declarative, not legislative. It determines the rectitude of the law, declares it to be obligatory, but does not itself render it obligatory. The law as founded in reason alone is a simple rule or measure of right and wrong, declaring what is right (*recta*), proper, decent, and what is not, but not binding the will to do the one, or not to do the other. In other words, a law of reason, *actus rationis*, is law for the understanding, but not law for the will; reasonable, but not obligatory. It teaches, but does not command. Hence, when we ask why we are bound to obey it, we are usually answered, it is reasonable that we should, it is conformable to nature to do so, it is useful, it is for our happiness, and we shall be miserable if we do not. All very true, but nothing binding the will, or asserting the reason of obedience.

If, to get law in an obligatory sense in which it is law for the will, we go further, and assert reason not merely as declarative, but as strictly legislative, we then lose all free legislation, for reason is necessary, not free. By placing the obligation as well as the rectitude of the law in reason, we place it in the eternal and necessary essence of God, and then God is no longer a free legislator, for in his essence he is necessary being. The law, then, is of necessity, and God has no freedom in governing the world. Then there is no free providence, and God can intervene in human affairs only in accordance with stern, inflexible, and necessary laws, which he can no more change or modify,

than he can his own eternal, necessary, and immutable essence. Then no miracles are possible, no order of grace conceivable, no supernatural revelation can be made, no prayers can be answered, and Christianity is inadmissible, save as a mythical, poetical, or symbolic representation, for the vulgar, of the universal, necessary, and unchangeable laws which bind alike God, man, and nature in the all-encircling chain of an invincible and inexorable destiny. Study the Hegelian philosophy in Germany, or the eclectic philosophy in France, represented by the brilliant Cousin, and the logical but despairing Jouffroy, and you may see where the doctrine that law is to be referred for its obligatory character to reason, inevitably leads. It makes God universal fate, and renders all freedom, save freedom *a coactione*, impossible. Those who have not, like ourselves, pushed modern heresy, in their own eager pursuit of truth, to its last consequences, may not feel as we do the danger of that doctrine, and the importance of refuting it in its principle. The age with its clamorous tongues demands liberty, and gets — slavery. We, too, demand liberty, the liberty of God. We are deafened and wearied half to death with the ceaseless babble about the rights of man, and we seek relief in a piercing cry for the rights of God. We had wandered in darkness, stumbling from error to error, with downcast look and saddened hearts, craving freedom and finding only bondage, till one day broke in upon us a solitary ray, the first that had ever penetrated our darkened understanding, and our heart bounded with joy to behold that God is free. Then began the revolution in our whole order of thought; then rolled back the clouds that had gathered over us; then fell the chains that had bound us, and entered into our very soul; and we found ourselves at once rejoicing in the glorious freedom and light of the Church of God. The revelation to us of the liberty of God wrought the change; it was the first step in the process of our conversion to Catholicity, and hence we feel most deeply the importance of asserting it. Its denial is at the bottom of all modern heresy. But the liberty of God, the foundation and support of all real liberty, can be asserted only by referring law, in that it is obligatory, to the will of God, and regarding it not as his eternal essence, but as his creature, and therefore whatever he chooses to make it. There is no freedom where there is no free legis-

lator, and man has no freedom, save in being freed from all created wills, and in being subjected to the will of God alone, who is free to impose on him whatever law he in his infinite wisdom and unbounded goodness judges best. Then we are not chained to the car of a stern and inexorable necessity, but are subjected to a free and living and loving sovereign, to whom our hearts may expand with true loyalty, to whom we can prefer our petitions and address our prayers, and who is free to hear and answer us, who is flexible to our wants, who can condescend to our weaknesses, bear our infirmities, console us in our afflictions, and rejoice with us in our joy. Give us this Sovereign, revealed to us by our holy religion, — this Sovereign Legislator who has free will, who is above all law, and whose laws are flexible to all his gracious designs, to all the dictates of his loving kindness, and we can feel that we are free in the infinite freedom of God.

We may be mistaken, but we think that all modern heresy, beginning with the Protestant principle of the right of private judgment, which supposes the law is not obligatory on account of the will that commands, but on account of what it commands, down to the assertion of the absolute independence of man and denial of the authority of God by Proudhon, finds its basis in the doctrine that law derives its essential character as law from reason, and that right in the sense of *jus* is participable. Hence we must believe that, to meet and refute that heresy in its principle, it is necessary to make a distinction which we find in St. Augustine, but which we do not always find expressed in the mediæval doctors, and which is seldom noticed in the little men of our times, between law regarded as to its contents, or as to the reason why God wills it, and law regarded as obligatory, or as that which binds the subject. In the former sense, it is *actus rationis*, and has its seat, its origin and ground, in the eternal reason of God; in the latter, it is *actus voluntatis*, and has its origin and ground in the free will of God, as has the creative act itself. It is only by means of placing obligation solely in the fact that God wills it, that we know how to carry on the war against the peculiar errors of our times. In this we do not regard ourselves as innovating, or as departing from the truth as taught by the mediæval doctors, but simply as applying that truth under the special form required to meet the errors of

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our times, as they applied it under the special forms required to meet the errors of their times.

But to return to our New York friend. He contends that we must have rights in the strict and proper sense of the word, because we have the *notion* of right. This notion must be derived either from rights which we possess as our own, or from *error*. The latter cannot be said. Therefore we must say the former. Therefore we have rights. This argument, he says, must be conclusive with us, for we are an ontologist, and contend that an idea must exist outside the mind before it can exist in it. How an argument which is based on pure psychologism must be conclusive with us because we are an ontologist, is not very clear to us. The notion of right cannot be obtained from an error, we concede, and that it can be obtained only from the intuition of real right, we also concede; but how it follows from this that we have rights in the strict and proper sense of the term, we cannot understand. J. V. H. says, indeed, that "all our ideas of spiritual and heavenly things are first taken from their earthly patterns"; but this is not ontology, nor do we admit it to be true. The reverse is what we hold. "See," said the Lord to Moses, "that you make all things according to the pattern shown you in the mount." We did not before know that the spiritual and heavenly things were patterned after the earthly; we thought the earthly was patterned after the spiritual and heavenly, and that the *idea exemplaris* was in God, in the Divine mind, not in the creature. Certainly we have read something like this among the Gentiles in Plato, and among Christians in St. Augustine and St. Thomas. It is psychologism, not ontology, that teaches that the order of science is the reverse of the order of reality. We suppose that, as right is a reality, it may be known to us in the same way that other realities, without being our property, are known to us.

J. V. H. argues that there must be human rights in the sense we deny, because God is the true Nemesis, and avenger of the wronged. But has he forgotten that the Lord says, "Revenge is mine, and I will repay"? But how can this be true, if the rights to be avenged are not his? He forbids us to revenge ourselves, because revenge belongs to him, and not to us, and therefore we should conclude that the rights violated and to be avenged were his,

and not ours, for if they were ours we should have the right to avenge them. But we have rights in the sense of trusts, created for our benefit, and we can conceive that God might with propriety be said in avenging their violation to avenge us, for he does avenge, in avenging the violation of his own rights, the benefit of which he has granted to us, both us and himself.

But the argument that is utterly to confound us our Catholic objector has reserved to the last to cap the climax. "If, finally, 'right on human lips be a vicious expression,' then what becomes of the rights of the Apostolic See of which the Popes in their briefs and allocutions constantly speak? What are the 'Catholic rights' of which Mr. Brownson speaks at the close of this very article? If 'right on human lips is a vicious expression,' let Catholics learn henceforth not to speak of their rights, but only of their 'duties,' and the Sovereign Pontiffs cease to protest that the 'rights' of their glorious throne are violated." This is a grave objection, and we can only say in our defence, that we wrote as a Catholic, and very innocently took for granted that Catholic rights and the rights of the Apostolic See are, in the minds of Catholics, Divine, not human rights, the rights of God, and not the rights of man. The Sovereign Pontiff, we have been taught, holds, exercises, defends, the rights of the Apostolic See as the successor of Peter and the Vicar of our Lord Jesus Christ, not in his own name, as his own inherent and indefeasible personal rights. Catholic rights are the rights of the Church, and the rights of the Church are the rights of her celestial Spouse. At least so Catholics believe. Is not J. V. H. a Catholic? If he is, will he tell us by what *right* he assumes that the rights of the Church are human rights? It strikes us that he has something here to settle with his confessor, and to explain to his Catholic brethren. He must have forgotten himself, for we cannot suppose him to be ignorant that a Catholic is not at liberty to follow Ranke and Macaulay, and call the Church commissioned by Almighty God to teach and govern, in his name and by his authority, all men and nations in all things pertaining to salvation, a human institution, to speak of her rights as human rights, and conclude that man has proper rights of his own, from the fact that she as God's Church has rights. Her rights are God's rights, and unless the question between us and the

Civiltà Cattolica be decided against us, no doubt can be thrown on them. J. V. H. by resorting to this last argument has damaged his own reasoning more perhaps than we have damaged it, because by it he plainly shows that he has either been blinded by passion, or has never begun to understand the subject on which he affects to speak as a master.

But we have said enough, and more perhaps than was necessary. However, we are not sorry that J. V. H.'s irritation has given us an opportunity to bring this great question of Rights and Duties before our readers again, for in our judgment it is the most important question of our times. We are not precisely ignorant of what may be adduced against us; we have seen in the *Ami de la Religion* a most frightful list of authorities, embracing wellnigh a catena of all the Fathers and Doctors of the Church in favor of the expression that man has rights, but we have not seen one, in that list or elsewhere, that asserts them clearly and unequivocally in the sense in which we deny them. None of them seem to have taken up the question in the precise form that we have, and though St. Thomas would seem to be against us, inasmuch as he formally teaches that law is *actus intellectus*, it is clear to us that he proves it to be so only in the sense in which we concede that it is, and we can find authority enough in his writings to prove that it is also *actus voluntatis*. Suarez, whom since writing thus far we have consulted for the first time on this point, in his *De Legibus*, the standard authority on this subject, appears to adopt and defend our view, that law in that it is obligatory is *actus voluntatis*. He gives three opinions, and certainly inclines to the third, which reconciles the other two, and this third opinion is the one we have defended. If we consider law as to its contents, or in answer to the question why the sovereign chooses to enact it, it is no doubt *actus intellectus*, but in that sense it is only improperly called law; if we consider it as obliging, or in answer to the question, why does it bind the subject to obedience, there is just as little doubt that it is *actus voluntatis*, for it certainly does not bind till the sovereign has willed it. If it did, it would be eternally law, and no sovereign will would be requisite to constitute it law. Its obligation would be in what it commands, not in him who commands, which no Catholic theologian, and none but an infidel or a *Liberal*

Christian can admit. The reason which induced some to hesitate about placing law in will, that is, to escape the doctrine, that whatever the prince or human sovereign wills is law, is obviated by our doctrine that the right to make the law is in God alone, and in human governments only by delegation or as a trust from him, and the force of the law as law is directly from him, and human governments act only in his name, and bind their subjects only in so far as they have his authority. And as they never have his authority for any unjust acts, such acts are null and void from the beginning, and when they persist in them they abuse their trusts and forfeit their powers. As we ascribe the law-making power solely to God, and allow it to others only as his delegates, tied up by the conditions he annexes, there is no danger in saying that the binding force of the law is derived solely from the will of the sovereign.

ART. V. — *Essays on Various Subjects*. By his Eminence CARDINAL WISEMAN. London: Dolman. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1853. 3 vols. 8vo.

WE are very glad to see these admirable *Essays* of his Eminence Cardinal Wiseman, the greater part of which were originally published in *The Dublin Review*, collected and given to the public in these three handsomely printed volumes. They constitute one of the richest contributions that have recently been made to our English Catholic literature. They bear to us the marks of a varied and extensive erudition, which we seldom look for out of Italy or Germany; are written in a style of singular freshness and beauty, vivacity and force, ease and dignity, which may well be studied as a model.

These *Essays* are divided into three classes. The first, which fills the first volume, consists of Scriptural *Essays*, and papers designed to bring out the beauties of the Catholic ritual, of Catholic practices, and of Catholic devotions. The second class, making up the second volume, with the exception of the last article, is entirely devoted to the High-

Church question, or, as it used to be called, the Oxford Controversy. The third class is made up of essays of a more miscellaneous character, — historical, artistical, archæological, and controversial; but all are subjects of great interest and importance to every Catholic. It is difficult to speak of these Essays in language which to those who have not carefully read them will not seem to be exaggerated. They are marked by great clearness of apprehension and expression, depth and originality of thought, a rich imagination, a cultivated taste, and a tender devotional spirit. They are in style and manner genuinely English, admirably adapted to the tastes and peculiarities of the English mind, but rigidly orthodox and even ascetic in their soul. We have in them great artistic beauty, high appreciation of the æsthetic, and a strong disposition to press into the service of religion sensibility, taste, and imagination, but we have nothing weak, morbid, or fanciful, and all is strong, healthy, and robust, under the regimen of good sense and enlightened devotion. We are pleased, delighted, charmed, as we read them, and at the same time enlightened, elevated, and invigorated. The illustrious author seems to us with rare felicity to have hit the proper medium between the dry, formal, and stiff scholastic form, repulsive to all but the very devout or those very much interested in the subject treated, and the weak and sentimental tone, affected phraseology, and literary claptraps, which offend us in such writers as Chateaubriand, Orisini, and other well-meaning but not very healthy Frenchmen, who seek to arrest the attention of modern society by their literary capers, and by means of a pious romanticism to cheat their readers into a weakly faith and a sickly devotion, which wilt in the first hot summer's day, and expire in the first autumnal frost. His Essays in style and manner are modern, adapted to the cultivated taste of the better classes of modern society, and may be commended as models to all our young men who aspire to make any valuable contributions to our Catholic literature. By studying them they will escape the dry and bald, the flashy and the sentimental, the turgid and the bombastic, the weak and the sickly, and, above all, the coarse and vituperative, which some of our Catholic journalists even seem to delight in, and which seems to have arisen from their excessive admiration of Cobbett, whose *History of the Reforma-*

tion in England appears, strangely enough, to be regarded by many Catholics as a standard Catholic work. Cobbett wrote an idiomatic, racy, and nervous English style, but his spirit was coarse, pugnacious, and savage, and whoever undertakes to imitate him is in great danger of catching and exaggerating his spirit without attaining to the excellence of his English. For ourselves, we cannot read anything of Cobbett, without calling to mind Peter Porcupine of Philadelphia, the *Political Register*, the high Tory in America and the Radical in England, the nominal Anglican but real unbeliever, who made a sort of pilgrimage to the grave of Tom Paine at New Rochelle, for the purpose of translating the relics of that arch-infidel and drunken blasphemer to England, although, it is said, the bones he carried back with him were those, not of Tom Paine, but of a poor old negro who had been buried in the same grave; and we confess we cannot listen with patience to anything he says, even when what he says is not reprehensible. The main facts of his History, which we are surprised to find the excellent Rohrbacher citing as his chief authority for his account of the Reformation in England, are, we believe, as far as they go, substantially correct, but the spirit that pervades the work is that of an infidel scoffer. We always regret to see any alliance of Catholics with vulgar radicals, whose proffered aid should be spurned rather than accepted. No good can ever come of alliances with those who war against society and blaspheme God.

We are glad that his Eminence suffered himself to be prevailed upon to include in this collection the masterly papers published in *The Dublin Review* on the Oxford Controversy. The Oxford movement was in its day a very remarkable movement, and the manner in which his Eminence met it, and followed it step by step, till most of the extraordinary men who commenced it were reconciled to the Church, is full of interest and instruction. These Essays, indeed, touch only a special phase of Protestantism, and by no means meet the general question between us and non-Catholics; but we can conceive nothing better adapted to the special purpose for which they were written. Their illustrious author evidently felt a deep interest in the movement and hoped much from it; he evidently had a sincere affection for the men engaged in it, and was most anxious to conciliate their good-will to the Church. He formed a

very high estimate of their learning, their ability, their sincerity, and their honesty of purpose, but he made no concessions to them, and while he treated them with genuine courtesy, and cheerfully gave them credit for their good intentions, he met their errors with uncompromising firmness, and refuted them in a calm, dignified, and manly manner. There is, however, running through these remarkable *Essays*, a gentleness, a sweetness, an affectionateness, which we greatly admire, and would wish to see far more common in our controversial writings.

We cannot read these *Essays* on the Oxford Controversy without something like envy of their illustrious author, — not, of course, for his talents, his genius, his erudition, his courteous manner, and his graceful and dignified style, for these are far above our humble aspirations, but for his public, for the men he had to refute, and to bring within the pale of the truth. He had a great and important movement setting towards the Church to deal with, conducted by men of mistaken views indeed, advocating in itself considered an absurd and ridiculous theory, but sincere, honest, and loyal, well-bred, cultivated, eminent for their abilities and learning, who were too much in earnest to be cavillers, numerous enough to make it an object to address them specially, and respectable enough to enable one to address them in gentle and hopeful terms. To one who understood the Oxford movement, and knew something of the men engaged in it, there was much of interest and promise. One could so treat these men as to refute their errors and retain their respect, and even secure their affection. Some such there no doubt are in our own country, but their number is small, and they scarcely ripple the surface of the main current of Protestant life. They bear too small a proportion to our whole population to be made much account of in our public controversies. They do not succeed in determining the form which the controversy between us and non-Catholics must take, and we can avail ourselves of none of their concessions. The great mass of our Protestants are simply non-Catholics, and we are obliged to discuss the question with them very much as if we were discussing it with Gentiles, and with Gentiles engrossed with their foul superstitions, or laughing at their gods, light and flippant, and apparently incapable of treating any religious questions with seriousness and candor.

Protestantism here refuses to meet the Catholic question either on the field of erudition or on that of reason and common sense. It refuses to discuss it in a form in which it can be brought to an issue. We have conducted our Review as a Catholic Review now for full nine years, and have during all that time been publishing quarterly elaborate essays on the most momentous subjects that can engage the mind or the heart of man, and during all this long period in only one single instance have we obtained a response from a Protestant author who seemed serious, and to be governed by honesty and sincerity of purpose. The answers which Protestantism has had to offer to us have been some worn-out sophisms too puerile to be urged by any grave reasoner, palpable misstatements of what we maintain, newspaper squibs, and pointless jokes about our alleged frequent changes of opinion when a Protestant. And to Catholics at large she replies with literary forgeries, falsifications of history, unsupported assumptions, the filthy lectures of a Leahey and a Giustiniani, the declamations of noisy demagogues, the ribaldry and tirades against our clergy and our religious of a Gavazzi, all brought forward in that loose and disjointed manner, that no human patience can work it into a shape that admits of a reply, and all supported by no authority but the ignorance and prejudices of the multitude. It renews against us the policy of Voltaire and his associates against Christianity. "Lie, lie boldly, lie stoutly, lie constantly; some of it will stick." Regular controversy is thus out of the question, and we have no opportunity to display, if we had them, those traits of gentleness and consideration for our "separated brethren" that we so much admire in Cardinal Wiseman's *Essays*. The only thing we can do is to plant ourselves on our rights as Catholics, and continue our attacks on Protestantism, not as a form of heresy so much as a form of gentilism. This seems harsh and uncourteous, nay, as some say, uncharitable; but we can do no otherwise, till we have compelled Protestantism to become serious, and to enter earnestly and gravely on her defence. The mode of address we are obliged to adopt in order to make any impression on the mass of our countrymen is by no means that most agreeable to Catholic feeling, but it is here and now necessary, for all except a small minority, who are lost in the multitude of non-Catholics.

The questions to be discussed in different times and places are different, and the Catholic controversialist must meet them in the form in which they come up in his own time and place. His Eminence met them as they needed to be met in England from 1836 to 1844, and has written what is necessary at all times and places to meet that form of Protestantism assumed by the Tractarians; and nothing can be better adapted to the wants of those who still adhere to it in our own country. But the controversy with High-Churchism is ended in England, and a very different class of questions there have now to be met, in reality the same that we have had to meet here from the first. It is there no longer a question of dogma, of forms, or of ecclesiastical policy, but is first a question of politics, and afterwards a question between religion and no religion, Christianity and heathenism. His Eminence has settled the question as to High-Churchism, and shown that every High-Churchman denies the Catholic Church only at the expense either of his conscience or of his logic. Frightened by his success in argument, Protestantism calls upon the civil authority for assistance, and, after her old instincts, seeks to entammel and restrain by force what she is impotent to check by reason. It is probably too late to do more by force than to vex and annoy, and soon Protestantism must take a new ground of defence.

This new ground, if new it is, is already beginning to be assumed amongst us, and will soon be assumed in Great Britain; for such is the intimate relation of the two countries that the opinions of each act and react on the other with surprising rapidity. As yet, here as in England we are opposed principally in the name of civil and religious liberty; but this sort of opposition, when liberty is understood in its proper sense, is too ridiculous to continue for any great length of time, and must soon be abandoned. The new ground of defence Protestantism is to assume is one we are very glad to see making its appearance. The attacks we and others have made on the sects, though made without hope and as if beating the air, are beginning to tell, and we see in various quarters the concession made, that, if it be admitted that Christ founded a Church at all, we must accept the Catholic Church, and therefore, to escape going to Rome, it must be stoutly denied that our Lord founded any Church, or instituted any ministry

of his word. This is what Evangelical Protestantism is now undertaking to prove, and the question now comes up, as simply a question between Catholicity and no church, — the very form in which it always presented itself to our own mind. How men of common sense and common honesty could reject the Catholic communion, and still contend that our Lord instituted a ministry or founded a Church, was to us as great a puzzle when we were a Protestant as it is now. To us it always seemed that Protestantism in its very essence was the rejection of every church and every sacerdotal principle. We had hardly commenced our career as a Protestant minister, before we began preaching against every thing that implied a church, on the very ground that, if we admitted a single church idea, we must, if consistent, go back to Mother Church. The thing seemed to us as plain as that two and two make four. Hence the Tractarian movement was one with which we could not sympathize, and the sincerity and honesty of the Tractarians seemed to us most difficult to be believed, and we could believe in them only on the ground of the perversion of the English mind which had resulted from its long study to find a *via media* between truth and falsehood. How a Tractarian could honestly admit so much and not admit more, could say two and two, and refuse to add — make four, we could not understand, and we should never have understood it had we not become a Catholic. But all our Protestant sects are in reality, though not so glaringly, as inconsistent, as illogical, as High-Church Anglicans.

The discomfiture of the High-Church party has finally opened the eyes of a large number of Protestants, and compelled Protestantism to abandon all pretensions to be a church and to fall back on no-churchism. But it will be discomfited on this ground also, for if any thing is certain in Christianity, it is that our Lord did establish a Church and instituted an external ministry of his word. This was proved to complete demonstration in an article republished in our *Essays and Reviews*, entitled *The Church against No-church*. Protestantism must then fall back on the ground of “no external authoritative revelation,” a ground already assumed by the modern spiritualists, the more advanced party of Protestants, and shown to be untenable in the first article in our present number. Discomfited on this ground,

it must and will fall back on the ground of no religion, and on this ground the great battle between Catholics and Protestants in the United Kingdom and the United States will have to be fought. All the engagements previously are only preliminary skirmishes, and really decide nothing. But though we see this very clearly, and can have no doubt whither Protestantism is tending, there is little to be gained by anticipating its developments. We must follow it step by step, and meet it on each new ground, as it assumes it, only too thankful to find it assuming any ground at all. The great difficulty in dealing with Protestants is and always has been in making them understand their own Protestantism. They do not understand, they have never understood it, and they never fairly accept either its principles or its consequences. They never will till driven to do so by their own experience. But the pressure from without and from within is every day increasing, and they find it less and less satisfactory and availing to continue their old practice of saying yes and no in the same breath to one and the same proposition. They must ere long make up their minds to say either the one or the other only, either to abandon Protestantism or else to accept and abide by it in its essential principles and its logical consequences. In the mean time, though we cannot expect to gain over the main body of Protestants, we must meet each phase of the movement as it is developed, each special controversy as it arises, and if we meet it fairly, wisely, firmly, with the uncompromising yet gentle and hopeful spirit of our religion, we hope to reap at each successive stage a rich harvest of such as are to be saved.

His Eminence has never, any more than we, supposed that all Protestantism is concentrated in High-Churchism, and that the great body of Protestants will consent to accept the issue between it and the Church. He of course regarded it and treated it as a special question, and as a special question, though a very interesting and important one, he has treated it so as to leave us nothing to desire. Wherever the controversy with High-Churchism is not out of date, his *Essays* offer us the best models and afford us all the assistance we need. They are worthy of the serious consideration of the Catholicizing party among Protestants everywhere, though not especially adapted to the form which the question assumes out of the Anglican

Church. But nowhere is the question his Eminence has discussed the only question of the day. We have other controversies than that with High-Churchmen, and questions to be solved which but few among us have studied thoroughly and completely mastered, although we have of course in our Church and her teaching the principle of their solution. But if we have the principle, we do not always understand its application, and to understand its application we must understand well our own times. We must not look only at the surface of things, and take them as they may present themselves at first sight. Error has a genetic history as well as truth, only the genesis of error is negative, and that of truth is affirmative. Error is never pure; it is always a mixture of truth and falsehood; the truth it holds tends always to eliminate the falsehood and become pure truth, and the falsehood tends always to eliminate the truth and become pure falsehood. This double process of elimination is always going on in the bosom of Protestantism, and explains, as we have elsewhere shown, its tendency on the one hand to a return to the Church, and on the other hand to absolute unbelief.

But in all parties starting with an error, the great body always adhere to the false, and aid in carrying on the elimination of truth. The great majority of Protestants are here and everywhere more wedded to their Protestantism in what it has that is infidel, than in what it has that is coincident with Christianity. Hence they are more ready to carry on the work of eliminating and rejecting the truth hitherto retained, than they are the elimination and rejection of the falsehood adopted by the Reformers. The sects are by their errors thrown back on corrupt human nature, fallen anew under the dominion of Satan; and corrupt human nature under his dominion is open to every illusion, and is sure to mistake falsehood for truth. It is thus we see in the mass of the Protestant world the false principles of the Reformers becoming every day more and more exclusive, and developing more and more distinctly their legitimate consequences. The same human nature which led the Reformers to adopt their false principles, we must remember, is also in ourselves, and in us, though it may be restrained by grace, and effectually resisted by constant vigilance and prayer, it is never annihilated. The greatest saint, who has led a life of the highest and truest sanctity, may fall

at the last moment, and be lost for ever. Hence it is that errors in a subtle form, not directly and immediately opposed to faith, so disguised as not to alarm the true believer, have a perpetual tendency to make their way, from the non-Catholic world without, among Catholics themselves, to the undermining at first of their piety, their virtue, and finally of their faith.

Protestantism has developed its denial of authority till it has become completely revolutionary, and its doctrine of individual independence till social order and society itself are threatened with utter dissolution. The error with Protestants began in the religious order, and was directed solely against the Church; but it subsequently passed into the political and social order, and is now passing into the domestic circle. But under its political and social character it found its way in the last century among the Catholic populations of Europe, and it is now no uncommon thing to find Catholics who are thoroughly Protestant, that is, thoroughly atheistic, in their political and social doctrines and tendencies. It is in this fact that the revolutionism or the radicalism of our age finds its chief support; and it is worthy of note that the war against political authority, social order, and religion is carried on to-day almost exclusively under the lead of apostate Catholics. The most influential and depraved radicals that the convulsions of Europe have thrown into the United States, as well as the most violent and energetic Antipopery lecturers, are almost without exception apostates from the Church. Without these apostates, Protestantism could no longer hold up its head.

These apostates are of course all infidels, at least men who have lost all respect for religion, who have made up their minds to live and die for this world alone. They despair of heaven and they welcome hell. They consequently give to their Protestant followers their own character and animate them by their own spirit. Caring nothing themselves for doctrine or morals, animated solely by love of the world on the one hand, which they call *patriotism*, and by hatred of the Church on the other, which they call *liberty*, they make war against us professedly in the name of liberty and patriotism, but really in hatred of all restraint, and in devotion to the world, the flesh, and the Devil. And this is the form in which we have to meet the ques-

tion of religion or no religion. At bottom it is, as we so often say, the old question between the flesh and the spirit, the Church and the world, Christianity and heathenism.

It seems to us, therefore, that our great work at present is to be for those within rather than for those without; and looking to the whole of Christendom, it consists precisely in bringing the faithful themselves to see and understand the great principles of our religion in their application to the great radical, socialistic, and revolutionary movements of our age. Past ages have shown the distinction between the temporal and spiritual, and even the union of the two as external governments; we are called upon to go a step deeper, and show the unity of all power in its origin and principle, and that in a deep internal sense the assertion of the independence of the temporal is virtual atheism. We must not revive the theocratic form of society or of government, but reassert the truth that was embodied in that form, and make it familiar again to the minds and hearts of the faithful. It is only as we weed out all radicalism, socialism, and revolutionism from our own minds, and comprehend that they are damnable errors, and incompatible with religion, the teachings and the spirit of the Church, that we can place ourselves in a position to carry on successfully the controversy demanded by our age.

In this work we can obtain less assistance from the great controversialists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries than in almost any other, because the questions in the form we have to meet them are modern. Bellarmine, Suarez, the brothers Wallenbruch, Bossuet, and the noble old English Jesuit Fathers, who did their work so well in their day, cannot serve us here, except so far as the enunciation of principle is concerned. Nor can we be much profited in this work even by the mediæval divines, or by those learned and enthusiastic writers in our own day, who are so nobly repairing the injustice so long and so generally done to the Middle Ages by Protestant, and to some extent even by Catholic historians; for the questions of our times were seldom mooted in those ages, and when they were, as in the fourteenth century they began to be, they were summarily disposed of by authority, not by discussion. The Middle Ages had much to be admired and honored, but they have passed away, probably never to return. We are not to look to them for our models, nor for

our ideal of a Christian society. The world was baptized then, but it was far enough from ceasing to be the world. The notion which some entertain, that the Church in those ages had organized society to her own wishes, and that we must take the state of things which then obtained as the ideal we are to strive to realize, is one we cannot accept. We like on this point some remarks of Count Franz de Champagny, which we trust he will permit us the liberty to quote: —

“ We are accustomed in our times, in consequence of a reaction fully justified by the injustice of the last century, to seek the perfection of Christian life and Christian works exclusively in the Middle Ages. We can no longer comprehend a Christian hero unless he has a cross on his breast ; Christian prayer seems almost impossible elsewhere than under Gothic ogives. The Middle Age, or more strictly, the thirteenth century, is supposed to have been the grandest epoch of the Church, her apogee, her moral era, before which there had been only a laborious infancy, and since which there has been only a rapid decline.

“ I do not believe, I avow it, either in this maturity so tardy, or in this decline so rapid. The thirteenth century, great and glorious as it was for Christianity, does not appear to me to have been her only epoch of glory. I render it justice and admiration ; I do not think that I owe it an exclusive worship. I bow with reverence before the genius of a St. Thomas or a St. Anselm, without believing myself for that obliged to treat St. Augustine, St. Basil, St. Chrysostom, as pagans. I meditate in admiration and prayer under the magnificent ogives of the thirteenth century, without forgetting, however, those Romanesque churches of preceding centuries which the taste of our age still neglects, without ceasing to love and respect those venerable basilicas of the city of Rome, marked still with the seal of the early Christian times. I recur with a loving curiosity to the natural and devout paintings of the Middle Ages, but I comprehend and appreciate none the less those paintings so beautiful of the Catacombs, where art, Grecian in its form, is already thoroughly Christian in its thought. I sacrifice not one Christian epoch to another, and above all do I refuse to admit that Christianity had in the thirteenth century, or in any other century, reached a culminating point, to the height of which it could never before attain, and after which it could do nothing but descend.

“ I go even further ; when I study our age, it seems to me that the first ages of the emancipated Christian Church are those which it is the most useful to be recalled to our memories. We are no longer in the conditions of the Middle Ages. That infancy of Christian Europe, that uncivilized state of new peoples, against

which the Church struggled laboriously and gloriously, has had its day. We are an adult, too adult society, and if there is in the past any thing that we should remember, it is the attitude of the Church, in face of a society whose infancy, as ours, had long since passed away, and which suffered, as we suffer, from the excesses and vices, not from the want, of civilization. We are by our manners, unhappily perhaps, the Romans of Constantine, rather than the Franks of Clovis; and the Fathers of the Church who lived in the fourth and fifth centuries have written what is better adapted to our age, than the legendaries and scholastics of those centuries which are called, a little too absolutely, the ages of faith." *

We are much nearer in our manners, our moral habits, and our modes of thought, to the Romans under the earlier Christian emperors, than we are to our ancestors of the Middle Ages, and modern society, especially in our own country, is far more Roman than feudal. We live, too, all through Christendom, in an old and crumbling society, and our vices and errors are those of the Roman Empire, from Constantine to Augustulus, rather than those of the Middle Ages. In the study of dogma, of morals, in seeking systematic arrangement, precision of thought, and exactness of expression, we must undoubtedly give our days and nights to the great mediæval doctors, but in studying how to deal with a civilization in its decrepitude, with a society that crumbles around us, how to meet the errors which spring from pride, refinement, excess, and sordid worldliness, we must leap over the Middle Ages and make ourselves masters of the great writers of the fourth and fifth centuries, and of the history of the Roman world from the time the Church emerged from the Catacombs to the downfall of the Western Empire. The ante-Nicene period has been studied with a great deal of care and success, as has lately been the period from the barbarian conquests to the revival of the classics in the fifteenth century; but the fourth and fifth centuries — so rich in the great names of the Church, so remarkable for Christian activity and beneficence, for the new character given to legislation, and the new efforts for social amelioration, and so disastrous by Arian astuteness, tyranny, and persecution, and by the venality and corruption of placemen, the insupportable

* *Revue Contemporaine*, Tome VIII. pp. 5, 6.

burdens imposed upon property, and barbarian invasions and conquests — are, after all, only imperfectly known, and have seldom been consulted for the lessons they afford applicable to our own age. We do not know a single intellectual, moral, or social question which comes up to day, that was not raised and solved during those centuries; if not in the precise form in which we have to meet it, at least the same in substance. When you read St. Chrysostom, you feel that you are reading a contemporary author, and the question discussed by St. Augustine in his *De Civitate Dei* is really the great question we have to discuss to-day. The non-Catholics of his time declared the decay and fall of the Empire were owing to the introduction and spread of Christianity, and the non-Catholics of to-day tell us the decline of Spain and Portugal and the Italian republics from their former grandeur is owing to Catholicity. In the time of St. Augustine they charged to the Church the political and social evils endured, and they charge the political and social evils of our times to the same cause. Then and now the real charge against our religion is, that she does not save the world from temporal ills, or create a paradise on earth. It is in the name of the world, at both epochs, that she is arraigned. To the great Fathers of that epoch we must then recur for instruction as to the best mode of dealing with our own.

But we have no space to develop this subject as we could wish, and we must content ourselves with the few hints we have thrown out. We think the fourth and fifth centuries will help us to understand our own times far better than the twelfth and thirteenth, and we are sure that the first want of our Catholic controversialists is to understand the real character of the present age. We do not in saying this imply any want of this understanding on the part of his Eminence; indeed, his *Essays* prove that he does understand both his age and country. We only say that the High-Church controversy is a specialty, and by no means the great controversy of our times. We, however, cannot conclude without expressing our deep gratitude to the illustrious author for the pleasure and the profit we have derived from his admirable *Essays*. We only wish there were more of them; and long may he live to instruct and edify the faithful, to refute heresy, and to elevate the tone of Catholicity, both in his own country and in ours.

ART. VI. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *A History of England from the Invasion of the Romans to the Accession of William and Mary, in 1688.* By JOHN LINGARD, D. D. From the last revised London Edition, in Thirteen Volumes. Boston: Phillips, Sampson, & Co. 1853. Vols. I. — III. 16mo.

THE publishers fall into a mistake when they tell us in their first volume that they print from the last London edition, for they print from the plates of the edition of 1837–39. In the Preface to their second volume, however, they tell us that they have incorporated into their edition all the important additions, which are very numerous, made by Dr. Lingard in the fifth and last London edition, in ten volumes octavo, which was published in 1849–50. How far they keep their promise we are unable to say, for we have not collated the two editions to any considerable extent; but if they keep their promise, it is all that we ask. We are tenacious of the rights of authors, and insist that their works shall be republished with their latest improvements, additions, or alterations.

We are very glad to see this work republished by so enterprising a house as that of Messrs. Phillips, Sampson, & Co., for there can be no doubt that it is the best and the least inaccurate History of England that we have or are likely to have for some time to come. The author was a Catholic priest, and in this work did much to correct the falsifications which non-Catholic writers had introduced into English history. He effected by it for the cause of truth at the time when he wrote perhaps more than he would have done had he written in a more thoroughgoing Catholic spirit. If he had been more rigidly Catholic, he would have had only Catholic readers, and would have exerted little influence on Protestant scholars. Nevertheless, let no one imagine that in this work he has a Catholic History of England. It is a learned work, it is written from the original documents, with honest intentions and rare critical sagacity; but it is not written from the Catholic point of view. The author writes as a disciple of the lowest Gallican school, and gives to his history from beginning to end a coloring extremely offensive to a genuine whole-hearted Papist, who is deeply impressed with the fact that our Lord founded his Church on Peter. He writes, too, with a cold and half-sceptical spirit. He never warms, he never glows, never kindles with any enthusiasm, — he has no mellowness, and seems to grudge every concession he makes to the pious belief of his Catholic ancestors. He is the most thoroughgoing Englishman that we have ever read, and while his writings tend to make Protestants more favorable to the Church, they not unfrequently tend to damp the fervor and extinguish the love of the young and ingenuous Catholic. A dear friend of our own to whom we gave a copy of it found it almost shaking his faith in Catholicity. It certainly presents the Church in a most unamiable light to the ordinary reader.

We know this is severe criticism, but it is honest criticism, and, without meaning to question the good faith of the author, we must say that we think he has sought the ears of Protestants at the expense of the hearts of Catholics. No history can be true, can give a true account of facts in their real order and significance, that is not written from the Catholic point of view; for save on the supposition of the truth of Catholicity, all history is fable, is unintelligible, all its facts are disconnected, a chaos, without order, sequence, or meaning. He who fancies that he can be impartial

without assuming the truth of Catholicity, falls at the very outset into the grossest partiality; for he takes sides with the non-Catholics, and assumes a position from which he can obtain only a partial view of the facts and events he has to narrate. Dr. Lingard intended to be impartial, but he never understood either the meaning or the conditions of historical impartiality, and has throughout been partial to the enemies of his religion. Catholicity is never a party; it is impartiality itself. Nothing can be less impartial than to treat it as a party, and to attempt to hold the balance between it and non-Catholicity. We wish our historians could once understand this; we might then hope to have real history written.

Nevertheless, we are pleased to see this History republished amongst us, for although not by any means what a History of England should be, it is, in comparison with any thing else we have, a most excellent one. It is infinitely superior to Hume, and there is no comparison between it and Macaulay's romance. Without the history of England our own is unintelligible, and the history of that country must always be studied as the introduction to our own. Whoever has not access to the original monuments, or lacks the leisure or the ability to study them, will find Dr. Lingard's work the best work that he can consult. We will only add the caution to the Catholic reader, that he must not take it either in spirit or tendency as a Catholic work, and that he must in reading it be always on his guard against the author's Gallicanism, Whiggism, and ultra-nationalism.

2. *A General Introduction to the Sacred Scriptures, in a Series of Dissertations, Critical, Hermeneutical, and Historical.* By the REV. JOSEPH DIXON, D. D., Professor of Sacred Scripture and Hebrew in the Royal College of St. Patrick, Maynooth; now Archbishop of Armagh, and Primate of All Ireland. Two volumes in one. First American, carefully revised, from the Dublin Edition. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1853. 8vo. pp. 246 and 271.

WE are not qualified to judge of works of this sort, not precisely because we have never had any acquaintance with the branch of literature to which they belong, but because we have for many years almost entirely neglected it, and really do not know its present state among the learned. Sacred literature has been cultivated latterly very extensively in Germany, and elsewhere, and we do not know but it may during the last twenty years have received some important additions and undergone some important modifications. How far or how accurately the work of Dr. Dixon represents the present state of learning on the subject he treats, we are unable to say. It does not strike us as adding much to what was previously known to those who had devoted themselves to sacred literature; but it is evidently a work of solid learning, marked by good sense and sound judgment, and we are sure that it is by far the best work of the kind to be found in our language. It is certainly a valuable general introduction to the study of the Sacred Scriptures, if not for the more advanced scholars, at least for our seminaries and the general reader. It is, so far as our language is concerned, a most important contribution to sacred literature. We welcome it, as we do the excellent Biblical writings of the learned Archbishop of Baltimore, most heartily, not only for its positive merits, but for the new spring it will give in our mother country and

among ourselves to sacred literature, which has for a long time been too much neglected. We thank the most reverend author for his work, and we thank also Messrs. Murphy & Co. for their very neat and convenient American edition of it.

3. *The Cloister Life of the Emperor Charles the Fifth.* By WILLIAM STIRLING. From the Second London Edition. Boston: Crosby, Nichols, & Co. 1853. 12mo. pp. 322.

THE literary execution of this work deserves very high praise. It is the production of a cultivated taste and an accomplished pen. It bears, so far as the cloister life of Charles the Fifth is concerned, all the marks of historical truth, and is extremely valuable as exploding the many fables which Robertson and others have rendered current in English literature concerning that retirement of the Emperor. It gives us some facts which we were glad to learn, especially that Charles regretted before he died the *quasi* protection he had given to Luther and his brood in Germany. Had he been half as much in earnest to discharge his duty as protector of the Church as he was to extend and consolidate his power as Emperor, the subsequent history of Europe had been very different from what it is. Charles may have been a great man, but we confess we have very little respect for his memory, and we have no patience with the hypocrisy that put the Church in Spain into mourning for the Pope, while his own troops held him imprisoned and were plundering Rome for nine months. He was sworn as Emperor to protect the Church, especially the Church of Rome, and the Church suffered more from him than she has ever suffered from any single barbarian, infidel, or heretical prince. As a Catholic, we have no reverence for his memory. He was not the man for his times.

Mr. Stirling is a Protestant, and writes as a Protestant. We do not think he means to be unfair, or offensive to Catholics, but he cannot make an allusion to our religion without offering us a gratuitous insult. His work from beginning to end is full of Protestant cant, without his being at all aware of it. We would suggest to him the propriety of stopping now and then, and asking himself what he means by the words "bigotry" and "superstition," and kindred terms, and of making himself acquainted with the real history of the Papacy before he undertakes to pronounce a judgment on its policy. Before he judges the Church as a human institution and applies to her the reasoning which would be proper enough if she were only a human institution, he would do well to establish the fact that she is human, and not divine. There is very little reason or wit in adopting a theory which has and can have no foundation with regard to the Church, and then explaining all the phenomena of her history by it. Be certain that your theory is true and undeniable before you undertake to use it.

4. *Hymns of the Church; The Nativity, and other Poems.* By the REV. M. A. WALLACE. Portland: Sanborn & Carter. 1853. 12mo. pp. 321.

THE "Hymns of the Church," which give the general title to this not unhandsomely printed volume, fill just eight pages; "The Nativity,"

fills twelve pages; the "other Poems" make up the rest of the volume, and consist of several pieces entitled *Wild Scenes in the West*, that is, in Nova Scotia, *Men and Things*, *St. John, a Sacred Drama*, *Occasional Pieces*, some sacred, some profane, *Odes of Horace*, *Virgil's Pastorals*, the *Cathemerinon* from St. Prudentius, and *Emanuel, the Virgin-Born*, modified from the Latin of Sannazar, an Italian poet of the sixteenth century. Of the merits of such a medley of Christianity and heathenism it is not easy to speak favorably. The author is undoubtedly a passable versifier, and may be a very deserving priest, but we do not think that he was born to be a poet. He hints in his Preface that his pieces will be approved or condemned by the reader according as he is or is not a Catholic; we think he will find as severe critics among Catholics as he will among non-Catholics. We do not discover much Catholicity in the Odes of Horace, or in the Corydon and Alexis of Virgil, and we certainly do not recognize it as an article of faith to regard as Catholic whatever trash a Catholic may choose to write. Catholic literature in its poetic department is not so poor as to make us thankful for such small favors as we have here. Sannazar was a poet, but he wrote in the abominable taste of the sixteenth century, which substituted *Dii immortales* for *Holy Trinity*, and *Sanctus Zephyrus* for *Holy Ghost*,—a taste which we have no wish to see revived, and which, happily, it is no longer possible to revive. The translation of the *Cathemerinon* of St. Prudentius we should gladly accept, if not mixed up in a volume with the Epicureanism of Horace and the heathenism of Virgil's *Bucolics*. But we have no wish to treat the author or the translator with critical severity; we only say that his mixture of sacred and profane is as offensive to good taste as it is to piety, and that his pretensions to be a Catholic poet, as set forth in his Preface, provoke our protest. We cannot accept his volume as a specimen of what genius can do when under the inspiration and guidance of our holy religion. We are jealous of the honor of Catholic literature, and a Catholic who cannot sing better than a pagan or a heretic may as well confine himself to praying and giving of thanks, and not attempt to sing at all. He can save his soul, though he be no poet.

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5. *St. Joseph's Manual, containing a Selection of Prayers, for Public and Private Devotion; with a Brief Exposition of the Catholic Religion. Compiled from Approved Sources.* Boston: Donahoe. 1853. 24mo. pp. 696.

OUR publishers wish to have each a prayer-book of their own. Messrs. Murphy & Co. have *St. Vincent's Manual*; Messrs. Dunigan & Brother publish *The Ursuline Manual*, Messrs. Sadlier & Co. *The Golden Manual*, and Mr. Donahoe has now issued a new compilation under the title of *St. Joseph's Manual*. They are all excellent manuals, but, as tastes differ, some will prefer one and some another. We shall not attempt to draw any comparison between them, or to give the preference to one over another of them. We do not pretend that the one before us is superior to many others, but, as far as we have examined it, we are much pleased with its contents and arrangement. The various devotions appear to be selected with taste and judgment, and we have no doubt that it will be an especial favorite with a large class of our Catholic population. It is preceded by a brief, but a very valuable, exposition of the Catholic religion, and it contains the Hymns for Vespers throughout the year.

6. *Des Études Classiques et Études Professionnelles.* Par ARSÈNE CAHOUR, S. J. Seconde Edition, publiée par le Comité de l'Enseignement libre, sans le Présidence de M. le Comte Malé. A Paris. Chez Mme. Ve Poussielgue-Rusand, Editeur. 1853. 8vo. pp. 302.

WE are indebted to the learned author for a copy of this valuable work. We have read it with a good deal of interest, but we have now no room to speak of it according to its merits. Its subject is one which we have already discussed *à propos* of the *Ver Rongeur* of the Abbé Gaume, but we hope to be able to return to it in a future number, and to discuss it at some length in connection with the educational movements going on in our own country and in Europe.

7. *Witchcraft : a Tragedy in Five Acts.* By CORNELIUS MATHEWS. London : Bogue. 1852.

THIS Tragedy is by one of our countrymen ; but our attention was first called to it by a pretended translation of it in the *Revue Contemporaine* by M. Philander Chasles, who appears to do the reviewing of English and American books for the instruction and delectation of French humanity. As we read it in the French translation, we could make very little of it, and were utterly unable to recognize in it a single trait of our old Puritan society, or of far-famed "Salem Witchcraft." We could see in it nothing of Mr. Mathews, who possesses in a certain line no mean abilities, is in many respects a worthy rival of Dickens, and in some his superior, and we wondered what folly he had been committing. We were therefore led to examine the work in our mother tongue, and we find it as unlike M. Philander Chasles's work, as the *Henriade* is unlike the *Paradise Lost*. Mr. Mathews's Tragedy is really a spirited work, the production of intellect and poetical genius, and one of which as an American we are far from being ashamed. We hope M. Philander Chasles will attempt to do no more English works into French, and recommend him to learn English before he undertakes again to criticize, either favorably or unfavorably, our literature.

8. *On Fashions.* From the French of FATHER BOONE, S. J. Baltimore : Murphy & Co. 1853.

THIS is a small book, but it has a great spirit, and is one which we recommend all parents to read and study, and all fashionable people to commit to memory. It is painful to reflect how many souls are ruined by what passes for fashionable dress, or what is more properly denominated undress.

9. *Happy Nights at Hazel Nook ; or Cottage Stories.* By HARRIET FARLEY. Boston : Dayton & Wentworth. 1854. 16mo. pp. 256.

THIS is intended as a gift-book for the Christmas holidays, and is handsomely printed and illustrated. Some of the designs are very meri-

torious, though the execution is not as good as they deserve. The author is not a Catholic, but her stories are very prettily told, are quite interesting, and as unobjectionable as any thing that we can expect from a non-Catholic source. She is a very estimable lady, and is well known to the public by the *Lowell Offering*, which she edited for several years with so much credit to herself. We have no doubt that her *Happy Nights*, written in a cheerful and amiable spirit, will be a favorite with the young folks.

10. *Discourses and Essays on Theological and Speculative Topics.* By REV. STEPHEN FARLEY. Boston: Farley. 1851. 12mo. pp. 400.

THIS is a Unitarian work, and therefore one which we can in no sense approve; but it is one of the ablest works that has recently issued from the Unitarian press, and ought to be a great favorite with the Unitarians. We apprehend, however, that it is too serious and too intellectual for their taste. Its author was not educated under the influence of Unitarianism, and had an intellectual culture that is never to be looked for in those who are brought up Unitarians.

11. *Red Brook; or Who 'll buy my Water-cresses?* By FRANCIS FORRESTER, Esq. Boston: Rand. 1853.

A VERY pretty little story, with a fine pagan moral, smacking slightly of the Temperance humbug, but as good as modern paganism can be expected to produce.

12. *The Southern Quarterly Review.* Charleston: Walker & Burke. July, 1853.

THIS Quarterly Review has passed, we learn, under the editorial control of W. Gilmore Simms, one of the most indefatigable literary men of our country, and favorably known by several publications of great literary merit. It is for the South what the *North American Review* is for the North, and more spirited and original. It has a freedom and freshness about it that we like, a boldness and independence that we admire, and is less under the influence of literary coteries and party cliques than any other periodical of the kind we are acquainted with in the country. This, however, is not saying that we approve its opinions on all subjects, or agree with the general tenor of its speculations. It is non-Catholic, but never violently anti-Catholic in any of the numbers we have seen.

13. *Calmstorm, the Reformer. A Dramatic Comment.* New York: Tinson. 1853.

THIS is a work of a good deal of merit, written somewhat in the style of the elder English dramatists. It is a two-edged satire, and worthy to be read alike by our would-be Reformers and the great body of those who oppose them. Calmstorm is a visionary, and his enemies are unprincipled, living by abuses.

